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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1  The Renaissance of Civil Society Discourse 
 
In the span of the last twenty years, the notion of civil society has been 
recurring in contemporary social science, as well as in normative social and 
political theory. The great variety of possible theoretical and empirical 
perspectives accounts for a tremendous amount of literature on civil society. 
It also testifies to the inexhaustible intellectual potential of the concept. 
Remarkably, the recent renaissance of the term coincided with the uprising 
of anti-communist opposition in East-Central Europe and with the struggle 
against military dictatorships in Latin America. The trigger to re-examine the 
notion of civil society, which is, in fact, an authentic product of Western 
civilization, emerged thus not in Western established democracies, but in 
newly formed post-totalitarian democracies. The major upheavals in East-
Central Europe and Latin America attracted attention of many Western 
social scientists and philosophers, stimulating them to reconsider the 
significance of the rule of law, the public sphere, and civil society for a 
democratic system. As for newly formed democracies, the Western world 
anxiously waited to see whether post-totalitarian societies were sufficiently 
prepared to accommodate democracy both as a model of political rule and 
as a social-political ideal. The concept of civil society attained accordingly an 
unprecedented centrality in the discussion on democratization, as it raised 
vital issues concerning the role of social forces in defining, controlling, and 
legitimating political regime.  
Not surprisingly, a notion as complicated and multifaceted as civil 
society has invited a range of attempts to capture its “conceptual essence” 
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across time and space.1 The idea of civil society is essentially an intellectual 
product of the seventeenth century European Enlightenment and of the 
emancipation of society from the monarchic state. With the emergence of 
self-regulating civil society, the certainty of a status-based social order came 
to suffer a visible decline. During the following two centuries, the challenge 
of balancing the emergent tension between the public good and private 
interests was undertaken by such outstanding thinkers as Adam Ferguson, 
David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Karl 
Marx. In the twentieth century, the concept seemed to have exhausted its 
intellectual vigor and eventually came to oblivion, except for its restricted 
usage by Antonio Gramsci. 
In the context of East-Central Europe, civil society discourse can be 
characterized by a double perspective. On the one hand, the notion of civil 
society was enthusiastically invoked in democratizing countries for the 
ideological and political struggle against authoritarian regimes. For these 
countries, as Charles Taylor justly notices, “civil society defined what they 
had been deprived of and were struggling to recreate” by learning from the 
experience of established Western democracies (Taylor 1995: 204). John 
Keane elucidates that the emigration of the term from Western Europe 
occurred mainly due to “the dramatic growth of non-governmental civic 
organizations operating at the international level, which allowed the subject 
of civil society to enter into broad public discourse, beyond the circles of 
academics and journalists” (Keane 1998: 32-33). On the other hand, such 
powerful resurgence of the notion of civil society led to its oversimplified 
usage because the notion became instantaneously prescribed to all countries 
in transition as a panacea against the maladies of their non-democratic past.   
In Western scholarship, the discussion assumed a quite different edifice. 
Taking into account that Western liberal democracies already had 
functioning civil societies, as well as a rich political-philosophical tradition 
of liberalism and democracy, Western scholars surpassed the strategic 
significance of civil society for the process of democratization. They were 
rather concerned with a moral dimension of the idea and the reality of civil 
society. However, despite the fact that the revitalized civil society discourse 
underwent a serious reorientation in Western scholarship, it managed to 
sustain its paramount intellectual heritage. The discussion started to involve 
such new topics as the role of values and norms in modern societies, the 
                                               
1 For concise, yet substantive overviews of the evolution of the concept of civil society, see 
Keane 1998, Seligman 2002, 1992a, 1992b, Taylor 1995, and Parekh 2004.  
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type of bonds among people and trust they have in each other, the moral 
foundation communities create and sustain, the extent to which people 
constitute a common public space through participation and civic 
engagement, as well as the role of the mass media and of the intellectual 
debate. Gradually, civil society became associated with the notions of 
culture (Gramsci 1971), community (Etzioni 1971, 1993), the public sphere 
(Habermas 1992), civility (Elias 1994), social capital (Putnam 1993 & 2002), 
popular participation and civic mindedness (Verba 1995), civic virtue and 
citizenship (Kymlicka 2002), pluralism (Keane 1998), and individual 
freedom (Walzer 1995).  
As far as the “conceptual essence” of civil society is concerned, the 
consequences of such an unprecedented global extension of the concept 
proved both devastating and invigorating. The impact was devastating 
because the notion of civil society lost its ‘conceptual integrity’ and 
disintegrated into as many applications as it was allegedly flexible enough to 
fit. Due to the fact that the term ‘civil society’ has been claimed by experts 
from diverse fields of social sciences, it clearly suffers from conceptual 
vagueness and remains continuously contested in terms of its actual 
meanings and uses. Burgeoning popularity of the notion accelerated “the 
accumulation of inherited ambiguities, new confusions, and outright 
contradictions. For this reason alone, the expanding talk of civil society is 
not immune to muddle and delirium” (Keane 1998: 36). On this point, I can 
fully agree with Nancy Rosenblum and Robert Post that “civil society is so 
often invoked in so many contexts that it has acquired a strikingly plastic 
moral and political valence” (Rosenblum & Post 2002: 1). Regrettably 
enough, an amazing array of meanings resonating from what Keane has 
named the “increasingly polysemic signifier ‘civil society’ ” contributed 
indeed to the negative connotation of this container notion.  
Nonetheless, I hold the opinion that the extensive usage of the concept 
of civil society did contribute to the conceptual richness of the notion. 
Western analysts of civil society were encouraged to revise the political-
cultural tradition associated with the rise of civil society in the West and 
readdress, from this new perspective, urgent problems inherent in 
contemporary Western democracies. In the meanwhile, their East-European 
colleagues were able to introduce some new trajectories in civil society 
research. Eventually, as the development of Russian post-Soviet science 
demonstrates, Eastern and Western scholars received the opportunity to 
become acquainted with each other’s positions and initiate a cooperative 
dialog, instead of confining themselves to monologs that focus exclusively 
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on their local problems. Ardent debates followed addressing such topics as 
democratization, liberalism, authenticity of Russian historical experience and 
interaction of culture, politics, and religion. The very possibility of reflection 
beyond one’s cultural context stimulates experts in the field of Russian 
studies to assess Russia’s intellectual heritage and its specific historical 
realities from a comparative perspective. 
With this in mind, I define the underlying objective of the present study 
as a clarification of what Russia had, has, or could have in common with 
Western liberal democracies. The intent is to contribute to the current 
debate on whether Russia can be seen as genetically belonging to the 
“family-tree” of Western civilization and thus as a legitimate member of 
European and Transatlantic partnership. By focusing on the specifics of 
Russian political and social tradition, I intend to explain what renders 
Russian state and society so different from those of Western democracies. 
In particular, I am concerned with the complex of moral resources that 
induce Russian society to pursue the path that may seem incomprehensible, 
appallingly unpredictable, or even entirely uncontrollable to external 
observers.  
 
1.2  Focus and Scope  
 
Given the focus of the present study on the idea and the reality of civil 
society in post-Soviet Russia, I define the central question as follows: How 
can we assess contemporary Russian civil society? The posed question raises 
a spectrum of consequent questions and qualifications, among which one is 
extremely important. In the attempted assessment, we are immediately 
confronted with the ambiguity ensuing from contradictory observations 
concerning democratic consolidation and civil society in post-Soviet Russia. 
On the one hand, as Dianne Schmidt reveals in her survey article ‘What 
Kind of Civil Society Exists in Russia?’,2 some scholars insist that Russian 
civil society remains weak and internally disintegrated, lingering at a low 
level of development, tending to assimilate with the state or business, or 
that civil society does not exist in Russia at all. Alternatively, other scholars 
are convinced that civil society does not only successfully function in 
democratic Russia, but also has foundations in the long-term historical 
traditions of Russian political culture, pointing at the tradition of self-rule 
                                               
2 Диана Шмидт, «Какое гражданское общество существует в России?» // Pro et Contra 
(Январь – февраль 2006). 
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extant in medieval cities of the North-European part of Russia (for instance, 
Velikij Novgorod). These two contradictory standpoints in assessing 
Russia’s democratic project create a high tension in the relevant discussion. 
 
1.2.1 Positive Developments during the Democratic Period 
 
The indicated tension can be explained by the biased position of the 
scholars. First, let us explicate the bias by evaluating the democratic project 
from a positive side. In comparison with the Soviet period, the crucial years 
of the perestrojka signified the regeneration of public life. This trend 
continued also during the subsequent period of liberal democratic reforms, 
associated with president Boris El’tsyn. Certainly, the revival of civic 
engagement in various organizations of civil society was determined by the 
new legal, economic, and political conditions of democratic rule. After 
decades of Soviet suppression and underground existence in the dissident 
circles, civil activity finally assumed legitimate forms. Thereby, it acquired 
greater political efficacy and gained a broad spectrum of adherents. The 
results presented in Natal’ja Dorosheva’s essay show that if at the dawn of 
the perestrojka (in 1987-88), the so-called third sector of society listed only 
thirty to forty social organizations, by 2002, the number of non-commercial 
organizations had increased to over three hundred thousand (Dorosheva 
2002: 6).3  
In 2000, the newly elected president Vladimir Putin announced fostering 
the development of civil society as one of the chief priorities of his policy 
program. In 2001, the presidential administration summoned “Civil Forum” 
to engage into discussion with the representatives of various organizations 
of civil society. Four years later, in 2005, a next step was undertaken by 
establishing the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation. This organ was 
“designed to interact with citizens of the state and local authorities, to take 
into account the needs and interests of citizens, to protect their rights and 
freedoms in the formation and implementation of public policies, as well as 
to implement public control over the activities of the authorities.”4 The 
Public Chamber became a forum for public debates, symposia, and 
conferences where local representatives of government services, scholars, 
and experts dealing with the third sector could share their experiences. 
                                               
3 Наталья Дорошева, Все, что вы хотели знать о некоммерческом секторе, но боялись спросить 
(2002). 
4 The information is available online at www.oprf.ru. 
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During the subsequent two years, 2006 and 2007, the Public Chamber 
published two annual reports on the state of Russian civil society. In 2008, it 
published the proceedings of the public assembly as the volume Empirical 
Studies of Civil Society (Lopukhin 2008).5  
Referring to this publication, I want to attend specifically to A. 
Kinsburskij’s contribution ‘Has Civil Society Been Formed in Russia until 
Now?’.6 The study comprises interviews7 held with the representatives of 
the local elite of the Russian Federation, whom the author characterizes as 
“status-holding leaders of public opinion who accumulate and to a certain 
extent reflect public opinion, but also participate simultaneously in its 
formation” (Kinsburskij 2008: 73). As the results demonstrate, only one 
third of the respondents believe that civil society has been (partially) 
established, whereas the majority (69 percent) gave a negative answer. 
Kinsburskij’s survey also reveals a significant differentiation between 
various groups of the respondents in their assessment of civil society. 
Remarkably, the idea that Russian civil society exists and functions is 
endorsed by the group of local representatives of the presidential 
administration (50 percent). An intermediate position belongs to the 
representatives of legislative power (38 percent) and of law enforcement 
agencies (34 percent). This contrasts the leaders of industrial enterprises (25 
percent), the representatives of social organizations (28 percent), and the 
group of owners of private businesses (13 percent). 
The results of Kinsburskij’s study reveal a paradoxical trend in the 
assessments of the respondents. Despite the fact that the democratic state 
presumes more freedom for civil society and business, the representatives of 
these two sectors hold a more moderate opinion about the establishment of 
civil society in post-Soviet Russia, whereas they are supposed to hail the 
transition to democracy and a market economy. A higher assessment of the 
success of the democratic project is endorsed by the representatives of the 
bureaucratic-legislative apparatus. This observation induces us to look at the 
problem of Russian civil society more critically. 
 
                                               
5 А. Лопухин (сост.), Эмпирические исследования гражданского общества. Сборник материалов 
общественых слушаний (2008). 
6 А. Кинсбурский, «Сформировалось ли к настоящему времени в России гражданское 
общество?» // А. Лопухин (сост.) Эмпирические исследования гражданского общества (2008). 
7 The interviews were held by the independent public opinion research center “Glas naroda” in 
April-June 2008.  
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1.2.2 Negative Factors in the Development of Russian Civil Society 
 
In contradistinction to the general revival of the third sector over the last 
two decades, there are doubtlessly several points of critique. First, as 
Schmidt correctly notices, state authorities tend to control those civil society 
organizations that are financially supported by foreign investors. 
Government officials do not trust the ideological climate of those 
organizations, considering them suspicious and inadequate. This ideological 
control aggravates the conditions under which civil society organizations 
have to survive because government subsidies do not simply suffice for all 
their needs. Schmidt laconically concludes, “Propositions to provide more 
sufficient government support are reduced in practice to the support of the 
groups that are loyal to the federal or local authorities, whereas financial 
support on the part of big Russian business is constantly confronted with 
some kind of obstacles” (Schmidt 2006: 7).  
Besides increasing distrust in foreign investors, the institutional 
organization of Russian civil society is also criticized for being dependent on 
the government. Certain analysts, among whom Sergej Peregudov, 
Konstantin Kostjuk, and Oleg Kharkhordin, consider Russian civil society 
to be constructed in a top-down way. This is in contradistinction to the 
natural, bottom-up mode of the development of grass-root organizations. 
The omnipresent influence of state authorities on the formation of Russian 
civil society testifies to “the authoritarian position of state power with 
regard to organizations of civil society, independent researchers, and 
journalists” (Schmidt 2006: 8). A contributing factor to the preeminent role 
of the state in instigating and maintaining different civil society associations 
can be also related to the communist legacy manifest in the population’s 
lingering belief that social groups, formed on the basis of certain interests 
and needs, are unable to act without control of the state. According to the 
results of E. Topoleva-Soldunova’s research on the (de)motivations of 
Russian citizens to participate in voluntary and charity associations, a 
significant number of respondents traditionally shift the responsibility for 
urgent social problems in their regions to local authorities. Thus, they do 
not distinguish between the structural tasks of government services and of 
non-commercial organizations (Topoleva-Soldunova 2008: 135).8  
                                               
8 Е. Тополева-Солдунова, «Готовность граждан к волонтерской и благотворительной 
деятельности через НКО: факторы мотивации и демотивации» // А. Лопухин (сост.) 
Эмпирические исследования гражданского общества (2008). 
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Moreover, as we can infer from Topoleva-Soldunova’s account, the 
sector of non-commercial organizations is undermined by the bad 
reputation they have acquired over the past two decades. Non-commercial 
organizations are suspected of spending their financial resources 
inefficiently and of participating in financial machinations aimed at ‘money 
laundering.’ On this view, new civil society organizations have to cope not 
only with the enduring remnants of the communist past, such as general 
distrust in public organizations, but also with the consequences of the 
radical liberal reforms of the early 1990s, in result of which many ordinary 
Russians came to associate public organizations with the sector of the 
twilight economy. 
 
1.2.3 Qualification of the Scope of the Study 
 
Although more research should be done concerning the type and the 
character of contemporary Russian civil society, the above discussion 
provides a number of tentative criteria for a coherent account. The 
ambiguous assessment of Russia’s transition to democracy, with its 
achievements and failures, reflects the complexity of the concept of civil 
society. In this sense, Schmidt is correct when averting that “the usage of 
the term in academic discussion, as well as in the official rhetoric still tends 
rather to complicate than to facilitate comprehension of the phenomenon” 
(Schmidt 2006: 6). On this view, I suppose that it would be shortsighted to 
measure recent developments in Russia’s democratic project exclusively by 
Western standards. Instead, the scope of the study should be defined by 
specifying three dimensions in the analysis: an analytical distinction between 
the normative and descriptive elements, a comparative perspective, and a 
historical perspective.  
First, the question how to assess the idea and the reality of civil society in 
contemporary Russia presumes an analytical distinction between the 
descriptive and normative elements in the analysis. The methodological 
problem with exploring civil society has to do with the connectedness of 
these two analytical elements. Namely, civil society can be analyzed as a 
theoretical idea, founded on an ideal vision of society, and, at the same time, 
as a social reality, as a tangible social phenomenon. Although I need to 
make such an analytical distinction in the study, I recognize, nonetheless, 
that whenever we speak of the idea of civil society, we inevitably build on 
certain descriptions of the social reality, and accordingly whenever we 
describe the social reality, we understand that this reality reflects the idea.  
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Second, the evaluative strategy of the research presumes a comparative 
perspective. The frequently repeated claim of many Western and Russian 
analysts that Russian civil society is underdeveloped raises the question 
pertaining to the causes of the deficient development of civil society. The 
exploration of the causes instigates us to compare the contemporary 
situation in Russia with the allegedly advanced models of democracy and 
civil society of Western countries. As noted above, recent Western discourse 
on civil society has been reinvigorated by the democratic revolutions in 
East-Central Europe. Then, the discussion revealed the vital importance of 
civil society, in the form of public debate and voluntary civil activity, for the 
sustainable success of Western democracies. In this discussion, the 
normative ideas associated with the general theory of democracy were 
revisited. That is why, in order to evaluate the development of civil society 
in post-Soviet Russia, I need to attend to the self-critical accounts of civil 
society that emerged in recent Western discussion as well. 
Next to the comparative perspective and the combination between the 
normative and descriptive elements, the study also includes a historical 
perspective. In order to understand current developments in political and 
social life of Russia, we need to consider them in a proper conceptual-
historical and cultural context. This is also necessary given the 
abovementioned objective to clarify the specifics of Russian political and 
social tradition.   
 
1.2.4 Subsequent Research Questions and Outline 
 
The central question of this study, namely how to assess civil society in 
post-Soviet Russia, can be further broken down into more specific 
questions, which guide the line of my argument and determine the sequence 
of the chapters. 
The delineation of the moral dilemmas inherent in civil society discourse 
is the primary objective of the second chapter. The question that I shall 
pursue is whether civil society is a good society and which arguments can be 
formulated pro and contra this claim. I shall address the problems that 
theorists are confronted with when they try to provide a normative 
validation for the idea and the reality of civil society. In order to identify 
these problems, I shall start with a conceptual history of the notion of civil 
society as it developed in the West. Next, I shall analyze the core dilemma 
of civil society discourse, namely how to reconcile individual freedom and 
rights with the common good and public ethics. The extant approaches to 
INTRODUCTION 
10 
 
this dilemma will be systematized into two theoretical schools: the liberal 
theory of civil society and the theory of deliberative democracy. 
In the third chapter, I intend to provide a sociological embedding of civil 
society theory and thereby place the discussion into a broader framework of 
social-scientific analysis, pertaining to the structure and the dynamics of 
modern society. The question is how we can develop an understanding of 
civil society as a spin-off of the process of societal differentiation, and why 
such an understanding is necessary. I suggest that the theory of functional 
differentiation of society complements the political-philosophical concept 
of civil society. This theory provides an empirical referent for the normative 
principles that underlie the concept of civil society. Accordingly, such 
principles as voluntary association, individual autonomy, plurality, legality, 
equality, and publicity acquire concrete descriptive characteristics in the 
theory of functional differentiation. With regard to a democratic system, the 
intended sociological embedding of civil society theory provides empirical 
evidence for the compatibility of a highly differentiated society with a 
complex set of social, civil, and political rights. 
The fourth chapter is concerned with the relationship between civil 
society and religion in the modern world. This general question will be 
addressed from a historical and intercultural perspective. In the first place, I 
shall consider the dialectic relationship between religion and modern 
secularism, as it developed in Western Christian world. In the second place, 
I shall focus on Russian history and specifically examine the relationship 
between Eastern Orthodox Christianity and secular society in Russia. In 
addition to historical analysis, I shall suggest a possible religious reading of 
civil society theory by resorting to the inspiring thoughts of the eminent 
Russian religious philosophers Vladimir Solov’ëv and Semën Frank. 
Having finished the theoretical part of the research, I shall turn to 
applying the attained insights to the continuously changing picture of civil 
society in contemporary Russia. The aim of the fifth chapter is to address 
the problem of institutional weakness of Russian civil society in the context 
of public morality. The underlying question concerns the role that moral 
attitudes play in the democratization process at the level of institutional 
transformations. In particular, I intend to reveal the kind of civil society that 
has been established after two decades of liberal democratic reforms, given 
the communist legacy of general political apathy of the majority of Russian 
citizens and their overt alienation from participation in the democratic 
process. The problem of mass distrust of public institutions is pivotal to this 
part of the analysis.  
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Although contemporary Russian civil society copes with many problems 
entrenched in distinctively Russian political culture and historical legacies, 
one can observe, nonetheless, an increasing importance of alternative moral 
resources for public reinvigoration. I tend to consider the Russian 
Orthodox Church as a determinate factor in the process of establishment of 
democracy. For that reason, I shall focus, in the sixth chapter, on the 
alternative conception of civil society that can be developed according to 
the theological tradition of Orthodox Christianity. This discussion aims at 
elucidating how Orthodox Christianity and civil society relate to each other, 
and whether their mutual assessment can be reckoned fruitful for the 
democratic project. 
 
1.3  Approach and Definition 
 
Given the versatility of civil society discourse, my intent is to bring some 
more clarity into the existing complexity by identifying, revising, and 
classifying eminent contributions to the debate so far. Before delving into a 
detailed discussion, I consider it necessary to accomplish two tasks. First, I 
shall systematize the diverse trends present in civil society discourse and do 
so by indicating main methodological contours of the analytic term ‘civil 
society.’ Secondly, I shall outline some salient commonalities in divergent 
definitions of civil society and provide, on the basis of the identified 
commonalities, my operational definition of civil society. I shall deliberately 
formulate my definition in oversimplified and schematic terms with the 
intention that it would sustain a firm conceptual core when placed in a 
dialog with different disciplines, like political theory, sociology, religious and 
cultural sciences, as well as in a different cultural context, when we address 
the specific case of Russia.   
 
1.3.1 Classification of Theorizations of Civil Society 
 
Various theoretical trends accentuate different components of civil society 
theory. Nevertheless, I maintain that there is much overlap among 
conceptual components accentuated by scholars. For that reason, I have 
decided to systematize the conceptions of civil society according to the 
emphasis they put on certain aspects of civil society theory with a view to 
sketching the broad methodological contours of these conceptions. So far, I 
have delineated three main categories of relevant studies: empirical, 
normative, and historical studies. 
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I categorize certain studies as empirical insofar as they, despite profound 
divergences between various strands, agree that civil society is indisputably 
an essential component of liberal democratic polity, as it simultaneously 
constitutes the social basis for the application of democratic governance and 
legitimizes the very existence of democratic states. Empirical accounts 
diverge immensely according to their underlying objective. In the present 
research, I shall consider the study of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) 
and a volume of critical essays with a pronounced focus on policy programs 
and fieldwork, edited by Peter Burnell and Peter Calvert (2004).  
The following two categories, i.e. normative and historical studies, 
comprise primarily theoretical studies. Although these studies draw on the 
empirical reality of civil society, their objective surpasses direct implications 
of the notion, as they aspire to provide an analytical-descriptive or 
normative account of the concept of civil society. As it will become clear 
from the further research, theoretical accounts of civil society often 
combine elements of descriptive and normative analyses, so that the 
methodological boundaries may seem blurred. 
A significant number of scholars are more interested in normative 
aspects, when they attempt to describe and simultaneously substantiate a 
certain conception of civil society. For instance, some scholars tackle 
primarily such vital issues of political theory as the unresolved antinomy 
between state power and individual freedom. The most prominent example 
is Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato’s study where they consider different 
normative conceptions of civil society within a broader framework of 
contemporary political theory (1992). Further, I need to mention Michael 
Walzer’s defense of a liberal reading of civil society (1995), Will Kymlicka’s 
research of the issues of citizenship and civic virtues (2002) and Simone 
Chamber’s deliberation on civil society from the perceptive of critical theory 
(2001, 2002). Noteworthy is the profound political-philosophical 
contribution of John Keane, who convincingly advocates a post-
foundationalist normative reading of civil society (1998).  
Besides these trajectories in the current research, the term ‘civil society’ 
made a triumphant appearance due to its allusion to the ideas of social 
capital, social cohesion, and communal spiritedness. Such qualification of 
the term is most saliently articulated in the communitarian contribution to 
the debate, presented by Robert Putnam (1993 & 2002), Amitai Etzioni 
(1995 & 2005), William Galston (1995), and Mary-Ann Glendon (1991). 
An attempt at systematizing normative aspects of the concept of civil 
society from the historical perspective is undertaken by Adam Seligman 
INTRODUCTION 
13 
 
(1992 & 2002) and Charles Taylor (1995). Providing historical-conceptual 
analysis of the concept, Taylor and Seligman seek to reveal crucial 
philosophical ideas and societal transformations that contributed to the 
development of civil society in the modern West.  
These, then, are the broad methodological contours of theorizations of 
civil society that testify to the complexity of the concept. 
 
1.3.2 Paradigmatic Commonalities in Civil Society Discourse 
 
While there is no single, unanimously agreed upon definition of civil society, 
I have tried to distinguish, nonetheless, some features that are paradigmatic 
to civil society discourse on the whole. I have discerned three most 
pronounced commonalities. 
As far as the definition of civil society is concerned, the overwhelming 
majority of scholars agree that the notion of civil society entails not only 
specific institutional structures, but also respective values and practices that 
these institutions embody. However, there is a general consensus to 
understand civil society as a rich array of voluntary associations that countervails 
the state and provides citizens with the skills and practices assistant for 
democratic government. This tangible description of civil society 
approximates what Taylor calls definition “in a minimal sense” (Taylor 
1995: 208) and is often considered by theorists as restrictive and insufficient. 
On this view, civil society can be redefined in a “strong” sense as embracing 
a wide range of characteristic features of modern liberal democratic societies. This 
understanding seeks to introduce the concept of civil society into a broader 
conceptual framework where civil society either is perceived as enhancing 
deliberative democracy (theorists of the Habermasian tradition such as 
Cohen, Arato, Chambers, or democratic communitarians such as Walzer 
and Kymlicka), or as embodying fundamental features and tensions inherent 
in Western civilization (Seligman, Taylor).  
However different these theoretical approaches may seem, they all 
eventually assert the importance of conceptualization of civil society beyond 
“the minimal sense.” I consider involving a more embracing perspective in 
the analysis of civil society to be necessary because it allows linking the 
organizational structure of civil society, as an intermediate public sector 
between the state and the economy, to the institutional-ethical 
characteristics of modern democracy. In this sense, one of the most 
successful attempts at synthesizing the two stipulated definitions of civil 
society has been undertaken by Helmut Anheier and Lisa Carlson who 
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conceived of civil society as operating at three different levels, namely at the 
level of institutions, concrete organizations, and individual citizens.9  
The second striking commonality in contemporary studies on civil 
society refers to the consistent claim of the tripartite relationship between 
democratic state, market economy, and civil society. As an essentially relational 
concept, civil society is systematically located in the tripartite relationship 
between the mentioned spheres. This tripartite relationship underscores the 
intimate connection of the conceptual history of civil society with such 
problematic issues as the limits of state power in regulating market 
economies and public life. Nowadays, there is a clear tendency among 
scholars to consider civil society as a sphere involved in a tripartite 
relationship with the state and the market. In this understanding, civil 
society functions as a buffer zone meant to control and resist the assaults of 
the state and the market that are potentially aggressive for society’s well-
being. Civil society occurs in current discourse as a tangible phenomenon 
subject to empirical description and hence to concrete localization. On this 
account, the notion of civil society has sufficient flexibility to be involved in 
reflection on difficult questions such as: Where to draw the secure 
boundaries against possible intervention of the market or the state in the life 
of civil society? How destructive could economic and political forces be for 
individual freedom and autonomy?  
The third glaring commonality that I can discern in the wide spectrum of 
civil society studies is the complexity of the concept and its resultant 
resistance to clear and coherent definitions. This complexity is inevitable 
because civil society is imbued with the permanent tension between its descriptive 
and normative components, which renders it an essentially hybrid notion. The 
tendency of many civil society theorists to amalgamate the descriptive and 
normative components leads consequently to the inevitable combination of 
descriptive and normative types of analysis they employ. With this in mind, 
I need to clarify methodological nuances of my study. 
                                               
9 An attempt at demonstrating the complexity of the intersections between civil society and 
modern institutions of the state, the economy, family, culture, and the media has been undertaken 
by Helmut Anheier and Lisa Carlson in the article ‘Civil Society: What It Is, And How to 
Measure It’ (2002) available online at www.lse.ac.uk/depts/ccs/briefings.htm. The scholars 
propose to define civil society in terms of the activities and values of institutions, organizations, 
and individuals located between the market, the state, and the family. Institutions are structural 
patterns that address and regulate specific areas or tasks and thus shape organization and pattern 
individual behavior. Organizations generally signify voluntary associations, non-governmental or 
non-profit organizations, social movements, networks, and informal groups. These organizations 
constitute the infrastructure of civil society; they are the vehicles and forums for social 
participation, the expression of values and preferences.  
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1.3.3 Types of Analysis of Civil Society 
 
Three types of analysis of civil society will be employed in the study: 
prescriptive-strategic, empirical-descriptive, and value-normative. Every type 
of analysis comprises the combination of descriptive and normative 
elements. 
Prescriptive-strategic analysis is employed prevailingly for studying 
democratic transformations in East-Central Europe. This analysis is 
founded on “the more direct and concrete political use of civil society as a 
slogan of different movements and parties” (Seligman 1992a: 201). Civil 
society is used then “for the purposes of calculating political strategies of 
achieving a predefined or assumed political good” (Keane 1998: 37).10 In 
the strategic usage, civil society performs an ideological function as a 
normative concept aimed at enhancing political efficacy. At the same time, 
this type of analysis is quite restricting because, as Seligman justly notices, it 
appears inadequate for transcultural studies. That scholar clarifies that 
“while in the West the idea of civil society is used as a political slogan to 
advance the cause of community, to mediate somewhat the adverse effects 
of the ideology of individualism,” in the East, the idea of civil society is 
meant “to advance an idea of the individual as an autonomous social actor 
and as an ethical and moral entity, an idea that is in a sense foreign to the 
political traditions of this area” (Seligman 1992a: 203). As a political slogan, 
civil society continuously faces the danger of becoming a sort of container 
notion that may be imbued with entirely different meanings and be rooted 
in entirely different traditions. Seligman concedes that when he criticizes the 
ideological use of civil society as a political slogan, he also slips from the 
political attributes into the normative attributes of the idea of civil society. 
Calling it “a common but nonetheless dangerous tendency,” the theorist 
                                               
10 Strategic usages of the concept of civil society can be also found in the renewed debate within 
the Gramscian tradition, which emphasizes the strategic importance of non-market and non-state 
institutions in the struggle against the exploitative power of capitalist society. Keane clarifies, 
“Gramsci usually – not always consistently – likened civil society to the labyrinthine trench 
systems of modern warfare. Wedged between the state and class-structured economy […] these 
‘fortresses and earthworks’ normally protect the ‘outer ditch’ of state power and shield the ruling 
class from the shock waves produced by economic crises.” By promoting the capturing of civil 
society structures as a vital precondition for the empowerment of the subordinated classes of 
proletariat, Gramsci attacked the Bolshevik strategy of violently seizing state power. The aim of 
the war in the trenches of civil society was “to avoid ‘statolatry’ by creating a communist civil 
society, whose successive enlargement would undermine the foundation of soft state and class 
power, thus sidestepping the danger of political dictatorship” (Keane 1998: 15). 
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considers turning to the analytic aspects of civil society as a sociological 
concept as a best remedy to halt this slide and rebalance the discussion. Let 
us follow Seligman’s apprehension and employ empirical-descriptive 
analysis, which allows considering civil society from a sociological 
perspective. 
In empirical-descriptive analysis, the term ‘civil society’ is used to 
describe “certain forms of social phenomena, of social organization on the 
macro-level, or even perhaps as a possible venue to link micro- and macro-
levels of social analysis” (Seligman 1992a: 201). According to Keane, civil 
society is depicted then “as an idealtyp to describe, explain, clarify and 
understand the contours of a given slice of complex reality.” Ultimately, 
empirical-descriptive analysis of civil society is aimed to develop “an 
explanatory understanding of a complex socio-political reality by means of 
theoretical distinctions, empirical research and informed judgments about its 
origins, patters of development and (unintended) consequences” (Keane 
1998: 37). In the socio-political reality of civil society, the institutional 
element is central, for it renders civil society “as an expression of a type of 
institutional order” (Seligman 1992a: 203) and allows conceiving of a 
complex reality of institutional structures. In this usage, the concept of civil 
society is commonly substantiated with the general theories of democracy 
and citizenship, being employed as a synonym to describe the organizational 
features of social life in the context of democracy. These features include, 
according to Seligman, freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of 
expression, the right to vote, eligibility for public office, the right of political 
leaders to compete for support and votes, alternative sources of 
information, freedom of the press, free and fair elections. Democracy needs 
these institutions for making government policies depend on votes and 
other expressions of preference (Seligman 1992a: 203-4).  
Finally, value-normative analysis underlies every discussion on civil 
society because it provides the foundation both for prescriptive-strategic 
and for empirical-descriptive analyses. Keane contends that normative 
analysis is aimed “to highlight the ethical superiority of a politically 
guaranteed civil society compared with other types of regime” (Keane 1998: 
37-38). The term ‘civil society’ is employed then “as a philosophically 
normative concept, that is, – putting it in somewhat grandiose terms – as an 
ethical ideal, a vision of the social order that is not only descriptive, but 
prescriptive, providing us with a vision of the good life” (Seligman 1992a: 
201). The normative vision of the good life and of the good society is based 
on certain values and beliefs. In this sense, “civil society is identified with 
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some more or less universalistic mode of orientations on the part of social 
actors, and with the definition of citizenship in terms of universalistic, 
highly generalized moral bonds” (Seligman 1992a: 204).  
At the same time, normative analysis of civil society reveals certain 
contradictions of modern existence, as it posits the concept of civil society 
on the span of usages ranging from an analytic idea to a normative ideal 
(Seligman 1992a: 206). In the normative usage, the concept of civil society 
obtains its potential for critical self-reflection. For instance, Seligman reveals 
that the normative reading of civil society theory builds upon two important 
presumptions, namely “Durkheimian emphasis on moral individualism as 
the basis of solidarity within modern, gesellschaftlich societies”11 and 
“Weberian emphasis on the increased rationality of modern forms of social 
organization as the embodiment of universal values.” However, the analyst 
refutes this informed reading, since it “ignores the problem of liberal-
individualistic ideology, that is, how to constitute a sense of community 
among and between social actors who are conceived of in terms of 
autonomous individuals” (Seligman 1992a: 204). Instead, the current debate 
on civil society needs to reassert “the sense of shared community in the face 
of what is perceived as an individualism defined in terms of self-interest” 
(Seligman 1992a: 205). As we can see, the concept of civil society evolves in 
accordance with society’s needs. Civil society appears then both as a 
tangible reflection and as a normative answer to the complex of urgent 
social problems. In this sense, I maintain that civil society is employed in 
academic debate as a social-moral concept.  
 
                                               
11 Referring to society in terms of Gesellschaft presupposes the contrast between Gesellschaft and 
Gemeinschaft. The distinction was introduced by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-
1936). In his book Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (first published in 1887), Tönnies contrasted two 
types of societies:  “an ‘organic’ Community (Gemeinschaft), bound together by ties of kinship, 
fellowship, custom, history and communal ownership of primary goods” and “a ‘mechanical’ 
Society (Gesellschaft), where free-standing individuals interacted with each other through self-
interest, commercial contracts, a ‘spatial’ rather than ‘historical’ sense of mutual awareness and 
the external constraints of formally enacted laws” (Tönnies 2001: vxii-xviii). The contrast 
between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft is a recurring theme in the present study. It will be 
considered in more detail in the chapter on sociological study of civil society, in connection to 
Weber’s theory of rationalization (§ 3.1.1) and to Luhmann’s theory of functional differentiation 
(§ 3.3.5). Besides, the contrast will be central to the analysis of the phenomenon of religious 
fundamentalism (§ 4.1.4), as well as to the sociological depiction of Soviet and post-Soviet 
Russian society (chapter five).   
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1.3.4 My Operational Definition of Civil Society  
 
I define civil society as a sphere of free association among citizens of 
democratic polities, which enjoys relative independence from the state and 
the economy. Civil society operates on the border between the public and 
the private, thus intersecting with various institutions of modern society. It 
provides citizens with a platform for unrestricted communication and 
deliberative reasoning on matters of public concern. In this sense, it reaches 
out to the sphere of politics insofar as it exerts influence on political 
decisions and policy-making. At the same time, civil society is also 
inextricably connected with the private sphere, which allows individual 
citizens to advocate their individual (economic) interests and moral 
sentiments.  
In the stronger sense, civil society presumes a highly differentiated model 
of society. Hence, its genesis can be identified with the process of structural 
transformation of society, as it developed in the modern West. The 
definition of civil society in the stronger sense is encompassing and 
therefore needs a vast interdisciplinary approach. For that reason, I shall 
unfold this conception in the subsequent chapters of the study. The next 
focus will be, however, on the description of civil society in the minimal 
sense. In this analysis, I shall rely on empirical studies insofar as they 
provide the most vivid illustration of what civil society consists of and how 
it functions in a modern democratic polity.  
  
  
2 
 
Civil Society as a  
Social-Moral Concept 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
The delineation of the moral dilemmas inherent in civil society discourse is 
the primary objective of the present chapter. The underlying question is 
whether civil society is a good society, and why it is so. In order to approach 
the understanding of civil society as a moral concept, we need first to clarify 
what kind of social reality this moral concept refers to at the empirical level 
of analysis. On this view, we need to provide an empirical embedding for 
the subsequent conceptual discussion. Empirical studies of civil society are 
elucidating insofar as they demonstrate that civil society is not exclusively an 
elusive philosophical idea with a salient moral dimension, but also a tangible 
social reality and an indispensable part of any modern democratic system. 
Although it is extremely difficult to draw a strict border between empirical 
and theoretical studies of civil society, I have selected the studies by John 
Clark, Gordon White, Juan Linz, and Alfred Stepan to provide an overview 
of the empirically-oriented research.  
For a clear-cut empirical definition of civil society, we can rely on Clark’s 
comprehensive book Worlds Apart: Civil Society and the Battle for Ethical 
Globalization. Civil society, on Clark’s view, spans a wide spectrum of 
activities, comprising concrete organizations of people, as well as “less 
tangible institutions such as neighborliness, clan loyalty, or the tradition of 
free speech” (Clark 2003: 93). Thus, civil society can be conceived of in 
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empirical terms as an area of associational activity of people that they 
undertake voluntarily and spontaneously, outside their workplace, families, 
and friends, neither for profit-making purposes in the private sector nor for 
management in the public sector. However, in practice, the three distinct 
spheres (civil society, political society, and economic society) frequently 
overlap. The gray areas of their overlap constitute a great interest for 
empirical researchers. In order to illustrate the alleged location of civil 
society and its relationship with the neighboring spheres, I offer below a 
modified version of Clark’s original scheme (figure № 1). 
Figure №1  
 
A more qualified account of the relationship  of civil society to the 
sectors of politics and the economy is provided by Linz and Stepan in the 
comparative study Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. This study marks an 
important stage in the development of strategic analysis of civil society, as it 
explicates how the strategy of democratization can be successfully arranged. 
As Keane has noted, Linz and Stepan propose a bold “theory of the 
preconditions of a successful transition towards democracy and the 
subsequent conditions that enable the consolidation of a democratic 
regime” (Keane 1998: 46-47).  
 Conceptualizing civil society, Linz and Stepan argue that civil society is 
not a monolithic unity defined by rigid boundaries, but rather is 
continuously constituted by its relationship with both state and market. In 
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order to clarify this relationship, Linz and Stepan specify five factors 
involved in the process of consolidation of a modern democratic system, 
which they call five interacting and mutually reinforcing “arenas” of 
democratization (Linz & Stepan 1996: 126). The interaction between the 
five arenas, especially in relation to civil society, has been thoroughly studied 
by Marc Morjé Howard in his recent publication The Weakness of Civil Society 
in Post-Communist Europe. I assume that the main conclusion one can draw 
from the considered studies is that the interaction between the five arenas 
of democratization is crucial for the democratic consolidation in non-
Western countries because these arenas reinforce each other and thereby 
contribute to the establishment of a democratic system. Since Howard has 
brilliantly illustrated and explained the interaction between the five 
reinforcing arenas, I resort to his original scheme, although in a modified 
form (figure № 2).  
Figure № 2 
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As it is illustrated in the above scheme, civil society is one of the five 
arenas in the democratic system; it refers, on Howard’s definition, to “the 
realm of organizations, groups, and associations that are formally 
established, legally protected, autonomously run, and voluntarily joined by 
ordinary citizens” (Howard 2003: 34-35). Hence, civil society is comparable 
with political and economic societies in the sense that the three designated 
arenas consist of concrete organizations and groups of people. In this 
regard, the three arenas determine, as Howard has put it, “the particular 
character” of the democratic system and are to be distinguished from the 
arenas of the rule of law and of the state bureaucracy, which are based on 
legal-rational institutions and organizing principles and which constitute the 
“essential core of any democratic system.” Interacting with each other, the 
arenas of political society, economic society, and civil society form the social 
basis for the procedural and institutional mechanisms of the democratic 
system. On this view, the mutually reinforcing interaction between these 
two sectors of the public sphere, the social and the procedural-institutional, 
is crucial for the stability of the whole democratic system. Howard provides 
an exhaustible explanation, “Indeed the more the state bureaucracy and 
legal system become institutionalized along legal-rational principles, the 
greater the freedoms and opportunities for actors and organizations in 
economic, political and civil society to associate. Correspondingly, the 
stronger and more influential these groups and organizations become, the 
better the chances for bringing about a state bureaucracy and rule of law on 
legal-rational principles” (Howard 2003: 34).  
Analyzing the specific relationship between civil society and the 
democratic state, Linz and Stepan rightfully assert that their mutual 
reinforcing interaction is of a great importance insofar as it provides 
legitimacy to the democratic system. The legitimacy of the democratic 
system depends on the rational-legal institutions and organizing principles 
of the state bureaucracy and the rule of law because these institutions 
guarantee the constitution, an independent juridical system, and a strong 
legal culture. At the same time, democratic consolidation also presumes a 
“robust civil society, which has the capacity to generate political alternatives 
and to monitor government and state” (Linz & Stepan 1996: 126). Insofar 
as political society comprises political parties, elections, electoral rules, and 
legislatures, organizations of civil society play a vital role in legitimizing the 
democratic state, as they allow citizens to elect their governments in a 
democratic way. Economic society, in its turn, creates the space for 
interaction between non-state forms of property, production, exchange, and 
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consumption. In this sense, it provides vital support for civil society, 
securing its independence from the state.  
The emphasis on the strategic significance of civil society for democratic 
consolidation also provoked an opposite trend in the current academic 
discussion. The critical voices of skeptically-oriented analysts became even 
stronger after the ‘boom’ that the concept of civil society has experienced in 
the course of the democratic revolutions in East-Central Europe. The main 
objection against the strategic use of the term ‘civil society’ pertains to the 
simplistic and tendentious usages of the term. The volume Civil Society in 
Democratization (Burnell & Calvert 2004) presents one of such critical 
accounts. It comprises studies with a pronounced policy orientation and 
fieldwork basis. The scholars’ main concern is to explicate civil society’s 
analytical separateness from and, at the same time, relatedness with political 
society and business, and thus to delineate the political role of civil society 
in facilitating or impeding the democratization process. Gordon White 
concedes that the strategic potential of the idea of civil society awakened an 
overwhelming euphoria encouraging a wishful thinking, yet blunting its 
practical utility, “Together with the market and democracy, ‘civil society’ is 
one of the ‘magic trio’ of developmental panaceas which emerged in the 
1980s and now dominate conventional prescriptions for the ills of the 
1990s.” Indeed, over the last twenty years, the idea of civil society, which 
indeed enjoys “a long, distinguished but highly ambiguous history in 
Western political theory,” “has been dusted off and deodorized to suit a 
variety of ideological, intellectual and practical needs.” As a consequence of 
such an extensive usage, the term acquired different meanings in different 
contexts and thus became “a muddled political slogan” (White 2004: 6). 
However, White insists, if we want to discuss the problems of the 
developing countries and see the relationship between civil society and 
democratization as empirically testable, we need an “analytically more 
precise and empirically more useful” notion of civil society. With this 
requirement, White intends to level criticism against normative-strategic 
usages of the concept and redefine the benefit of strategic analysis of civil 
society. Insofar as civil society pertains to social forces that underlie any 
existing polity, “the idea of civil society is central to any discussion of 
democratization since it raises central issues about the role of social forces 
in defining, controlling and legitimating state power” (White 2004: 13). A 
conventional dichotomous exposition of the relationship between civil 
society and the state badly oversimplifies the actual relationship. Instead, we 
need to consider more thoroughly the aforementioned gray area of overlap 
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between civil society and political society, which reaches to the level of 
legal-rational institutions and organizational principles. The relationship 
between civil society and the democratic state is crucial when “it comes to 
investigating the relationships between civil society and democracy because 
one would expect systematic differences between different categories of 
organization in their attitude to the reality or the prospect of democratic 
politics” (White 2004: 10).  
On that account, I agree with White that the objective of empirical study 
of civil society should consist in identifying “the specific constellations of 
social forces which underpin a process of political democratization.” In 
certain transforming countries, civil society can be depicted as tolerant or 
supportive of an authoritarian regime, whereas in other countries, it can 
advocate a conception of democracy that is far from liberal. Moreover, civil 
society can be also typified as “progressive,” fostering the values of liberal 
democracy. White correctly concludes, “Thus any statement to the effect 
that a ‘strong’ civil society is more conductive to democratization would be 
meaningless unless one went further to investigate the precise content of 
this constellation of social forces” (White 2004: 11). Taking White’s 
argument seriously, I intend to clarify in the present study the constellation 
of social forces that constitute the versatile landscape of contemporary 
Russian civil society.  
As we can conclude, empirical studies help us to identify the place and 
the function of civil society in the democratic system. Nonetheless, they do 
not answer the important question whether civil society is a good society, 
and on which grounds it is (not). This question belongs rather to a 
normative theoretical order and thus requires conceptual analysis. Any 
attempt at understanding of civil society as a social-moral concept entails 
considering different moral dilemmas that emerge when one provides a 
normative foundation for the concept and the reality of civil society. 
Undertaking such an attempt, I specify the questions to be addressed as 
follows. Does the normative model of civil society provide optimal 
conditions for the realization of individual freedom and legitimize an 
acceptable degree of permeation by political power? Where can we draw the 
borderline of state intervention to secure that individual liberties are not 
infringed, and that the distribution of resources is just? What are the 
potential risks latently present in the liberal-individualistic principles civil 
society is based on? Why, despite of these risks, do analysts still choose to 
resort to civil society as a paramount normative model of social order? To 
answer these questions, I shall provide first a conceptual history of the 
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notion of civil society, as it developed in the West (2.1). Next, I shall 
systematize the answers to the posed questions into two theoretical schools: 
the liberal theory (2.2) and the theory of deliberative democracy (2.3).  
 
2.1  Genesis of Civil Society as a Social-Moral Concept  
 
As it has become clear from the overview of empirical studies, current civil 
society discourse is characterized by an overwhelming consensus among the 
scholars concerning one central issue, namely that civil society is indeed a 
vital component of successfully functioning democracies. The more vibrant 
and advanced civil society is, the better governed and self-organizing the 
political community is likely to be. This argument largely underlies the claim 
that Western democratic societies enjoy a relatively high degree of freedom, 
autonomy, and endurance, whereas post-communist societies, in their 
struggle to establish and normalize the course of democratization, suffer 
from the absence of the essential experience of civil society.  
On the other hand, as Bhikhu Parekh has rightly noticed, “the fact that 
the consensus has acquired the status of an intellectual orthodoxy is a good 
enough reason to subject it to a critical scrutiny” (Parekh 2004: 15). 
Moreover, if we concede that civil society is indeed an authentic product of 
Western civilization, the question is whether the notion of civil society can 
be rendered as an adequate solution for the problems that emerge in post-
communist countries. As an upshot of Western civilization, civil society 
developed along with the politico-philosophical tradition of liberalism and 
therefore imbibed the principles of modern individualism and liberalism. 
Are these principles compatible with the values prevalent in East-European 
political culture, which has an overt communal element and presumes a 
different relationship between society and the state?  
Curiously enough, this question does not dominate the discussion 
despite its obvious relevance. Instead, the discussion assumed another 
orientation, which is correctly stipulated by Charles Taylor in his thought-
provoking contribution ‘Invoking Civil Society.’ Although the recent 
attempts to invoke the notion of civil society in the discussion on 
transforming politics of Eastern Europe were initially intended to reinforce 
the nineteenth century concept of civil society, they actually resulted in 
articulation of some fundamental features of the development of Western 
civilization, which go much further (Taylor 1995: 204). Thus, prior to 
evaluating civil society in the context of non-Western democracies, we need 
first to reconstruct the conceptual history of civil society in its authentic 
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Western context. Thereby, we need to specify different intellectual 
traditions that contributed to the ideological versatility of the contemporary 
understanding of civil society and made it such a highly contested notion.  
 
2.1.1 Conceptual History of Civil Society in a Comparative Perspective  
 
The most innovative insight I have contributed from Taylor’s study pertains 
to the distinction between two different conceptions of civil society. On the 
one hand, we can conceive of civil society in a minimal sense as “a web of 
autonomous associations, independent of the state, which bound citizens 
together in matters of common concern, and by their mere existence or 
action could have an effect on public policy” (Taylor 1995: 204). This 
conception presumes that in the West there is already a functioning civil 
society simply because “civil society exists where there are free associations 
that are not under tutelage of state power” (Taylor 1995: 208). In reality, this 
claim is rebutted by the tendency of voluntary associations to become 
integrated into the state, or, put differently, by the unavoidable tendency 
towards corporatism. In the end, Taylor concludes, “we are all going to have 
to live with some mix of market and state orchestration. The difficult 
question is what mix suits each society” (Taylor 1995: 207). 
On the other hand, the contemporary reality of established civil society 
in the West can be viewed as an “heir to centuries-long development of the 
distinction between society and state” (Taylor 1995: 205-6). Departing from 
this vision, Taylor suggests a definition of civil society in a stronger sense, 
“Civil society exists where society as a whole can structure itself and 
coordinate its actions through such free associations [and where] the 
ensemble of associations can significantly determine or inflect the course of 
state policy.” Whenever analysts speak of civil society, they inevitably point 
at the fundamental structures and institutions of modern Western societies 
in general. This conception of civil society in a stronger sense entails “a 
public dimension that has been crucial to the concept in the Western 
tradition,” so that civil society, in virtue of the fundamental features of 
political development of the West, still “could be referred to in the singular 
as civil society” (Taylor 1995: 208).  
With this contribution, Taylor aims at enriching the minimal conception 
of civil society and at rediscovering the conceptual sources of the Western 
historical tradition of democracy and civil society. He concedes, “It remains 
true that Western liberal democracy has deep roots in its past, that certain 
socially entrenched self-conceptions greatly facilitated its rise” (Taylor 1995: 
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210). Resorting to the institutions that incorporate their own self-
interpretation, Taylor identifies five main ideas that encouraged the 
emergence of civil society in medieval Western-European society. In the 
first place, the idea that society is not identical with its political organization 
contributed to the conception of political power as one subsystem among 
others. In the second place, “this differentiation was carried further by one 
of the most important features of Latin Christendom: the development of 
an idea of the Church as an independent society,” articulated in the doctrine 
of the two cities, the spiritual one and the temporal one. Insofar as this 
model sanctified two equal sources of authority, it created “a formula for 
perpetual struggle” and determined the bifocal character of Latin 
Christendom (Taylor 1995: 211), in contrast to Eastern Christendom, which 
accommodated the model of Byzantine symphonia.12 Referring to medieval 
Western Europe, Taylor clarifies that “alongside with these two pervasive 
features, there were particular facets of medieval political arrangements” 
that have served as a prototype for a modern civil society. Namely, the 
development of a legal notion of subjective rights, a contractual type of 
relations of the feudal system, the existence of relatively independent, self-
governing cities, and the standardization of political structures of medieval 
polities (Taylor 1995: 212).  
The historical analysis of the genesis of civil society in the West 
elucidates the analogical developments in Russia from a new perspective. 
The juxtaposition between these two historical contexts suggests, in Taylor’s 
view, that Russia is “the obvious pole of comparison” with the West 
because “at successive stages, Russia took a different political path from 
Western polities.” Hence, the development of an independent noble class, 
of free cities and of a regime of estates was impeded by the reforms of Ivan 
the Terrible, of Peter the Great, of Nicolas I, and, later, of the Communist 
Party (Taylor 1995: 209). 
One the reasons why Russia took a political path different from Western 
polities lurches in the different type of state-church relations and the 
different self-conception of the Russian Orthodox Church (henceforth: the 
ROC). In this sense, as Taylor compellingly argues, “a mainstay of Western 
development, that is, a Church independent of political authority, never 
existed in the Russian Orthodox tradition” (Taylor 1995: 209). I consider 
Taylor’s claim correct to the extent that it concerns the ROC as an official 
institute. Indeed, the long-term symphonic arrangement of state-church 
                                               
12 The model of Byzantine symphonia is discussed further in § 4.2.1 and § 6.3.2. 
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relations put the ROC in a vulnerable and submissive position with regard 
to the state. This induced the Church to accept the legal framework of the 
state and neglect the development of its social doctrine. At the same time, 
another consequence of the ROC’s traditional dependence on political 
authority has remained unnoticed so far. Namely, the Church continuously 
enjoyed considerable freedom in its theological self-conception and self-
identification.13  
Taylor develops a dynamic understanding of the poignant historical fate 
of Russia, recognizing that “in fact, there were moments when things could 
have been reversed.” Thus, the tragic political plight of Russia was not 
predestined by the Mongol conquest in 1237; great alterations could have 
occurred, for instance, during the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917. 
For his part, Taylor describes the Bolshevik takeover as “a contingent 
political disaster for Russia, which interrupted the slow development of civil 
society that had been gathering pace in the last decades of tsarism” and 
forced Russia to miss opportunities to accommodate at least some 
principles of liberalism on which Western democracy was founded. Instead, 
I would conceive of the Bolshevik revolution not as a contingent result, but as 
a consistent result of the distinctively Russian genetic code. The fact that the 
Bolsheviks abruptly usurped political power was not the disaster on itself; 
what was much more disastrous for the subsequent history of the Russian 
people was the weak and disorganized opposition of the democratic parties 
and liberal social forces, which proved incapable to overthrow the 
established Soviet government. From this purview, Taylor’s explanation 
seems to me more plausible. The Bolshevik takeover happened because 
“certain socially entrenched self-conceptions” that facilitated the rise of 
Western liberal democracy “were absent in Russia or were ruthlessly rooted 
out by earlier rulers,” or, put differently, because “Western democracy was 
never written in the genes” (Taylor 1995: 210).  
The pertinent inclination of Russian political power toward 
authoritarianism is also obvious from the attempt of Peter the Great to 
reform the country’s polity according to the popular at that time Western 
model. Taylor elucidates that when Peter undertook to modernize Russia in 
the early eighteenth century, he tried to imitate Western Europe by 
implementing “what was seen as the latest, most effective model, the so-
called absolute monarchies” (Taylor 1995: 210). Despite his extended stay in 
                                               
13 A more detailed discussion on the relationship between political power and the ROC is 
presented in the fourth and sixth chapters of the study.  
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Holland in 1697-98, Peter seemed to have remained uninterested in the 
popular political treatises, among others John Locke’s Treatises of Government 
published in 1689. In consequence, the Russian tsar took over from the 
Western model of absolute monarchy only those elements that suited his 
own idea of monarchic rule and remained indifferent to the claim that the 
absolutist power of the monarch should be restricted by the rule of the law 
and by the body of independent associations.14 
If Russian political culture explicitly misses certain democratic 
arrangements, the justifiable question is which developments in the history 
of Western polities can be considered as contributing to the rise of Western 
liberal democracy and civil society. Relying on Taylor’s analysis, we can 
stipulate three developments: the formulation of anti-absolutist doctrines, 
the rise of the self-regulating economy, and the rise of the independent 
public sphere. In the history of Western liberalism, the doctrines of John 
Locke and Charles Montesquieu have played a pivotal role. In the course of 
the seventeenth century, the medieval European establishments such as 
independent cities and citizens’ freedoms did not “ensure trouble-free 
progress for modern liberal democracy.” On the opposite, the seventeenth 
century was marked by an attempt to set up absolute monarchies and 
thereby impose the identification of society with its political organization. 
Taylor traces the intellectual roots of the idea of absolute sovereignty back 
to the works of Bodin and Hobbes (Taylor 1995: 212). It is in this context 
of resistance to absolutism that two alternative doctrines arose: one most 
saliently embodied in the political writings of Locke, and the other – in the 
writings of Montesquieu. Taylor labels these traditions as the L-stream after 
Locke and the M-stream after Montesquieu. Subsequently, these two anti-
absolutist doctrines would lay the foundations for two main traditions of 
political-philosophical thought, namely the Trans-Atlantic liberal tradition 
and the continental conservative tradition. Later, in the nineteenth century, 
the two traditions would be synthesized in the Hegelian sophisticated 
conception of civil society.  
The most advanced conception of civil society belongs to Locke. 
Inspired by the outstanding military and economic success of England and 
the Low Countries, where a consensual model of political organization was 
practiced, Locke introduced “a richer view of society as an extrapolitical 
reality” (Taylor 1995: 215). With his political treatises, the distinction 
                                               
14  Peter’s construction of the monarchic state and the Church’s involvement in this process are 
addressed in § 4.2.2. 
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between society and political organization “returns in the unprecedentedly 
strong form that defines government as a trust.” To develop vision, Locke 
took inspiration in predominantly Calvinist and partially Puritan theological 
anthropology and ethics, which is specifically obvious from his advocacy of 
natural human rights. Insofar as he believed society to be constituted as a 
community of individuals endowed with God-granted natural rights, he 
considered society as ontologically prior to any political arrangement. 
Nonetheless, Locke argued, society needs the political arrangement, so that 
it can be redeemed from the state of nature. If government violates society’s 
trust, society is free to overthrow it. With this “notion of mankind as a 
prepolitical community,” Locke prepared the ground for the emergence of a 
new understanding of civil society, which would be different from his own 
traditional use as synonymous with political society (Taylor 1995: 213).  
Montesquieu offered an alternative anti-absolutist doctrine to the one 
elaborated by Locke. Taylor clarifies, “Unlike Locke, he assumes a strong 
monarchical government that is unremovable,” but restricted by the rule of 
law and allowing for independent bodies, which constitute civil society. This 
“equilibrium between a powerful central authority and an interlocking mass 
of agencies and associations it has to work with” is central to the M-stream. 
Independent agencies form “the basis for the fragmentation and diversity of 
power within the political system” (Taylor 1995: 222). The distinction 
between society and the state refers then to the balance between central 
power and “a skein of entrenched rights” (Taylor 1995: 214-15).  
Later, as Taylor convincingly argues, the anti-absolutist ideas were also 
substantiated by the structural transformations that occurred in West-
European societies in the seventeenth and in the eighteenth centuries, 
namely the increasing autonomy of the economy and the rise of the 
independent public sphere. The remarkably swift development of the 
economy testified to the ability of modern society to organize itself outside 
the ambit of political organization and follow its own laws of equilibrium 
and change.15 At the same time, Western society experienced the rise of an 
autonomous public with its own “opinion,” which later would determine 
the deliberative character of Western liberal democracies. In its original early 
modern meaning, public opinion relates, according to Taylor, to “something 
that has been elaborated in debate and discussion, and is recognized by 
everyone as something held in common. This element of common 
recognition is what makes it public.” The rise of the public sphere signified 
                                               
15 This awakening awareness is portrayed, among others, by Adam Smith. 
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an important landmark in the history of emancipation of Western societies 
from politics. Insofar as “public opinion is elaborated entirely outside the 
channels and public spaces of the political structure,” it “pertains to the 
instruments, institutions or loci by which the society comes together as a 
body and acts” (Taylor 1995: 216-17). In this astute description, one can 
unmistakably distinguish certain characteristics of contemporary civil 
society.  
Taylor concludes, “The self-regulating economy and public opinion – 
these two ways in which society can come to some unity or coordination 
outside the political structures. They give body to the Lockean idea, which 
in turn has medieval roots, that society has its own identity beyond the 
political dimension.” By revealing the pervasiveness of the public dimension 
in the idea and the reality of civil society, Taylor exceeds the empirical 
conception of civil society in the minimal sense. The conception of civil 
society in the minimal sense fails to do justice to the conceptual richness of 
the notion because civil society “defines a pattern of public social life, and 
not just a collection of private enclaves” (Taylor 1995: 218-19). Bearing this 
in mind, let us consider which important moral dilemmas contributed to the 
conceptual richness of civil society discourse. 
 
2.1.2 The Moral Dilemma in Early Modern Civil Society Discourse 
 
Adam Seligman suggested an alternative view on the conceptual history of 
Western liberalism and civil society. Seligman focused on the moral 
implications of various historical theorizations of civil society and thereby 
revealed a deep incoherence within the liberal reading of civil society theory. 
To a certain extent, the intrinsic incoherence is rooted, as Seligman argues, 
in the normative character of the concept itself. The normative usage of the 
concept of civil society comprises an inevitable tension between 
individualism and community, particular interests and universal law. The 
whole plethora of historical conceptions of civil society has been polarized 
with regard to this dichotomy. The question is whether any of these 
conceptions has succeeded to offer a satisfactory solution to the indicated 
dichotomy. 
Until now, as Seligman laments in his contribution ‘Civil Society as Idea 
and Ideal,’ the term ‘civil society’ remains a catchword for both liberals and 
communitarians. For liberals, civil society embodies a hope that individuality 
and sociability can be harmoniously reconciled but still lacks a coherent 
theoretical framework. Beholding a skeptical position, Seligman criticizes 
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liberals for neglecting the danger of institutionalization, which inevitably 
accompanies any voluntary movement, and communitarians for 
disregarding the fact that voluntary organizations can be based on ascriptive 
principles of membership and, in that way, can undermine liberal 
foundations of the idea of civil society (Seligman 2002: 13). Therefore, the 
critic’s central concern is to reconstruct historical responses to the question 
of “how to posit a social whole beyond the particular interests that define 
individual existence” (Seligman 2002: 26). 
For the first time in European history, the normative concept of civil 
society in its modern meaning16 was clearly formulated and extensively 
discussed in Europe by the abovementioned thinkers, Locke and 
Montesquieu. At that time, the concept of civil society emerged in result of 
major changes in the spheres of commerce, politics, geopolitics, and science. 
The advancing scientific discovery of the empirical world revealed the 
possibility of a new normative vision of the world as autonomous from 
God and susceptible to rational explanation. Individual was subsequently 
positioned at the center of the universe, imbued with one’s natural rights 
and responsibilities. This new insight of an autonomous individual 
abolished the traditional foundations of the social order in categories 
external to the social world itself. As Europeans were challenged to find 
alternative legitimating sources for the social order beyond the traditional 
theocentric model, the idea of civil society appeared as “a critical new 
attempt to argue the moral sources of the social order from within the 
human world and without recourse to an external or transcendental 
referent” (Seligman 2002: 15).   
 The crux of the moral dilemma in early modernity pertains thus to the 
“the newly perceived tension between public and private realms” – the 
tension that the concept of civil society was designed to overcome. 
Seligman succinctly summarizes, “In fact, what stood at the core of all 
attempts to articulate a notion of civil society in that period and since, has 
been the problematic relationship between the private and the public; the 
individual and the social; public ethics and individual interests; and 
individual passions and public concerns” (Seligman 2002: 13-14). 
Historically, it was “with the nascent capitalist economy and the freeing of 
the individual from traditional communal and often primordial ties that the 
                                               
16 For reasons of selectivity, I omit tracing the roots of the concept of civil society back to Greek 
philosophy and Roman law, where it was primarily used in contrast to the natural society of 
animals. A more extensive discussion on the notion of civil society in ancient Greece is 
presented, among others, in George F. McLean’s (ed.) Civil Society and Social Reconstruction (1997). 
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problem of squaring individual and social goods and desiderata achieved a 
new saliency” (Seligman 1992a: 205). As society and the economy were 
increasingly liberalizing from the sphere of politics, the idea of civil society 
acquired a distinct normative dimension, for it addressed such vital issues as 
how to organize and legitimize a new social order after the breakdown of 
the feudal model of society and the rise of a free and equal citizenry. In 
Seligman’s words, “more pointedly, the question of civil society was, and 
still is, how individual interests could be pursued in the social arena and, 
similarly, the social good in the individual or private sphere. What is 
ultimately at stake in this question is, moreover, the proper mode of 
normatively constituting the existence of society – whether in terms of private 
individuals or in the existence of a shared public sphere” (Seligman 2002: 
14). Because the early-modern attempts at articulating of a new idea of civil 
society resulted from the persistent intellectual search for a moral vision of 
social order, civil society can be now studied not only as a reality, but also as 
an ‘idea,’ ‘image,’ ‘vision,’ or ‘representation.’ 
One of the prominent moral visions of civil society was provided by 
Locke in his Second Treatise of Government (1689), where the philosopher 
suggested a solution to the crisis of medieval social order by synthesizing 
the principles of Protestant individualism and natural law doctrines 
(Seligman 1992a: 61). Insofar as Locke founded his vision on the Calvinist 
ethical principles of austerity and self-discipline, he avoided an external 
transcendent referent. Herbert Foster explains in the article ‘International 
Calvinism through Locke and the revolution of 1688’ that Locke justified 
his opposition to tyranny, whether of sovereign monarch, bishop, or 
presbyter, and supported tolerance and revolution “upon Calvinistic 
grounds of contract, natural rights, and sovereignty of people” (Foster 1927: 
477). Evaluating Locke’s contribution to the international resonance of 
political Calvinism in early modernity, Herbert contends, “Through Locke 
there filtered to the American Revolution five points of political Calvinism 
held by hundreds of Calvinists, but clarified through his Civil Government: 
fundamental law, natural rights, contract and consent of people, popular 
sovereignty, resistance to tyranny through responsible representatives” 
(Foster 1927: 487). Locke succeeded to structure these five points of 
political Calvinism into a coherently working system. Insofar as the 
philosopher deduced the idea of fundamental law from the Calvinist tenet 
of the absolute sovereignty of God, he demonstrated “the general 
Calvinistic tendency to identify the law of nature with the law of God” 
(Foster 1927: 488). Consequently, Locke argued that “rights, bestowed by 
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God and based upon his fundamental law of nature, were a part of both 
divine and human nature and therefore natural and inalienable” (Foster 
1927: 490). These natural rights included rights to liberty, equality, life, 
property, conscience, and reason. Being by nature and God’s law free, equal, 
and rational, man was connected with God by a “mutual relation,” which 
resembled in the Calvinists’ thought the mutual relation between ruler and 
people. This signified, Foster argues, the origin of the contract theory. The 
doctrine of a mutual contract advocated the sovereignty of people and the 
possibility of their resistance in case the contract was violated (Foster 1927: 
491-92). If we agree with Foster that the main historical outgrowths of 
international Calvinism were the Civic Revolutions of the seventeenth 
century, the relevant question is what Locke’s doctrine of government as 
people’s trust contributed to the development of civil society in modern 
Western polities.   
Obviously, Locke’s main contribution to contemporary civil society 
discourse consists in relating the normative idea of civil society to the state 
of nature, which he understood as a state of perfect freedom equally inborn 
in every individual. Seligman notices that Locke did not have any intention 
to use purely descriptive terms with regard to civil society and expose a state 
of equality and liberty as a historical reality. This would otherwise seem 
farfetched, taking in consideration all the economic and political struggles 
that tore the English society in the late seventeenth century. Rather, he 
introduced the notion of civil society as “a theological axiom whose 
ontological status was not given to empirical evidence or questioning” 
(Seligman 2002: 16). In Locke’s vision, human beings are naturally free and 
equal, and therefore endowed with natural rights and with capacity for 
rationality and self-determination. However, as Parekh notices, men “could 
not flourish in the unregulated state of nature and needed a well-ordered 
society that ensued them maximum freedom to pursue their self-chosen 
purposes. Such a society has a public or civil authority entitled to take and 
enforce collectively binding decisions” (Parekh 2004: 15-16). Insofar as civil 
society was founded on a common rational decision, it was essentially “a 
human artifact, created, sustained and capable of being changed by human 
beings.” Being constructed without a transcendental referent, civil society 
appeared in Locke’s theory as “a rational and artificial institution” (Parekh 
2004: 16).  
After Locke, the idea of civil society became saliently embodied in the 
intellectual heritage of the Scottish Enlightenment, specifically in the works 
of Francis Hutcheson, Hugh Blair, Adam Ferguson, and Adam Smith. 
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These thinkers shared the aspiration to clarify the existing bond between 
morality and nature and ground the idea of civil society on this bond. In 
their writings, the notion of morality appeared as an “axiomatic propensity 
of the human mind,” which made possible to ground “the existence of 
social order in an intimately human propensity of innate mutuality” 
(Seligman 2002: 17). Grounding the moral vision of society in an inner-
worldly logic, the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment conceived of a 
member of civil society no longer as an isolated individual, but as part of the 
whole, a member of the community who evolved in a creative tension 
between the self and the common good (Seligman 2002: 18-19). This moral 
vision of sociability and mutual recognition presumed harmony between 
moral sentiment and natural sympathy, revolving around the concept of 
civilization. A civilized society was characterized by the Protestant, or more 
specifically the Puritan, virtues of moderation, self-restraint, and rationality 
on the one hand and by the secular virtues of exquisiteness, refinement, and 
progression in the arts and science on the other. The conclave of these 
virtues entailed respect for law and liberties, serving as a moral legitimation 
of the growing sector of commerce. In fact, as Parekh correctly notices, the 
idea of a civilized moral civil society was meant to legally warrant and 
normatively legitimize the framework necessary for the development of a 
civilized and commercial society in early modernity (Parekh 2004: 16). 
However, the naivety of Smith’s and Ferguson’s belief in the confluence of 
morality and reason was ruthlessly criticized by their contemporary, David 
Hume.   
 
2.1.3 The Dichotomy between the Private and the Public Revisited  
 
The dichotomy between private morality and public reason was first overtly 
exhibited by David Hume in his Treatise on Human Nature (1740). Hume is 
notoriously known for ruining of what Seligman smartly calls “a happy 
confluence of reason and benevolence” because he exposed, with disarming 
simplicity, the contradictions of human nature. Hume claimed that human 
nature is permanently torn between determinacy of reason and motivation 
of moral sentiment. With this claim, “Hume abstained from positing the 
social order in terms of any morally substantive good” and rejected any 
moral validation of the social order. In contradistinction to the optimistic 
thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, Hume considered social order as 
devoid of any autonomous moral value and as motivated singularly by the 
individual’s rational and benefit-seeking calculus. In this sense, Seligman 
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categorizes Hume as the first theorist who articulated the inexorable tension 
between the realm of private interests and the realm of the public good. 
Articulating this tension, Hume emphasized “the distinction between justice 
and virtue, between a public sphere based on the workings of self-interest 
(in conformity to law) and a strictly private sphere of moral action 
(predicated on such considerations as those of friendship for example)” 
(Seligman 2002: 22).  
Immanuel Kant’s theory signified a new stage in philosophical 
deliberation on the dichotomy between the public and the private. In 
contrast to the Scottish philosophers’ inclination to ground the injunction 
of moral sentiment and natural sympathy in the natural endowment, Kant 
founded the fragile balance between individual interests and the common 
good on the notion of categorical imperative of the universal moral law. 
What is new in Kant’s vision of society is the connection of the ideas of 
freedom and equality with “the progressive workings of a universal Reason 
through which individual rights (to civic freedom and political equality) were 
articulated” (Seligman 2002: 22). Associating universal Reason with the 
public realm by appealing to the ideals of equality, freedom, and justice, 
Kant succeeded to overcome the dichotomy between individual interests 
and social mutuality. Nonetheless, Kant’s solution “contained the critical 
distinction between the juridical and the ethical that was so important for 
further theoretical attempts to articulate an ethical vision of societal 
representation” (Seligman 2002: 23). Indeed, Kant associated the public 
realm primarily with the juridical law and the duty, but reserved the 
considerations of morality to the private realm. Thus, the sphere of morality 
remained “divorced from the representative vision of society as juridical 
community,” and the discrepancy between public ethics and private 
interests remained basically unsolved.  
In the nineteenth century, the discussion of the moral dilemmas was 
reinvigorated by a new generation of civil society theorists: Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx. Hegel in The Philosophy of Right (1821) and 
Marx in Das Kapital (1867) conceive of civil society both as a realm of 
societal differentiation and as a normative idea of society. As Seligman 
noticed, Hegel and Kant signified “the end of the civil society tradition as a 
normative model of social life” (Seligman 2002: 24). Irrespective of great 
dissimilarities, their theories share the same goal, namely to overcome 
Kantian distinction between public legacy and private morality, between 
juridical societal community and private moral life. Trying to reintegrate 
morality with legality, Hegel and Marx emphatically asserted the collective 
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nature of morality and provided, for this purpose, a sociologically-
descriptive embedding for the normative idea of civil society.  
Thus, the Hegelian and Marxist theorizations of civil society are 
characterized, as Seligman reveals, by descriptive feasibility because they 
depict civil society as a realm of societal differentiation marked by a high 
degree of conflict and density. According to Hegel’s theory, civil society 
occupied an intermediate position between the state and the family. If the 
family was centered on such values as love and unselfish unconditional 
concern for its members, the state was guided primarily by rationally 
conceived sentiments of love and disinterested concern for the whole of 
societal community. Given the opposition between the two distinct realms 
of the state and the family, civil society was meant to permeate this span by 
providing the space for “differentiation, in which free, independent, and 
otherwise unrelated individuals pursued their self-interest in a spirit of 
mutual respect and within the limits of the laws” (Parekh 2004: 17). At the 
same time, Hegel argued that it is precisely the heterogeneity and partiality 
of individuals’ or classes’ interests that render civil society “self-defeating” 
and incomplete. Accordingly, the high degree of societal differentiation and 
social conflict prevents civil society from achieving ultimate universality. 
The state alone, as the sole representative of the supreme justice and 
morality, is able to overcome the “contradictory desiderata of particular 
interests.” Underscoring the normative meaning of the state, Hegel “artfully 
shows how civil society is itself the object of historical development and not 
a predetermined natural state” (Seligman 2002: 24-25). In contrast to the 
earlier understanding of civil society, Hegel considers civil society as an 
essentially unstable formation, ridden with internal tensions and conflicts, 
and thus incapable of self-regulation. Later, this idea will be revived in the 
current discussion on civil society by John Keane, who characterized civil 
society as essentially wreckable (Keane 1998: 50).  
Following Hegel, Marx understood civil society as a realm of conflict, 
distorted by the class struggle of the capitalist society and in need of 
regulatory power of the state. Yet, as Seligman explicates, “if Hegel 
‘resolves’ civil society into the existent and ethical (universal) entity of the 
State, Marx, it can be said, resolves it into itself” (Seligman 2002: 25). Marx 
conceived of civil society within the scope of material relations, associating 
it with the “whole communal and industrial life of a given stage” (Marx and 
Engels 1973: 362-63). In Marx’s opinion, civil society was “unique to the 
modern bourgeois society, especially in respect to autonomy and the 
freedom from moral and communal constraints that it had currently 
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acquired” (Parekh 2004: 17). Rejecting all “myths and fantasies” of the 
early-modern belief in the natural origin of civil society, Marx argued that 
civil society was just a temporal stage in the societal evolution towards a 
single possible social-ethical ideal – socialism. Only a socialist society, with 
its planned economy, based on the principle of ‘from each according to his 
ability and to each according to his need” (Parekh 2004: 18),17 would be able 
to substitute such an unjust social formation as a bourgeois civil society. 
To sum up the above, the historical overview sketched main ideas and 
developments that defined civil society as a typical product of Western 
civilization. Civil society originated in early modernity out of a need to 
establish a new universal and at the same time individualistic basis for the 
construction of communal life. Civil society suggested a new ethical vision 
of the modern social order. This vision came to rest on “the idea of the 
autonomous, moral, and agentic individual as standing at the foundation of 
the social order,” imbued with immutable natural rights and responsibilities 
(Seligman 1997: 119). The expansion of the self-regulating economy and the 
development of the public sphere have instigated the discussion on how the 
realm of civil society, i.e. the realm of independent citizenry, relates to the 
state and to the economy (Taylor 1995: 218). The principles of individual 
natural rights, civic equality, and publicity have instigated the constitutional 
and institutional formation of a modern democratic state (Seligman 1997: 
119). Consequently, the early-modern balanced vision of civil society was 
challenged by the dichotomy between private moral sentiment and universal 
public reason. In the nineteenth century, civil society came to be seen as a 
realm of societal differentiation and permanent conflict, and thus as 
essentially temporal and wreckable. Next, I want to discuss different 
solutions to the pivotal question of how to reconcile private individual 
interests with the public good in the framework of liberal democracy.  
 
2.2 Liberal Theory of Civil Society 
 
In this section, I shall attempt at reconstructing liberal theory of civil 
society. I refer to this theoretical approach as ‘liberal theory’ because it 
comprises different theorizations of civil society, which are united by one 
                                               
17 Parekh notices, “Within the Marxist tradition, the concept of civil society played a limited role 
until Gramsci reintroduced it and made it one of the central categories of his thought.” However, 
Gramsci’s usage was “both inconsistent and richly suggestive” (Parekh 2004: 18) because he 
linked the concept of civil society with culture, dominance of conventions, and concealed power 
structures.  
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central concern, namely to advocate the polycentric and pluralistic nature of 
contemporary civil society. Specifically, I shall analyze theories elaborated by 
John Keane, Will Kymlicka, Michael Walzer, and a group of communitarian 
liberal theorists. Despite dissimilar accents, these scholars agree that civil 
society represents the arena of conflicting interests, which result from 
different subjective meanings and commitments of democratic citizens. The 
solution, however, is never the same, because it implies proposing a right 
balance between individual freedom and social justice, between political 
liberties and state power, between a normative vision and distressing 
realities. 
 
2.2.1 A Post-Foundationalist Perspective  
 
In his impressive study Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions, Keane develops 
a coherent critical account of civil society by revising the normative meaning 
of the idea and the reality of civil society. With his normative criticism, the 
scholar intends “to highlight the ethical superiority of a politically 
guaranteed civil society compared with other types of regime” (Keane 1998: 
37-38). Methodologically, Keane’s account is an interesting example of an 
amalgamation of the descriptive and normative approaches, which is 
obvious from his own definition of civil society. In Keane’s purview, civil 
society “both describes and envisages a complex and dynamic ensemble of 
legally protected non-governmental institutions that tend to be non-violent, 
self-organizing, self-reflexive, and permanently in tension with each other 
and with the state institutions that ‘frame,’ construct and enable their 
activities” (Keane 1998: 6). 
In my opinion, Keane contributed to the understanding of civil society 
as a social-moral concept with three important insights. First, he suggests an 
innovative normative interpretation of civil society theory. For this purpose, 
he refutes the early-modern conception of civil society as identical with a 
politically-organized community. Emphasizing the “polysemic quality” and a 
high level of differentiation inherent in modern civil societies, Keane 
establishes a post-foundationalist pluralist normative vision. Second, with 
regard to the debate on the relationship between civil society and political 
power, Keane argues for a power-sharing perspective. The post-
foundationalist normative vision of civil society requires also a revision of 
the concept of democracy. Hence, Keane conceives of democracy as an 
indispensable condition for a successful and safe existence of civil society, 
emphasizing at the same time that democracy should increasingly resemble a 
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“self-reflexive system,” which is permanently monitored by the institutions 
of civil society. Third, Keane embarks on possible misusages of individual 
freedom and provides a convincing analysis of the inborn proclivity of 
human societies towards incivility. It is exactly this inborn proclivity of 
human societies toward uncivil behavior that prevents Keane from 
identifying civil society with a good society.  
The main merit of Keane’s theory consists, to my mind, in reviving old 
conceptions of civil society. He strives to conceive of civil society in 
contemporary terms, in accordance with concrete needs and dilemmas that 
are typical of existing democratic societies. Thus, Keane refutes the old 
“philosophically naïve view that the category of civil society perfectly 
represents some determinate reality existing ‘out there’ ” (Keane 1998: 52). 
Equally, he repudiates Hegel’s conception of civil society as a mere stage in 
the actualization of the ethical idea, as well as Marx’s identification of civil 
society with a class-ridden bourgeois society. Instead, despite his general 
critique of Hegel, Keane selects two important theses from Hegel’s 
Grundlagen der Philosophie des Rechts (1821). First, he admits that Hegel was 
right in defining civil society “as a historically produced sphere of ethical life 
which comprises the economy, social classes, corporations and institutions 
concerned with the administration of welfare and civil law.” Hegel’s 
innovative perspective on civil society as a product of the complex historical 
process and an achievement of modern society implied another important 
characteristic of civil society, namely its wreckable nature. Civil society does 
not signify an arena of harmonious meeting of different interests, but rather 
resembles “a restless battlefield where interest meets interest” (Keane 1998: 
50). Insofar as civil society proves unable to overcome its particularities, it 
needs the higher order of the state.  
Keane integrates the characteristics of temporality and wreckability into 
his own critical account. He argues, “The birth or rebirth of civil society is 
always riddled with dangers, for it gives freedom to despots and democrats 
alike.” Notwithstanding such contingent evil outcomes, the normativity of 
civil society provides certain antidote to its principal wreckability. The 
antidote consists, according to Keane, in the self-reflexive capacity of civil 
society, namely in “the shared understanding among socially interacting and 
socially interconnected subjects that their world never stands still, that it is a 
puzzling product of their own making, and that as subjects of inquiry into 
the meaning of life they are an intrinsic part of the object of their enquiries” 
(Keane 1998: 51). Indeed, Keane concedes that civil societies generate from 
time to time “self-paralyzing ideologies,” such as patriarchal domination, the 
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fetish of market competition, ideologies of nationalism, and the 
conventional belief in the public. Nonetheless, he claims, “All hitherto 
existing and present-day civil societies contain powerful countertrends that 
insure that ‘society’ has no fixed and immutable meaning” (Keane 1998: 51-
52). Within civil societies, individuals are free to reflect on their values, 
commitments, and orientations and justify their decisions. Exactly this 
“bewildering plurality of normative justifications” explains, according to 
Keane, “the polysemic quality of the civil society perspective.” Keane’s 
conception of civil society as a social-moral category presumes a “post-
foundationalist normative justification that itself recognizes, and actively 
reinforces respect for the multiplicity of often incommensurable normative 
codes and forms of contemporary social life” (Keane 1998: 53). The term 
‘civil society’ implies for social and political ethics a high level of 
differentiation of the forms, structures, and styles of contemporary social 
life. In this sense, civil society enables “genuinely non-hierarchical plurality 
of individuals and groups openly and non-violently to express their 
solidarity with – and opposition to – each other’s ideals and ways of life” 
(Keane 1998: 55).  
Hence, Keane advocates an essentially pluralist post-foundationalist 
perspective on civil society theory. He argues that the pluralistic nature of 
civil society compels scholars “to break with the bad monist habit of 
philosophically justifying civil society by referring back to a substantive 
grounding principle, as the early modern notions of God-given justice, 
natural rights or the principles of utility, or their later modern counterparts 
of rational argumentations (Habermas), principles of ‘the right to equal 
concerned respect’ (Dworkin), respect for ‘the worth of the individual’ 
(Hall), or knowledge of a ‘good which we can know in common’ (Sandel)” 
(Keane 1998: 53-54). Refuting to involve any substantive grounding 
principles in the normative validation of civil society theory, Keane radically 
disagrees with the theorists of civil society who are inspired by the 
Habermasian idea of universal rationality (theorists like Cohen, Arato, and 
Chambers, whose views will be considered later). 
Keane consistently dismantles any normative argumentation based on a 
single supreme ethical principle. On the contrary, he defines civil society “as 
an implied condition and practical consequence of philosophical and 
political pluralism.” Insofar as Keane claims to treat the principle of 
plurality in terms of “the logic of occasion,” he considers any attempt at 
theorizing civil society “as merely one normatively inclined theory among 
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others,” i.e. one possible theoretical approximation of truth, which can be 
formulated in the universal terms (Keane 1998: 54). 
Considered within the political context, Keane’s post-foundationalist 
understanding of civil society implies that “the meaning and ethical 
significance of civil society at any given time and place can be asserted 
and/or contested as such only within a sociopolitical framework marked by 
the separation of civil and state institutions, whose power to shape the lives 
of citizens is subject permanently to mechanisms that enable disputation, 
accountability and representation” (Keane 1998: 56). Although Keane 
insists on the separation between the state and civil society, he, nevertheless, 
agrees with Walzer and Kymlicka that civil society presumes the protective 
legal-political framework of a democratic state. He also concurs with Linz, 
Stepan, and White that democratic polity is an indispensable precondition 
for the emergence of civil society. Yet for a successful functioning of civil 
society one needs, Keane emphasizes, a revisited version of democracy 
where political power is “subject to public disputation, compromise and 
agreement” (Keane 1998: 8). On this view, Keane moves on to the 
advocacy of the power-sharing principle in democratic polity.  
Over against oligarchic and state-centered theories of politics starting 
from Plato’s Statesman and Xenophon’s Cyropaedia to Hobbes’s Leviathan and 
Schmitt’s Die Diktatur, Keane positions an idealistic vision of democracy as 
“a fractured and self-reflexive system of power.” According to this vision, 
“state actors and institutions within a democracy are constantly forced to 
respect, protect and share power with civilian actors and institutions – just 
as civilians living within the state-protected institutions of a heterogeneous 
civil society are forced to recognize social differences and to share power 
among them” (Keane 1998: 11). Within such a power-sharing model of 
democracy, civil society enables citizens to communicate and interact freely, 
choose publicly their identities, decide their entitlements, and honor their 
duties within a political-legal framework. Main functions of civil society are 
to secure peace among citizens, to facilitate good government, to promote 
social justice and make sure that political power, wherever it is exercised, is 
publicly accountable (Keane 1998: 76). 
Insisting on the interactive power-sharing perspective in the relations 
between civil society and the democratic state, Keane criticizes the dualistic 
model of relations between civil society and the state, as developed by 
Ernest Gellner in his renowned work Conditions of Liberty. For Gellner, civil 
society is the set of “institutions, which is strong enough to counterbalance 
the state, and, whilst not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of 
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keeper of peace and arbitrator between major interests, can, nevertheless, 
prevent the state from dominating and atomizing the rest of society” 
(Gellner 1994: 5). Gellner depicts civil society as permanently abiding in 
antagonistic resistance to the political despotism of the state. Civil society, in 
his view, emerges only when political power is separated from economic 
and social life and when dominating power structures retreat from social 
life. This spatial independence of civil society enables the subjects of civil 
society to become self-confident individuals, who are in control of their 
social achievement and apt for self-improvement.  
Exactly at this point Keane diverges from Gellner, criticizing him for 
juxtaposing civil society and political despotism. This juxtaposition 
inevitably results in demonizing politics and mythologizing the goodness of 
civil society. Keane endorses his critique of Gellner’s idealistic interpretation 
of civil society by the “flimsy objection, long ago put forcefully by Michel 
Foucault, that the discourse about civil society is weakened by a sort of 
Manichaeism that afflicts the notion of ‘state’ with a pejorative connotation 
while idealizing ‘society’ as good, living, warm whole” (Keane 1998: 70). 
Instead, Gellner’s understanding of civil society “as the incarnation of social 
virtue in opposition to political vice” retains antagonism (Keane 1998: 79). 
An ardent defender of plurality and versatility, Keane introduces an 
important qualification to civil society theory. He qualifies civil society as 
essentially wreckable, alterable, fragile, and therefore susceptive to 
destructive ideologies, market-generated economic inequalities, and 
violence. The key problem that Keane rediscovers in Gellner’s account 
pertains to Gellner’s failure “to see the need permanently to develop new 
images of civil society,” as he “wrongly supposes that civil societies are 
largely unencumbered by self-paralyzing contradistinctions and dilemmas” 
(Keane 1998: 80).   
Given contingent outcomes of the pluralistic nature of civil society, 
Keane is sensitive to the problem of uncivility inherent in modern civil 
societies. He seriously considers the possibility that civil societies can be 
dominated by uncivil attitudes and self-paralyzing ideologies, such as 
xenophobia, racism, religious fanaticism, violence, or unequal patterns of 
market-generated wealth and income. Hence, Keane confronts us with the 
following tough dilemma. On the one hand, “the emerging consensus that 
civil society is a realm of freedom correctly highlights its basic value as a 
condition of democracy: where there is no civil society there cannot be 
citizens with capacities to choose their identities, entitlements and duties 
within a political-legal framework” (Keane 1998: 114). On the other hand, 
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the same freedom entails the possibility of uncivil choices and behavior 
within the structures of civil society. The problem of uncivility in civil 
societies has to do primarily with freedom of choice and hence requires 
considering the problem of civil society in connection to the problem of 
human nature and morality. 
Working within the post-foundationalist paradigm of civil society theory, 
Keane adopts a far more rigorous critical approach to the problem of 
freedom and morality than his predecessors (Locke, Smith, Ferguson, 
Hegel, and Marx), who, despite numerous differences, understood history as 
a process of society’s transformation from of a rude and uncivil one toward 
a modern civil one. Keane considers their invention of civility as an antidote 
to uncivility no more than a mask to conceal the hypocrisy of civility and 
considers their solution to the problematic balance between violence and 
peace to be simplistic. Denouncing their naïve belief that violence was on 
the wane, Keane points at the permanent presence of conflict and violence 
in all existing civil societies. He asserts, “All known forms of civil society are 
plagued by endogenous sources of incivility, so much so that one can propose the 
empirical-analytic thesis that incivility is a chronic feature of civil societies, 
one of their typical conditions, and hence normatively speaking, a perennial 
barrier to the actualization of a fully ‘civilized’ civil society” (Keane 1998: 
135). 
What are the sources of violence and uncivility in civil society? Or, put 
differently, why can the intentionally peaceful associational activity become 
affected by the sentiments of anger, brutality, hate, or revenge? These are 
legitimate questions to ask. If Keane wants to develop an adequate 
normative justification of civil society, he needs to provide a solid 
philosophical account of violence, which he certainly does. 
In essence, Keane distinguishes between external and internal sources of 
violence that may affect civil society. He identifies external sources of 
violence with the mechanisms inherent in a modern democratic state as an 
impersonal, abstract entity, a bureaucratic machine, or an invisible power 
apparatus. State violence tends to destroy civility “leaving in its wake social 
relations riddled with incivility: violence, insecurity, aggravated conflict” 
(Keane 1998: 124). Keane’s awareness on this issue has been mainly 
stimulated by the innovative book by Norbert Elias, Über den Prozess der 
Zivilisation, published in 1939. Drawing on Elias’ ideas, Keane envisages civil 
society as abiding in a permanent tension with violence, latently or overtly 
present in modern societies. Therefore, the civilizing process of 
modernizing Western societies cannot be conceived in purely normative 
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terms; instead, it should be conceived in terms of a fragile historical episode, 
which connects the medieval and modern epochs. Although this important 
transformation towards civility seemed to alter the normative façade of 
modern societies, it did not affect the perseverance of power structures, as 
Foucault has demonstrated it, nor did it restrict or reduce the possibility of 
violence, as Elias has argued (Keane 1998: 119-24).  
Elias’s thesis of the exogenous source of violence in modern civil 
societies allows Keane to argue that “the modern civilizing process is 
directly related to the formation and growth of states seeking to disarm 
competitor power groups and thereby to monopolize the means of violence 
over a given territory and its inhabitants” (Keane 1998: 122). Responding to 
this apprehension, Keane clarifies that civil societies cannot escape 
monopolistic power of a sovereign state. He resorts to Claude Lévi-Strauss’ 
distinction between primitive and civilized cultures with respect to violence. 
Lévi-Strauss defines primitive cultures as anthropophagic, meaning that they 
‘devour’ their adversaries. Modern civilizations, on the other hand, are 
anthropoemic, meaning that they segregate, evict, marginalize, or ‘vomit’ their 
adversaries. When dealing with violence, modern civilizations appear 
“quintessentially modern” not only due to their struggle for territorially 
bound state power, but also because they illustrate “the rational-calculating 
use of violence as a technique of terrorizing and demoralizing whole 
populations and preventing them from engaging in organized or 
premeditated resistance” (Keane 1998: 126). 
In opposition to the persistence of power structures and state violence, 
Keane accentuates the positive achievements of modern societies, amongst 
them the invention of “non-violent methods of ensuring that the 
institutions of violence, such as the police and the army, become publicly 
accountable, and therefore disembodied or ‘empty’ spaces of power that can 
be made by citizens to change their ways” (Keane 1998: 130). Keane 
assesses the democratization of the means of state violence as an important 
step toward minimizing the threats of violence that confront civil society 
from the outside.  
In addition to the external source of violence, civil society is also 
potentially susceptible to the internal source of violence, which consists in 
the inner contradiction within the workings of civil society. Keane clarifies, 
“Every known form of civil society tends to produce this same violent 
antithesis, thereby preventing it from becoming a haven of non-violent 
harmony” (Keane 1998: 141). Keane relies on two different explanations to 
elucidate the source of violence with regard to modern institutions. The first 
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explanation, grounded in “meso-level regime theories, insists that violence on a 
limited or extended scale derives primarily from the particular, historically 
specific organizing principles of the state or socio-economic system” 
(Keane 1998: 144-45). Put differently, violence is inherent in certain regimes 
and thus can be attenuated only if these regimes are defeated. It is 
noteworthy that Keane builds upon social theories of risk elaborated by 
Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, although he does not use the term ‘risk.’ 
Keane asserts, “Civil societies, ideal-typically conceived, are complex and 
dynamic webs of social institutions in which the opacity of the social 
ensemble […] combined with the chronic uncertainty of key aspects of life 
[…] makes their members prone to stress, anxiety and revenge” (Keane 
1998: 147). The vital concerns include uncertainties about employment, 
policies, and identities of one’s self and of one’s household. Keane 
associates other causes of individual violence with the increasing availability 
and cheapness of means of violence, or with high freedom of 
communication within civil society.  
In contrast to meso-level regime theories, Keane ascribes less 
explanatory potential to macro-level geopolitical theories, which identify the 
ultimate cause of violence with “the permanently decentered international 
system of states,” characterized by anarchic dynamism and a plurality of 
armed states. Keane considers the meso-level theories more plausible, since 
they ascribe the eruptions of violence to the specific institutional structures 
of civil society and thus understand civil society as a contingent historical 
phenomenon and not as a naturally given social order. It is the self-
determination of societies that contains potential for tensions, struggles, 
conflicts, and violence.  
One of the most effective remedies against uncivility consists, according 
to Keane, in the tactic of publicizing violence. Making violence transparent 
to the public stimulates public awareness about actual conflicts enabling 
citizens to monitor resistance efforts non-violently. In this sense, Keane 
rightly asserts that “the public spheres of civil society can certainly canvass 
and circulate to other citizens ethical judgments about whether or not (or 
under what conditions) a certain form of violence – by the police, for 
instance – is justified” (Keane 1998: 156). Interestingly, Keane has argued 
above against grounding civil society theory on any single grounding 
principle, insisting on the post-foundationalist  conception of civil society. 
However, discussing public opinion as a capacity of civil society to resist 
and condemn violence, the scholar presumes that there are some universal 
moral values, or rational standpoints, to which publicizing of violence can 
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appeal. In this regard, Habermas’s idea of universal public reason appears 
relevant, since we need some common presuppositions to preserve 
democratic pluralistic society from lapsing into an absolute chaos of 
relativism that would lead to ceaseless war against all.  
 
2.2.2 A Liberal-Egalitarian Perspective 
 
In the studies Civil Society and Government and Contemporary Political Philosophy, 
Will Kymlicka suggests a liberal-egalitarian perspective on civil society 
theory. What is remarkable about Kymlicka’s approach is his attempt to 
combine “a liberal commitment to individual freedom of choice and an 
egalitarian commitment to eliminating disadvantages in the distribution of 
resources and opportunities” (Kymlicka 2002b:79). Doubtlessly, this “twin 
commitment” to the two opposite ideals has been a source of ardent 
debates on whether these principles are susceptible to reconciliation in a 
single coherent theory.  
Another noticeable attempt at synthesizing antinomies refers to 
Kymlicka’s conception of civil society as operating on the border between 
the private and the public, but without infringing upon any of these two 
spheres. Specifically, Kymlicka subdivides the concept of civil society into 
two broad areas. The first area comprises public interest groups, including 
NGO’s and social movements, in which citizens discuss various issues of 
public concern. The second area relates to private associations in which 
people pursue their particular ideas or needs (Kymlicka 2002b: 82). The 
scholar maintains that the combination of both kinds of associations is 
essential for the liberal-egalitarian theory of civil society. Accordingly, he 
criticizes theorists of the Habermasian tradition for defining civil society 
exclusively in terms of the public sphere where public communication and 
reasoning occur, and for ignoring associations that are merely private in 
their orientation. On the other hand, Kymlicka also repudiates the 
libertarian conception of civil society as the network of exclusively private 
associations because this definition suits libertarian promotion of the 
genesis of self-organizing spheres that are genuinely independent of the 
state.18 It is the commitment to social justice through fair distribution of 
resources that distinguishes the position of liberal egalitarianism from its 
more right-wing libertarian counterpart.  
                                               
18 Loren Lowansky’s contribution ‘Classical Liberalism and Civil Society’ is a good illustration of 
the libertarian perspective (Chambers and Kymlicka 2002: 50-70).  
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The greatest challenge for liberal-egalitarian perspective on civil society 
theory consists, on Kymlicka’s view, in ensuring “that people exercise their 
freedom of association in a way that promotes, or at least does not inhibit, 
the achievement of social justice” (Kymlicka 2002b: 83). An analogous 
problem underlies Seligman’s critical account of the inconsistencies inherent 
in liberal attempt to reconcile the public good and individual freedom. 
Nevertheless, if Seligman regards the problem unresolved, Kymlicka 
undertakes to elevate the tension between social justice and individual 
freedom by developing a normative liberal-egalitarian theory of democratic 
state and civil society. Attending to the characteristically egalitarian concern 
with distributive justice, Kymlicka asserts, “The justice of a modern 
democracy depends not only on its ‘basic structure,’ but also on the qualities 
and attitudes of its citizens” (Kymlicka 2002b: 84). On this view, Kymlicka 
revises the normative theory of democratic citizenship and civic virtue.   
In Kymlicka’s opinion, democratic citizens possess, or, I would say, 
should possess, a distinctive way of dealing with different national, ethnic, 
or religious identities. Civic virtue pertains to citizens’ ability to tolerate and 
work together with individuals different from themselves. Next to tolerance, 
dedication to the common good is also a distinguished virtue of democratic 
citizens. This virtue manifests itself in citizens’ desire to participate in the 
political process in order to promote the public good and hold political 
authorities accountable. Moreover, democratic citizens need to be willing to 
show self-restraint and exercise personal responsibility in their economic 
demands or personal choices (Kymlicka 2002b: 84). On the liberal-
egalitarian account, the state and civil society are involved in a reciprocal 
relationship, as they both need each other to accomplish their goals. Ideally, 
civil society and a democratic state participate in “a mutually reinforcing 
interaction” (Kymlicka 2002b: 94) because “it is in the voluntary 
organizations of civil society […] that we learn the virtues of mutual 
obligation” (Kymlicka 2002a: 305), and because any democratic system 
needs to be continuously legitimized by its citizens. In a nutshell, Kymlicka 
astutely summarizes, “a thriving civil society produces the citizens who 
support the policies that support a thriving civil society’ (Kymlicka 2002b: 
94).  
What civil society needs from the state is the guarantee of a legal 
framework that enables citizens to associate freely and according to the law 
(Kymlicka 2002b: 93). This legal framework is expected not only to involve 
the Habermasian ideal of freedom of speech, but also, as Kymlicka argues, 
to establish an efficient and balanced cooperation between civil society 
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organizations and the sector of public administration. Such an arrangement 
allows civil society organizations to manage finances, possess property, and 
obtain an official status. Kymlicka underscores the importance of this 
cooperation by pointing at the democratic transformations in Eastern 
Europe where the weak institutional network of civil society organizations 
resulted from the deficient legal system in these new democracies. In this 
sense, Kymlicka correctly notices that “the enhanced role of the state also 
entails a more robust and demanding conception of the individual citizen.” 
A developed democracy presumes a strong sense of justice of the part of 
the citizens, their capacity for public debate, and their disposition towards 
civility. Accordingly, a developed democracy entails a more demanding role 
for civil society because “the associations of civil society must help develop 
such citizens” who “abide by certain principles of civility and justice” 
(Kymlicka 2002b: 101).  
Emphasizing the importance of learning civic virtues in the associations 
of civil society, Kymlicka agrees with Walzer that “the civility that makes 
democratic politics possible can only be learned in the associational 
networks” of civil society (Walzer 1992: 104). He also shares Glendon’s 
opinion that civil society is the “seedbed of civic virtue.” Glendon praises 
the voluntary formations of civil society as the only places where “human 
character, competence, and capacity for citizenship are formed” and where 
citizens acquire the skills of self-restraint and a better understanding of how 
ideas of personal responsibility and mutual obligation can be realized 
(Glendon 1991: 109). Recognizing the strength of Glendon’s argument, 
Kymlicka qualifies it by admitting that “the civil society theorists demand 
too much of voluntary associations in expecting them to be […] a small 
replica of democratic citizenship” (Kymlicka 2002a: 305-6). Thus, his 
adherence to the liberal-egalitarian position obliges Kymlicka to consider 
civil society as one of the successful, yet not perfect, environments for 
laying the foundations of civility. Kymlicka’s conception of civility is devoid 
of the previous teleological content typical of the Scottish Enlightenment, 
which has been criticized by Keane. Instead, civility signifies prudence and 
adequacy in the social behavior of citizens, who act within the legal-political 
framework of a pluralist democratic state.  
Such prudence and adequacy in social behavior can be learnt not only in 
civil society organizations, but also in various political organizations, 
business associations, and the family. Taken apart, these organizations suffer 
from their limitations, but merged together, they have more chances to 
provide citizens with freedom to communicate their ideas about the public 
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good. With this claim, Kymlicka makes an importance distinction between 
civic virtues that are applicable to the public sphere and virtues that are 
appropriate to the private sphere. For instance, he considers the virtue of 
public reasonableness as essential in political debate, but as unnecessary and 
sometimes undesirable in the private sphere. Moreover, the philosopher also 
admits that people frequently join voluntary associations because they want 
to pursue their own private interests and realize their own individual values, 
which have not much to do with the promotion of citizenship (Kymlicka 
2002a: 306).  
It is important for us to realize that Kymlicka’s theory exposes a 
normative vision. In reality, however, the interactions between civil society 
and the state are considerably more conflictual than depicted. Likewise, not 
all associations teach democratic values. When associations create injustice 
through discriminatory practices, “bad civil society” is likely to emerge. 
Addressing the problem of bad civil society, Kymlicka does not fully 
embrace Walzer’s advocacy of “critical associationalism,” whereby Walzer 
implies that associations of civil society may need to be reformed in the 
light of the principles of citizenship. Kymlicka objects, “If the government 
adopts this aim too enthusiastically, it would become a threat to civil 
society” (Kymlicka 2002b: 94, 98). The question at stake is, in Kymlicka’s 
eyes, where to draw the line for legitimate state intervention. 
As we can remember, the main controversy of the liberal-egalitarian 
theory ensues from the attempted balance between considerations of 
egalitarianism and liberalism. The indicated controversy reaches its climax 
when applied to the case of bad civil society and possible state intervention. 
Liberalism precludes the state’s engagement with cases of private 
discrimination, even if there is a clear evidence of inequality of resources 
and life-chances. Although this standpoint may be liberal, it is at odds with 
egalitarian principles. Egalitarianism, on the other hand, advocates social 
justice based on the equal distribution of resources; thus, when social justice 
is endangered, it justifies state intervention. However, this solution is not 
liberal enough (Kymlicka 2002b: 98). Being permanently confronted with 
this dilemma, liberal egalitarians seek for “the minimally disruptive way to 
remedy the problem” (Kymlicka 2002b: 102).  
As far as potential violence within the institutional framework of civil 
society is concerned, Kymlicka holds an opinion comparable to that of 
Keane. Accordingly, Kymlicka does not share Nancy Rosenblum’s “liberal 
expectancy,” whereby she expresses the hope that public awareness about 
the principles of liberal democracy would function as a gravitational pull 
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with regard to associations of civil society. Instead, Kymlicka points at the 
alarming outbursts of discrimination and incivility in civil society, which 
threaten, in his view, to refute liberal expectancy and thus need to be 
thoroughly studied by theorists of civil society (Kymlicka 2002b: 103).  
 
2.2.3 Michael Walzer’s Argument “In Favor of Inclusiveness”  
 
The “civil society argument” – the term that Michael Walzer introduced in 
his identically titled contribution in 1992 – does not imply one systematic 
unencumbered argument. Instead, the “civil society argument” comprises a 
complex of arguments, some of which seem incongruent with each other. 
Presumably, Walzer meant to emphasize the versatility of existing civil 
society theories. In addition, he conceptualizes civil society as a vision of the 
good life, thus attaching a distinct normative meaning to his conception. 
This is evident from his later contribution ‘The Concept of Civil Society’ 
(1995). In the chapter ‘Equality and Civil Society’ (2002), Walzer concretizes 
his political position as “the non-Marxist secular left,” which is in certain 
ways similar to liberal egalitarianism (Walzer 2002: 34). In his normative 
substantiation of the idea and the realty of civil society, Walzer departs from 
the presumption that civil and political liberties are fundamental to human 
freedom and dignity. However, he admits that a perfect equality could never 
be achieved because people would use their freedom to pursue conflicting 
conceptions of the good life.  
In search for the preferred setting for the good life, Walzer starts with 
refuting four rival answers suggested by moral philosophers and political 
theorists. The scholar criticizes these answers because none of them can 
claim to be exclusively correct and complete. Instead, Walzer suggests a 
vision of the good life that would take into account “the necessary pluralism 
of any civil society.” First, Walzer discusses two positions from ‘the Left.’ 
According to the republican conception of the good life, the perfect setting 
refers to the political community and presumes freely engaged, active, 
committed, and politically-effective participation of citizens. Walzer 
ridicules the republican interpretation that citizens are motivated to engage 
into political life “not for the sake of this or that determination [of our 
common destiny] but for the work itself.” The full-pledged engagement of 
all citizens in the process of political decision-making is beyond realism, 
simply because power of the democratic state has grown enormously and 
because politics rarely attracts the full attention of the citizens who are 
involved in economic relations. The second leftist answer to the question 
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about the good life focuses on economic activity. Walzer associates this 
position with the names of Marx and other “utopians he hoped to 
supersede” (Walzer 1995: 9-10). According to the Marxist theory, the 
perfect setting for the good life would be the cooperative economy. Once 
productivity of the economically engaged citizens would be set free, the 
state would surrender its legitimacy and disappear. Again, Walzer repudiates 
this “romantic” vision as being “set against an unbelievable background – a 
nonpolitical state, regulation without conflict” (Walzer 1995: 12).  
As far as conceptions from ‘the right’ are concerned, a capitalist, or 
libertarian, position promotes the marketplace as the preferred setting for 
the good life and associates the marketplace with the ultimate expression of 
individual freedom. Walzer finds the market-based model restrictive and 
unjust because “people come to the marketplace with radically unequal 
choices” and therefore “autonomy in the marketplace provides no support 
for social solidarity.” In this regard, Walzer is as emphatic as Kymlicka in 
asserting the principle of distributive social justice.19 Finally, the critic 
perceives a nationalist response as “a response to market amorality and 
disloyalty,” playing on the nation-bound sentiments of citizens. Because the 
highest value of this response consists in “the firm identification of the 
individual with a people and a history,” he repudiates the nationalist 
conception of the good life due to its exclusiveness (Walzer 1995: 13-14).  
Given the normative and empirical insufficiency of the depicted 
positions, Walzer proceeds with elaborating his liberal reading of civil 
society theory. The scholar criticizes the answers both from the left and 
from the right for their singularity and undertakes to overcome it by 
exposing the civil society argument “as a corrective to the four ideological 
accounts of the good life.” Prompted to think “in favor of inclusiveness,” 
he aspires to demonstrate that “ideally, civil society is a setting of settings: 
all are included, none is preferred” (Walzer 1995: 16). Thus, he ascribes a 
distinct anti-ideological propensity to his theorization. This presumption 
                                               
19 Although the question whether civil society includes market associations is not of major 
importance to Walzer, he addresses this issue, as he recognizes that the market can have far-
reaching consequences for a balanced civil society. He clarifies, “Civil society reflects and is likely 
to reinforce and augment the effects of inequality” insofar as it provides space for mass 
mobilization of recourses and where the basic market rule of expansion of the strongest is 
applied (Walzer 2002: 39). Weak groups of civil society face the danger of being excluded from 
the market. To deal with the problem of inequality, Walzer suggests two arguments. First, he 
insists that each individual is responsible for his own individual destiny. Secondly, he underscores 
that the state’s action aims at a just redistribution of resources. Both arguments are valid in 
Walzer’s eyes, as “the distribution of responsibility is a pluralist business” (Walzer 2002: 41). 
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resembles Keane’s post-foundationalist pluralist thesis that any theory of 
civil society is essentially incomplete and cannot have one universally valid 
substantive foundation.  
Within this liberal reading of civil society theory, Walzer defends the 
argument “in favor of inclusiveness” on the grounds that civil society 
“would include all social groups that are or can be understood as voluntary 
and noncoercive, thus excluding only the family, whose members are not 
volunteers, and the state,” which yields coercive power over its members 
(Walzer 2002: 35). In essence, Walzer calls for “a more densely organized, 
more egalitarian civil society” that would allow people to make smaller 
decisions and thereby to exert more direct influence upon the state and the 
economy (Walzer 1995: 18).20 The unity and coherence of civil society in 
such a pluralist understating, are guaranteed by “multiple and overlapping 
memberships” that help to tie all the groups together, “creating something 
larger and more encompassing than any of them.” In this respect, it is vital 
that autonomous individuals should be free to join associations of their 
choice and move from one group to another. At the same time, the unity of 
civil society is also guaranteed by the liberal state, which marks the 
boundaries of civil society and establishes “the chief playing field for 
associational commitment” (Walzer 2002: 36-37).  
The problematic relationship between civil society and the state is for 
Walzer as important as for Kymlicka and Keane. On Walzer’s account, the 
problem arises from the discrepancy between the normative idea and the 
practice of state- civil society relations. If ideally, civil society designates “a 
realm of free choice, community, and participation,” in reality, it also 
accommodates “a realm of difference and fragmentation,” and thus a realm 
of conflict and competition. The scholar admits, however, that “there is no 
avoiding it, and it may well be that the most important thing people learn in 
civil society is how to live with the many different forms of social conflict” 
(Walzer 2002: 37-38). On this account, I cannot but fully agree with Walzer 
that “civil society is a school indeed – for competitive coexistence and 
toleration, which is to say, for civility. Of course, it is also simultaneously, a 
school for hostility and sometimes for zeal. But […] toleration may win out 
in the end, if only by exhausting its enemies” (Walzer 2002: 38).  
                                               
20 Walzer shrewdly observes that active participants of civil society are different from the “heroes 
of republican mythology” of Ancient Greece, as they remain outside the republic of citizens and 
are commonly represented by “part-time union officers, movement activists, party regulars, 
consumer advocates, welfare volunteers, church members, family heads” who search “for many 
partial fulfillments, no longer for the one clinching fulfillment” (Walzer 1995: 18). 
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The exhaustion of the enemies should be exactly the ultimate goal of the 
democratic state, which “has to hold the ring and make sure that the 
conflicts within civil society are never permanently won by any single group 
and that the norms of civility, at least in some minimalist version, are 
maintained throughout” (Walzer 2002: 39). In order to sustain the unity 
within civil society, Walzer asserts, we need “a strongly positive theory of 
the state” (Walzer 2002: 47). However, it is the indispensability of the state 
that constitutes “the paradox of civil society argument.” As the realm of 
freedom, differentiation, and possible conflict, civil society needs the state 
because the state compels “association members to think about a common 
good, beyond their own conceptions of the good life” (Walzer 1995: 23). 
On this view, Walzer agrees with Keane and Kymlicka that the state’s 
primary function is “to enforce the norms of civility and regulate the 
conflicts that arise within civil society.” This can be achieved by remedying 
“inequalities produced by the associational strength of different groups” and 
by setting the limits on the forms of occurring inequalities. The conclusion 
of this argument is obvious: “A decent society requires state action” (Walzer 
2002: 47).   
Walzer addresses the problem of bad civil society in the context of state-
civil society relations, admitting again that the normative idea of their 
relations often diverges from the actual relations. Specifically, the scholar 
wonders how the liberal democratic state can deal with those associations of 
civil society that potentially or virtually undermine the principle of 
individual autonomy, tolerance, and pluralism. The question at stake is 
analogous to that posed by Kymlicka, namely how the liberal egalitarian 
state may resist damaging practices, and to which extent state intervention is 
justified. Walzer, however, suggests a different solution to this dilemma. To 
start with, he denies that there is such a thing as a perfect, essentially non-
hierarchical, all-reconciling civil society because “many of the supposedly 
voluntary associations of civil society are in fact involuntary” and because 
not all individuals are equally aware of their autonomy and are prepared to 
defend it. Walzer concludes, “For these reasons, there will always be local 
hierarchies and even local tyrannies within liberal democratic state, and so 
we will always need a theory […] that tells us when to intervene and when 
not.” Positioned between two main strategies of prevention or defeat, “state 
intervention should not aim at a perfect civil society, but rather at partial 
and temporary remedies to the complex imperfections of actual 
associations” (Walzer 2002: 46). In this sense, Walzer’s proposition to 
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balance an ideally free civil society and a controlling state approximates the 
solutions suggested by practical politicians. 
 
2.2.4 A Communitarian Amendment to Liberal Theory  
 
The analysis of the liberal theory of civil society would be incomplete 
without a communitarian perspective. For this purpose, I shall resort to the 
contributions of Amitai Etzioni, William Galston, and Robert Putnam. The 
general goal of the communitarian theory consists in revealing the need for 
“a change in the moral climate” established in contemporary Western 
societies. Worried by the growing moral disconnectedness and consumption 
attitude, Etzioni advocates a pronounced communitarian perspective on 
civil society theory with a view to restoring “civility and commitment to the 
commons” (Etzioni 1995: 100). This objective is evident from the title of 
Etzioni’s article ‘Too Many Rights, Too Few Responsibilities,’ in which the 
scholar emphatically assets that the communitarian project aims to promote 
shared responsibilities among members of a community and thus to reduce 
the demand for state restrictive intervention.  
Given these objectives, Etzioni considers the concept of civil society as 
utterly apt for communitarian aspirations. As he explains in his insightful 
article ‘Why the Civil Society Is Not Good Enough?’, communitarians tend 
to reinvigorate the normative understanding of civil society exclusively in 
terms of a good society because only in this sense the concept “fosters 
additional virtues beyond the merely civil.” If, “from the basic standpoint of 
the civil society, one voluntary association is, in principle, as good as any 
another,” from the perspective of the good society, associations of civil 
society differ, as they embody different values. Insofar as the good society 
seeks to uphold “some particular social conceptions of the good,” it is 
viewed by Etzioni as “centered around a core of substantive, particularistic 
values” and thus as different from civil society (Etzioni 2005). 
In his contribution ‘Progressive Politics and Communitarian Culture,’ 
Galston also conceives of civil society in terms of a good society on the 
grounds that civil society provides “a rich set of opportunities for satisfying 
human connections.” He identifies the natural home of such connections 
with “micro societies: in particular, family, neighborhood, local school, 
voluntary associations, and the workplace.” Galston’s argument reveals a 
typically communitarian proclivity to associate civil society with a web of 
micro communities that promote “special kinds of bonds of intimacy, 
continuity, and stability.” On that account, Galston underscores the 
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importance of different values that underlie the relations within civil society. 
Insofar as individuals participate in civil society to articulate their private 
needs and interests, the characteristic language of these relations is “a 
language of commitment, responsibility, duty, virtue, memory, solidarity, 
and even love rather than the discourse, valuable in its own rights, of 
choice, rights, personal freedom, and individualism” (Galston 1995: 109).  
A similar focus on the micro-level in the life of civil society is central to 
Robert Putnam’s study Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern 
Italy, where he compares contemporary American and Italian civil societies. 
Analyzing the process of formation of civil society, Putnam complements 
the micro-level with the factor of civic culture. Voluntary associations of 
civil society are exactly the places where civic virtues are cultivated and 
where civic skills are developed; they are basically the “schools of 
democracy.” Such nonpolitical associations promote, as Putnam correctly 
argues, social capital, which is the capacity of citizens to trust each other and 
work jointly for a common purpose. In such context of trust-based civil 
society, the “cultural cement of the civic community” is created and the 
cardinal civic values are learned (Putnam 1993: 182-83). Accordingly, civil 
society offers an environment that nurtures associative life and enables 
people to share common interests and hobbies, or, using Putnam’s 
evocative term he has coined in his study Bowling Alone: The Collapse and 
Revival of American Community, to “bowl together” (Putnam 2000). 
The brief survey of the communitarian amendment to the liberal theory 
of civil society reveals that there are two more complexities to the liberal 
reading of civil society theory. First, any theory of civil society will be 
inevitably confronted with the question whether civil society is indeed a 
good society, and, if so, why bad civil societies can emerge. As we have 
seen, liberal theorists, amongst whom Keane, Kymlicka, and Walzer, do not 
avoid the problem of bad civil society; instead, they consider it in 
connection to such urgent issues as violence, individual right to freedom 
and autonomy, a legitimate extent of state intervention. Secondly, 
communitarians revitalize the values of solidarity and commitment in civil 
society discourse, considering these values as a remedy to counterbalance 
the consequences of individualism.  
 
2.3 Civil Society in the Theory of Deliberative Democracy  
 
To study the concept of civil society in the light of the theory of deliberative 
democracy, I have chosen to consider the contributions by Jean L. Cohen, 
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Andrew Arato, and Simone Chambers. The mentioned scholars elaborate 
their conceptions of civil society under the noticeable influence of Jürgen 
Habermas’s theory of deliberative democracy and discursive ethics. Despite 
differences in philosophical profoundness, scope, and objective of their 
contributions, the theorists tend to ground their analysis of civil society in 
such concepts as public reasoning, rational consensus, and communicative 
interaction. In what follows, I intend to sketch the trajectories for 
conceptualizing civil society within the framework of deliberative 
democracy.  
 
2.3.1 Conceiving Civil Society within the Theory of Deliberative 
Democracy 
 
Jean Louise Cohen and Andrew Arato’s comprehensive study Civil Society 
and Political Theory has been an immense contribution to the revitalization of 
the debate on civil society and democracy. With this study, the scholars have 
succeeded to draw attention to the normative foundations of the concept of 
civil society. Their analysis provides a sympathetic revision of the 
Habermasian framework and advances civil society theory to a high pitch of 
philosophical sophistication.  
At the background of Cohen and Arato’s work, one can clearly discern 
Habermas’s conception of civil society that he articulated in his paramount 
study The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category 
of Bourgeois Society.21 Habermas associates civil society with society’s capacity 
for self-organization beyond the institutions of the state and the market. In 
his view, “Civil society is made up of more or less spontaneously created 
associations, organizations and movements, which find, take up, condense 
and amplify the resonance of social problems in private life, and pass it on 
to the political realm or public sphere” (Habermas 1992: 443). Convinced 
that the current academic discourse urgently needs a normative theory of 
civil society “on the basis of a new comprehensive and justifiable practical 
political philosophy,” Cohen and Arato suggest such an innovative 
normative theory. They do so by linking the Habermasian theory of 
discourse ethics and the political-philosophical theory of civil society 
through the categories of democratic legitimacy and basic rights (Cohen and 
Arato 1992: 346-47).  
                                               
21 First published in German as Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der 
bürgerlichen Gesellschaft  in 1962. The English translation appeared in 1989. 
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In essence, the scholars venture a further qualification of the 
Habermasian theory. In the first place, they emphatically assert the 
importance of civil society for a democratic polity, asserting that “a highly 
articulated civil society with cross-cutting cleavages, overlapping 
memberships of groups, and social mobility is the presupposition of a stable 
democratic polity, a guarantee against permanent domination by any one 
group and against the emergence of fundamentalist mass movements and 
antidemocratic ideologies” (Cohen and Arato 1992: 18). Such a conception 
of civil society bears a striking resemblance to the liberal-egalitarian 
definition of Kymlicka and Walzer. Cohen and Arato’s positioning of the 
concept of civil society within the general theory of democracy determines 
two indispensable characteristics of civil society. First, civil society promotes 
civic culture of participation. Second, civil society can successfully function 
only within the established institutions of democracy. Let us consider these 
two characteristics more thoroughly.  
As far as the intrinsic connectedness of civil society with civic culture of 
participation is concerned, Cohen and Arato criticize contemporary 
accounts of the decline of civil society in Western democracies because 
these accounts tend to understand civic culture of modern civil societies as 
one based on civic privatism and political apathy. Rejecting this 
presumption, the scholars undertake to break through general political 
apathy by asserting the urge of civic participation in associations of civil 
society, which has never been abolished by established and enormously 
expended democratic polities. On the contrary, the truly democratic 
character of civic culture is unthinkable without “active participation on the 
part of citizens in egalitarian institutions and civil associations, as well as in 
politically relevant organizations.” The scholars compellingly explain, 
“Precisely because modern civil society is based in egalitarian principles and 
universal inclusion, experience in articulating the political will and in 
collective decision making is crucial to the reproduction of democracy” 
(Cohen and Arato 1992: 19).  
In contrast to Walzer’s liberal encouragement to “join association of 
your choice,” Cohen in her contribution ‘Interpreting the Notion of Civil 
Society’ approximates rather a republican view. She contends, “The 
discourse of civil society involves a politics, a democratic politics potentially 
more engaging and mobilizing than the slogan” endorsed by Walzer. It is 
the democratic edifice of civil society that necessitates a specific type of 
politics, namely the one that envisages civil society itself as a target of 
democratization. Cohen is convinced that “the politics of civil society can 
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try to change the institutions of civil society in a direction […] toward 
egalitarian, horizontal, non-sexist, open versions based on the principles of 
individual rights and democratic participation in associations.” On this view, 
she advocates “a self-limiting, radical politics” as indispensable for 
contemporary civil societies (Cohen 1995: 36-37).  
The second essential characteristic of civil society is intrinsically 
connected with the promotion of civic engagement, namely the condition 
that civil society can successfully function only within the established 
institutions of democracy. Endorsing the conception of civil society as “a 
normative model of a societal realm different from the state and the 
economy,” Cohen and Arato allege that this ideal of civil society needs a 
corresponding institutional makeup of the democratic polity. First of all, 
civil society presumes plurality and therefore needs to be composed of 
“families, informal groups, and voluntary associations whose plurality and 
autonomy allow for a variety of forms of life.” Second, civil society 
presumes publicity and, in this sense, requires the institutions of culture and 
communication. Third, civil society presumes privacy, as it corresponds to “a 
domain of individual self-development and moral choice.” Finally, civil 
society presumes legality because it needs “structures of general laws and 
basic rights needed to demarcate plurality, privacy, and publicity from at 
least the state and, tendentially, the economy.” Cohen and Arato conclude, 
“Together, these structures secure the institutional existence of a modern 
differentiated civil society” (Cohen and Arato 1992: 346).  
Cohen and Arato specify the institutional preconditions for the existence 
of civil society. Although the scholars work within the paradigm of political 
theory, they move toward an inquiry characterized by both sociological 
precision and philosophical depth. In fact, their approach exceeds the limits 
of the minimal definition of civil society as a web of voluntary associations, 
revealing instead a broad scope of creative approaches related to the 
conception of civil society in a strong sense. The creative potential is even 
more obvious from Cohen’s description of civil society, “Modern civil 
society is created and reproduced through forms of collective action, and it 
is institutionalized through laws, especially subjective rights that stabilize 
social differentiation” (Cohen 1995: 37). Her definition pertains to the 
institutional and structural constitution of modern democracies, as well as to 
the concept of social action, which is the key concept in sociological 
accounts of modern differentiated societies. Similarly, Cohen and Arato’s 
study advocates a dynamic understanding of the process of 
institutionalization of civil society as involving “a stabilization of societal 
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institutions on the basis of rights” and providing civil society with “the 
immanent possibility of becoming more democratic” (Cohen and Arato 
1992: 411).  
By way of a midway conclusion, the strength and the weakness of Cohen 
and Arato’s conception of civil society ensue from their attempt at 
amalgamating the descriptive and normative approaches. The scholars 
undertake such an attempt in order to provide an exhausting understanding 
of civil society, which would be valid for practical philosophers, sociologists, 
political scientists, and policy analysts. Next to articulating normative 
principles that underlie the idea of civil society, Cohen and Arato also 
examine the institutional and structural makeup of the democratic polity. 
With this, they legitimately signal the demand for a sociological analysis of a 
polity that is compatible with a highly differentiated society. 
An innovative interpretation of the theory of deliberative democracy has 
been suggested by Simone Chambers, particularly in her contribution ‘A 
Critical Theory of Civil Society.’ To start with, Chambers declares her 
scientific affinity with the school of critical theory, which significantly 
determines her account of civil society. In general, adherents of critical 
theory22 develop a “talk-centric” theory of democracy (Chambers 2002: 98), 
as they aspire to investigate “the way in which domination and alienation 
insinuate themselves into the social lives of citizens” (Chambers 2002: 96). 
In contrast to voting-centric democratic theories, the talk-centric theory 
focuses on the communicative processes of opinion and will-formation, 
which precede voting. For talk-centric theorists of democracy, the leading 
question is how deliberation can shape preferences, moderate self-interests, 
and maintain conditions of equality (Chambers 2002: 99). 
From the perspective of the “talk-centric” theory of democracy, civil 
society is conceived as possessing a huge emancipatory potential shared by 
all citizens, which is manifested when citizens freely enter the public sphere 
to announce their ideas, values, and ideologies and thus to make them 
politically efficacious. The primarily function of public opinion pertains to 
“simply public criticism,” which becomes “a test of rationality and right.” 
This is the reason why there is a strong plea among critical theorists for the 
diversity and the density of civil society. Insofar as critical public debate 
“emerges only out of a diverse civil society,” “the more diverse is civil 
                                               
22 Chambers names some significant contributions to the talk-centric critical theory of 
democracy: Seyla Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political 
(1996); James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (1996); Simone 
Chambers, Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse (1996).  
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society, the more critical will be the public sphere.” Concisely, Chambers 
concludes, “Diversity is the watchdog of democracy, ensuring that 
outcomes are viewed and tested from many different perspectives” 
(Chambers 2002: 100).  
The scholars working within the talk-centric theory of democracy 
ground their normative conception of civil society in the presumptions quite 
different from those of classical liberalism. Chambers clarifies, “While 
liberals see individual voluntarism as the defining feature of civil society, 
however, critical theorists see communicative autonomy.” On this view, she 
systematically contrasts the critical theory’s conception of civil society as 
based on the principle of communicative autonomy to the liberal theory of 
civil society, which promulgates individual right to voluntary association. 
Communicative autonomy is pivotal to the talk-centric theory of civil 
society, as it refers to “the freedom of actors in society to shape, criticize 
and reproduce essential norms, meanings, values, and identities through 
communicative (as opposed to coercive) interaction. Communicative 
autonomy is linked to individual autonomy in that the former is a condition 
of the latter.” Citizens exercise their autonomy when they start to 
communicate about their life plans in the public space and in interaction 
with each other. In this process, communication is “the unifying link within 
civil society,” as it provides the institutional background for free 
communication among reasoning autonomous individuals. Civil society is 
thus “the lifeworld as it is expressed in institutions” (Chambers 2002: 93).   
If Chambers juxtaposes individual voluntarism with communicative 
autonomy, Cohen and Arato consider synthesizing these two principles 
unproblematic. Even stronger, they are convinced that “the public spheres 
of societal communication and voluntary association” are the central 
institutions of civil society (Cohen and Arato 1992: 411). Moreover, Cohen 
and Arato refute Kymlicka’s critique of Habermas’s conception of civil 
society. Kymlicka criticizes Habermas for relating civil society exclusively to 
the public sphere and neglecting associations of private interest (Kymlicka 
2002b: 82). Cohen and Arato mend the situation by including the private 
sphere in their account of civil society. They understand the private sphere 
as “the domain of autonomous individual judgment,” which is crucial to 
modern civil society (Cohen and Arato 1992: 411). On this view, I suggest 
resolving the misunderstanding that ensues from Kymlicka’s critique by 
understanding the different theoretical backgrounds of the concerned 
scholars. If Kymlicka works within the paradigm of political theory and 
defines civil society in descriptive terms, as comprising associations of both 
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the private and the public spheres, Cohen and Arato attempt, alternatively, 
at a normative ethical conception of civil society. They define the private 
sphere as a domain reserved for private moral deliberation, which is no less 
constitutive to the overall conceptualization of civil society.  
Cohen and Arato’s attempt at reconciling public communication and 
individual voluntarism touches upon another outstanding problem, 
potentially very worrying. This problem pertains to the classic tension 
between individuality and sociability that tends to undermine any coherent 
theory of civil society. As we can recall from Seligman’s analysis, the scholar 
remains skeptical in the question whether any political-philosophical theory 
has sufficient moral resources to sustain an enduring normative ideal of civil 
society. On the contrary, Cohen and Arato try to resolve this seemingly 
insurmountable difficulty by resorting to Habermas’s theory of discourse 
ethics. The cardinal antinomy between rights-oriented liberalism and 
solidarity-oriented communitarianism can be resolved, the scholars claim, 
within the theory of discourse ethics because this theory elucidates the 
concepts of universality and autonomy in a new light. The process of 
universalization does not necessarily require that one must abstract from 
one’s concrete situation in order to engage in “an unbiased moral testing of 
principles.” Universality is rather a regulative principle that underlies the 
discursive process in and through which participants attaint the possibility 
to reason together about “which values, principles, need-interpretations 
merit being institutionalized as common norms.” Cohen and Arato explain 
why Habermas’s theory possesses such a great potential for their intended 
dynamic conception of civil society, “Assuming that individual and 
collective identities are acquired through complex processes of socialization 
that involve both internalizing social norms or traditions and developing 
reflective and critical capacities vis-à-vis norms, principles and traditions, 
this theory has as its core an intersubjective, interactive conception of both 
individuality and autonomy” (Cohen and Arato 1992: 21).  
 
2.3.2 Civil Society, the State, and the Economy. A Tripartite Model of 
Relations 
 
In order to see how civil society is related to the spheres of the state and the 
economy, Cohen and Arato elaborate a tripartite model of relations, 
emphasizing that their model is “neither state-centered, as was Hegel’s” nor 
“economy-centered, as was Marx’s,” but rather is a society-centered model 
(Cohen and Arato 1992: 411). 
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Before discussing this model, it is necessary to avoid a potential 
misunderstanding that may arise from the different terms used by the 
scholars whose works I rely on. Cohen and Arato clearly distinguish their 
position from what they call “the neo-conservative model of civil society,” 
which presumes a dichotomous opposition of society against the state and 
equals civil society to a bourgeois society (Cohen and Arato 1992: 23). This 
dichotomous model is also criticized by Chambers, when she speaks about 
the liberal approach (Chambers 2002: 93-94). For clarification, we can refer 
to Walzer’s critical classification of different conceptualizations of civil 
society in which he demonstrates that the partial identification of civil 
society with the sphere of the economy occurs both in the Marxist and in 
the right-wing liberal tradition. On that account, Chambers’s critique of 
liberalism becomes clear. The political-philosophical tradition of liberalism 
can be divided into two categories. Firstly, it has the form of libertarianism 
and/or rights-oriented liberalism of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin; 
secondly, it approaches the egalitarian liberalism of Kymlicka, Walzer, and 
Keane who depart from the principle of individual freedom and 
voluntarism but restrict it with concerns of the public good and social 
justice. Hence, the critique of liberalism as articulated by Cohen, Arato, and 
Chambers is clearly oriented against the right-of-center form of liberalism.  
Theorists of deliberative democracy reject the dichotomous model that 
underlies the right-wing liberal and Marxist conceptions of civil society. 
Instead, they attempt at separating the sphere of civil society from the 
spheres of the economy and politics. The question arises why this 
distinction is so crucial. Cohen explains that the erroneous view of civil 
society as devoid of “any critical potential vis-à-vis the dysfunctions and 
injustices in our type of society” ensues from the dichotomous model that 
opposes civil society to the state. In contradistinction to Seligman’s 
conception of civil society as possessing insufficient theoretical resources to 
resolve social-moral dilemmas, Cohen considers the concept of civil society 
as imbued with an appropriate theoretical adequacy, under the condition 
that the concept is correctly interpreted. For that reason, she insists on the 
tripartite model that allows distinguishing between the “civil” and the 
“bourgeois,” and securing the autonomy of civil society from the expansion 
of the economy. Cohen emphasizes the necessity of the tripartite model 
because “as we know from the West, economic power can represent as 
great a danger to social solidarity, social justice, and autonomy as the power 
of the modern state” (Cohen 1995: 36).  
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Discussing the tripartite relationship between the state, the market, and 
civil society, Cohen and Arato demonstrate that “the resources for meaning, 
authority, and social integration are undermined not by cultural or political 
modernity (based on the principles of critical reflection, discursive conflict 
resolution, equality, autonomy, participation and justice) but, rather, by the 
expansion of an increasingly illiberal corporate economy as well as by the 
overextension of the administrative apparatus of the interventionalist state 
into the social realm” (Cohen and Arato 1992: 24). Thus, civil society is 
jeopardized by the forces of the market on the one hand, and by the forces 
of the bureaucracy on the other. The intervention of both the market and 
the welfare state can fragment collectives and thus destroy horizontal 
solidarities established in the social realm of civil society.  
In modern societies, the economy has developed an enormous capacity 
to penetrate other spheres of life and moderate social behavior according its 
internal logic. As it has been exhibited by Weber in his ideal-typical 
classification of rationalities, instrumental rationality tends to overwhelm, in 
modern capitalist societies, value rationality and affective rationality. The 
expansion of the economic interest is considered by critical theorists as 
jeopardy to individual freedom, which constitutes the basis for a healthy 
democracy (Chambers 2002: 93-94).  
Nonetheless, some of us might still wonder what is wrong with 
economic expansion in modern societies. Critical theorists depart rather 
from the communicative than the voluntarist nature of society, arguing that 
the pre-eminence of the state and the market over civil society tends to 
distort communication in the society on the whole. They are convinced that 
each separate sphere of society has its own internal logic and means of 
communication. If one sphere dominates another, it undermines its inherent 
communicative channels of meaning. Insofar as actors and institutions of 
political and economic society are directly involved in power or economic 
production, “they cannot afford to subordinate strategic and instrumental 
criteria to the patterns of normative integration and open-ended 
communication characteristic of civil society” (Cohen 1995: 38). On this 
consideration, the specific form of communication necessitates the 
distinction of civil society from both economic and political society. If the 
market operates by means of money and aims to increase the turnover, and 
politics operates by means of coercive power structures and aims 
respectively at generation, reproduction, and increase of power, civil society 
aims at facilitating free communication among citizens about the common 
good and acceptable ways to achieve it. Accordingly, “for critical theorists, a 
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healthy civil society is one that is steered by its members through shared 
meanings. An unhealthy civil society is one that has been colonized by 
power or money or both” (Chambers 2002: 94). In order to safeguard civil 
society from the intervention of the state and of the market, Cohen and 
Arato emphasize the procedural character of communication within civil 
society, “The procedural principles underlying the possibility of arriving at a 
rational consensus on the validity of a norm involve symmetry, reciprocity, and 
reflexivity” (Cohen and Arato 1992: 348). On this view, the scholars advocate 
a self-reflexive conception of civil society.  
To sum it up, critical theorists endorse the tripartite model of relations 
between civil society, the state, and the economy. Refuting the dichotomous 
model that identifies civil society with economic society, they strive to 
safeguard civil society from the sphere of the economy because of the 
market’s potential threat to distort free communication among citizens on 
matters of public concern. This motivation is quite different, however, from 
liberal-egalitarian theorists who warn against the market’s expansion because 
the market presumes a mass-scale mobilization of resources, which may 
augment the effects of inequality and thus work against distributive justice. 
In such a scenario, weak associations of civil society simply face the danger 
of exclusion (Walzer 2002: 41). 
 
2.3.3 ‘Bad Civil Society’ 
 
The normative understanding of civil society has not been unencumbered 
by critical assaults. Cohen and Arato take much trouble to address the 
normative critique of civil society uttered by Hannah Arendt, Michel 
Foucault, and Niklas Luhmann. Despite the intriguing nature of their critical 
accounts and the brilliant contra-argument of Cohen and Arato, I leave this 
debate beyond the scope of my study and rather focus on empirically 
tangible pitfalls of the normative idea of civil society.  
The exposition of possible negative upshots of civil society has been 
undertaken by the scholars affiliated with the talk-centric theory of 
democracy. This theory presupposes a dense and diverse civil society that 
accounts for a vibrant and critical public debate. Insofar as it advocates a 
plurality of ideas represented in the public sphere, it tries to define the 
extent to which civil society may accommodate this “infinitely expanding 
diversity.” Thereby, the talk-centric theory of democracy strives to define 
the borderline at which the “difference is so wide that we can no longer call 
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civil society a society” (Chambers 2002: 101). These questions touch upon 
the vital problem of bad civil society. 
However paradoxical it may sound, bad civil society can exist if we agree 
with critical theorists that not all active associational life is unconditionally 
good in and of itself. In contradistinction to this view, communitarians 
Putnam and Etzioni assert that associational engagement usually entails the 
idea of good citizenship. Critical theorists regard the communitarian claim 
empirically questionable, since they argue that certain groups operating 
under the shelter of civil society “can and do promote antidemocratic 
illiberal ideas and, when they do, bad civil society emerges.” On this 
account, Chambers defines bad civil society as “one that promotes or is 
hospitable to particularistic civility – that is, a civility that does not cross 
group boundaries” (Chambers 2002: 101). In the article ‘Bad Civil Society,’ 
Chambers and Kopstein develop this insight further by identifying the lack 
of reciprocity as a criterion for characterizing civil society as ‘bad.’ The value 
of reciprocity implies recognition of other citizens “as moral agents 
deserving civility.” Accordingly, the groups that actively and publicly 
challenge the value of reciprocity by advocating hate and bigotry constitute 
“one particular pathology of civil society” (Chambers & Kopstein 2001: 
840).  
Reflecting on the question why people join ‘bad’ organizations, 
Chambers and Kopstein point at the neglected importance of socio-
economic factors and reinvoke the classical problem of social justice 
(Chambers & Kopstein 2001: 838-39). Referring specifically to the cases of 
bad society in contemporary Russia, such as right-wing skinheads, the 
scholars clarify, “It is not growing inequality alone that has fueled the 
support for antiliberal movements in the post-Communist world. Significant 
inequality always existed in the Soviet Union. What is new, however, is the 
upheaval associated with the prospect of unemployment and the potential 
for radical downward mobility, something that was virtually unknown in the 
Communist era” (Chambers & Kopstein 2001: 846). The threat of potential 
downward mobility in societies where people tend to define their self-worth 
in terms of economic success is indeed a decisive factor in mobilizing some 
citizens towards extremist views. Concisely, the perceptible lack of social 
justice motivates people to join bad civil society. 
Chambers and Kopstein emphasize the need to study those material 
conditions that are relevant for the formation of citizens’ anti-democratic 
and anti-liberal opinions and attitudes. The scholars propose the so-called 
formative project as a medium to preclude the formation of bad civil 
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society. At the same time, they oppose a simplistic understanding of this 
formative project in exclusively materialistic terms. The formative project 
corresponds to the general goal of the critical theory, which is “to consider 
the forces at work shaping antidemocratic interests” and investigate why 
people opt for mean-spirited or hate-enthusing groups. Undertaking the 
formative project, critical theorists examine “the ways in which institutions, 
social structures, and economic forces shape identity, affect interest-
formation, and influence value orientation” (Chambers 2002: 103).  
Thus, although Chambers realistically admits that “there will be always a 
certain number of people who reject the core principles of liberal 
democracy” and “there is nothing much we can do about this hard core,” 
she sees a positive potential of critical theory in promoting those institutions 
of deliberative democracy that can offer “alternative venues of cultural 
formation” (Chambers 2002: 104-5). For instance, when she ascribes one of 
the causes of bad civil society to unfortunate economic conditions, she 
proposes democratic deliberation as “a noncoercive means of creating the 
social solidarity necessary to overcome a culture of inequality” (Chambers 
2002: 107).  
The project of cultural formation of citizens who are capable of 
democratic deliberation seems to me, however, a distant normative ideal. It 
should be taken into consideration when we discuss possible improvements 
in actual policies of democratizing countries, but it should not overshadow 
empirical analysis of real problems. On this view, I am inclined to endorse 
the realistic view articulated by Chambers and Kopstein, “Poverty, 
downward social mobility, diminished economic expectations, and even 
basic inequality […] create illiberal citizen that no amount of deliberation 
will convince otherwise” (Chambers & Kopstein 2001: 848). Moreover, it is 
also important for policy-makers and politicians to realize that reshaping 
civil society with the aid of government subsidies is not a good strategy 
either. As the recent example of post-communist Russia has revealed, the 
expansion of various externally funded programs designed to promote 
associational life has not changed communist society into a liberal 
democratic society. Instead, the creation of civic groups by external funding 
has resulted in a patron/client relationship and facilitated the formation of 
small, isolated islands of liberalism and tolerance (Chambers & Kopstein 
2001: 855-56). Although these islands of liberalism and tolerance are 
essential for emerging democracies, they are not meant, in my opinion, to 
remain just islands. These initiatives should expand their public reach and 
influence, work on generating public trust and on strengthening cross group 
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boundaries. For this purpose, a complex approach embracing political, 
economic, ethical, and cultural reforms is needed.  
The analysis of bad civil society from the perspective of critical theory 
underscores certain shortcomings in our contemporary understanding of 
civil society and democratic polity. The problem of bad civil society 
invigorates a discussion on urgent social-moral dilemmas that originate from 
the tension between solidarity and individual autonomy, the common good 
and individual freedom. It also addresses such pertinent issues as social 
justice, distribution of resources, and the limits of state intervention in 
restricting contingent outbursts of citizens’ uncivil behavior. In this regard, I 
believe Chambers and Kopstein are correct in supposing that “addressing 
the problems of bad civil society will mean returning to the issues of social 
justice that have been at the core of political theory since its inception” 
(Chambers & Kopstein 2001: 860).  
 
Conclusion  
 
The present chapter focused on the moral dimension of civil society theory. 
The analysis of moral dilemmas inherent in civil society has revealed certain 
requirements if the political-philosophical ideal of civil society were to be 
applied to the social realm.  
 Most importantly, the moral assessment of civil society theory has 
disclosed the permanent tension between the conceptions of civil society as 
the social reality and as the normative idea. Conceived within the liberal 
democratic theory, civil society is both a normative reflection of the 
established social order and an evolving realization of the normative idea 
about an ideal social order. In the present chapter, I intended, first of all, to 
elicit a description of civil society and clarify what and whom civil society 
includes. This empirically-oriented approach defines civil society in a 
minimal sense, in Taylor’s words, as a web of voluntary associations 
autonomous from the tutelage of the state and distinguished from business 
corporations. In this sense, civil society refers to the existing network of 
public initiatives including various NGO’s, trade unions, interest groups, 
religious organizations, not-for-profit organizations (such as charity 
foundations), neighborhood associations, hobby clubs, etc. In the context of 
liberal democracy, this network is legally protected by the constitution, 
recognized by state authorities and able to cooperate with the corporate 
sector. Such a network already exists in Western liberal democracies and is 
in the process of development in democratizing countries.   
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In addition to empirically-oriented analysis, I discussed conceptions of 
civil society that involve comprehensive philosophical visions. In this 
discussion, civil society rather embodies a normative concept, or an ethical 
vision of the ideal social order. It allows for a definition of civil society in a 
stronger sense, i.e. as a self-regulative and self-reflexive social body that is 
able of politically-effective decisions and actions. The normative 
understanding of civil society theory connects political analysis to the realm 
of values and beliefs. As “a phenomenon in the realm of values, beliefs, or 
symbolic action,” civil society reveals a certain “universalistic mode of 
orientations on the part of social actors.” Thus, it is affiliated with “the 
definition of citizenship in terms of universalistic, highly generalized moral 
bonds” (Seligman 1992a: 204). Perceived in normative terms, the notion of 
civil society touches upon the question as how individual should act within 
one’s social and political environment. In this sense, the idea of civil society 
reflects an ideal social order. The study of civil society as a political-
philosophical ideal entails the search for a right balance between individual 
freedom and solidarity, private interests and the public good. By relating this 
balance to concrete structures and institutions of a democratic polity, 
scholars describe certain organizational features of social life and thereby 
connect the normative ideal to the social reality. This complex approach is 
justified because it does justice not only to the conceptual richness of civil 
society, but also to the plurality of its social forms. 
The study of civil society as a social-moral concept has revealed certain 
moral dilemmas. One of the chief dilemmas ensues from the controversial 
relationship between civil society and the democratic state. The question at 
stake pertains to the supremacy in their relationship. Historically, the debate 
on this question has resulted, as Taylor has noticed, from “an amalgam of 
two rather different influences,” namely the influence of Locke and that of 
Montesquieu. Despite their different intellectual and political-historical 
background, both visions developed in the context of anti-absolutist 
struggle and thus ardently defended the distinction between civil society and 
the state. The distinction between political authority of the state and the 
living organism of civil society arose, in Taylor’s words, “as a necessary 
instrument of defense in face of the specific threats to freedom implicit in 
the Western tradition.” Since modern democratic states are “still drawn to a 
vocation of mobilizing and reorganizing its subjects’ lives, the distinction 
would seem to be guaranteed a continuing relevance” (Taylor 1995: 223). At 
the same time, this distinction poses an enduring moral quest of where to 
draw a legitimate line for potential state intervention in the life of society. 
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In addition to the state-society distinction, civil society discourse 
involves reflection on the moral problems that ensue from the principles of 
Western liberalism. Seligman brilliantly formulated the foremost moral 
dilemma of civil society as how to posit “a unified vision of the social order 
that, at the same time, recognized the legal, moral, and economic autonomy 
of its component parts.” In his analysis, civil society discourse approaches 
“first and foremost ethical edifice” aimed at clarifying the conflict between 
individual and society (Seligman 2002: 27; 1997: 110). The normative usage 
of the concept of civil society reveals the glaring tension between 
individualism and community, particular interests and universal law. 
Therefore, the analysis of civil society as a social-moral concept attempts at 
defining optimal conditions for the realization of individual freedom within 
liberal democratic order. At the same time, it also suggests a qualified way to 
deal with potential risks latently present in the liberal-individualistic 
principles upon which civil society theory is founded.  
In the course of history, civil society theory absorbed two fundamental 
ideas, “Durkheimian emphasis on moral individualism as the basis of 
solidarity within modern, gesellschaftlich societies” and “Weberian emphasis 
on the increased rationality of modern forms of social organization as the 
embodiment of universal values” (Seligman 1992a: 204). The moral 
dilemma lying at the heart of civil society discourse continues to invigorate 
the debate between rights-oriented liberals and communitarians, with the 
problem of freedom and rights being at stake. The rights thesis, most 
vigorously advocated by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971) and by 
Ronald Dworkin in Taking Rights Seriously (1977), has been criticized by 
communitarian democrats, like Taylor, Walzer, and Kymlicka, who argue 
that freedom must have its original locus not in the isolated individual, but 
in the society, which is the medium of individuation. Insofar as freedom is 
obtained at the level of social interactions, communitarian democrats claim 
civic virtue, the public good, and democratic participation to be pivotal to 
contemporary civil society discourse. They perceive the communal practice 
of citizenship as pervading not only societal institutions and structures, but 
also social behavior and moral sentiments of each individual citizen. By 
implication, communitarians warn that if the rights thesis is realized to its 
utmost, it would seriously undermine solidarity in societal community and 
would eventually lead to the project of alienated, anomic, privatized, 
competitive, and devoid of moral sentiments society.  
The tension between rights-oriented liberalism and justice-oriented 
communitarianism entails an unresolved antinomy, succinctly explicated by 
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Cohen and Arato. On the one hand, rights-oriented liberalism appears as 
“the source of egoistic, disintegrative tendencies in modern society and 
hence the main impediment to achieving a democratic society predicated on 
civic virtue.” On the other hand, communitarians continue to defy the claim 
that modern societies are not precisely communities integrated around a 
single vision of the good life. Cohen and Arato clarify, “Modern societies 
are characterized by a plurality of forms of life as they are structurally 
differentiated and socially heterogeneous. Thus, to be able to lead a moral 
life, individual autonomy and individual rights must be secured” (Cohen & 
Arato 1992: 10). On this view, it is only democracy with its emphasis on 
rational deliberation and egalitarian acknowledgment of individual rights 
that can render modern pluralistic civil societies legitimate in the eyes of 
minorities.  
The next chapter will address again the problem of social and political 
pluralism, but then from the perspective of sociological theory. I shall 
pursue the question what constitutes civil society as an enduring self-
sustaining social system and what holds this complex system together. I 
shall discuss the theory of societal differentiation with a view to clarifying 
the role of values and the function of structures in the formation of civil 
society as a moral community and a social system. In preparation for this 
discussion, we can conclude from the analysis presented in the present 
chapter that civil society is essentially complex, dynamic, pluralistic, and not 
necessarily unencumbered by assaults of state violence or uncertainties of 
risk society. In real civil societies, the balance between individualism and 
solidarity is indeed fragile because it pertains to the condition of freedom. 
As Keane has compellingly argued, “The openness that is characteristic of 
all civil societies – their nurturing of a plurality of forms of life that are 
themselves experienced as contingent – is arguably at the root of their 
tendency to violence” (Keane 1998: 147). That is the reason why the 
problem of bad civil society, manifested in various anti-democratic, 
intolerant and extremist movements, is inherent in liberal democratic 
polities. It requires an understanding of civil society as imbued with capacity 
of self-reflexivity and self-sustenance. The pursuit of such an understanding 
motivates the further analysis of the institutions and structures of civil 
society. 
Finally, I want to address the question whether civil society, which is 
essentially an authentic feature of Western liberal democracies, can be 
employed as an adequate instrument for evaluating democratic projects in 
post-communist countries. For instance, Seligman is unambiguously critical 
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of such usage. He asserts that the idea of civil society as “a model for 
overcoming contemporary impasses of social life” is irrelevant to the 
current situation both in the East and in the West (Seligman 1992b: 5). In 
my view, the concept of civil society should be used if we want to assess the 
democratic experience in the countries of Eastern Europe.  
This objective posits the study of civil society as a social-moral concept 
in a transcultural context. Referring to the focus on my study on 
contemporary Russia, I consider civil society to be indeed an indispensable 
instrument for evaluating Russia’s democratic project. However, I do not 
think it is a fully adequate instrument. Insofar as Russia accepted the 
constitutional form of liberal democracy, it needs civil society as an integral 
part of the accepted polity. In this sense, civil society is expected to provide 
democratic politics with legitimacy and serve as a vital link between the state 
and society. On these grounds, civil society is an indispensable criterion for 
the evaluation. Nonetheless, the conceptual level of evaluation would 
confront us with an obvious contrast between the normative content 
ascribed to civil society in Western established democracies and the 
normative content ascribed to civil society in East-European emergent 
democracies. As these two distinct forms of democratic polity cope with 
quite different kinds of social-moral problems, civil society has different 
connotations in the two concerned contexts.  
Most vividly, the contrast has been portrayed by Seligman. In the West, 
the classical liberal-individualistic model is confronted with such upshots of 
mass democratic societies as diminishing trust, mutuality, and social 
cohesion (Seligman 1992a: 200). In this context, “the idea of civil society 
invokes a greater stress on community” and the discussion is meant to 
provide a definition of civil society in terms of “some set of highly 
generalized and universalistic moral bonds obtaining between social actors.” 
The universal moral cohesion accounts for a conception of civil society as 
“a self-regulating community existing between individuals yet distinct from 
their existence as citizens of the nation-state” (Seligman 1992b: 6). 
In contrast to the Western context, in newly established democracies of 
Eastern Europe, “the (practical) conditions for the emergence of the 
classical Western liberal-individualist model of civil society do not fully 
exist.” Hence, the discussion on civil society expresses primarily “a call for 
the institutionalization of those principles of citizenship upon which 
modern liberal, democratic polities in the West are based” (Seligman 1992b: 
5). These are the principles of individualism and pluralism that so many in 
the West identify with the idea of civil society, but that are lacking in the 
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East. For East European democracies, “civil society evokes a strong 
communal attribute that, while apart from the State, is also equally distant 
from the idea of autonomous and agentic individual upon which the idea of 
civil society rests in the West.” Seligman correctly observes that the 
individual actor within civil society is still seen in the East as “firmly 
embedded within communal, mostly primordial attributes that define the 
individual in his or her opposition to the state.” This community-engraved 
understanding of the individual in the East, which is especially true with 
regard to Russian political culture, is opposite to the Western “idea of the 
individual as infused with moral and transcendental attributes” (Seligman 
1992a: 202-3).  
In a nutshell, if Western civil societies are mainly confronted with the 
moral problem of increasing individualism and diminishing social cohesion, 
Eastern nascent civil societies bear a strong community orientation and 
suffer from the insufficient public recognition of individual rights and the 
underdevelopment of legal culture. 
  
3 
 
Sociological Embedding of  
Civil Society Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
If in the previous chapter, the concept of civil society was studied as a 
social-moral concept from the perspective of political-philosophical theory, 
the present chapter examines the idea and the reality of civil society in the 
light of sociological theory. This choice is motivated by the following 
consideration: Insofar as every normative theory of democracy presupposes 
a corresponding model of society, we need to complement normative 
analysis by social-scientific analysis of societal structures and institutions. In 
this respect, I draw inspiration from the insight suggested by Cohen and 
Arato, “Without a social-scientific analysis of the structure and dynamics of 
modern society, we have no way of evaluating the generality of a given 
identity or the global constraints operating behind the back of social actors” 
(Cohen and Arato 1992: xvi). Following this apprehension, I intend to 
examine the structures and dynamics of modern society and thereby to 
provide a sociological embedding for the idea of civil society. 
The primary aim is thus to reconstruct major sociological descriptions of 
modern civil society. For this purpose, I employ the conception of civil 
society in the stronger sense, whereby civil society is understood as a typical 
feature of Western civilization and as an heir to the societal processes that 
occurred in the West (Taylor 1995: 208). In accordance with this 
conception, the intended sociological embedding is meant to provide an 
understanding of civil society as a spin-off of the process of societal 
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differentiation. Having said this, I need to explain why the model of a 
differentiated society corresponds, in my view, to the concept of civil 
society. 
My basic presumption, which I have gained from Cohen and Arato’s 
study, is that the key notion in any sociological description of modern civil 
society pertains to differentiation. Insofar as the egalitarian edifice of civic 
culture presumes a high degree of differentiation of society, societal 
differentiation provides the idea of civil society with an empirical referent 
and allows matching a political ideal with descriptive material. Accordingly, 
Cohen and Arato “locate the genesis of democratic legitimacy and the 
chances for direct participation […] within a highly differentiated model of 
civil society itself. This shifts the core problematic of democratic theory 
away from descriptive and/or speculative models to the issue of the relation 
and channels of influence between civil and political society and between 
both and the state, on the one side, and to the institutional makeup and 
internal articulation of civil society itself, on the other” (Cohen and Arato 
1992: 19). The connection of democratic theory with the model of a highly 
differentiated civil society necessitates thorough studying of the very 
concept of differentiation. The scholars corroborate, “Given the challenges 
to the very model of differentiation that is at the heart of the discourse of 
civil society, it is essential to provide a systemic reconstruction of its 
structural presuppositions” (Cohen and Arato 1992: xvi). This 
reconstruction is meant to reveal how the normative principles underlying 
the idea of civil society, such as plurality, publicity, legality, equality, justice, 
voluntary association, and individual autonomy, constitute a demand for a 
plurality of democratic forms, a complex set of social, civil, and political 
rights compatible with a highly differentiated society (Cohen 1995: 37). 
In view of these considerations, I define the central question of the 
present chapter as how one can revise the idea and the reality of civil society 
in the light of the theory of societal differentiation. The following 
subquestions ensue from the central question: What are the key concepts 
that allow reconstructing the sociological description of civil society in the 
modern West? What does the sociological analysis of civil society clarify in 
the theory of democracy and what are the main pitfalls of sociological 
analysis? More specifically, does sociological analysis still harbor the tension 
between descriptive and normative elements? Alternatively, has it been able 
to overcome this tension and construct a satisfying coherent conception of 
civil society?  
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Providing the sociological embedding of civil society, we should be 
aware of the criticism articulated by Cohen and Arato, “Because of the 
normatively marked heritage of the concept, it is difficult to find systematic 
social theorists who take up the issue of civil society” (Cohen and Arato 
1992: 300). Indeed the notion of civil society has an unequivocal normative 
connotation, whereas sociologists seek to develop a value-free theory of 
society. Nevertheless, I shall pursue my goal and do it by elucidating how 
civil society has been conceptualized in the history of modern sociological 
science. First, I shall focus on the theory of social action developed by Max 
Weber (1864-1920) and by Talcott Parsons (1902-79); subsequently, I shall 
examine the systems theory developed by Niklas Luhmann (1927-98). The 
names of Weber, Parsons, and Luhmann certainly belong to the pantheon 
of twentieth century sociological classics. Because the limitations of the 
scope of my study do not allow to do full justice to their enormous 
contributions, I aim at spelling out only those specific concepts that provide 
sociological evidence for the rise and function of modern civil society.  
Although one can hardly find in Weber’s impressive oeuvre any explicit 
reference to the term ‘civil society,’ let alone a substantive analysis of the 
notion, I believe that it is possible to discover in his theory two fundamental 
hypotheses about the dynamics of Western civil society, namely the thesis of 
rationalization and the thesis of the increasing “disenchantment of the 
world” (3.1). For their part, Parsons and Luhmann do not center their 
sociological theories on the concept of civil society either. Nevertheless, I 
shall select certain insights from their extensive studies to reveal sociological 
credibility of the idea of civil society. Specifically, I shall revise Parsons’s 
concept of societal community, which he believed to produce collectively 
shared norms and value patterns, providing thus modern differentiated 
society with cohesion (3.2). Finally, I shall examine how Luhmann extended 
Parsons’s original paradigm toward a sophisticated theory of differentiation 
(3.3). If Parsons associated the concept of civil society with a subsystem of 
society aimed at performing the function of integration in the system of 
society, Luhmann refuted confining civil society to any particular subsystem 
of society and opted for a value-free conception of civil society in terms of 
modern Gesellschaft. By focusing on each of the mentioned theories, I intend 
to trace the evolution of sociological conceptions of modern civil society.  
A few words should be said about the genesis of the concept of 
differentiation in modern social science. When describing the complex 
structural-institutional edifice of modern societies, certain sociologists use 
the term ‘differentiation.’ In the article ‘Differentiation as Absolute 
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Concept? Toward the Revision of a Sociological Category,’ Gerhard Wagner 
undertakes to trace what he calls “the interrupted tradition” of this 
theoretical category. Wagner associates the inception of differentiation-
oriented thinking with the name of Herbert Spencer, who was the first 
sociologist to provide a systematic elaboration of the concept. Borrowing 
his theoretical perspective from biology, Spencer defined differentiation in 
terms of organic process in the primitive germ-cell, which denotes the 
process of transformation from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. 
Insofar as Spencer believed that what applies to biological organisms also 
holds for societies, he employed the concept of differentiation as a universal 
principle to explicate the social realm. In his theoretical framework, 
differentiation signified a process initiated by an increase in size and 
resulting in a very specific transformation of a homogeneous state into a 
heterogeneous one (Wagner 1998: 451-52). Although Spencer’s Principles of 
Sociology was frequently accused of simplistic analogies, he did establish, as 
Wagner contends, a continuous theoretical tradition.  
In social science, the concept of differentiation came to mean the 
process of division of society into autonomous social subsystems according 
to their primary functions. Hence, societal differentiation involves the 
increasing specialization of different subsystems and institutions within 
modern society. On the other hand, it also implies that the structures have 
autonomous nature and are able to sustain themselves during the process of 
differentiation. The concept of differentiation was for the first time 
extensively researched by sociologists Emile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons. 
Nowadays, it continues to inspire the current academic discussion held by 
Jeffrey Alexander, Paul Colomy, Wolfgang Schluchter, and Richard 
Münch.23 However, the leading position in the theory of differentiation 
belongs to Niklas Luhmann, who, as Wagner correctly notices, “makes the 
concept of differentiation the foundation of an elaborate sociological theory 
that far surpasses the works of all the aforementioned authors in its 
complexity” (Wagner 1998: 452).  
My choice to focus on the theories of society produced by Weber, 
Parsons, and Luhmann is motivated by the following considerations. 
Notwithstanding all radical differences, these sociologists share an 
understanding of society in terms of an encompassing system, constituted 
by a multiplicity of interconnected analytical components, or subsystems. 
                                               
23  Wagner also indicates that the concept of differentiation has provoked much criticism in 
sociology, for instance, by Karin Knorr-Cetina and Renate Mayntz. 
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The systemic purview allows these theorists to overcome piecemeal analysis 
of society and interconnect all different social and historical processes into 
one unifying vision of society.  
 
3.1  Max Weber’s Theory of Rationalization 
 
Max Weber is justly regarded as “the most troublesome figure in twentieth 
century social and political thought” (Nielsen 1996: 375). His work has 
continuously constituted an inexhaustible source of inspiration for a wide 
range of social scientists, irrespective of their theoretical orientations. My 
interest in Weber’s oeuvre pertains to the question what determines the 
specifics of Western modern society. Central to Weber’s account of modern 
society is his notion of rationality, which allows him to understand the 
process of societal modernization as the process of increasing 
rationalization of autonomous value spheres. Given the prolific vastness of 
Weber’s work, I have to restrict my research to a number of writings where 
Weber has made rationality his major category: Economy and Society, The 
Protestant Ethic and the ‘Spirit’ of Capitalism, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur 
Religionssoziologie, especially the intermediary chapter ‘Zwischenbetrachtung,’ 
and a range of sociological essays, amongst which the essay ‘Politics as a 
Vocation.’ Strategically, I shall build up my analysis as follows. First, I shall 
discuss the concept of rationality as central to the Weberian diagnosis of 
Western modernity; next, I shall focus on the application of the Weberian 
concept of rationality to the complex and multidimensional process of the 
development of Western society; finally, I shall address critical accounts of 
Weber’s theory of rationalization.  
 
3.1.1 Weber’s Diagnosis of Western Modernity 
 
My presumption is that Weber’s sociological-historical account of modern 
society provides sociological evidence for Taylor’s definition of civil society 
in a stronger sense (Taylor 1995: 205-6). Relying jointly on Weber and 
Taylor, I understand the emergence of civil society at the end of the 
seventeenth century as the result of all-encompassing societal 
transformations that occurred in the majority of Western countries 
throughout the Trans-Atlantic zone. The rise of the public sphere and the 
differentiation of society from the spheres of politics and the economy are 
the most salient consequences of the structural transformations in the newly 
established social order. If in the previous chapter, we have discussed the 
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philosophical and political implications of these transformations, now we 
need to attend to the sociological description of the shift in the social 
behavior of modern individuals. In this quest, Weber’s typology of social 
action and legitimate order is elucidating.  
Weber explains this change in the social behavior of modern individuals 
by attending to the thesis of increasing rationalization. Exploration of the 
rationalization thesis underlies Weber’s voluminous sociological-historical 
investigations, where he persistently seeks for an empirical referent in order 
to provide his idea of increasing rationalization with some modicum of 
feasibility. Insofar as rationalization permeates the structural makeup of 
modern society, it renders society as differentiated into a multiplicity of 
social subsystems, each of them overridden with a specific rationality. Given 
this presumption, one can wonder how the increasing rationalization 
influenced the social behavior of individuals in the typically modern 
differentiated society.  
Weber commences his comprehensive work Economy and Society24 with an 
ideal-typical classification of four basic types of social action. He 
understands social action as saturated with a subjective meaning. Since 
acting individuals attach a subjective meaning to their behavior, they take 
into account the behavior of others and thereby consciously orient their 
action according to their specific motivations, interests, values, affections, 
etc. Due to his primary focus on Western type of social behavior, Weber 
discusses with noticeably less interest affectual and traditional forms of 
social action, the former determined by the emotional state of the actor and 
the latter – by the actor’s habitual patterns of behavior. Of greater 
importance for the scholar is the interrelation between instrumentally-
rational (zweckrational) and value-rational (wertrational) forms of social action. 
Instrumentally-rational action pertains to Zweckrationalität and is 
“determined by the expectations as to the behavior of objects in the 
environment and of other human beings; these expectations are used as 
‘conditions’ or ‘means’ for the attainment of the actor’s own rationally 
pursued and calculated ends.” Value-rational action is sustained, on the 
contrary, by the considerations of Wertrationalität and hence is “determined 
by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, 
religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects for 
success” (Weber 1978: 24-25).  
                                               
24 Weber’s Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft  was first published in German in Tübingen (1922). 
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Although Weber’s ideal-typical distinction between four basic types of 
action is characterized by a remarkable analytical elegance, Weber did 
acknowledge the fact that in reality any given social action involves a 
combination of elements belonging to different pure types of action. In 
particular, Weber’s concession becomes even more important when he 
takes up the old controversial juxtaposition of Gemeinschaft against 
Gesellschaft. Addressing communal and associative relations within the 
theoretical framework of his typology of social action, Weber ascribes 
affectual and traditional rationality to the communal type of action. 
Vergemeinschaftung occurs when “the orientation of social action […] is based 
on a subjective feeling of the parties, whether affectual or traditional, that 
they belong together.” On the other hand, Vergesellschaftung characterizes 
social relations, which are determined by “a rationally motivated adjustment 
of interests to a similarly motivated agreement, whether the basis of rational 
judgment by absolute values or reasons of expediency” (Weber 1978: 40-
41). Weber admits that although communal relations are sociologically 
observable in different sorts of bonds (family, religious community, military 
unit, or ethnic group), the majority of social relations retain characteristics 
of both communal and associative relations, which is obvious from Weber’s 
argument: 
No matter how calculating and hard-headed the ruling considerations in 
such a social relationship […] may be, it is quite possible for it to involve 
emotional values which transcend its utilitarian significance. Every social 
relationship which goes beyond the pursuit of immediate permanent ends, 
which hence lasts for long periods, involves relatively permanent social 
relationships between the same persons, and these cannot be exclusively 
confined to the technically necessary activities. Hence, in such cases an 
association in the same military unit, in the same school class, in the same 
workshop or office, there is always some tendency in this direction, 
although the degree, to be sure, varies enormously (Weber 1978: 41). 
As it is clear from the above quote, Weber’s elevation of the opposition 
between the processes of Vergesellschaftung and Vergemeinschaftung renders the 
typically modern associative type of the relations amenable to the 
considerations of affectual and traditional nature. In other words, 
associations of modern civil society are spontaneously formed not only due 
to individuals’ awareness, or sometimes rational decision, about their values, 
goals, and interests, but also due to the intuitive and often irrational 
motivations, traditionally entrenched habits, and sentiments, such as 
attachment, love, and longing for inclusiveness.   
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Besides, Weber resourcefully addresses the problem of legitimacy of 
social order within his analysis of social action. He concedes that social 
action is maintained by the belief in the existence of a legitimate order, and 
consequently that a social order is legitimate when it is “considered being 
binding” (Weber 1978: 31). Employing the ideal-typical method, he 
distinguishes three sources of legitimacy: rational, traditional, and 
charismatic. Authority legitimized by tradition is maintained by “an 
established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions,” authority 
legitimized on rational grounds presumes “a belief in the legality of enacted 
rules and the rights of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue 
commands,” and finally, authority legitimized by charisma is sustained by the 
devotion of followers to the exceptional sanctity or outstanding personality 
of a political leader and to his proclaimed political vision (Weber 1978: 215). 
It is worth noticing that Weber’s political writings, considered in their 
totality, reflect a serpentine path of his changing political convictions; 
especially his later writings express the scholar’s fascination with the 
charismatic form of authority.  
The three basic types of legitimate order have multifarious structural 
forms. One of the forms of rational-legal authority has continuously 
compelled Weber’s attention when he analyzed modern capitalistic society, 
namely the bureaucracy. The major structural shift towards rationalization 
and proceduration that emerged with the rise of early-modern liberalism 
reached its apex in the form of a modern bureaucratic state and unalterably 
changed societal relations between modern individuals. Weber confirms that 
bureaucratic rationalization relies on the techniques and procedures in 
maintaining social order: It “first changes the material and social orders and 
through them the people, by changing the conditions of adaptation, and 
perhaps the opportunities for adaptation, through a rational determination 
of means and ends” (Weber 1978: 116). Weber’s extensive study of 
bureaucracy brings us to the discussion of an inventive notion that Weber 
employed to describe the distinctiveness of modern Western society – the 
notion of formal rationality of modern social order. 
Weber made a pioneering attempt to render the process of increasing 
rationalization and consequent differentiation of value spheres in 
sociological terms. Undertaking detailed studies of the structures and 
institutions of modern Western society, he provided a cogent framework for 
identifying a specific logic imbued in the process of differentiation. As 
Rogers Brubaker correctly observes in The Limits of Rationality: An Essay on 
the Social and Moral Thought of Max Weber, Weber was also the first to 
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conceive the essentially “multifaceted rationality of modern society” not as 
“simply a conceptual mosaic,” nor as “a mere aggregate of unrelated 
elements” (Brubaker 1984: 29), but as directed by the rationale of the formal 
type of rationality. Trying to get at the core of the Weberian concept of 
rationality,25 Arnold Eisen identified in the article ‘The Meanings and 
Confusions of Weberian “Rationality” ’ six elements that constitute the 
semantic core of the concept. First, Eisen concedes that it is the purpose, or 
the conscious intent of the actor to achieve a given end, that underlies 
rationality. Second, he identifies the element of calculability as a criterion for 
maximum efficacy of an action for the achievement of a desired result. 
Next, rationality entails control over both a means to and an end of an 
action; it also hinges on logic that is necessary for making sense in terms of 
a given purpose and rendering action coherent and efficacious. Concisely, 
rationality is characterized by logical or teleological consistency. Besides, 
there is a formal element in logic, namely universality. Universality allows 
rationality to hold true its logical method regardless of what the empirical 
content in a particular case may be. Conversely, universality connotes 
abstractness and impersonality. Finally, rationality is characterized by 
systematicity, as it pertains to systematic methodical organization, relating 
parts to the whole in a manner most efficacious for the achievement of 
established goals (Eisen 1978: 58-61). Taken together, these features 
characterize the formal rationality that underlies modern Western society. 
Weber’s pivotal claim is that formal rationality permeated, in modern 
Western civilization, each institutional component of the social order, 
including formalistic law, industrial capitalism, bureaucratic administration, 
ethic of vocation, and scientific-technological progress. As Stephen Kalberg 
explains in his article ‘Max Weber’s Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for 
                                               
25 Remarkably, multiple attempts of Weberian scholars to clarify a deep conceptual ambivalence 
toward rationality have produced a gallery of distinguished Weberian sociologies, some of which 
are based on entirely opposite conceptions. Without addressing the specifics of the debate, I shall 
simply survey most prominent positions. Steven Lukes discusses the problem of rationality in 
relation to a set of beliefs that seem prima facie irrational and arrives at a confusing conclusion: 
Insofar as the concept of rationality cannot on itself produce a number of distinct criteria for 
assessing belief or motivations on the rational/irrational nexus, the concept is “hopelessly 
opaque” (Lukes 1974: 194). Alternatively, other scholars set forth a critical appraisal of the 
meaning of Weber’s rationality. Thus, Ann Swindler focused in 1973 on the semantic-conceptual 
specifications of the three terms ‘rationality,’ ‘rationalism,’ and ‘rationalization.’ Arnold Eisen 
discerned in 1978 six component elements of the concept, while Rogers Brubaker extended in 
1984 the semantic domain of Weber’s concept of rationality toward sixteen possible meanings. 
Other important attempts at elucidating Weber’s somewhat evasive usage of the concept 
‘rationality’ include contributions of Wolfgang Schluchter, Guenther Roth, Wolfgang Mommsen, 
Stephan Kalberg, and Joel Elliott.  
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the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History,’ formal rationality has 
delineated boundaries and attained an unprecedented perseverance in the 
course of industrialization and has come to legitimize “a similar means-end 
rational calculation by reference back to universally applied rules, laws, or 
regulation” (Kalberg 1980: 1158). Insofar as the inner logic of formal 
rationality is based on what Wolfgang Schluchter calls in the volume Max 
Weber’s Vision of History: Ethics and Politics the “scientific-technological 
rationalism,” pointing at “the capacity to control the world on basis of 
empirical knowledge by means of calculation” (Roth and Schluchter 1979: 
14-15), the relations in modern social order become increasingly 
characterized by abstraction, impersonality and calculability. 
In addition, Weber admits another upshot of his thesis of increasing 
rationalization, namely that the dominance of formal rationality gradually 
excludes substantive rationality. Formal rationality makes modern Western 
society progressively efficient but deprives it of its traditional foundations. 
The institutions of the market, bureaucracy, and law acquire, through using 
the techniques of increasing formalization and impersonal quantification, a 
higher degree of efficiency and control. However, at the same time, these 
institutions become increasingly impervious to the logic of substantive 
rationality and neglect the values of fraternity, equality, and compassion. 
Brubaker explains the causes of the diminishing role of substantive 
rationality in the modern West as follows, “The severe restriction of the 
scope and significance of brotherly conduct results [….] from the 
importance of demands for substantive rationality in a society dominated by 
objectified economic and political structures that perpetuate themselves 
according to an inexorable logic of purely formal rationality, a logic that 
excludes all considerations of substantive rationality, all questions of 
ultimate value” (Brubaker 1984: 86). More specifically, Joel Elliott draws a 
particular example of the depersonalizing influence of bureaucracy in his 
contribution ‘The Fate of Reason: Max Weber and the Problem of 
(Ir)Rationality.’26 He claims that bureaucracy, which is “the most salient 
example of formal rationality in the modern world” and thus is 
“indispensable to the orderly and efficient functioning of mass society,” 
“increasingly dehumanizes life with its impersonality and quantification of 
values” (Elliott 1998: 21). This non-optimistic conclusion acquires a soberer 
tone in the formulation of Brubaker, “Never, in premodern times, had 
social and economic life been regulated by mechanisms so relentlessly 
                                               
26 Internet publication, last visited on 28 July 2010. 
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indifferent to substantive ends and values; never before had means and 
procedures become so completely autonomous, so thoroughly divorced 
from ends” (Brubaker 1984: 44).  
Concisely, the Weberian thesis of rationalization allows typifying modern 
social order as “uniquely rational” in the sense that it is based on the clear 
distinction between formal rationality and substantive rationality, between 
reason and conscience (Brubaker 1984: 43-44). Thus, although Weber 
originally intended to produce a conceptually unific framework apt for the 
historical-sociological analysis of modern society, his attempts were 
invariably countered by the irreconcilable conflict between formal and 
substantive rationalities. If formal rationality is primarily dominated by 
means and devoid of considerations of ends, substantive rationality is 
permeated by value considerations. Elliott describes formal rationality as 
denoting “the pursuit of the most efficient and technically correct means 
within the bounds of accepted scientific knowledge; it displays an inherent 
tendency toward maximum calculability, escalating impersonality and 
general indifference to all substantive considerations” (Elliott 1998: 8). On 
the contrary, substantive rationality operates in relation to the “value 
postulate” and thus is “a manifestation of man’s inherent capacity for value-
rational action” (Kalberg 1980: 1155). Upon this consideration, Weber’s 
substantive rationality is compatible with Schluchter’s notion of 
“metaphysical-ethical rationalism,” under which he understands “the 
systematization of meaning patterns by means of intellectual elaboration and 
deliberate sublimation of ultimate ends” (Roth and Schluchter 1979: 14-15). 
Even such a short comparison makes clear that formal and substantive 
rationalities have different internal logics and consequently refute each other 
as irrational. Brubaker comments in this respect that formal rationality of 
modern capitalism, law, bureaucracy, and vocational asceticism “may be 
judged highly irrational from a substantive or evaluative point of view” 
(Brubaker 1984: 29-30).  
It is the Weberian consistent juxtaposition between formal and 
substantive rationalities that constitutes the inexorable tension in his 
conception of society. This juxtaposition pertains to the essential 
antagonism between means and ends, formal efficiency and moral 
commitment, proceduration and substantiation. In the subsequent parts of 
his impressive Economy and Society, as well as in the numerous sociological 
essays, Weber is obsessively preoccupied with contemplating the foreboding 
consequences produced by the inexorable tension between instrumental 
rationality (Zweckrationalität) and substantive rationality (Wertrationalität). 
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Hence, he inquisitively stakes out the opposition between ethics of 
responsibility (Verantwortungsethik) and ethics of ultimate ends 
(Gesinnungsethik), trying to explain the predominance of instrumental 
rationality in the market and the predominance of substantive rationality in 
fraternal and personal relations.  
The moral consequences of this conflict are far-reaching. None of the 
Weberian value spheres, be it politics, religion, science, ethics, aesthetics, or 
law, is redeemed of the indicated tension. On the contrary, as Elliot rightly 
observes, “the rationalizing tendency is operative in all spheres of human 
existence, pushing ideas and values toward their logical extremes, 
increasingly cultivating differentiation among value spheres that are 
progressively antagonistic with each other” (Elliott 1998: 22). Becoming 
increasingly devoid of the considerations of substantive rationality, 
differentiated value spheres evolve in relation to abstract laws, regulations, 
and external necessities. In result, “the overwhelming strength of 
sociologically entrenched spheres unable in principle to generate value-
rationalization processes condemned the unified personality to exist ‘at the 
edge’ of modern society in small and intimate groups” (Kalberg 1980: 1176). 
This has led to a situation in which modern individuals should cope with the 
problem of moral choice and motivation alone, without reference to the 
desacralized cosmos as the ultimate source of substantive values. With the 
problem of individual moral choice and motivation, we have come to 
Weber’s famous diagnosis of “the disenchantment of the world.”  
 
3.1.2 The Paradox of the Disenchanted Modernity 
 
In order to understand Weber’s diagnosis of the disenchantment of Western 
modernity, we need first to clarify how Weber envisages the dynamics of 
Western civilization in connection to the indicated tendency toward 
increasing rationalization. For instance, Kalberg opts to “reconstruct, at the 
purely conceptual level, Weber’s vision of a multiplicity of rationalization 
processes that variously conflict and coalesce with one another at all societal 
and civilizational levels.” Accordingly, he regards four discrete types of 
rationality as the “cornerstones” for the corresponding rationalization 
processes (Kalberg 1980: 1147). On this view, Kalberg assumes that Weber, 
despite of his primary focus on the rationalization process in Western 
society, does not reject the idea that rationalization processes, albeit often of 
a different kind, take place in non-Western civilizations as well. 
Furthermore, in the course of his intellectual journey, Weber “came to 
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doubt all those theories that understood the advance of ‘rationality’ as a 
unilinear evolutionary process occurring with equal intensity in all societal 
spheres. He then began to investigate the manner in which action was 
rationalized in particular areas” (Kalberg 1980: 1149-51). Likewise, Elliott 
rightly asserts that any attempt to consider the process of Western 
development in terms of a “triumphalist, unilinear dynamic of sociocultural 
evolution” would fundamentally misconstrue Weber’s intentions and ignore 
his “frequently expressed uncertainties over the impact of rationalization on 
human freedom and autonomy.” According to Elliott, Weber is rather 
inclined to reveal “a multidimensional, multidirectional dynamic operative in 
the historical process that simplistic notions of cultural progress or 
developmental determinism could not accommodate” (Elliott 1998: 4).  
Given these considerations, I contend that Weber did not intend to 
provide an understanding of the dynamics of modern society exclusively in 
terms of increasing rationalization. Instead, he understood the dynamics of 
society’s development as essentially determined by a dynamic relationship 
between formal and substantive rationalities. When applied to the historical 
progress, this means that an increase of one type of rationality leads to an 
inevitable decrease of the other type. However, it would be unpardonably 
simplistic to suppose that Weber described the process of historical 
development as one unilinear process, or, in other words, as a gradual 
progression from a civilization construed by substantive rationality toward a 
civilization determined by formal rationality. Rather, I would suggest that 
Weber envisaged historical progress as a diagram that registers various 
fluctuations in the proportional prevalence of substantive or formal 
rationality. The condition in which Western modernity currently occurs is 
characterized by a high degree of formal rationality and by a minimal degree 
of substantive rationality – the condition that Weber anxiously called “the 
disenchantment of the world” (Entzauberung der Welt).  
It is also possible that Weber was extremely sensitive to the origin and 
dynamics of society’s development, instead of aiming at a static depiction of 
a certain stage in this development. Thus, Guenther Roth suggests that 
Weber has succeeded to elaborate only “a partial theory of modernity,” 
since he “spent more effort on studying its genesis than on diagnosing it” 
(Roth 1987: 75). Consequently, Roth is convinced that Weber’s explorations 
of alternative “socio-historical models were meant to facilitate the 
comparative study of world history in search of the distinctiveness of 
Western rationalism,” so that Weber’s historical synthesis appears to be 
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imbued by one unifying intent, namely to present Western modernity as “a 
product of a long rationalization and intellectualization” (Roth 1987: 90).  
Schluchter converges with Roth on that Weber was simultaneously 
fascinated and appalled by his own depiction of the structures of modernity 
as pervaded by the consequences of increasing rationalization. Let us attend 
to the core of Schluchter’s interpretation:  
Weber achieves a diagnosis of our situation on the basis of his socio-
economic, political, and socio-cultural analysis of capitalism and of 
occidental rationalism. It is the diagnosis of the disenchantment of the 
world which has been going on for millennia and has now been completed, 
the diagnosis of the rationalization of its value spheres and of the 
intellectualization of our responses to them. But it is also the diagnosis of 
the paradox of this process which presents to modern society a problem not 
only of management but also of meaning (Roth and Schluchter 1979: 13).  
An important shift from metaphysical-ethical rationalism that imbued 
the world with a transcendental meaning toward scientific-technological 
rationalism of the calculable, efficiency-oriented, and controllable modern 
world has become a confronting issue for those Weberian scholars who 
tend to interpret his theory of modernity in dialectical terms. However, they 
have not left this issue unsolved, as they proposed various concepts to 
alleviate the pressure of increasing rationalization. For instance, Kalberg 
suggests that the “axial shift” in modernity from religion to science 
established a new prevalence of formal rationality but determined, on the 
other hand, a corresponding type of modern Lebensführung of modern 
individuals (Kalberg 1980: 1173-75). Lebensführung, which can be inelegantly 
translated in English as ‘ways of life,’ denotes the system of attitudes that 
underlie the entire organization of life. The dominant role of formal 
rationality in modern Lebensführung entails rationalization of life-style in the 
direction to methodical action. Kalberg explains that “rationalization 
processes of historic significance in societies and in entire civilizations have 
often originated when a constellation of factors crystallized that rewarded 
methodical rational ways of life” (Kalberg 1980: 1149).  
Consequently, the concept of Lebensführung can be reckoned as a unique 
Western invention aimed at reconciling the tension between formal and 
substantive rationalities. Schluchter, for his part, has demonstrated much 
resourcefulness in elaborating on this concept in his extensive study Religion 
und Lebensführung. Retracing the Weberian theory of rationalization, 
Schluchter posits his analysis at the level of “metaphysical-ethical 
rationalism” and focuses primarily on the relationship between economic 
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ethics and religion. Consequently, he seeks to endorse two fundamental 
arguments: First, that the life-style of modern individual is structured 
according to the considerations of “practical rationalism,” and second, that 
the achievement of this methodical way of life is an upshot of the 
institutionalization of configurations of meaning and interest (Roth and 
Schluchter 1979: 15). 
Weberian scholars generally agree that the paradox of Western 
civilization consists in the unanticipated effect of the fluctuating balance 
between substantive and formal rationalities. According to Weber, the 
development of Western civilization was influenced by the rationalizing 
tendencies that were originally released into the world by the ethical 
prophets of Judeo-Christian religion. It was at the dawn of European 
modernity that the rationalizing potential of the religious-ethical complex 
caused an unanticipated effect. Then, economic rationality of capitalism 
prevailed over religious rationality of Protestantism. With an overwhelming 
convincingness, Weber unfolds this argument in The Protestant Ethic and the 
‘Spirit’ of Capitalism, claiming that there is an extraordinary convergence 
between early the logic of modern capitalism and the religious-ethical logic 
of Protestantism, especially of its Puritan and Calvinist forms. The 
inextricable connection between the spirit of capitalism and the Protestant 
ethic has been brilliantly explicated by Kalberg, “Weber argues that the 
origin of modern capitalism cannot be fully understood without reference to 
the value-rational orientations of the Puritans to an ethical substantive 
rationality: the believer religiously inspired to value disciplined, methodical 
work and the accumulation and reinvestment of money brought a 
systematic component to economic activity that proved far more effective 
that the utilitarian considerations […] of economic traditionalism” (Kalberg 
1980: 1163).  
Weber depicted the Puritan as an inner-worldly ascetic who rejects all 
forms of worldly attachments (such as tradition, art, and pleasure) that can 
potentially compromise his pursuit of personal salvation and devotes 
himself entirely to restless, consistent, and diligent work in a worldly 
vocation. That is the origin of the Weberian ideal-typical concept of 
Berufmensch. Substantive rationality of Puritanism directed the formalistic 
understanding of money and economic success in terms of means toward 
the end-oriented understanding of any material gain as an equivocal sign of 
personal salvation. With the Protestant doctrine of predestination, 
economic success acquired a new substantive meaning as a manifestation of 
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God’s favor in relation to the chosen individual in the pre-eternal plan of 
the worlds’ salvation.  
At the same time, Weber disclosed a deep paradox inherent in the 
intrinsic connectedness between the ethoses of Protestantism and 
capitalism. The core of the Weberian paradox has been a challenge for many 
Weberian scholars. Amongst others, Bryan L. Turner eloquently described 
the genesis of the Weberian paradox:  
Protestant values were, at least in the pristine doctrines of Luther and 
Calvin, opposed to the development of capitalist culture, which emphasized 
secular success and material advancement. However, the strains within 
Calvinist teaching, regarding the tension between the intense personal quest 
for salvation and the unknown outcome of the salvational drive for each 
isolated individual, produced a notion of calling or vocation which over time 
became, not only compatible with capitalist requirements, but actually drove 
capitalism along. The consequence was that Calvinism produced a 
characterology which was perfectly suited to the spirit of capitalism, 
especially with individualism and activism. This mixture was the ‘fatefulness’ 
of our times, namely the unintended consequence of the historic mixture of 
Calvinist discipline, instrumental rationality and modern capitalist 
organization was the iron cage of modernity (Turner 1993: 15). 
Examining the enigmatic depth of the Weberian paradox, Elliot 
convincingly argues that the process of economic rationalization, which 
once was initiated by substantive rationality of Puritan-Calvinist religious 
ethic, eventually resulted in irrationalization of religion, as well as in radical 
de-sacralization of the world. Specifically, he claims, “In the serpentine 
course of Western rationalization those otherworldly values and 
commitments of Puritanism gradually lost both their metaphysical 
credibility and motivational significance.” The inherent link between 
substantive rationality of Protestant ethic and instrumental rationality of the 
modern world has been decisively torn, so that “in the modern world this 
once pivotal nexus between ‘the Protestant ethic’ and ‘the spirit of 
capitalism’ no longer obtains.” What has been left for the diligent 
Berufmensch is the perfection of his mundane vocation. In result “the modern 
capitalist engaged in the endless accumulation of capital, the economic 
systematization of life in the service of greater profits, simply as an end in 
itself and for ‘the irrational sense of having done his job well’ ” (Elliott 
1998: 14). Formal rationality of capitalism and substantive rationality of 
Protestantism were bound to deny each other’s inner logic as irrational.  
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With the general escalation of Western economic and cultural 
rationalism, “the world was increasingly transformed from an enchanted 
garden into a cause-and-effect mechanism, existing in a universe devoid of 
magical or mysterious forces,” whereas the sacral foundations of the 
medieval God-centered world “slowly crumbled before the ruthless and 
inexorable process of rationalization” (Elliott 1998: 15). The processes 
occurring in the mundane world are now regarded as mere events of nature, 
completely demystified and stripped of the sacred meaning, so that “the 
world eventually transformed from a meaningful totality into a disenchanted 
causal mechanism” (Elliott 1998: 22). This major transformation has exerted 
a paramount influence on the modern conception of social order. Since the 
world has lost its transcendental referent, the social order can no longer 
sustain its traditional foundations; instead, it is conceived as a pure creation 
of men. In fact, the de-sacralization of the worldview encouraged early 
modern thinkers to ground their doctrines of liberalism in such concepts as 
natural rights, individual autonomy, and freedom. These concepts provided 
foundations for the normative idea of civil society – the issue we have 
addressed earlier (§ 2.1.2). 
The Weberian paradox continues to produce much confusion. One of 
the intriguing questions pertains to the circumstances under which 
substantive rationality of Protestantism was able to instigate, perhaps 
unintentionally, irrationalization of religion and secularization of the world. 
Put differently, how and why did religion contribute to its increasing 
marginalization and irrationalization? In my view, Elliot has suggested an 
insightful explanation, “The internal logic of formal rationality produces 
escalating indifference and outright hostility to all substantive 
considerations. This results, Weber argued, in a system where the cultivation 
and pursuit of efficient means is elevated to a position functionally 
equivalent to substantive value, increasingly exposing the system to 
accusations of substantive irrationality” (Elliott 1998: 9). Insofar as internal 
logic of religion becomes increasingly rationalized by the world devoid of 
any transcendent dimension, religious substantive values become 
increasingly inadequate for systematization and legitimation of the world 
order and of human conduct. Religion loses its rationalizing power in a 
secular world, and the world becomes explainable and calculable for 
modern individuals. On this view, the disenchantment of the world has 
turned, in Elliott’s words, “the ironic result of a religious orientation whose 
commitment to a transcendent deity and a meaningful cosmos appeared 
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increasingly irrelevant and irrational to a morally incredulous humanity” 
(Elliott 1998: 10).  
The logical question rises whether the “morally incredulous humanity” is 
content to live in the disenchanted world. Until now, Weber’s suggestive 
answer remains enigmatically open to endless interpretations of what he 
actually intended to say by his famous characterization of modern society as 
an “iron cage,” “from which there is no escape, where humans are held 
hostage in an oppressively efficient, inexorable social order that subverts 
human freedom and dignity” (Elliott 1998: 10). In a disenchanted, morally 
disjointed cosmos, humans are left to choose their own values and beliefs, 
to invent their own moral criteria and construct a new rationally justified, 
meaningful cosmos. Weber’s diagnosis of instrumentally-rational modernity 
is far from comforting; instead, it seems confronting and incensing: 
The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and 
intellectualization and, above all, by the ‘disenchantment of the world.’ 
Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from public 
life either into the transcendental realm of mystic life or into the 
brotherliness of direct and personal human relations (Weber 1958a: 12). 
Formal rationality of the modern world confronted humanity with the 
conditions of increasing abstraction, impersonality, and quantification of 
values. 
How can we assess Weber’s gloomy diagnosis of modern society? For 
his part, Elliott argues that Weber’s diagnosis is a typical product of his age 
and that it reflects the cultural malaise that pervaded European intelligentsia 
in the early 1920s. Due to the rapid industrialization in Western countries, 
German academics started to worry about soullessness of the modern age 
and the malevolent potential lurching in an institutionalized and morally 
vacuous rationality of modern society (Elliott 1998: 16-17). If Elliot is right 
in positioning Weber’s theory in the historical-cultural context, we need to 
consider the influence of Weber’s ideas on the subsequent generations of 
Weberian scholars. 
 
3.1.3 A Critical Revision of Weber’s Theory  
 
In what follows, I shall survey the critical emendations of Weber’s theory of 
rationalization, which are essentially different from the dialectically oriented 
historical-ethical accounts by Roth, Schluchter, Kalberg, and Elliott.  
SOCIOLOGICAL EMBEDDING OF CIVIL SOCIETY THEORY 
93 
 
In his contribution ‘Personal Conduct and Societal Change’ to the 
volume Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity, Wolfgang Mommsen revises 
the rationalization thesis, which contemporary Weberian theorists consider 
to be the axis of Weber’s “grandiose attempt at a substantive reconstruction 
of Occidental history in terms of the origins of the specific and peculiar 
‘rationalism’ of Western culture” (Mommsen 1987: 36). Given Weber’s 
outspoken emphasis on the distinctiveness of Western civilization with 
which he commences The Protestant Ethic and the ‘Spirit’ of Capitalism (Weber 
1958b: 20-26), scholars have been continuously misled to interpret Weber’s 
religious sociological analysis of other world religions “merely as a contrast 
to the specific character of Western civilization and as an indirect 
corroboration of the hypothesis of modern capitalism and the spirit of 
Protestantism” (Mommsen 1987: 37). Thus, Schluchter has been criticized 
by Donald Nielsen for providing a misleadingly “unifying account” of 
Weber’s theory (Nielsen 1996: 386-88). Similarly, Mommsen reckons 
Schluchter’s interpretation of the rationalization thesis as insufficient 
because, despite Schluchter’s intention to “avoid the pitfalls of a 
straightforward evolutionary theory,” his presentation of modern Western 
civilization still appears as “the apotheosis of the principle of rationality and 
modern rational science” (Mommsen 1987: 45). Mommsen argues that 
Schluchter, by extensively discussing formally rational methods of science, 
rational institutions of the capitalist industrial system and the bureaucratic 
and institutional state, sets forth an extolling description of these 
institutional features as exclusive achievements of Western civilization.  
Instead, Mommsen opts for an alternative interpretation of the Weberian 
account of history. Drawing on Weber’s later studies of societal change, 
legitimacy, and religion,27 Mommsen demonstrates how Weber gradually 
arrived at a new evaluation of the concept of charisma. Initially, Weber was 
inclined to regard the charismatic foundations of political and social order 
as a typical phenomenon of the early history of humankind, but later, 
becoming more attentive to the influence of otherworldly attitudes on the 
historical development, Weber reinterpreted and extended his concept of 
charisma. Thereby, he demonstrated that major historical changes in social 
order have origin not only in the institutional makeup of a particular society, 
but also in “the highly personal behavior of a charismatic quality” 
(Mommsen 1987: 45). Mommsen asserts consequently that the societal 
change is induced by two antagonistic yet complementary forces – 
                                               
27  The studies collected in Economy and Society and in the volume From Max Weber. 
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rationalization and charisma, “Charisma (which in Weber’s later sociological 
theory had come to replace both Jewish prophecy and Puritan asceticism in 
the early history of the modern world) makes the place where personality 
forces its way into the empirical processes of history. Rationalization, on the 
other hand, begins to take effect either as an adaptation to existing value 
ideas or as an adaptation to material interests or institutional conditions” 
(Mommsen 1987: 47). 
If Mommsen rediscovers in Weber’s oeuvre the dialectical relationship 
between rationalization and charisma, Johannes Weiss focuses rather on the 
dialectic relationship between normative rationality and empirical 
irrationalities. In his article ‘On the Irreversibility of Western Rationalization 
and Max Weber’s Alleged Fatalism,’ Weiss argues that Weber’s theory of 
rationalization has “no place for a one-dimensional, unilinear and so 
ineluctable developmental process.” Thus, he undertakes to depict the 
process of increasing rationalization in the modern West as “pluralistic and 
conflictual,” imbued by internal tensions and contradictions between the 
extremes of rationality versus irrationality (Weiss 1987: 155). Weiss 
pinpoints some countervailing factors in the complex process of 
rationalization as inevitable material irrationalities such as recourse 
limitations, health factors, unexpected outcomes of the market economy, 
“all of which necessitate rational action but are outside the prescriptive rules 
of rationality” (Weiss 1987: 182). With that, the scholar instigates a very 
important discussion concerning the antagonistic tension between the 
normative orientation of the Weberian rationalization theory and the 
descriptive orientation of an empirical critique of this theory. Insofar as 
“any attempt to develop the theory of rationalization will need equally to 
theorize the irrationalities of the modern world,” Weiss concludes that “so 
long as human culture survives, rationality and irrationality are locked in a 
dialectic embrace” (Weiss 1987: 182).  
The dubious status of rationality in Weber’s theory has been a hot issue 
in the social-scientific debate. On this view, Brubaker provocatively assumes 
that Weber disclosed “the extreme inhospitality of the modern formally 
rational social and economic order to the values of equality, fraternity and 
caritas” with so much vigor that his analysis seems to lack a “critical edge.” 
However, Brubaker concedes that the critical impulse in Weber’s work is 
present but remains “exclusively diagnostic,” since Weber never suggests a 
therapy. Sociological science, like any other Western social order, is a 
rational enterprise in a purely formal sense and thus unable to yield any 
values judgments, to define substantive rationality and provide normative 
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defense of a conception of the good life (Brubaker 1984: 44-45). 
Nonetheless, the value of Weber’s diagnosis consist in that it has called into 
question the very possibility of leading a rational life in a pervasively 
rationalized world of modernity. If modern individual has to choose 
between the considerations of formal rationality or of substantive 
rationality, his choice cannot be rational, for “it is precisely criteria of 
rationality that must be chosen.” Modern individual, as Brubaker concludes, 
“cannot escape making a criterionless and therefore irrational choice about 
the meaning of rationality” (Brubaker 1984: 87). 
Weber’s theory of rationality has been also reassessed in the light of the 
later achievements in social scientific theory. For instance, Barry Hindess 
agrees in the article ‘Rationality and the Characterization of Modern Society’ 
that “Weber’s account of the rationality of the modern West depends on a 
specific model of the actor as a human individual, analyzed in terms of 
concepts of interests, values, a need for meaning and a potential for rational 
calculation.” Relying on these concepts, Weber develops his well-known 
typology of social action, rationalism, and legitimate domination. However, 
“Weber’s model of the actor operates with a limited and inadequate account 
of the conditions of action, and especially of the discursive conditions in 
which actors reach and formulate decisions.” Hindess corroborates this 
conclusion by exposing the lapses of rational choice theories (Hindess 1987: 
137-38). Perhaps, all these revealed shortcomings have inspired Benjamin 
Nelson to reconsider the present status of the Weberian rationalization 
thesis in contemporary Western society by introducing the concepts of 
conscience, cultural systems, and directive structures. Particularly, Nelson 
argues, “To understand the making of early modern cultures we need to 
understand the making of early modern minds, and therefore we need to 
have a proper sense of the changes in the central paradigms as well as the 
reconstructing of axial institutions of society” (Nelson 1981: 71). 
Such an attempt at clarifying the psychological and social dimensions of 
Weberian rationalization has been undertaken by Walter Wallace, who 
researched in his insightful contribution ‘Rationality, Human Nature, and 
Society in Weber’s Theory’ the relationship between rationality and human 
nature. Wallace argues that Weber’s definition of rationality is grounded in 
“consciously rule-bound comparison and choice among alternative means 
to a given end.” Insofar as Weber uses, whenever he speaks of rationality, 
terms like ‘generalization,’ ‘systematization,’ and ‘methodical,’ he associates 
rationality with the operations based on distinction, classification, and 
systematic comparison between primary and secondary elements (Wallace 
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1990: 206). However, Wallace is convinced that the human individual is 
unable to compare and choose among the ends because “the human 
individual, in Weber’s eyes, is by nature constitutionally able to conceptualize 
alternative means to a given end but unable reliably and precisely to compare 
and choose among these alternatives […] without help from fellow 
humans.” Thus, Wallace emphasizes the importance of a social dimension 
in the Weberian concept of rationality, “It is on this foundation of 
combined abilities and inabilities of human nature that Weber’s theory of 
that collectivity of fellow humans called ‘society’ is constructed” (Wallace 
1990: 220). Indeed, if Wallace’s analysis is correct, the Weberian notion of 
rationality is bound to touch upon the problematic balance between 
individual freedom and solidarity.   
By way of conclusion, Weber’s theory of rationalization does not hold a 
place for the normative concept of civil society. Instead, Weber’s 
sociological theory remains primarily a classic value-free sociological 
account of the rise and dynamics of society in the modern West. On this 
view, Weber’s theory is necessary for the present study, as it provides 
sociological evidence for the structural edifice of real civil societies in the 
West and positions this structural edifice in a specific historical-cultural 
context. Weber belonged to the pioneering generation of social scientists 
who conceived of society as an essential product of human interactions and 
discovered much ingenuity in explaining social structures by the innovative 
concept of rationality. Employing Weber’s ideal-typical method of analysis, 
we can characterize the structure of modern Western society as permeated 
by a high degree of differentiation – differentiation between diverging 
rationalities of autonomous social spheres. The process of increasing 
differentiation corroborates the normative principle of pluralism, which is 
entrenched in the political-philosophical idea of civil society. Besides, it also 
clarifies why contemporary theorists of civil society agree on differentiating 
the sphere of civil society from the spheres of politics and the economy. 
The Weberian thesis of differentiation of rationalities endorses the tripartite 
model of relations between the three arenas of democratization – the 
analytical model I have discussed in the introduction to the previous chapter 
and specified further in § 2.3.2. The Weberian sociological diagnosis of a 
highly differentiated society elucidates the complex interrelations between 
the spheres of society, the economy, and politics from a dynamic religious-
ethical perspective.  
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3.2 Talcott Parsons’s Theory of Structural Differentiation of Society 
 
In what follows, I intend to consider how Parsons has conceived of civil 
society in his theory of structural differentiation. Specifically, I shall try to 
indicate the strength and the weakness of his sociological approach with a 
view to clarifying whether Parsons has been able to overcome the tension 
between normative and descriptive conceptions of civil society. 
 
3.2.1 Civil Society in the Theory of Structural Differentiation 
 
Parsons developed Weberian tentative theory of modern differentiated 
society in a much more pronounced manner. If Weber elaborated a 
conception of modern differentiated society in terms of increasing 
rationalization of different social spheres, Parsons positioned the concept of 
differentiation as the cornerstone of his theory of structural differentiation. 
Parsons himself repeatedly acknowledged his indebtedness to the Weberian 
ideas. For instance, in his book The System of Modern Societies, Parsons asserts, 
“The system constitutive of modern societies is the most rational yet 
achieved in historical development. It has an unsurpassable adaptive 
capacity rooted in multi-dimensionality” (Roth and Schluchter 1979: 11).  
Indeed, Parsons elaborated his theory of society under the influence of 
his prominent predecessors in the sociological science. In his illuminating 
article ‘Parsons’s Structure (And Simmel) Revisited,’ Donald Levine traced 
the impact of Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber on Parsons’s ideas. Prior to 
Pareto, Durkheim and Weber, social theorists were divided between so-
called “positivists,” who viewed action as organized solely by the utilitarian 
pursuit of benefits, and “idealists,” who viewed action as organized solely in 
terms of affectively grounded normative dispositions. Levine claims that 
despite profound divergences, Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber “converged 
behind a single theoretical orientation constituted by the view that action is 
shaped both by utilitarian interests and normative ideals (= ‘voluntarist’)” 
(Levine 1989: 111). For his part, Parsons was convinced that their 
sociologies “pioneered a conception of human action as two-dimensional.” 
Consequently, he developed his theory of action by relying on the Weberian 
synthesis of utilitarian and normative considerations in social action. On this 
view, Levine concludes, Parsons’s analysis is pitched on a high level of 
generality “regarding the duality of human nature and the two-dimensional 
character of human action” (Levine 1989: 113). Levine’s conclusion is 
elucidating for my investigation of Parsons’s attempt at reconciling 
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normative and descriptive conceptions of civil society. Based on the 
synthesis of utilitarian and normative considerations, Parsons’s vision of 
society inevitably involves the amalgamation of descriptive-empirical and 
normative elements, and that is why it may be susceptible to certain 
controversies, which I intend to discuss in more detail later. 
For now, it is important to emphasize Parsons’s contribution to the 
development of civil society theory in general. Cohen and Arato 
unambiguously acknowledge the high value of Parsons’s sociological 
approach to civil society theory. Parsons was in his time a progressive social 
scientist to understand the revival of associational life as “the re-creation of 
a fabric of societal intermediations […] in a new and posttraditional form” 
(Cohen and Arato 1992: 425). More precisely, Parsons was the first to refute 
the dichotomous model of state and society used by Marxists and 
neoliberals, which reduced civil society to the economically-defined sphere 
of bürgerliche Gesellschaft (Cohen and Arato 1992: 423). Parsons compellingly 
asserted the structural independence of civil society from the sphere of the 
economy. In his extensive analysis, he revealed that “contemporary society 
is reproduced not only through economic and political processes, or even 
their new or renewed fusion, but through the interaction of legal structures, 
social associations, institutions of communication, and cultural forms, all of 
which have a significant degree of autonomy” (Cohen and Arato 1992: 425).  
Moreover, Parsons rehabilitated the concept of civil society in social 
theory. Arato and Cohen notice that the concept of civil society became 
unpopular in sociological science because of a deep-rooted habit to regard 
civil society as a remnant of pre-social-scientific discourse. The 
reappearance of the concept in Parsons’s work is all the more remarkable, 
given that it reappeared in the framework of a new theory of differentiation. 
Cohen and Arato praise Parsons for revitalizing the notion of civil society in 
his authentic concept of a “societal community,” which is differentiated 
from the state, the economy, and the cultural sphere and whose function is 
societal integration through normative frameworks of legality and plurality, 
or participation in associations (Cohen and Arato 1992: 118-19). Reviewing 
Cohen and Arato’s book in the article ‘The Return to Civil Society,’ Jeffrey 
Alexander rightfully underlines that the scholars’ constructive reception of 
Parsons’s notion of “societal community” has been a major theoretical 
advance in the contemporary discourse on civil society because their work 
was aimed to provide “the key intellectual mediation between earlier 
philosophy and any contemporary effort to conceptualize civil society” 
(Alexander 1993: 798). Indeed, it is due to Parsons’s notion of societal 
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community that Cohen and Arato managed to elaborate a convincing 
account of the tripartite model of relations between the state, the economy, 
and civil society. This is because Parsons’s notion of societal community 
revealed “how, in an economically stratified and politically bureaucratic 
society, a differentiated and relatively autonomous social sphere can emerge 
that is based on influence and persuasion rather than money and power and 
that allows inclusion on the basis of institutionalized values of universal 
rights” (Alexander 1993: 798). With that, we need to consider how Parsons 
conceived of civil society in his general theory of structural differentiation.  
To provide a structural-functionalistic conception of society, Parsons 
developed the ‘AGIL paradigm,’ which is central both to his earlier studies, 
such as The Structure of Social Action (1937), and to his later publications, 
amongst which I rely on The System of Modern Societies (1971), written as a 
companion to his Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (1966). The 
AGIL-paradigm specifies four primary functions that are necessary for any 
system to sustain its inner stability: Adaptation, Goal attainment, 
Integration, and Latency pattern maintenance. Adaptation implies that the 
system needs to perform adaptive function with regard to the threats of the 
external environment. Goal attainment implies that the system needs to 
define and attain its goals. Integration implies that the system needs to 
perform an integrative function in order to regulate the interrelationship of 
its component parts. Finally, latency pattern maintenance implies that the 
system needs to generate, maintain, and renew motivation for individual 
participation, including the cultural patterns that create and sustain this 
motivation.  
Applying the AGIL paradigm to the analysis of the system of social 
action, Parsons identifies four functional imperatives with four subsystems: 
behavioral organism, personality, society as a system of social organization, 
and culture. Next, Parsons settles his analytical tool of the AGIL paradigm 
at the level of society, which he considers “the type of social system 
characterized by the highest level of self-sufficiency relative to its 
environments, including other social systems” (Parsons 1971: 8). He 
proceeds with examining the social realm as structurally subdivided into 
four functions or subsystems: the economy, the polity, the societal 
community, and the fiduciary system. In the scheme below (figure № 3), I 
have ventured to visualize Parsons’s social theory. 
Parsons relates ‘societal community’ to the integrative subsystem of 
society, as its function is to integrate a differentiated social system by means 
of institutionalization of cultural values as socially accepted and applied 
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norms. Parsons believes that social integration can be achieved through 
increasing specialization and, at the same time, interdependence of the 
segments of social subsystems because social systems, while performing 
their specific functions, contribute to the whole. A complex and 
functionally differentiated social system is therefore to be integrated 
through common pursuing of abstract, normative values. 
Figure № 3:  The system of social action 
 
Parsons conceives of societal community in a two-fold perspective, namely 
from the perspective of ‘normativity’ and from the perspective of 
‘collectivity.’ With this, he attaches a normative meaning of societal 
community to the systems of legitimate order, which are produced by 
institutionalization of cultural values. In its turn, the element of collectivity 
results from envisaging societal community as an organism. Thus, Parsons 
identifies the prototype associational behavior within civil society with “the 
societal collectivity itself, considered as a corporate body of citizens holding 
primarily consensual relations to its normative order and to the authority of 
its leadership” (Parsons 1971: 24). Arato and Cohen critically comment in 
this respect that Parsons, in his advocacy of the element of collectivity, “is 
ready to see the whole as a ‘politically organized’ collectivity of 
collectivities.” On the other hand, because “such an overarching collective 
solidarity” is possible only in accordance with consensually agreed norms, 
Parsons endorses in his idea of societal community a kind of unification that 
is hardly characteristic of modern societies (Cohen and Arato 1992: 126). 
Asserting that social consensus and order requires an indispensable 
reference to substantive values, Parsons develops a relatively strong 
foundationalist view on the legitimacy of modern civil society. Hence, he 
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diverges from liberal theorists of civil society like Keane, Kymlicka, and 
Walzer, who advocate a liberal-egalitarian understanding of civil society and 
recognize post-foundationalist, pluralistic nature of liberal democracy. 
To conclude the evaluation of Parsons’s notion of ‘societal community,’ 
I want to emphasize that his vision of society is strongly influenced by the 
idea of unification and, for that reason, can be hardly applicable to the 
typically modern conditions of pluralization and differentiation. Civil 
society, in my opinion, is not what Parsons erroneously supposed to be a 
normative-legally regulated collective of collectives, but rather is the arena 
where conflicting individuals, groups, or, in the systems theoretical parlance, 
subsystems, collide and where the complex atlas of these differentiated 
elements is being constantly reconstituted. However, the pivotal issue of 
internal conflict resulting from the plurality of diverse social subgroups, 
which altogether constitute modern civil society, remains underemphasized 
in Parsons’s balanced vision of societal community.  
Cohen and Arato can also corroborate this presumption. The analysts 
discern two potentially worrying problems in Parsons’s extolling account of 
American society and his normative exposition of societal community. The 
first troubling issue concerns Parsons’s consistent refutation of the negative 
potential imbued to the modern institutions of civil society. Parsons is right, 
Cohen and Arato admit, “in insisting on the important normative 
implications of the pluralistic traditions of American society but his 
dismissal of the specific selectivity and asymmetry built into the existing 
practice of pluralism is both unsophisticated and misguided” (Cohen and 
Arato 1992: 137). Parsons’s theory tends to bypass oligarchic trends 
inherent in political elite, as well as the asymmetric distribution of social 
control inherent in representative institutions. The second criticism 
concerns Parsons’s insufficient analytical distinction between the 
democratically-informed concept of the public and its dangerous 
counterpart concept of mass culture. Cohen and Arato emphatically claim 
that even “after noting the possibilities of overconcentration, manipulation, 
decline of cultural standards and political apathy as possible consequences 
of the modern mass media, he [Parsons] dismisses, or at least vastly 
deemphasizes, the relevance of these trends to American society!” (Cohen 
and Arato 1992: 137). Given the above, one may have become gradually 
aware that Parsons’s account of modern civil society, irrespective of its 
seemingly harmonized veneer and sociological credibility of a systemic 
theory of modern society, is still unable to elucidate and systematize the 
whole set of problems that emerge from the analysis of civil society as a 
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normative ideal and an empirical reality. This brings us to exploring the 
pitfalls of Parsons’s theory of society. 
 
3.2.2 Amalgamation of the Normative and Descriptive Analytical Methods 
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed a range of contemporary political-
philosophical theorizations of civil society and established the theoretical 
eligibility of the tripartite model of relations between the state, the market, 
and civil society. Parsons’s theory of society corresponds in great lines with 
the tripartite model: It draws the distinction between societal community on 
the one hand, and the systems of politics and of the economy on the other 
hand. If association is a prototypical form of organization in societal 
community, the bureaucracy is the ideal form of political organization, and 
the market is the ideal form of economic organization. Accordingly, the 
structure of societal community is permeated by the solidaristic dimension, 
in contrast to the individualistic patterns of the analogical structures of the 
market and the bureaucracy. However, notwithstanding Parsons’s 
distinction between the structural components and functional imperatives in 
the three subsystems of societal community, the economy, and politics, his 
intentionally descriptive analysis of society stakes out an unsustainable 
normative claim. This happens when Parsons slips into dangerous 
identification of “the normatively desirable with the actual functioning civil 
society of the present, thereby falling into an unconvincing apology for 
contemporary American society” (Cohen and Arato 1992: 118). This lapse is 
obviously the main issue of Cohen and Arato’s28 polemics against the 
simultaneously normative and empirical account of civil society. Cohen and 
Arato assert, “Parsons’s theory of societal community is an excellent object 
of immanent criticism because he both elaborates the normative 
achievements of modernity and represents these as if they were already 
institutionalized” (Cohen and Arato 1992: 125).  
Obviously, Parsons had his own reasons to refuse drawing a strict line 
between normative and descriptive elements in his analysis of civil society. 
Alexander agrees with Cohen and Arato that “Parsons failed to link his 
empirical theorizing about societal community either to the long history of 
normative philosophy about civil society or to contemporary theories of 
justice.” However, Alexander suggests a different explanation for this 
                                               
28 In the present discussion, I rely primarily on the chapter ‘Theoretical Development in the 
Twentieth Century’ by Andrew Arato.  
SOCIOLOGICAL EMBEDDING OF CIVIL SOCIETY THEORY 
103 
 
alleged lapse. Namely, he states, “because of the vast institutional distance 
between contemporary academic disciplines, and also because of his 
particular anxiety about scientific neutrality, Parsons failed to thematize the 
moral roots and political ambitions of his empirical theory” (Alexander 
1993: 800). In the article ‘Timeless Moral Imperatives in Causal Analysis of 
Social Functioning,’29 Emanuel Smikun reveals that Parsons amalgamates 
“macro and micro-levels of social analysis,” as he attempts at providing an 
all-encompassing theory of social action that would comprise both the 
normative collective dimension and the individualistic motivation of social 
action. Smikun convincingly argues that Parsons blended “macro-
institutional-behavioral and micro-voluntaristic-action elements” in one 
theory. Specifically, he shows that Parsons’s repetitive evocation to such 
terms as “teleological orientation” and “purposive behavior” testifies to the 
unattainable mixture between “attributes of subjectively intended 
purposeful action” and “descriptions of objectively observed social 
behavior.” In the end, Smikun assesses Parsons’s grand endeavor to attach 
the meaning of normative impersonal values to individually rationalized 
ends and means as “not fruitful” (Smikun 2000: 10).  
Parsons’s concept of societal community reveals that the nexuses 
connecting civil society with the spheres of the economy and politics harbor 
certain ambiguity. Let us consider these two nexuses in more detail: first, the 
economy – civil society nexus, and second, the politics – civil society nexus. 
As far as the economy – civil society nexus is concerned, Cohen and 
Arato insist that Parsons has not succeeded to resolve the problem of 
capitalism in his analysis of the democratic revolution. In contrast to his 
extended analysis of the dramatic process, in the course of which societal 
community, or civil society, declared independence from the state, Parsons 
does not exhaustively investigate the process of differentiation of societal 
community from the subsystem of the economy (Cohen and Arato 1992: 
121). For that reason, Cohen and Arato juxtapose Parsons’s position with 
that of Karl Polányi’s who maintains the view that “a self-regulating market 
produces an ‘economization’ of society, against which a program of the self-
defense of society emerged in the nineteenth century.” Nevertheless, instead 
of focusing on society’s self-defensive strategy against the devastating 
potential of classical capitalism, Parsons “considers the issue solved with the 
development of the welfare state.” This argument cannot be applied “in a 
consistent and convincing fashion to the economy-societal community axis” 
                                               
29 Internet publication, last visited on 28 July 2010. 
SOCIOLOGICAL EMBEDDING OF CIVIL SOCIETY THEORY 
104 
 
of Parsons’s analysis (Cohen and Arato 1992: 121-23). Moreover, Cohen 
and Arato consider Parsons’s exploration of the differentiation of societal 
community and the economy unsatisfactory because Parsons does not 
engage in the discussion of the multiple ways in which the associational 
trend penetrates the economy, for instance, in the form of professional 
associations and fiduciary boards.  
The central point of Cohen and Arato’s critique of Parsons’s conception 
of civil society is again the treacherous amalgamation between Parsons’s 
normative claims and his descriptive analysis of the contemporary American 
society. On the one hand, conceptualizing the relationship of societal 
community to the sphere of economy, Parsons tends to raise existing 
capitalist practice to the level of norm thus making a normative claim out of 
his descriptive analysis. On the other hand, Parsons’s normative intention 
compels him to move his theory beyond the existing alternatives of 
capitalist economism and socialist statism (Cohen and Arato 1992: 133). 
Consequently, Parsons gets into the trap by describing American society as 
both a “postcapitalist” and a “postsociaslist” society. Critically evaluating 
this attempt, Cohen and Arato astringently observe, “The astonishing part 
of this theory is the claim that such a postcapitalist, postsociaslist model is 
not only the counterfactual normative construction of a social-political 
project but is already actualized, even not yet completely, in contemporary 
American society. Once again, the rational is the real, the real is the rational” 
(Cohen and Arato 1992: 134).  
Why does Parsons understand American society as “the most hospitable 
terrain possible for the principle of associationism,” and why does he 
believe that this principle has been already institutionalized, offering a 
strong normative-empirical alternative to both capitalist economism and 
socialist statism? Addressing this question, Cohen and Arato point at the 
ideological roots of Parsons’s theory as grounded in Tocqueville’s account 
of civil society. Both Parsons and Tocqueville consider civil society as 
represented by the pluralistic constellation of associations and believe this 
constellation to be authentically entrenched in American history (Cohen and 
Arato 1992: 135). Furthermore, being a pupil of Weber, Parsons connects 
this specific character of early-modern American associationism with the 
organization of American Protestantism and with the ensuing favoring of 
pluralism, toleration, and entrepreneurship. Indeed, a unique combination 
of religious ethics and secular patterns stimulated the amalgamation of 
different ethnic groups and thereby contributed to the rise of associationism 
in American societal community in early modernity. Turner also identifies 
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the origin of the permeating value emphasis of Parsons’s account of society 
in the Weberian tradition, “Borrowing his terminology partly from Max 
Weber, Parsons argued that the dominant value in American society was 
‘instrumental activism.’ Social action and institutions are positively valued if 
they are seen to contribute instrumentally to success, while activism has a 
higher value than passive adaptations to the environment.” Parsons largely 
accepts the Weberian ideal-typical distinction between mysticism and inner-
worldly asceticism. This is obvious from the claim that “America had been 
fundamentally shaped by Puritan values which were inner-worldly, activist, 
individualistic and instrumental” (Turner 1993: 6-7). It is this unique 
combination of Protestant values and the market principle of capitalism that 
inspired Parsons to envisage the principle of associationism as both a 
normative and empirical feature of American society and construct the 
economy – civil society nexus on this combination.  
Addressing the politics – civil society nexus, Cohen and Arato point at 
the centrality of law. Insofar as Parsons conceives of societal community in 
terms of associations regulated by law, he argues that law substantiates the 
nexus between political society and civil society. For Parsons, “the most 
important step in the emergence of a modern legal system is the transition 
from law as an instrument of state policy to law as the ‘mediating interface’ 
between state and societal community, formally constitutive of their 
differentiation” (Cohen and Arato 1992: 127). Understanding citizenship 
complex as a direct “outgrowth of the system of laws,” Parsons attaches to 
it a pronounced normative universalistic dimension as grounded in the 
egalitarian democratic ideals of equal rights and freedoms. Cohen and Arato 
comment in this respect, “The modern citizenship complex, with its 
egalitarian tendency to free membership from all ascriptive characteristics, is 
rooted in an important attempt to base the norms of modern societies in 
not only transsocietal but actually universal values, of which the first version 
was the doctrine of natural rights” (Cohen and Arato 1992: 127-28). 
Nevertheless, Parsons’s attempt at construing the normative concept of 
citizenship is at odds with his sociologically description of society “as the 
social system having the highest level of self-sufficiency.” That is why, “the 
normative structures that define the identity of a society thus are never free 
of a dimension of particularism” (Cohen and Arato 1992: 127). As a result, 
Parsons’s analysis of modern society suffers from the indicated tension 
between the normative understanding of society in terms of a societal 
community based on citizens’ universal rights and the sociologically feasible 
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account of politically-organized society as constituted by ascriptive and 
particularistic membership.  
An analogical amalgamation between normative and descriptive elements 
can be discerned in Parsons’s conception of the procedural law. When 
discussing the important link between associations and procedural law, the 
theorist tends to confuse two distinct concepts, namely procedure and 
procedural law. This confusion gave Cohen and Arato sufficient ground to 
revise the cause of the indicated analytical error. The error lurches in 
Parsons’s understanding of procedural law as legitimatized not by the rule 
of procedures themselves, but also by a higher normative order, with a 
strong reference to religious-moral values. Consequently, “with the meta-
level this occupied, Parsons apparently sees no important reason to 
distinguish between procedures themselves and the procedures that produce 
or regulate procedures. In other words, he cannot discover the meaning of 
procedural law as a specifically modern, reflexive and intersubjective 
regulation of the production of norms” (Cohen and Arato 1992: 141-42).30 
Thus, we can draw an important conclusion from Parsons’s conception of 
civil society. While Parsons tends to conceive of procedural law in 
substantive terms, he overlooks the fact that the structures of modern civil 
society require rather procedural understanding of procedural law, which 
means that normative legitimation is produced without substantive external 
referent. The development of Parsons’s explanation of societal processes 
and structures is a great intellectual challenge for Niklas Luhmann, whose 
systems theory I shall consider later.  
Having discussed Parsons’s tendency to amalgamate the normative and 
descriptive-empirical approaches in his theory of society, I can conclude 
that Parsons departs in his analysis from sociological observation and then 
stretches this sociological account toward a normative model. Specifically, 
he starts with the analysis of his contemporary American society in 
structural-functionalistic terms and consequently seeks to legitimatize this 
empirical model of society by involving in the discussion normative 
concepts such as common values and the integrative function of societal 
community. Thus, as Cohen and Arato have convincingly demonstrated, 
Parsons amalgamates descriptive and normative elements. Evaluating 
                                               
30 Discussing Parsons’s polemical defense of his views on law, Cohen and Arato refer to the 
debate between Parsons and Unger presented in the following publications: T. Parsons ‘Law as 
an Intellectual Stepchild,’ Sociological Inquiry  47, no. 3 & 4 (1977), 11-57; R. M. Unger Law in 
Modern Society (New York: Free Press, 1976); Parsons’s review of Unger’s book in Law and Society 
Review 12, no. 1 (fall 1978), 145-49. 
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Cohen and Arato’s volume Civil Society and Political Theory in his review ‘The 
Return to Civil Society,’ Alexander argued that while Cohen and Arato 
criticized Parsons for such an amalgamation, they themselves bridged “the 
gap between normative and empirical theorizing about civil society that the 
problems in Cohen and Arato’s model emerge.” On Alexander’s estimation, 
the core problem consists in that “Cohen and Arato present a highly 
idealized and rationalistic understanding of the good (i.e., civil) society, and 
from this vision they ascribe empirical characteristics to actually existing 
societies that often are exaggerated and extreme” (Alexander 1993: 800). To 
simplify, Cohen and Arato start with conceptualizing civil society as a 
normative concept, and proceed with analyzing the structures and 
institutions of extant civil societies. This approach is different from that of 
Parsons, who starts with a structural-institutional analysis and proceeds with 
a normative legitimation of his empirical observations.  
By pinpointing some crucial flaws in Parsons’s explication of societal 
community within his structural functionalist approach, Cohen and Arato 
have produced, doubtlessly, an immense contribution to the sociological 
embedding of civil society theory. Their effort was rewarding because they 
criticized Parsons’s conception of civil society from a vantage point entirely 
different from that of structural functionalism. Alexander expresses his 
aggravation in this respect that Cohen and Arato take their normative 
inspiration from Habermas’s theory of communication, whereas, as a tool 
for their empirical incision to the quixotically harmonized veneer of 
Parsons’s structural functionalist analysis, they refer to social movements, 
endorsing their diversity and oppositional strength. Accordingly, Alexander 
explains the cause of Cohen and Arato’s persistent irritation by Parsons’s 
positive assessment of American society. With their study, Cohen and Arato 
reinvigorate the role of social movements in contemporary political theory 
of civil society and “suggest that Parsons’s equanimity about contemporary 
capitalist democracies, and particularly the American one, undermined the 
critical potential of his theory of societal community. For Parsons’s 
increasingly conservative inclination to present the interchanges, or 
relations, between the economy and societal community, and polity and 
societal community as equilibrated and reciprocal obscured the inherent 
tensions between these spheres and seemed to obviate the need for any 
future, far-reaching societal reforms.” Thus, if “Parsons stressed the degree 
to which universalism had been institutionalized in the civil sphere,” Cohen 
and Arato, by producing their prominent study Civil Society and Political 
Theory, undertook an “ingenious and highly stimulating effort” to connect 
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social movement theory to the theory of civil society. Thereby, they made 
their “most important empirical emendations to the sociological model of 
civil society in its orthodox functional form” (Alexander 1993: 800).  
Grounding their conception of civil society in Habermas’s theory of 
discourse ethics, Cohen and Arato convincingly reintroduces what 
Alexander calls “the salutary tension” between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ in the 
concerned theory. Cohen and Arato rediscover the Habermas-inspired 
concept of law, taking up the notion of law as “an institutionalized 
specification of the morality of civil society” and thus inextricably binding 
moral and juridical dimensions in their conception of civil society. However, 
Alexander does not contend with their decision because “if the 
independence and vitality of civil society are to be preserved, rights must 
function not only as legal rules but also as a moral resource upon which 
critical social movements and liberal reformers, can continuously draw” 
(Alexander 1993: 798). By subjugating public morality to the norms of civil 
society, Cohen and Arato insist on a distinctively normative understanding 
of civil society and law. This kind of moral indexation of law is entirely 
refuted, as we will see further, by Luhmann’s systems theoretical approach 
in the light of which law is understood as merely a self-referential organizing 
code. 
To sum it up, Alexander sees the failure of the Habermasian approach in 
confusing analytic and empirical concepts of differentiation. Analytically, we 
need to differentiate between the profit-oriented sphere of the economy, 
the power-constituted sphere of politics, and the norms-generating sphere 
of civil society. However, functioning as empirical subsystems, these 
subsystems demonstrate a significant degree of interpenetration with the 
bordering subsystems. This continuous empirical interpenetration is 
obvious, for instance, when the functional specialization of the economy is 
underpinned by the values of solidarity, which are inherent in civil society, 
or when politics takes into account the meanings and values also generated 
in result of public reasoning. Cohen and Arato, on the contrary, draw on 
Habermas’s theory of discourse ethics and rational consensus, presenting 
“Habermas’s idealized theory of communication as empirically descriptive 
of the civil realm” (Alexander 1993: 801). In this sense, the theorists follow 
an illusive path that is similar to Parsons. By glossing “the mundane 
institutions and processes that structure discourses and solidarities in realm 
rather than idealized, social life,” Cohen and Arato depict the normative as 
the already empirically achieved and hence are trapped into a similar 
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treacherous amalgamation for which they have criticized Parsons’s account 
of societal community.  
In his publication Real Civil Society, Alexander suggests conceiving of civil 
society as a partially realized liberal democratic utopia. Qualifying Parsons’s 
concept of societal community, the analyst identifies societal community 
with the institutionalized form of the integration subsystem in the system of 
modern differentiated society and hence understands civil society as “a 
relatively distinct institutional sphere portraying a logic quite distinct from 
that of the market, the state, and of other institutional areas” (Mouzelis 
1999: 728). However, as Nicos Mouzelis explicates in his article ‘Post-
Parsons’s Theory’, Alexander rejects Parsons’s emphasis on the balance 
between the distinct logics prevalent in each specific subsystem of society 
and on the interinstitutional balance inherent in the subsystem of societal 
community. Rather, he insists on the essential interinstitutional imbalance 
by exposing the constitutive value of civil society, i.e. the value of 
universalistic solidarity, as permanently jeopardized by the logic of the 
adaptive subsystem, i.e. by the increasing weight of economic 
considerations. For that reason, Alexander’s account of civil society obtains 
the degree of empirical incision resembling in this sense Cohen and Arato’s 
analysis. Nevertheless, if Cohen and Arato elevate the normative/empirical 
tension inherent in any discourse on civil society through the Habermasian 
concept of rational consensus, Alexander recognizes a merely partial 
realization of the normative idea of civil society. He argues that the model 
of a universalistically oriented solidary community is only partially realized 
in modern societies and “portrays relatively specific codes/values (e.g., 
democratic ideals), institutions (e.g., a free press), and integrative patterns 
(e.g., open, trusting, civil relationships)” (Mouzelis 1999: 729). Mouzelis 
suggests, in his turn, a possible emendation of Alexander’s notion of civil 
society. In his opinion, “Alexander will have to distinguish more precisely 
between civil society as a very partially realized utopian democratic project, 
and a posttraditional, differentiated social sphere within which a variety of 
discourse and collective actors (civil, noncivil, anticivil) keep struggling for 
the establishment of different and often conflicting types of solidarity” 
(Mouzelis 1999; 733). Mouzelis’s suggestion clearly takes up the issue of bad 
civil society, which we considered earlier. 
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3.2.3 Beyond Parsons: Theory of Interpenetration by Richard Münch 
 
Richard Münch is currently one of the leading social scientists who work on 
the theory of action. Although Münch develops his theory of 
interpenetration under an obvious influence of Parsons’s structural 
functionalism, his main scholarly aspiration is to build on the work of 
Parsons as “reaching beyond Weber’s own achievement.” In other words, 
Münch attempts at reinvigorating the explanatory achievement of Weber’s 
account of Western modernity by viewing it from the perspective of 
Parsons’s theory of structural differentiation. This is because, as he explains 
in the study Understanding Modernity: Toward a New Perspective Going beyond 
Durkheim and Weber, “a satisfactory explanation of modern occidental 
development must be based on Weber’s explanatory achievement, viewed 
from the perspective of Parsons’s theory of action” (Münch 1988: 241). 
Indeed, Münch does not hesitate to borrow chief presumptions of 
Parsons’s conception of structurally differentiated society, extensively 
discussing the four major subsystems of Parsons’s classification. In order to 
elucidate the resembling concepts, I offer the schematic illustration (figure 
№ 4). 
Figure № 4 
 
In the principle of interpenetration that underlies Münch’s theory of 
society, we can discern the integrative function that Parsons ascribed to 
societal community. Münch confirms, “Only modern Western society has 
developed an integrated order […] which is the normative central structure 
of modern society, can only have been due to the spheres of communal 
action interpenetrating with those of cultural, economic and goal-setting (i.e. 
political) action” (Münch 1988: 239). However, Münch advances Parsons’s 
theory of structural differentiation by integrating certain insights from 
Weber’s theory of rationalization. With that, Münch reinterprets Weber’s 
theory. If Weber arrived at the conclusion that modern society is 
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characterized by the conflict between formal and substantive rationalities, 
Münch suggests an innovative emendation to Weber’s diagnosis by 
developing a theory of interpenetration. Specifically, Münch conceives the 
process of increasing rationalization of different value spheres as parallel to 
the process of their increasing interpenetration. Münch vigorously 
characterizes Western modern society by a high “amount of 
interpenetration between the differentiated spheres,” which he sees as 
providing “the basis for the emergence of a common order governing the 
spheres and for the simultaneous development of the spheres beyond the 
previously existing limits to development” (Münch 1988: 235). Münch 
asserts that the logic of societal differentiation proceeds according to the 
specific “modern pattern of values,” which rests on the typically Western 
conjunction of essentially opposing orientations to action – individualism 
and universalism, rationalism and inner-worldly activism – the conjunction 
that constitutes an integrative order embracing differentiated social spheres 
in one coherent whole (Münch 1988: 238).  
Thus, Münch insists that Weber’s account of Western modernity did not 
reveal the conflict between formal and substantive rationalities, but, 
alternatively, exhibited the mutual penetration of religious ethics and the 
world. As he asserts in his recent study The Ethics of Modernity: Formation and 
Transformation in Britain, France, Germany and the United States, this unique 
conjunction between Zweckrationalität and Wertrationalität occurred in the 
process of ethical shaping of the world by active penetration of religious 
ethics (Münch 2001: 24). Consequently, Münch envisages the process of 
modernization “not simply as the separation, rationalization, and 
dedifferentiation of domains of instrumental action from ethics, but as a 
normative transformation through interpenetration of ethics and the world 
of instrumental action” (Münch 2001: 27). The upshot of the “fundamental 
ethical transformation” in the modern West is “the establishment of an ever 
more comprehensive normative order” and the subsequent interpenetration 
of differentiated social spheres (Münch 2001: 25). Already in his earlier 
work Die Kultur der Moderne, Münch attempted to explain, with the aid of the 
concept of interpenetration, how every single worldly action is ethically 
qualified, and how the process of normative ethicization sustains both 
universal regulation of social actions and institutionalization of a universal 
ethical order (Münch 1986: 55). Later, Münch deepened his understanding 
of interpenetration of religious ethics and the world, arguing, “The various 
domains of action represent the material that is shaped by religious ethics, in 
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such a way that the practical action domains are ‘ethicized’ while religious 
ethics are made ‘practically relevant’ ” (Münch 2001: 25).  
Münch relates the origin of the integrative social order of modern 
Western societies to a specific religious-ethical codex, insisting that 
“understanding of modernization as ethical transformation” can provide “a 
much better tool for explaining Western historical development” (Münch 
2001: 3). Münch identifies the roots of Western modernity in the religious 
ethics of ancient Judaism and traces the subsequent development of 
religious ethics through the history of Western Christianity. Specifically, he 
discusses the impact of the Reformation and the Enlightenment. Although 
many social institutions have undergone, with the rise of modernity, 
significant changes, “the basic values and ethical principles that have 
characterized modernity as opposed to tradition have remained constant: 
freedom and self-responsibility, equality of rights and universalism, rational 
justification of action, and active intervention in the world in order to shape 
it according to ethical principles” (Münch 2001: 4).31  
Crucial for the formation of modern Western society was, according to 
Münch, the conjunction between the religious-ethical complex of 
Protestantism and economic rationalism of capitalism as this conjunction 
signified the genesis of “modern rational, ethically and legally regulated 
capitalism” (Münch 2001: 255). In the cities of medieval Europe, where 
voluntary association of free citizens constituted relations based on private 
ownership and free contract, the characteristic interpenetration of religious 
ethics and economic rationalism was commenced by “the regulation of a 
society of voluntary contracting individuals by a common law made by 
practicing legal experts and the sharing of a common cult – the Christian 
religion – which committed the peoples to a commonly shared ethics” and 
which enabled “the all-embracing regulation of social relations by an ethics 
of equity and formal legality.” It is in this structural setting that “the 
character of ethics changes from traditionalism and the collectivist ethics of 
brotherhood to modernist and the individualistic ethics of equity” (Münch 
2001: 254). In result, as Münch explains in his earlier comprehensive study 
Die Struktur der Moderne, economic rationality necessitated interaction with 
other mediating social systems (Münch 1984: 12-15). Thus, with the rise of 
the modern market economy, Protestant “ethics of equal individual freedom 
                                               
31 Münch’s persistent juxtaposition between modernity and tradition seems disturbing to me. He 
hails modernity, especially in its Western form, as the highest achievement of social evolution, 
but neglects, at the same time, the significance and function of tradition in maintenance of social 
order.  
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and responsibility and civil law engaged in an enduring marriage and became 
a comprehensive normative order that reached beyond the economic sphere 
and penetrated every area of social life” (Münch 2001: 256).  
Münch attends also to the crucial socio-cultural impact that the 
Reformation has had on the evolution of Western society. The Reformation 
signalized two major changes that contributed to the modern process of 
institutionalization and internalization of religious ethics. First, the 
Reformation initiated substitution of the ‘professional’ monopolization of 
the Catholic Church by effective opening of religious doctrine to the public; 
consequently, by invigorating community life of free religious sects, it 
facilitated institutionalization of religious pluralism (Münch 1986: 59). 
Without the Protestant refutation of the principle of “societal exclusivity” 
and its replacement by the principle of “societal inclusivity,” the process of 
universalization of ethics would have been (forever) delayed in the modern 
West. 
Departing from the principle of interpenetration, Münch also attempts 
to revise Parsons’s structural-functionalistic theory of society. In the articles 
‘Talcott Parsons and the Theory of Action. I. The Structure of the Kantian 
Core’ (1981) and ‘Talcott Parsons and the Theory of Action. II. The 
Continuity of the Development’ (1982), Münch retains the thesis that 
Parsons’s solution to the problem of social order is neither utilitarian nor 
normative but “lies instead in the notion of interpenetration of distinct 
subsystems of action” (Münch 1981: 709). Consistently revealing “a 
fundamental congruence of basic structure and method between the theory 
of action and Kant’s critical philosophy,” Münch argues that Parsons’s 
notion of interpenetration is derivative of Kantian transcendental 
philosophy and therefore essentially centered on the Kantian core. 
Concisely, Münch understands social order as an upshot of 
interpenetration of between subjective rationality and collective normativity. 
If the only orientation of social action would be utilitarian, that is, conceived 
exclusively within the paradigm of the means-end rationality, it would fail to 
provide any substantial basis for social order because “a social order is 
possible only if there is a selective principle which exempts certain means 
and ends from utilitarian considerations and assigns to them a permanent 
priority” (Münch 1981: 724). In order to substantiate this permanent quality 
of utilitarian considerations, Münch invokes the Kantian notion of 
categorical principles and opposes them to hypothetical principles because, 
as he explains, “only categorical principles can produce a constancy of 
choice of actions through the variableness of situations of action.” Relying 
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on the Kantian transcendental referent in the moral motivation of action – 
the well-known “categorical imperative” – Münch qualifies Parsons’s 
argument of the maintenance of social order. He argues, “The social order 
is possible only if action is guided not solely by conditional selective 
principles, but also by normative selective principles which determine the 
scope of the validity of the conditional, hypothetical selective principles” 
(Münch 1981: 724).  
Elaborating his vision of the theory of action, Münch admits that 
interpenetration “is only one of many possible relations which may obtain 
between analytically differentiable subsystems of action” (Münch 1982: 
772). With that, Münch draws on Weber’s typology of the four ways in 
which the conflictual relations between differentiated values-spheres can be 
resolved. Weber’s typology “provides us with a ready set of categories for 
thinking about the various ways in which these can be eased: the 
accommodation of the potentially regulative subsystems to the dynamic 
subsystem, their reconciliation, their mutual isolations, their 
interpenetration, the one-sided constriction of the potentially dynamiting 
subsystem by the regulative subsystem.” Predictably enough, Münch opts 
for the model of interpenetration because it offers “the mechanism by 
which the potential of every system is converted into actuality; it is the 
mechanism of self-realization and evolution” (Münch 1982: 772-73).  
The crux to the problem of social order lies, according to Münch, in the 
interpenetration of the subsystem of instrumental rationality and the 
subsystem of categorical-normative obligation, which occurs at the level of 
societal community. Insofar as societal community accommodates a 
personally internalized and culturally institutionalized complex of normative 
obligations, duties, and values, it provides this complex with continuity. 
Münch’s disclosure of the Kantian core in contemporary social theory is 
corroborated by Levine’s observation that the new generation of social 
scientists, starting from Weber, Pareto, and Durkheim, identified utilitarian 
and normative considerations, suggesting thus a voluntaristic approach to 
the theory of social action. If Parsons grounds his conception of social 
order on Weber’s postulate of the voluntaristic and intentional nature of 
social action, Münch demonstrates how this voluntaristic dimension is 
entrenched in the intentionality of social action, and how it allows 
establishing social order. Münch’s eloquently asserts, “As soon as we 
recognize that human action is intentional action, we can no longer 
understand it as completely causally determined by dynamic factors. On this 
plane of intentional action, order is possible only if the actors share 
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common values, which in principle they acknowledge of their own free will” 
(Münch 1982: 773).  
Subjectively accepted values acquire a collective dimension as soon as 
they engage into the integrative social subsystem – societal community. It is 
the locus where the shared values of individual voluntaristic actors assume 
“an increasingly universal standpoint of collective solidarity,” which 
transcends not only utilitarian considerations of individual actors, but also 
the shared values of particular social groups. The shared values pertaining to 
the intentional and voluntaristic social behavior of human actors should be 
anchored in this collective solidarity. Münch maintains that the concept of 
interpenetration provides optimal conditions to solve the core dilemma of 
modern social order, namely how to reconcile the public good and the 
private interest. The merit of the concept of interpenetration, in his 
evaluation, consists in that it allows for the realization of individual freedom 
at the level of the dynamic spheres of action, as well as for the continuity of 
collective solidarity with the aid of a normative frame of reference. On this 
view, interpenetration appears as “a generalization from the normative ideas 
of the coexistence of the actions of autonomous individuals and social order 
which is, in the framework of action theory, the central idea of modernity” 
(Münch 1982: 733).  
So far, we have been concerned with the sociological embedding of civil 
society theory within the theory of social action. Notwithstanding deep 
disagreements, the considered theorizations depart from the concept of 
actor and understand action as subjective and rational. The theorist I shall 
address next – Niklas Luhmann – has overthrown the paradigm of social 
action theory by positioning the system, and not the human actor, as the 
starting point for his theory of society. Accordingly, he has also overthrown 
the normative dimension attached to the previous accounts of society. What 
has he achieved with his value-free sociological account, and how can civil 
society be reconstructed from his sociological description of modern 
society? These questions determine the structure of further investigation.  
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3.3 Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Functional Differentiation of 
Society 
 
Niklas Luhmann’s contribution to contemporary sociology is immense.32 
Given the scope and focus of my study, I shall restrict myself to examining 
a modest selection of Luhmann’s prolific writings: Social Systems (1995 
[1984]), The Differentiation of Society (1982), Political Theory in the Welfare State 
(1990), and his articles ‘The World Society as a Social System’ (1982) and 
‘Differentiation of Society’ (1977). I structure the analysis as follows. First, 
systems theory will be concisely sketched (§ 3.3.1); second, the changes that 
Luhmann introduced into the sociological theory of modern society will be 
examined (§ 3.3.2); third, his eminent theory of functional differentiation of 
society will be studied (§ 3.3.3). Next, I shall attend to the concrete 
implications of Luhmann’s theory to the structure and function of 
democratic politics (§ 3.3.4), and finally, I shall reconstruct a Luhmann-
based conception of civil society in accordance with the gained insights (§ 
3.3.5).  
 
3.3.1 Systems Theory in a Nutshell   
 
The catchword of Luhmann’s idiosyncratic theory is differentiation. With 
his notion, he re-evaluates previous achievements of systems theory and 
introduces “a change in the conceptual framework in terms of which 
systems are conceived and analyzed” (Luhmann 1977: 30). Specifically, with 
the notion of differentiation, Luhmann insinuates a new understanding of 
the system in terms of difference from the environment and develops 
subsequently a new concept of an autopoietic, self-referential system. The 
theorist explains eloquently his innovative ideas as follows: 
Systems are oriented by their environment not just occasionally and 
adaptively, but structurally, and they cannot exist without an environment. 
They constitute and maintain themselves by creating and maintaining a 
difference from their environment, and they use their boundaries to regulate 
this difference. Without difference from an environment, there would not 
even be self-reference, because difference is the functional premise of self-
referential operations (Luhmann 1995: 16-17). 
                                               
32 A comprehensive introduction to Luhmann’s systems theory is provided, among others, by 
John Bernarz Jr. in his study Niklas Luhmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). 
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Instead of the traditional concept of system, i.e. a whole made up out of 
parts, Luhmann develops what W. T. Murthy calls in the article ‘Modern 
Times Niklas Luhmann on Law, Politics and Social Theory,’ “the relational 
and orientational view of systems” (Murphy 1984: 47), implying that a 
distinction is to be drawn between a system and its environment. With that, 
Luhmann advances Spencer’s original vague intuition that there is the 
contrast between the inner and the outer. This connectedness has been 
established by Gerhard Wagner in his article ‘Differentiation as Absolute 
Concept? Toward the Revision of a Sociological Category’ (Wagner 1998: 
453). Luhmann comments on this paradigmatic shift:  
The first move in this direction was to replace the traditional difference 
between whole and part with that between system and environment. This 
transformation, of which Ludwig von Bertalanffy33 is the leading author, 
enabled to interrelate the theory of the organism, thermodynamics, and 
evolutionary theory. A difference between open and closed systems 
thereupon appeared in theoretical descriptions. Closed systems are defined 
as a limit case: as systems for which the environment has no significance or 
is significant only through specific channels (Luhmann 1995: 6-7). 
As George Ritzer and Douglas Goodman assert in their volume 
Sociological Theory, the difference between a system and its environment is 
defined by complexity (Ritzer & Goodman 2004: 318). Namely, because the 
system is always less complex than its environment, it permanently tends to 
simplify environmental complexity. Otherwise, it would be overwhelmed by 
complexity and unable to function. In order to manage the complexity of its 
ever-changing environment, the system engages in a process of 
differentiation, whereby it copies the difference between itself and the 
environment. Put differently, differentiation is a method of managing 
environmental complexity by means of “a replication, within a system, of the 
difference between a system and its environment” (Luhmann 1982: 230). Luhmann 
explicates: 
System differentiation is nothing more than the repetition within systems of 
the difference between system and environment […]. Accordingly, a 
differentiated system is no longer simply composed of a certain number of 
parts and the relations among them; rather, it is composed of a relatively 
large number of operationally employable system/environment differences, 
which each, along different cutting lines, reconstructs the whole system as 
the unity of subsystem and environment (Luhmann 1995: 7). 
                                               
33 The exact term of differentiation was coined by the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy in the 
middle of the twentieth century. 
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System differentiation results thus in “multiplying specialized versions of 
the original system’s identity” and can be therefore understood as “a 
reflexive and recursive form of system building. It repeats the same 
mechanisms, using it to amplify its own results” (Luhmann 1982: 230-31). 
In the end, the fundamental principle of “what applies to the overall system 
also holds for subsystems” (Wagner 1998: 454) provides the system with 
systematicity and determines the unity of the system (Luhmann 1995: 18). 
Technically, the system replicates itself by means of a “binary code,” 
whereby the system distinguishes its unique identity from the environment 
and from other neighboring systems. The binary code is a way to distinguish 
meaningful elements of a system from alien elements that do not belong to 
the system. At the same time, the mechanism of communication by means 
of binary codes entails contingency because it is impossible to predict how 
X will react to the message sent by Y.  
Systems are able to react only to the input from their direct environment, 
while they are unable to decipher the code of other systems. That implies 
that systems are essentially closed with respect to external impulses coming 
from the environment. The outside ‘impinges’ on a system but remains 
unknown. The only effect these environmental perturbations, or “the 
noise,” exert on the system consists in catalyzing the operations of the 
system’s internal organization. Being essentially closed, systems are self-
referential and therefore have autopoietic nature. According to Ritzer and 
Goodman, autopoiesis implies that “systems produce their own basic 
elements, they organize their own boundaries and the relationships among 
their internal structures, they are self-referential, and they are closed” (Ritzer 
& Goodman 2004: 332). Luhmann deduces the principle of autopoiesis 
from his distinction between system and environment, which entails the 
distinction between identity and difference. Luhmann argues, “Self-
reference can be realized in the actual operations of a system only when a 
self […] can be identified through itself and set off as different from others” 
(Luhmann 1995: 10). In this sense, systems can be called self-referential if 
they “have the ability to establish relations with themselves and to 
differentiate these relations from relations with their environment” 
(Luhmann 1995: 13). Therefore, the process of functional differentiation 
occurs at the level of self-referential systems because only the self-referential 
system “itself constitutes the elements that compose it as functional unities 
and runs reference to this self-constitution through all the relations among 
these elements, continuously reproducing its self-constitution in this way” 
(Luhmann 1995: 33-34).  
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To sum it up, Luhmann defines functional differentiation as a contingent 
process of multiplying the structural differences between systems and their 
environment aimed at managing environmental complexity. Given this 
sketchy introduction to Luhmann’s systems theory, we can now proceed 
with applying Luhmann’s theory to the analysis of specific structures and 
functions of modern society.  
 
3.3.2 Luhmann’s Shift of the Paradigm  
 
Systems theory has acquired a prominent and independent position in 
contemporary sociology mainly due to the contribution of Luhmann. The 
key concept systems theorists use to describe and evaluate society is 
functional differentiation. In contrast, social action theorists tend to employ 
the concept of structural differentiation, relating the process of 
differentiation to social structures, and not to the functions of social 
subsystems. Despite their genetic affinity, systems theory and social action 
theory provide conflicting accounts of society. I presume, Luhmann has 
instigated two major changes in the sociological theory of modern society. 
On the one hand, Luhmann changed the focus and analytical components 
of sociological analysis and thereby provoked the shift of the paradigm; on 
the other hand, with his theory of functional differentiation, he 
‘rehabilitated’ the notion of complexity in the sociological description of 
modern society. In what follows, I shall examine these two aspects in more 
detail.  
Although Luhmann averts his indebtedness to Parsons, whose main task 
he appreciatively defines as “articulation and elaboration of conceptual 
models for describing interchanges between systems” (Luhmann 1982: 230), 
the theorist moves beyond his predecessor. This transfer has been 
explicated by the outstanding experts of Luhmann’s social theory Michael 
King and Chris Thornhill in their recent study Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of 
Politics and Law. Parsons departs from the idea of the unified system of 
society and constitutes his social theory on the analysis of “human action 
and the way that the integration of shared normative structures reflecting 
people’s needs makes social order possible.” He conceives of social systems 
as functional insofar as they underlie the established structures of a 
normatively construed societal realm. Focused on “the integration of 
particular people through norms and roles into society’s structure,” 
Parsons’s theory was frequently criticized for its rigidity and inability to deal 
with social change (King and Thornhill 2003: 14). For his part, Luhmann 
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does not intend to uphold any unifying normative vision of society and 
undertakes to conceive the emergence of social systems from a new 
perspective. King and Thornhill explain, “for Luhmann, the evolution of 
society subsystems did not happen in any purposeful or rational way, but 
[…] through a process in which information was selected and given 
meaning as communication” (King and Thornhill 2003: 9).  
On this view, Luhmann pinpoints two pertinent problems in Parsons’s 
theory of society: First, it excludes any possibility of society’s self-reference, 
and second, it explicitly obviates contingency. Exactly these two concepts, 
the self-referential capacity of society and contingency, lie at the foundation 
of Luhmann’s systems theoretical view of society. Specifically, Luhmann 
asserts the preeminence of functional structures over empirical processes, 
adopting an entirely different perspective from that of Parsons. Ritzer and 
Goodman elucidate, “System theorists reject the idea that society or other 
large-scale components of society should be treated as unified social facts. 
Instead, the focus is on relationships or processes at various levels within 
the social system” (Ritzer & Goodman 2004: 315). Thus, Luhmann affirms 
primacy of empirical reality over theoretical deliberation on social structures 
and processes. This outspoken empiricist standpoint has given Cohen and 
Arato a good cause to portray Luhmann as “a staunchly realistic analyst of 
existing society” (Cohen and Arato 1992: 422).  
Luhmann’s fixation on empirical processes determined his choice of 
alternative analytical components. Luhmann’s theory is not about people or 
their actions, like Parsons’s theory, but about systems and their 
communications. Indeed, as most Luhmann’s critics rightly notice, his 
primary unit of analysis is not the individual or social group, but the system. 
Technically, Luhmann distinguishes three basic types of systems: living 
systems (constituted by organic entities), psychic systems (constituted by 
consciousness), and social systems (consisting of societies, organizations, 
and interactions constituted by communications). The social system of 
society is further differentiated into subsystems of politics, law, religion, 
science, art, education, etc. According to this classification, Luhmann 
defines society as “the encompassing social system which includes all 
communications, reproduces all communications and constitutes 
meaningful horizons for further communication” (Luhmann 1982: 131).  
On this view, Luhmann analyzes social relationships as relationships 
between a social system and its environment, and not as relationships 
between individual and society. This is the reason why Luhmann’s analysis 
may seem “anti-humanist” and “anti-individualistic” (King and Thornhill 
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2003: 2). Alex Viskovatoff clarifies in the article ‘Foundations of Niklas 
Luhmann’s Theory of Social Systems’ that the indicated idiosyncrasy of 
Luhmann’s account has to do with a two-fold intention of the theorist. 
Namely, “Luhmann was trying to do two things, among others: to find a 
theory that spans the social and defines it in a positive way and (derivative 
of the former) to find one that is self-reflexive” (Viskovatoff 1999: 508). 
This two-fold intention resulted in the lost of both realism and 
individualism. Viskovatoff argues that “by allowing a reentry of subjects’ 
own self-understanding into social theorizing, our theoretical framework 
bridges common sense and social and natural science” so that the classic 
sociological notion of subject becomes obsolete (Viskovatoff 1999: 509).  
In his theory, Luhmann described society as the all-encompassing social 
system constituted by functionally differentiated systems, which “represent 
a collection of autonomous but interdependent processes” (King and 
Thornhill 2003: 11) and which communicate through binary codes. The 
relevant question rises to how functionally differentiated subsystems of 
society actually emerge and what makes them functional? King and 
Thornhill offer an exhaustive explanation. Luhmann’s systems become 
functional “insofar as they are able to organize communications and 
disseminate them in ways that they and other communicative systems may 
make use of them. In very general terms, functional systems create order out of 
chaos: they give meaning to events which otherwise would be meaningless 
for society. Their functionality relates exclusively to communications” (King 
and Thornhill 2003: 9). Luhmann relates functions of differentiated social 
subsystems to the organization of meaning because the meaning imbues 
functions to the specific societal structures and directs communication 
processes. Concisely, systems’ functionality depends on their ability to 
create the meaning out of intersecting flows of communication.  
Moreover, the organization of meaning, which is specific to each system, 
determines the uniqueness of binary codes, through which social systems 
perform their function. King and Thornhill comment, “These organizations 
of meaning evolve as specific to each system, so that one system’s particular 
way of organizing cannot take over those of other systems” (King and 
Thornhill 2003: 11). Luhmann insists that coding is always binary in nature 
because it makes a distinction between two opposing values; thereby, it 
effectively excludes other semantic opportunities of transforming noise 
from the outside into meaningful communication within the system. That is 
why, binary codes do not overlap. In the study Niklas Luhmann’s Modernity: 
The Paradoxes of Differentiation, William Rasch correctly indicated the upshot 
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of the indispensable uniqueness of binary codes, “Since Luhmann considers 
communication […] to be the basic element of social systems, the notion of 
systemic closure and functional differentiation can be conveyed by saying 
that the ‘language’ of one system cannot be adequately translated into the 
‘language’ of another system […]. Luhmann’s system languages are 
incommensurable, a fact that guaranteed their autonomy” (Rasch 2000: 144-
45). For instance, the system of science may process information according 
to a true/false schema, economics – according to a profitable/unprofitable 
one, and art – according to a beautiful/ugly one. The binary codes stand in 
an “orthogonal” relationship to one another, ensuring that ‘beautiful’ cannot 
be automatically associated with ‘profitable’ or ‘true.’ Processing 
communication via the binary codes that are specific to social systems 
determines “the incommensurability, autonomy, and autopoietic closure of 
social systems” in modern society (Rasch 2000: 145).  
In addition to changing analytical components in the analysis of society, 
Luhmann also changed the view on modernity. With his systems theoretical 
approach, Luhmann rehabilitated the notion of complexity in the 
sociological description of modern society and related this revisited 
sociological description to the philosophical discourse on modernity. 
Instead, Luhmann’s theory of society is highly complex. However, King and 
Thornhill consider this complexity to be consciously intended by Luhmann 
himself. The scholars argue that Luhmann aimed to depict modern society 
as essentially complex because he “saw the task of a social theorist as 
observing complexity for what it is and avoiding simplified or reductionist 
accounts of the social world. He wanted to avoid above all else the idea that 
one could capture ‘the truth’ or essence of modern society in one theoretical 
account” (King and Thornhill 2003: 1).  
Hence, if Parsons was preoccupied with providing a unifying vision of 
society and advocated integration, Luhmann opted for the semantics of 
differentiation and dynamism. He attempted to amend Parsons’s structural 
functionalism by introducing a distinction between system and 
environment. Consequently, Luhmann moved away from understanding 
society as a network of individuals united by shared values and norms, 
towards understanding society as a complex totality of communications that 
contingently create the matrix of intersystemic relations. Describing modern 
society in terms of autonomous, self-referential social systems, which are 
related to each other by means of their environments, Luhmann defended 
thereby the empiricist value-free observation technique. His greatest 
SOCIOLOGICAL EMBEDDING OF CIVIL SOCIETY THEORY 
123 
 
ambition was to provide an account of modern society that would be free of 
any normative framework.  
Once called by Rasch “modernity’s most meticulous theorist,” Luhmann 
obviously deserves this title, as he took up the challenge of explaining, with 
his systems theory, the key characteristics of modernity: contingency, 
rationalization, and pluralization. Rasch brilliantly explicates a deep 
interconnectedness between Luhmann’s social theory and the multifarious 
philosophical discourse on modernity. Luhmann was sensitive to the 
unresolved antinomies and imminent loss of unity that already began to slip 
into philosophical accounts of society in the eighteenth century and 
determined the modern condition. If the unifying center for the pre-modern 
worldview was God, the modern worldview has lost this unifying centric 
vision and experienced an expansion of alternative visions, none of which 
could claim its centrality. Modernity’s greatest challenge consists thus in 
grappling with the antinomies caused by “the lamented inability to think the 
absolute, which is to say, the inability to justify reason rationally or even 
historically” (Rasch 2000: 12-13).  
Luhmann took much inspiration in Weber’s diagnosis of Western 
modernity. In this sense, I agree with Rasch that hovering in the 
background throughout Luhmann’s work is the spirit of Weber. Weber 
correctly grasped the crux of modernity by suggesting his metaphor of an 
immanent polytheism of warring gods who represent competing and 
incommensurable values-spheres. With his key concepts of rationalization 
and pluralization, Weber conceived of Western modernity as engendered by 
“the very splintering of reason into a plurality of system rationalities” and 
hence as essentially characterized by the irreconcilable “polytheism” of 
values of the disenchanted and demythologized world (Rasch 2000: 2). 
Rasch convincingly reveals that even after the postmodern critique of 
modernity with such terms as reification, alienation, and fragmentation, we 
still “find ourselves once again in the middle of the coolly calculable 
modernity that was diagnosed by sociology in its early-twentieth-century 
infancy.” Obviously, “neither our quasi-theological rejection of the world 
nor our political theodicies and ethical lifeworlds have been able to move 
beyond the barren landscape of rationalization and pluralization.” On this 
account, Rasch regards Luhmann as “best guide in this ever-expanding 
wilderness” (Rasch 2000: 2-3)  
Drawing on Weber’s diagnosis of modernity, Luhmann acknowledges 
the loss of metanarratives in social science and, accordingly, the 
impossibility for a social scientist to occupy a vantage point from which 
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modern society can be examined as an external object. On this view, 
Luhmann asserts that analysts of modern society will always work from an 
internal perspective, observing society from within. Even more importantly, 
Luhmann rehabilitated Weber’s thesis of the differentiation of rationalities. 
Rasch confirms that in Luhmann’s theory of modern society the polytheism 
of values-spheres transforms into “the plurality of systemic rationalities that 
construct an observable world by drawing and designating distinctions.” 
Luhmann depicts modern society as “a complex, internally differentiated 
system that further subdivides with every new attempt to observe its 
operations.” Given that we already live in the midst of a plurality of 
competing rationalities, Luhmann calls for “emancipation from reason” 
instead of the Enlightenment “emancipation of reason,” because he insists 
that emancipation from reason is “really an emancipation from nostalgia 
and anxiety.” Rasch concludes, “Luhmann’s trajectory of modernity 
therefore is much like the trajectories traced by Weber and Habermas, who 
chart the unique development of a European or Western rationality” (Rasch 
2000: 13). 
However, Rasch draws a clear distinction between Habermas’s and 
Luhmann’s accounts of modernity. If Habermas regards modernity as 
evolving towards “constructing a functional equivalent for the lost unity of 
reason” by means of an innovative project of discourse ethics, Luhmann 
believes that modernity leads to “the operations and mitosis-like self-
divisions of modern rationality by describing how those operations 
function” (Rasch 2000: 11). Rasch evocatively explicates the distinction. 
Habermas, like most theorists of modernity, conclude from Weber’s earlier 
account that ethics has undergone, with the rise of modern differentiation, 
an unprecedented specialization, in result of which it has been enclosed into 
one particular life-sphere. Consequently, these theorists understand “this 
compartmentalization of morality as a cause for anxiety” and threat to moral 
integration of society. In contradistinction, Luhmann “unabashedly 
endorses it” because for him the decentralization of morality “is the only 
way to preserve what he considers to be the hard-won and improbable 
victory of systemic autonomy that marks differentiated modernity” (Rasch 
2000: 144). In essence, Luhmann assesses modern differentiation positively, 
envisaging it as an inevitable and contingent process of evolutionary 
development of human society. The emphasis on differentiation in 
Luhmann’s systems theory has had a great impact not only on the 
subsequent developments in the field of social theory, but also on 
philosophical reflection on the nature of modernity and post modernity. In 
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this respect, Wagner had a good reason to affirm that “Luhmann bears a 
good deal of the responsibility for the inflated status of differentiation now 
prevalent in sociology. The attractiveness of the concept seems enhanced by 
its phonetic affinity with the enigmatic discourse of the postmodern” 
(Wagner 1998: 456).  
 
3.3.3 Functional Differentiation of Modern Society 
 
Having discussed analytical components of Luhmann’s account of modern 
society and having positioned it within the academic discourse on 
modernity, I intend now to examine how Luhmann applies his theory of 
functional differentiation to the historical reality of societal progress. 
Luhmann uses the criterion of differentiation to evaluate society’s capacity 
to manage environmental complexity. Accordingly, differentiation becomes 
the criterion to define society’s position on the evolutionary scale. The more 
advanced complexity-managing ability society exhibits, the more 
differentiated and advanced its structure is. Upholding this evolutionary 
perspective, Luhmann distinguishes three major subsequent stages in the 
evolutionary development of society.  
At the lowest stage of societal development, Luhmann poses archaic 
societies. These societies consist of independent groups or tribes that 
operate in a parallel and essentially independent way with no division of 
labor. The principles of approximate equality underlay the organizational 
structure of early societies. This type of society is characterized by segmentary 
differentiation: The system of society is split into equal subsystems that are 
supposed to fulfill recurrently identical functions (Luhmann 1982: 233).  
The emergence of traditional, hierarchically structured societies signifies 
a shift towards stratificatory differentiation. Historically, this shift occurred 
with the transition from small-scale Neolithic settlements to centrally 
organized agricultural societies in Mesopotamia and Egypt. These 
hierarchical societies survived until the end of the eighteenth century in 
Europe when the development of the market and the division of labor 
emerged, causing reorganization of society according to functional 
differentiation. Stratification differentiates society into unequal subsystems 
and therefore refers to a vertical differentiation according to rank or status 
in a hierarchically ordered system of society. Insofar as stratified society is 
characterized by top-down centralized authority and inequality, it needs 
some central controlling organ that intertwines economic, religious, military, 
and other aspects of social life. If in segmentary differentiation, inequality 
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results from accidental variations in environments, in stratified societies, 
alternatively, inequality is inherent in the social system. The higher ranks 
have more access to resources and thus a greater potential to influence the 
communication in society (Ritzer & Goodman 2004: 326). On this view, 
Luhmann concludes, “the structural problem of stratified societies is that 
the identification of subsystems requires a hierarchical definition of their 
environment in terms of rank order or equality/inequality” (Luhmann 1982: 
235).34 
Luhmann associates the transition to modern type of society with 
functional differentiation. Luhmann describes this transition as follows:  
A societal system that is vertically differentiated according to the principle 
of stratification presupposes that societal differentiation is directed by kinds 
of persons, by their “quality,” by their determination to live in specific castes 
or ranked groups. By contrast, with the transition to functional 
differentiation, the schematic of differentiation is chosen autonomously; it is 
directed only by the functional problems of the societal realm itself, without 
any correspondences in the environment (Luhmann 1995: 193). 
Eva Knodt insightfully comments in her foreword to the English edition of 
Luhmann’s Social Systems, “In the course of this structural transformation, 
which was essentially completed by the end of the eighteenth century, the 
hierarchically ordered, ‘monocontextural’ universe of premodern society 
broke apart, and the reproduction of society was distributed among a 
plurality of non-redundant functional systems such as the economy, art, 
science, law, and politics, each of which operates on the basis of its own, 
system-specific code” (Luhmann 1995: xxxv). Luhmann understands this 
kind of differentiation of functional systems as the most complex form of 
differentiation and as “the latest outcome of sociocultural evolution,” as it is 
the one that dominates modern society (Luhmann 1982: 236). Functional 
differentiation means that in a modern ‘polycontextural’ society no function 
system can control, dominate, or substitute for any other. Society consists 
of a number of relatively autonomous subsystems that configure their own 
rationality according to their internal goals and therefore fulfill their specific 
functions. Due to the relative autonomy of differentiated subsystems, 
central control is needed no longer, and the coordination between the 
subsystems can be resolved locally (Luhmann 1977: 35).  
                                               
34 Luhmann also distinguishes to the transitory stage between the two abovementioned types of 
differentiation, which he signifies as center-periphery differentiation.  
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One of the implications of functional differentiation of modern society 
pertains to the irreversible loss of hierarchical structure. If prior to modern 
situation, as Rasch succinctly remarks, “one part of society – the ‘top’ part, 
the aristocracy of the court – assumed the privilege and responsibility of 
representing the whole,” with the rise of Western modernity, “the social 
world has been ‘flattened,’ in the sense that no single social entity or system 
enjoys a fixed relationship of hierarchical dominance over all the others, as 
in premodern, ‘feudal’ societies.” Rasch endorses his thesis by an exemplary 
citation from Luhmann’s work, “We live in a society which cannot represent 
its unity within itself because this world contradicts the logic of functional 
differentiation. We live in a society without a top and without a center. The 
unity of society no longer appears within this society” (Luhmann 1990: 16; 
Rasch 2000: 102).  
When applied to the actual processes to the social realm, Luhmann’s 
theory of functional differentiation imbues the normative idea of society 
with unique sociological credibility. The loss of a hierarchical top in modern 
functionally differentiated society led to the reorganization of the societal 
realm according the principles of egalitarianism, equality, inclusion, and 
accessibility. Luhmann argues that functional differentiation, in contrast to 
segmentary and stratificatory types of differentiation, shifts the distribution 
of equality and inequality, as it essentially combines inequality, i.e. the 
persistence of hierarchical political structures, and equality, i.e. an equal 
access to opportunity with regard to the market, property, and law. In 
modern functionally differentiated society, “functions have to be unequal, 
but the access to functions has to be equal, that is, independent, of any 
relations to other functions” (Luhmann 1982: 236). This means that certain 
social subsystems acquire only partial functional primacy for a limited span 
of time, like the political system in the early modernity, followed by the 
economy in the nineteenth century. Currently, Luhmann asserts, the sphere 
of science retains relative primacy. Notwithstanding partial dissimilarities in 
systems functional supremacy, none of the systems remains inaccessible – 
all social systems are equally accessible for free individual participation and 
inclusion. Consequently, discrimination occurs only in the distinction 
between system and environment, whereas environment itself remains 
equally neutral to all systems. Luhmann concludes, “A functionally 
differentiated society, as a result, will become, or will have to pretend to be, 
a society of equals insofar as it is the aggregate set of environments for its functional 
subsystems” (Luhmann 1982: 236).  
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One of the best applications of Luhmann’s systems theory to the 
transformations in the social realm can be found in the recent article ‘Niklas 
Luhmann’s Systems Theoretical Redescription of the Inclusion/Exclusion 
Debate’ by Antoon Braeckman. Relying on Luhmann’s theory, Braeckman 
explicates the cardinal rupture between the pre-modern and modern societal 
types, “If in pre-modern forms of differentiation, where distinctions are 
made between equal clans (segmentary differentiation) or between unequal 
states (stratification), the boundaries of the societal subsystems run parallel 
with the boundaries between people. With the transition to the functional 
differentiation of modern society this situation changes completely: people 
do not longer belong to only one subsystem (clan or estate), but participate 
simultaneously in different subsystems” (Braeckman 2006: 67-68). This 
societal transformation has, on Braeckman’s view, far-reaching 
consequences for the conditions of inclusion and exclusion. In stratified 
societies, inclusion occurred at the level of social strata, since the 
individual’s identity was ascriptively determined by its complete inclusion in 
a certain subsystem. In modern functionally differentiated societies, the 
individual’s identity “falls outside all subsystems, for as an individual it no 
longer belongs (fully) to any of them,” so that “the boundaries of societal 
differentiation this time run straight through the individual.” Hence, if in 
stratified societies, the individual “belonged to only one multifunctional 
societal subsystem – the pre-modern household – it is now supposed to 
participate in various subsystems” (Braeckman 2006: 69-70). In addition, 
this fundamentally new awareness of the individual that he/she does not 
any longer belong to society became, as Braeckman justly observes, the 
cause of “the tragic relationship between modern individuality and society,” 
which has been vivaciously discussed by such prominent scholars as Charles 
Taylor, Ulrich Beck, and Anthony Giddens.  
Returning to the structural-analytical level of analysis, I want to revise 
Luhmann’s argument why he considered functional differentiation to be 
“the latest outcome of sociocultural evolution.” The key to Luhmann’s 
account of modern functionally differentiated society is its complex 
structure that results from “the increased process of system differentiation 
as a way of dealing with the complexity of its environment” (Ritzer & 
Goodman 2004: 325). Rasch concedes accordingly, “Through this 
functional differentiation – that is, the self-division of society into the 
specialized systems of politics, economics, art, science, law, religion, 
pedagogy, and so on – modernity develops the ‘resiliency’ to withstand 
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environmental assaults and deal with increased environmental complexity” 
(Rasch 2000: 144).  
For Luhmann, “the important condition for stabilizing a differentiated 
and functionally specified system is that it maintains its own complexity at a 
level corresponding to that of its social environment” (Luhmann 1982: 147). 
Put differently, the crucial condition is society’s capacity to manage 
complexity in a way compatible with the structure inherent in its system. 
Insofar as a social system needs to maintain its boundaries in relation to 
unpredictable environmental variations, it needs to increase its internal 
complexity by allowing its component subsystems to differentiate. In result, 
a new social system evolves in order to cope with a new problem posed by 
the environment. Luhmann juxtaposes complexity as “the totality of 
possible events” with the concept, which Murphy resourcefully the 
“possibilization” of the world, implying specific mechanisms that render the 
world’s complexity possible and manageable (Murphy 1984: 604). Luhmann 
brilliantly articulates the argument: 
A high internal complexity entails allowing alternatives, possibilities of 
variation, dissent, and conflicts in the system. For that to be possible the 
structure of the system must be, to a certain degree, indeterminate, 
contradictory, and institutionalized in a flexible way. Against the natural 
tendency toward simplification and the removal of all uncertainties it must 
be kept artificially open and remain underspecified (Luhmann 1982: 147-48). 
Given that modern society evolves in the direction of increasing systems 
differentiation, it is supposed to possess some essential skills for managing 
the ever-increasing complexity. Murthy explains how this seemingly 
contradictory idea that “modern societies are highly complex and have 
highly developed mechanisms for reducing complexity” is in fact not 
contradictory at all. Luhmann does not use the notion “complexity-
reducing” as synonymous to “complexity-eliminating” to signify 
decomplication of society. This is because “continued evolution requires 
even greater complexity: but greater complexity requires yet more adequate 
means of pro tem. complexity-reduction.” Decomplication (as a future 
possibility) is associated with a ‘dedifferentiation’ of society, which means a 
decline in the capacity of complexity-reducing mechanisms (Murphy 1984: 
605). A vivid example of dedifferentiation is the identification of the 
political code with the moral code, which leads to inevitable moralization of 
the political code (Luhmann 1982: 187).  
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The complex internal structure imbues functionally differentiated society 
with the capacity to structure possibilities. Luhmann contends, “The 
function of system differentiation can be described as the enhancement of 
selectivity, that is, the increase in available possibilities for variation or 
choice.” It allows autonomous social systems to determine “in what further 
ways a system can structure various processes, regulate itself, and strengthen 
its selectivity”; it is therefore “a form of strengthening selectivity” 
(Luhmann 1982: 214). Although the system of society is continuously 
copying with contingent environmental changes, the system itself has 
“nevertheless already domesticated internal environment which serves as a 
condition for the development of further social systems” (Luhmann 1982: 
231). Consequently, Luhmann asserts, “the principal function of the all-
encompassing system of society therefore is simultaneously to enlarge and 
reduce (i.e., to provide a prepatterned and orderly access to) the complexity 
of external and internal environments, so that smaller systems will find 
enough substructure to support their higher selectivity or increased 
freedoms.” Again, Luhmann persuades us that the radical flattening of the 
social realm allows component subsystems to constitute “specialized 
organizations and forms of interaction” (Luhmann 1982: 231-32). Luhmann 
reveals that it is exactly the mechanism of increasing specialization that 
makes problem-solving techniques of modern differentiated society so 
advanced:  
Functional differentiation leads to a condition in which the genesis of 
problems and the solution to problems fall asunder. Problems can no longer 
be solved by the system that produces them. They have to be transferred to 
the system that is best equipped and specialized to solve them. There is, on 
the level of subsystems, less autarchy and self-sufficiency but higher 
autonomy in applying specific rules and procedures to special problems 
(Luhmann 1982: 249). 
On this view, modern society is likely to be equipped with superior 
problem-solving techniques, as it is able to locate a malfunction within one 
system and assign its solution to another (sub)system. This becomes 
possible only in a functionally differentiated society that is able 
simultaneously to enhance the specificity of functional subsystems and 
loosen the boundaries of relatively autonomous subsystems with regard to 
new inputs from the environment. Luhmann explains, “By specifying and 
institutionalizing functions, society increases its internal interdependencies,” 
whereas “by loosening the structural complementarities of systems and 
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environments and by providing for more and more indifference, society 
decreases internal interdependencies” (Luhmann 1982: 237).  
Obviously, there has been much criticism of Luhmann’s apparently 
positive assessment of modern differentiation. Primarily, critics pointed at 
the consequences of Luhmann’s theory for sociological science. Insofar as 
Luhmann’s elimination of the hierarchical top does not allow any system to 
provide a perspective from which the system can pursue the project of 
universal theory, his theory of modern differentiation “rejects the 
part/whole way of dealing with the modern puzzle of perspective” (Rasch 
2000: 87). The system/environment distinction presupposes that 
environment does not preexist systems, but rather is called into being 
through exclusion, whereby systems differentiate themselves from 
environment. Consequently, no system can claim priority over others; 
neither can it provide a vantage point from which one could observe all 
other systems as parts of the whole. This elimination of functional primacies 
significantly affects sociology as a science. In the process of observation and 
description, “even the criticisms of society must be carried out within 
society” (Luhmann 1990: 17), which leaves for sociology only one possible 
solution – to accept self-reference as its fundamental methodological 
procedure. Universal theories, systems theory is one of which, cannot claim 
to provide an absolute vision, because it is impossible to observe the totality 
of systems from anywhere outside the systems totality. On this view, 
universal social theories include themselves in the domain they observe and 
thus subject themselves to their own methods of observation (Rasch 2000: 
103). 
Secondly, Luhmann’s systems theory has been criticized, for instance by 
Ritzer and Goodman, for its vulnerability. The scholars argue that the 
complex structure of functionally differentiated society reveals a mixture of 
dependence and independence. On this view, the evolution of modern 
society relies on the excellence and the result of functioning of its 
autonomous subsystems. Notwithstanding a greater flexibility and 
independence of systems, functional differentiation also entails an imminent 
danger: If one functionally differentiated sub-system fails to perform its 
function, the system as a whole may fail. Hence, structural complexity of the 
system increases the risk of a system breakdown if any specific function is 
not properly fulfilled. The corollary of greater independence of functional 
subsystems is greater vulnerability of the social system as a whole (Ritzer & 
Goodman 2004: 327).  
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Finally, Luhmann’s theory has been considered by certain scholars as 
one-sided and inflexible to analyze the social realm in its dynamics and 
‘existential’ complexity. For instance, Ritzer & Goodman assert that 
Luhmann’s theory “seems limited in its ability to describe relations between 
systems. Not all systems appear to be as closed and autonomous as 
Luhmann assumes” (Ritzer & Goodman 2004: 329). The scholars point at 
the process of de-differentiation, i.e. the process of dissolving boundaries 
between social systems, as an alternative to Luhmann’s purely systemic 
view. Even stronger, Münch’s theory of interpenetration, which we have 
explored earlier, can be also regarded as another counter-account to 
Luhmann, for it attempts at understanding the intercessions between 
differentiated social systems. 
 
3.3.4 Differentiation in a Democratic System 
 
In what follows, I want to apply Luhmann’s theory to the practical question 
as how we can assess the role and function of politics and of civil society in 
a modern functionally differentiated society. I believe that Luhmann’s 
theory, besides providing innovative insights and helpful analytical tools to 
address this question, also renders the key ideals of democracy and civil 
society sociologically credible. Researching these issues, I have taken much 
inspiration from the study by King and Thornhill who convincingly argued 
that the process of functional differentiation created “broad-ranging societal 
conditions of liberty, pluralism and autonomy, which are usually construed 
as the features of democracy” (King and Thornhill 2003: 69). Indeed, 
notwithstanding Luhmann’s intention to provide a value-free theory of 
society, his theory contains a normative-evaluative dimension, which the 
scholars rightly discern in Luhmann’s contrasting “advanced differentiation 
as the most adequate condition of modern social life” to “undifferentiated 
societies as in some respect deficient and prone to inappropriate and 
unsustainably centralized modes of legislation and power-application.” As 
we have concluded earlier, Luhmann considers functional differentiation as 
the most optimal form of societal structure that has been attainted in the 
history of humankind so far. This latent normativity of Luhmann’s theory 
becomes even more evident in his view on democratic politics, political 
legitimacy, and law. Uttering certain prescriptions on how the system of 
politics should properly perform its function in the democratic polity, 
Luhmann’s theory provides at the same time an excellent tool to reveal 
“how a political system might fall behind or even obstruct the democratic 
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conditions already existing through the reality of differentiation” (King and 
Thornhill 2003: 70).  
Most importantly, Luhmann argues that it is a functionalistic 
understanding of politics that is appropriate in modern democracies. Insofar 
as the subsystem of politics has attained in the process of functional 
differentiation a high degree of autonomy, it lost its former substantive 
foundation. Luhmann agrees with Weber that in modern differentiated 
societies the political system can no longer sustain substantive rationality. In 
contrast to the substantive validation of politics in stratified societies, in 
modern functionally differentiated societies politics can be substantiated 
only by its functional excellence. On this account, Luhmann maintains that 
“the political system of a highly differentiated society can no longer be 
understood as a means to an end and can no longer be regulated by rigid 
external guidance,” otherwise it would result in the moralization of politics 
(Luhmann 1982: 158). In order to perform its primary political function, 
that is to produce collectively binding decisions and control proper 
enactment of these decisions, the political system “has become so 
differentiated from the rest of society, so autonomous and complex, that it 
can no longer base its stability on fixed foundations, practices, or values” 
(Luhmann 1982: 158). 
A similar crisis of substantive rationality emerges in the system of law. 
Functional differentiation necessitates the transformation of the legal 
structure according to the political-legal principle of the rule of law. In the 
article ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law,’ Gunther 
Teubner analyzes the upshots of the crisis of substantive legal rationality. 
The scholar seeks to renew the science of sociological jurisprudence by 
introducing the Luhmannian concept of “reflexive law.” Teubner argues 
that in modern societies substantive rationality of law is not viable any 
longer, as it is substituted by reflexive legal rationality, which “requires the 
legal system to view itself as a system-in-an-environment and to take 
account of the limits of its own capacity as it attempts to regulate the 
functions and performances of other social subsystems” (Teubner 1983: 
280). Indeed, Luhmann confirmed with his theory that “functional 
differentiation of society requires a displacement of integrative mechanisms 
from the level of the society to the level of the subsystems” (Luhmann 
1982: 229). Applying the requirement to the system of law, Teubner argues 
that “reflexive law is characterized by a new kind of legal self-restraint. 
Instead of taking over regulatory responsibility for the outcome of social 
processes, reflexive law restricts itself to the installation, correction, and 
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redefinition of democratic self-regulatory mechanisms” (Teubner 1983: 
239). Accordingly, “corresponding restrictions must be built into the 
reflexion structure of every functional subsystem,” so that these reflexion 
structures become “the key to determining how responsive law can play a 
role in functionally differentiated societies” (Teubner 1983: 272). Succinctly, 
a reflexive type of law fulfills its legal-regulatory function by transferring 
reflexive processes in other social subsystems.  
If reflexivity is the mechanism whereby the system of law manages the 
complexity of its environment, the question is whether the system of 
democratic politics employs an analogous mechanism. While studying 
Luhmann’s critics, I have concluded that the system of politics manages 
environmental complexity through engaging in the process of continuous 
self-legitimation. With regard to the system of politics, Luhmann also 
employs the general principle of managing complexity as a criterion to 
evaluate the system’s superior capacity simultaneously to increase and 
reduce the degree of internal complexity. With regard to the system of 
politics, the theorist maintains that the system’s ability to absorb social 
conflicts testifies to stability and viability of the political system. 
Accordingly, “more complex political systems have a better chance for 
adapting to an increasingly more complex environment” (Luhmann 1982: 
164). 
However, the specific function of the political system, which is to 
produce collectively binding decisions and thereby to produce political 
power, becomes troublesome when the system enforces decisions on other 
systems. Commenting on the prevalence of the regulative function, King 
and Thornhill reveal that Luhmann ascribes a very limited significance to 
the political system because he considers politics to be not the only social 
system to determine the whole sphere of human activity. Instead, politics is 
only one system among others whose function is at most “to provide broad 
orientations in questions which cannot be adequately resolved in the 
autopoietic systems of economics, medicine, art, law, and so on” (King and 
Thornhill 2003: 70). For that reason, Luhmann’s conception of political 
legitimacy “revolves around both a theoretical and a practical restriction of 
the scope and remit of political decision-making” (King and Thornhill 2003: 
76) and ultimately aims at maximal limitation of politics. On this view, 
Luhmann refutes to envisage the political system as the only brain behind 
political decision-making in democratic societies.  
Notwithstanding this normative view, Luhmann is deeply concerned 
about possible interpenetration of politics and morality in modern societies. 
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That is why “the insistence on the incommensurability, autonomy, and 
autopoietic closure of social systems like science, economics, and politics 
[…] is of crucial importance for Luhmann’s handling of the problem of 
morality in modern society” (Rasch 2000: 145). Particularly, Luhmann 
criticizes morality for its unquenchable orientation towards a certain 
“metacode’ that eventually aims at totalization. Rasch vividly describes the 
theorist’s apprehension, “The danger comes, according to Luhmann, when 
the moral code – good/bad – attaches itself ‘isomorphically’ […] to the 
prevailing codes of the respective function systems, when it seeks, that is, to 
impose a binding translating of ‘true’ or ‘government’ or ‘profitable’ into 
‘good’ (or ‘bad’). Such a debilitating moral ‘infection,’ or parasitic overlay of 
the good/bad grid, would paralyze the autonomous functioning of the 
system, eventually causing it to lose its identity and disappear” (Rasch 2000: 
146). Hence, Luhmann insists that in parliamentary democracies the political 
binary code of government/opposition should be separated from the moral 
code of good/bad. Neither government nor opposition should entangle the 
code of government/opposition in a moral discussion, so that both systems 
can obtain their legitimacy within the limitations of their unique binary 
code.  
Luhmann grounds his value-free functionalistic understanding of politics 
in Weber’s typology of legitimate order. Like Weber, Luhmann postulates 
that legitimacy can be obtained by political authority’s appeal to tradition, 
charisma, and rationality. Again, Luhmann stipulates the evolutionary road 
from legitimate orders based on charisma and tradition toward the modern 
type of legitimate order based on procedure and rationality. In pre-modern 
societies, the political organization of society was not yet differentiated from 
personal-hierarchical traditions of rule, and hence the political system 
legitimized itself by appealing to the immutable principles of tradition and 
divine law. Due to the functional differentiation of the system of politics 
from other systems, such as law, religion, culture, and the economy, the 
sources of legitimacy were transmitted to rational debate and procedures. 
King and Thornhill clarify that the process of functional differentiation 
stimulated the emergence of “fully differentiated, autonomous political 
systems which are required to explain themselves to themselves in internally 
consistent terms, and which thus depend upon the formula of legitimacy” 
(King and Thornhill 2003: 73). Conversely, Luhmann admits that social 
systems in general “have the natural tendency to eliminate great complexity 
and insecurity by means of emotionally based identifications and fixations, 
personalized mechanisms of domination […], tactical simplifications, and 
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the construction of a historical tradition of generalized experience.” On this 
view, he insists that this tendency, especially in the political system, should 
be counteracted because “incentives for continually creating new 
alternatives must be built into the system in such a way that they survive 
individual goal-oriented actions and can generate themselves” (Luhmann 
1982: 158).  
Such incentives are created when the system of politics engages into the 
process of self-legitimation. King and Thornhill elucidate, “The legitimate 
political system is a political system which has woven a convincing web of 
legitimacy out of its own, utterly contingent, operations.” Hence, legitimacy 
in the political system is basically “a form in which the political system can 
consistently and persuasively talk about itself to itself, and then provide 
itself with an essentially coherent account of what it does and why it does 
it” (King and Thornhill 2003: 74, 73). Concisely, the political system 
legitimizes itself by creating the meaning within its own system. King and 
Thornhill admit that the exposed Luhmann’s technocratic conception of 
legitimacy has been frequently assaulted. Habermas – perhaps the most 
eloquent opponent of Luhmann – criticized him for eliminating the 
consensual, cultural, and moral dimensions to democratic legitimacy. For his 
part, Luhmann refuted the Habermasian model of democratic participation, 
asserting that it depicts politics as acquiring legitimacy from accountability 
of democratic government and from binding decisions of public consent. 
Luhmann believed, on the contrary, that any attempt to tie legitimacy to 
citizens’ participation would necessarily lead to the bureaucratic 
overburdening of a democratic polity.  
King and Thornhill demonstrate that Luhmann has succeeded to 
develop “a theory of democratic legitimacy” (King and Thornhill 2003: 90) 
and thereby to approach a systems theoretical understanding of how the 
political system produces legitimation and functions under the modern 
conditions of democracy and functional differentiation. Luhmann 
demonstrates how, in the course of historical evolution, the political system 
became differentiated into there subsystems: politics, administration, and 
the public. First, during the formation of modern political system, politics 
emerged as a functional system of decision-making – the state. Confronted 
with increasing complexity of the bureaucratic state, the political system 
equipped itself with some new techniques of complexity management and 
differentiated into politics and administration. At that stage, the internal 
complexity of the political system enormously increased and the subsystem 
of the public emerged. This politically relevant public was “both a part of 
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the environment of the political system, communicating consensus or 
friction back to the administration and to politics, and an internal 
component of the political system itself” (King and Thornhill 2003: 87-88). 
The tripartite differentiated structure of the political system confirms that in 
modern differentiated society the power generated by the political system 
cannot be identified with any particular person, or apparatus, or 
conglomerate of institutions. Neither can the power be monopolized by the 
apparatus of the state. King and Thornhill maintain that Luhmann regards 
the state as a rudiment of the original differentiation of politics into an 
autonomous sphere, which occurred in the seventeenth and the eighteenth 
centuries. Instead of “the anachronistic inflation or overestimation of the 
state,” Luhmann endorses the idea that the modern political system is in 
fact “a non-hierarchical system, which consists of an enormous sequence of 
recursively closed communications of power” (King and Thornhill 2003: 
77).  
Together, the subsystems of politics, administration, and the public 
constitute what King and Thornhill call “a recursive system of democratic 
political communication” (King and Thornhill 2003: 87). Communication 
between these functionally differentiated subsystems imbues the democratic 
political system with legitimacy. Specifically, the scholars reveal that the 
production of political legitimacy is performed exclusively by politics, 
whereas the usage of legitimacy is the task of administration. If politics 
creates legitimacy ex nihilo by proposing political plans to the public, or by 
filtering themes that are popular with the public, administration operates 
effectively only when it is freed from the obligation to generate its own 
resources of legitimacy. This symbolic resource of legitimacy is preserved by 
the administrative system, which communicates political plans to the public 
in the form of enacted laws. Luhmann identifies administration with the 
legislative component of politics, which signifies the point in the political 
system where the actual political arena immediately contacts the public and 
where this relation is externalized in the form of legislation. The subsystem 
of administration performs a mediating function between politics and the 
public, as it connects the moment where collectively binding decisions are 
being enacted in the form of laws, and the moment where the public 
engages into debate to achieve consensus about which collectively binding 
decisions should be stimulated, offered, or withheld (King and Thornhill 
2003: 88-89). On this view, the analysts have a good cause to conclude that 
Luhmann vigorously defended the significant role of the public in 
democratic politics by arguing that the political system cannot generate and 
SOCIOLOGICAL EMBEDDING OF CIVIL SOCIETY THEORY 
138 
 
preserve legitimacy without public consensus in the form of public opinion. 
It is public consensus that performs the function of self-reference in the 
political system, through which the system renders its autopoietic existence 
stable and viable (King and Thornhill 2003: 90).  
 
3.3.5 Civil Society as a Modern Differentiated Gesellschaft 
 
In this section, Luhmann’s innovative understanding of civil society will be 
discussed with a view to accomplishing three tasks. First, the tripartite 
model of relations between the spheres of politics, the economy, and civil 
society will be established as being congruent with the model of functionally 
differentiated society. Second, the distinction between Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft will be introduced. Finally, Luhmann’s principle of political 
pluralism will be discussed in the light of his theory of functional 
differentiation.  
One of the consequences of Luhmann’s theory of differentiation is what 
Cohen and Arato rightly called the decomposition of the classical liberal 
conception of civil society, which presumes the identification of civil society 
either with the political community (Locke), or with economic society 
(Hegel and Marx). Insisting on functional differentiation between the 
spheres of politics, the economy, and civil society, Luhmann regards such 
identifications as obsolete and inapplicable to modern democratic polities. 
According to Cohen and Arato, the clue to Luhmann’s surprising 
preoccupation with the problem of civil society lies in the theorist’s 
conviction that “sociologists such as Durkheim, Parsons (his major 
forerunner), and Habermas (his most important rival) are still under the 
sway of this major concept of ‘old European’ practical philosophy.” On this 
view, Luhmann’s strategy consists in identifying these social-scientific 
descriptions of the concept of civil society with “the traditional societas civilis” 
and, consequently, in revealing “the resulting inadequacies for the study of 
modern conditions” (Cohen and Arato 1992: 300). 
Luhmann conceives of social evolution as a “virtually irreversible” 
movement that increases the complexity of society (Luhmann 1982: 224-
25). In the course of this evolutionary movement, certain subsystems of 
modern society tend to acquire functional primacy. However, “the concept 
of functional primacy is not concerned with comparing the intrinsic 
importance of specific functions. Instead, it refers to the position of a 
subsystem in the total context of social evolution – namely, the position of 
that subsystem which by virtue of its own complexity and dynamics guides 
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social development and delineates for other subsystems their domains of 
possibilities” (Luhmann 1982: 225). Consequently, Luhmann argues that at 
the current stage of social evolution functional primacy belongs to the 
subsystem of science, which implies the subordination of both politics and 
the economy to the scrutiny of scientific control. In this sense, science “can 
already anticipate attaining social primacy,” as it “would have to become a 
social system that brings forth an adequate theory of society” (Luhmann 
1982: 225). 
Applying Luhmann’s evolutionary perspective to historical conceptions 
of civil society, we can notice that the political system, due to its relatively 
advanced complexity, acquired functional primacy in pre-modern and early-
modern conceptions of civil society. This functional primacy explains why 
Locke identified civil society with the political community. Later, in the 
nineteenth century, the swift development of the market economy led to the 
Marxist amalgamation of civil society with economic society under one 
concept of bürgerliche Gesellschaft. If Marx departed in his conception of civil 
society from a dichotomous model of state/society relations, opposing 
bürgerliche Gesellschaft to the state, Luhmann considers the identification of 
civil society with economic society unacceptable. This is because “bürgerliche 
Gesellschaft refers to a topos that is not identical with but parallel to ‘political 
society’ ” (Cohen and Arato 1992: 304). Accordingly, Luhmann argues that 
the identification of a social subsystem of the economy with the whole of 
society is a methodical error of taking the part for the whole. To mend the 
situation, he insists on understanding “the economic system as a subsystem 
of society” (Luhmann 1982: 225) and, accordingly, on restoring the model 
of functionally differentiated society as the all-encompassing system, which 
comprises the subsystems of politics, the economy, and civil society. 
Moreover, with his theory of functional differentiation, Luhmann 
eliminates the Marxist juxtaposition of society and state. Cohen and Arato 
comment that in the Marxist dichotomous model the state is identical with 
the political system, whereas bürgerliche Gesellschaft remains a loose concept, 
signifying the whole undifferentiated environment of the political system. 
Luhmann’s model of functionally differentiated society offers, alternatively, 
a clear vision of how the subsystems of politics, the economy, and civil 
society constitute the dynamic fabric of communications within the all-
embracing system of society (Cohen and Arato 1992: 310-11).  
Luhmann’s conception of civil society presumes a clear distinction 
between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. In my view, Luhmann refutes the 
conception of civil society in terms of Gemeinschaft because this conception 
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identifies civil society with a traditional society. Instead, believing in 
pluralization and differentiation of societal structures, the theorist tends to 
conceive of civil society in terms of Gesellschaft as a spin-off of the process 
of functional differentiation.  
Luhmann’s overt preference of Gesellschaft over Gemeinschaft is explicable 
if we attend to his study of the relationship between individual and society. 
The theorist criticizes the old-fashioned understanding of socialization in 
terms Gemeinschaft as participation of human beings (psycho-organic 
systems) in society (social system) because this understanding provides a 
simplifying model of how individuals interact with society and with each 
other. In Luhmann’s view, the depiction of socialization in terms of 
Gemeinschaft does not do full justice to the complexity of systems 
environment and of systems differentiation on the whole. Hence, Luhmann 
argues that we, individuals who interact with each other in modern 
differentiated societies, “bid farewell to all Gemeinschaft mythologies – more 
precisely, we relegate them to the level of the self-description of social 
systems” (Luhmann 1995: 220).  
Refuting Gemeinschaft mythologies, Luhmann compares the relationship 
between individuals (i.e. organic/psychic systems) and society (in the form 
of its differentiated social systems) to the relationship between autopoietic 
self-referential systems. Such kind of “interpenetration permits a relation 
between autonomous autopoiesis and structural coupling” (Luhmann 1995: 
221). If differentiation applies to psychic/biological systems at the level of 
self-referential reproductions in human beings, societal differentiation 
involves self-referential reproductions of social systems. Luhmann’s 
exposition of interpenetration of organic/psychic and social systems 
“presupposes the capacity for connecting different kinds of autopoiesis” 
inherent in organic life, consciousness, and communication (Luhmann 1995: 
219). The theorist considers the interactions between individuals in the 
context of functionally differentiated society, “Formulated less abstractly, 
participation in a social system requires human beings to make their own 
contributions, and it leads to human beings’ distinguishing themselves from 
one another and behaving exclusively for one another; because they must 
produce their own contributions themselves, they must motivate 
themselves. When they cooperate one must clarify, despite all natural 
similarity, who has made which contribution” (Luhmann 1995: 220-21). 
Emphasizing individual motivation and responsibility while speaking about 
the “individualization of persons,” Luhmann reinvigorates the importance 
of subjective meaning in individuals’ actions. Specifically, he argues that 
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“meaning enables psychic and social system formations to interpenetrate, 
while protecting their autopoiesis; meaning simultaneously enables 
consciousness to understand itself and continue to affect itself in 
communication, and enables communication to be referred back to the 
consciousness of the participants. Therefore, the concept of meaning 
supersedes the concept of the animal sociale” (Luhmann 1995: 219). Given 
Luhmann’s interest in meaning as the underlying principle of intersystemic 
communication, his conception of civil society bears more resemblance to 
the Weberian sensitivity than to the Parsonian functionalistic rigidity; hence, 
it refutes the accusations of its technocratic character. 
Even stronger, Luhmann-based conception of civil society includes an 
explicit human dimension because it also touches upon the concept of trust, 
which is the fundamental precondition of all human interactions. A 
convincing account of the relevance of trust to Luhmann-based conception 
of civil society has been suggested by Martin Schweer in his contribution 
‘The Importance of Trust for Civil Society.’ Considering “the participation 
of citizens as a salient feature of the working civil society,” Schweer 
maintains that trust in the system is the precondition for civic engagement. 
Put differently, “people willing to engage civilly and thus to create a basis 
for a participatory democracy have to be able to trust in the institutions” 
(Schweer 2001: 61, 68). Schweer claims that “readiness of society members 
to get involved inside and outside its varied institutions is indispensable for 
a functioning civil society. But this readiness for involvement requires a 
basic trust in the social system as such, and in the subsystems included, such 
as government, political parties, unions, but also churches, associations and 
organizations” (Schweer 2001: 60). Trust in the institutions of democratic 
polity stimulates individuals to articulate their demands and expectations 
and thereby to attract public interest to their private interests. Thus, it is 
legitimate to assume that systemic “trust does not reduce the complexity of 
social demands” (Schweer 2001: 67). 
Evidently, Luhmann’s understanding of trust is very specific: Trust 
designates trust in the system. Only within Luhmann’s systems theory, as 
Schweer comments, trust can be correctly interpreted as “a vital mechanism 
to reduce social complexity,” as an instrument that provides a significant aid 
to manage countless options. Trust, understood as the mechanism whereby 
civil society manages environmental complexity, is analytically comparable 
to the mechanism of reflexion employed by the system of law and the 
mechanism of self-legitimation employed by the system of democratic 
politics. Furthermore, Schweer clarifies that “the complexity reducing 
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mechanism of trust is a prerequisite for people’s power to act in a civil 
society” because “the lack of trust in systems, and its connected insufficient 
reduction of complexity, can only be compensated with a mechanism of 
increasing alienation, isolation and ego-centricity instead of a working sense 
of community” (Schweer 2001: 63). Thus, Luhmann-based conception of 
civil society entails an inextricable connection between active citizenship 
and cooperative behavior, “Without trust the willingness to take 
responsibility for the common tasks cannot develop” (Schweer 2001: 68). 
Examining Luhmann’s understanding of political pluralism, King and 
Thornhill demonstrate how and why Luhmann repudiates both radical-
liberal and neo-conservative understandings of political pluralism. The 
scholars maintain, “By dismissing interpretations of the political system as 
an organ which is tied to the specific interests of the constituent body, or 
which is called upon to re-present either the particular (interests) or the 
general will of the people, Luhmann places himself resolutely not only 
against the founding assumptions of liberalism, but also of contemporary 
political activism, pluralism, and indeed of all current left-of-center debate” 
(King and Thornhill 2003: 95). Accordingly, Luhmann labels social 
movements with the radical-liberal political agenda, including ecologism, 
feminism, protest groups, etc. as “parasitic modes of communication.” This 
is because social movements aim to confront society with its internal 
problems, instead of supporting the systems theoretical insight that all 
communication occurs inside the system of society and that their protest 
signifies only one particular process amongst others, whereby the system of 
society communicates about itself. Put differently, the subsystem of civil 
society understood in a minimal sense, as a network of various social 
movements, pretends to assume the task of the all-embracing system of 
society and communicate outside of its own subsystem in order to exert 
influence on the neighboring subsystem of politics. Luhmann criticized the 
ungrounded claim of social movements that they can provide an external 
perspective on society. That is why the theorist repudiates civil society, 
conceived in terms of a network of social movements, as “the founding 
bastion of modern left-liberal conceptions of anti-systemic or anti-
organizational agency, as a largely meaningless term” (King and Thornhill 
2003: 95). Although Luhmann criticizes one-issue social movements for 
their attempt to draw political capital from a very selective account of the 
entirety of social reality, he “sets out a highly nuanced theory of issue-
politics” (King and Thornhill 2003: 96).  
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In addition to his advocacy of political pluralism, Luhmann equally 
refutes a neo-conservative critique of pluralism as a threat to social cohesion 
and integrity of political order. Thornhill and Kind clarify that Luhmann 
distinguishes himself from both neo-conservatism and radical liberalism 
because both positions erroneously depart from a reductively schematic, 
either hierarchical or dualistic, theory of society. In result, “both cling to a 
binary theory of the relation between state and society which falsifies the 
essentially plural difference and interdependence of the many social systems 
which constitute modern complex societies” (King and Thornhill 2003: 97). 
Luhmann’s exposition of modern society as “a society without an apex and 
a center” (Luhmann 1990: 31) presumes accordingly a different validation of 
political pluralism. Pluralism ensues from functionally equal subsystems, 
which sustain their systemic autonomy by differentiating themselves from 
other subsystems instead of battling for functional primacy over each other. 
That is the reason why Luhmann criticizes both neo-conservatism and 
radical liberalism for their shared presumption that certain subsystems can 
claim primacy over others, like the conservative belief in the regulative 
authority of the political apparatus, or the left-liberal belief in the ability of 
(civil) society to encroach on the political system.  
For his part, Luhmann intends to reinvoke an innovative understanding 
of political pluralism by attending to the concept of functional 
differentiation. In doing so, as Kind and Thornhill comment, Luhmann 
places his conception of political pluralism outside fundamental 
conservative hostility to social pluralism, as well as radical-liberal 
dichotomous juxtaposition of society and the political system. Instead, 
Luhmann insists that “the conditions of pluralism can thus only be 
guaranteed if society is not viewed as being centered in specific regions of 
interaction, specific issues or specific people, if it is decoupled from all 
mono-focal constructions of reality” (King and Thornhill 2003: 98). To 
meet these conditions, an all-embracing systems theoretical view of 
functionally differentiated society is required. Hence, “Luhmann suggests 
that the reality of differentiation, of coexisting centers of authority for truth, 
validity and legitimacy is a fundamental prerequisite for a society 
characterized by a high degree of social pluralism” (King and Thornhill 
2003: 225). As we can recall, the underlying principle of differentiation 
pertains to replicating of the system’s difference from environment by 
means of system-specific binary code. Difference is therefore the 
precondition for systems’ autonomy, rationality, and legitimacy and thus the 
precondition for political pluralism. The result of these processes of 
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differentiation “is that all modern social systems admit (or necessitate) an 
extremely high degree of external and internal systemic plurality” (King and 
Thornhill 2003: 97). At the same time, Luhmann warns that the pluralistic 
multi-contextual structure of functionally differentiated society is 
jeopardized when society begins to center itself around one particular 
system, i.e. starts to de-differentiate itself. Kind and Thornhill confirm that 
Luhmann identifies the process of de-differentiation, whether in politics, 
science or law, with “the greatest threat to modern society” (King and 
Thornhill 2003: 225). Founding his theory of modern society on the 
concept of differentiation, Luhmann asserts that “the true and necessary 
condition of modern society is its essential polycentricity.” Correspondingly, 
pluralism is the precondition for a liberal democratic polity. On his view, 
King and Thornhill rightly conclude that Luhmann “appears precisely as a 
spokesperson for pluralism, albeit for a much more far-reaching and less 
immediately transparent concept of pluralism than that promulgated by 
social movements” (King and Thornhill 2003: 97).   
 
Conclusion  
 
In the above analysis, I attempted to provide a sociological embedding of 
civil society theory by assessing the idea and the reality of civil society from 
the perspective of the theory of societal differentiation. I have sketched a 
series of sociological depictions of society, which are consonant with the 
political-philosophical and moral-social premises of civil society. Having 
studied the concept of societal differentiation within the two competing 
paradigms, theory of social action and systems theory, I can conclude that 
the main categories of civil society, such as plurality, voluntary association, 
civic engagement, public sphere, democratic decision-making, legality, and 
equality, make the strongest case for the importance of functional 
differentiation. The discussed sociological theorizations marshaled a wealth 
of empirical evidence to enhance reflection on the difficulties that the 
normative idea of civil society can bring about in reality. Using insights from 
these sociological theories, I shall summarize the main results from the 
analysis. 
The merit of Weber’s theory of modern society consists in that it has 
exposed the process of increasing rationalization as the crucial precondition 
for the emergence of civil society in the modern West. Weber described this 
process at the level of differentiating value spheres of politics, religion, 
aesthetics, science, morality, the economy, etc. However, the Weberian 
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understanding of modernization as increasing rationalization contains much 
ambiguity and is unable to provide a straightforward account of the 
institutional and structural makeup of civil society as established in Western 
societies. Weber himself recognized the essential ambiguousness of his 
concept of rationality when he applied it to the historical re-description of 
Western modernity. Certain scholars dramatized the consequences of the 
Weberian diagnosis of increasing rationalization as the prevalent trend in 
Western modernity and concentrated on the ensuing contradictions. 
Weber’s diagnosis raised a series of pertinent questions about possible 
limitations of the concept of rationality, such as freedom of choice, 
contingency, and rationality of choice. In contradistinction to these dramatic 
interpretations of Weber’s theory, Münch spawned an entirely different 
trajectory of interpretation by conflating Weber’s theory of rationalization 
with the theoretical framework of Parsons’s theory of structural 
differentiation. Thereby, Münch developed his theory of interpenetration. 
For his part, Parsons understood civil society as a subsystem of 
structurally differentiated society, namely the subsystem of societal 
community. He identified this category with the integration subsystem of 
society, which is constituted by normative-legal and associational elements. 
However, Parsons’s theory faces insurmountable difficulties when it tries to 
reconcile the normative idea of civil society with the empirical description 
of it. It obscures the inherent tensions and obviates the need for empirical 
emendations to the model of civil society. The problem with the analysis of 
the idea and the reality of civil society from the perspective of social action 
theory starts when the theorists try to depict the normative idea of civil 
society as already realized in bureaucratic power-ridden democracies. Weber 
anticipated these problems, which is evident from his ambiguous attitude to 
the irreversible expansion of formal rationality in the structures of the 
bureaucracy, law, and the economy. Parsons, on the other hand, overlooked 
the imminent threats of the expanding economy, of increasingly procedural 
nature of modern law, and of enhancing passivity of democratic citizens. 
Alexander and Münch ventured to remedy the mistakes of their theoretical 
predecessors by entrenching the empirical element of a theorization of civil 
society in their theory of interpenetration. They tried to demonstrate the 
continuous empirical interactions between the separate spheres of civil 
society, the economy, and politics. Obviously, the theory of social action has 
trouble to accommodate an explosive combination of descriptive and 
normative elements, both of which are still indispensable for an 
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encompassing theory of civil society. The challenge of dealing with 
normativity in sociological analysis of (civil) society was left for Luhmann.  
Luhmann elaborated the most sophisticated theory of functional 
differentiation until now; thereby, he creatively advanced the sociological 
account of civil society toward the next analytical level. Luhmann radically 
diverged from Parsons’s theory of social action, as he became gradually 
aware that the structural complexity of modern society is comprehensible 
only through a value-free analysis at the level of social systems. The theorist 
transferred the emphasis on the concept of differentiation and opted for the 
semantics of autonomy and separation, in contradistinction to Parsons’s 
foundationalist and universalistic orientation. Even stronger, he returned to 
the conceptual roots of modern differentiation: Developing his theory of 
differentiation, Luhmann characteristically drew on the Weberian diagnosis 
of modernity. If Weber conceived modern society as being determined by 
the dynamics of differentiation among various value spheres, Luhmann 
approached a resembling understanding of “the evolution or modernization 
of society as a process of increasing system differentiation and pluralization” 
(Luhmann 1982: 232-33). In Luhmann’s estimation, modern society, by 
means of engaging in the process of functional differentiation, increases its 
internal complexity and thereby manages environmental complexity. 
Hence, if Parsons provides “the most advanced reconstruction of the 
concept of civil society within academic social science” by depicting civil 
society as the integration subsystem of society composed of normative-legal 
and associational components, Luhmann, for his part, “does his best to 
eliminate any such a sphere in whatever guise from the systems theory of 
society.” Luhmann emphatically refutes “the notion that one of the 
differentiated spheres should be understood as any kind of replacement for 
civil society, or the social, or normative integration” (Arato and Cohen 
1992: 311, 301). In this sense, Luhmann argues that Parsons’s reduction of 
civil society to societal community fundamentally contradicts the logic of 
functional structuralism. Insofar as Luhmann claims civil society to be 
principally irreducible to any of social spheres, he does not consider it as an 
appropriate analytical unit for his systems-theoretical analysis. 
Indeed, sociological evidence for civil society is not to be easily 
discovered in Luhmann’s theory. Nevertheless, I believe that the 
reconstruction of Luhmann-based conception of civil society is possible 
when we undertake such a reconstruction pertaining to the broad, all-
encompassing definition of civil society, which reaches beyond any 
particular social subsystem of society and resides rather at the level of 
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intersystemic communication between differentiated spheres. Assuming 
this, I took much inspiration in the way Cohen and Arato astutely 
articulated the essence of Luhmann’s approach, “Society, in his analysis, 
stands only for the whole” (Cohen and Arato 1992: 301). On this view, 
Luhmann revises the concept of civil society “in terms other than that of a 
subsystem of society in the manner of Parsons’s societal community” 
(Cohen and Arato 1992: 341). Luhmann’s conception of civil society also 
diverges from Taylor’s minimal definition of civil society as a network of 
public organizations, social movements, and voluntary associations that 
claim their political efficacy. Luhmann considers Parsons’s identification of 
civil society with the subsystem of Gemeinschaft, i.e. the societal community, 
archaic. Overcoming Parsons, Luhmann conceives of modern society in 
terms of modern differentiated Gesellschaft, which releases civil society from 
confinement to one particular sphere and allows envisaging it as a highly 
differentiated society constituted by a complex matrix of intersystemic 
communications. His theory advances thus a new revisited conception of 
civil society that is concordant with the presumption of functionally 
differentiated, that is de-centralized, complex, and pluralized, society.  
Luhmann’s model of functionally differentiated society presumes 
simultaneous dependence and independence of various social systems, so 
that “instead of fusion, Luhmann provides us with a persuasive model of 
the growth of both differentiation and interdependence, of both systemic 
self-closure and openness to other systems” (Cohen and Arato 1992: 309). 
Functionally differentiated social subsystems are able of rational 
communication and independent judgment. In result, due to the advanced 
matrix of intersystemic communications, society becomes able to detect 
problems in one of its various subsystems and find the most efficient 
solutions, without recurring to the political system. Arato and Cohen 
rightfully observe, “It is in the context of such a reconstruction that 
Luhmann’s notion of autopoiesis first becomes serviceable for a 
postinterventionist model of the relations of the political system to the 
other spheres of society” (Cohen and Arato 1992: 341). By his advocacy of 
“the heterogeneous societal sources of norm creation” (Cohen and Arato 
1992: 340), the theorist succeeds to provide a compelling defense of 
political pluralism understanding it as the essential precondition for 
functional differentiation and the key to functioning democratic polities.  
As I have stated earlier, Luhmann intended to eliminate the normative 
dimension from his theory of society. However, attempting at a value-free 
conception of society, Luhmann produced an account of society’s evolution 
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that still retains a certain degree of normativity. Demonstrating a distinct 
proclivity towards the (unintended) normative view on functionally 
differentiated society, the theorist advocates a specific type of society that 
has been established in the modern West, namely “a society without a top 
and without a center” (Luhmann 1990: 16). Evaluating functional 
differentiation positively, Luhmann ascribes a normative value to this 
process. On this view, I suggest that Luhmann’s analysis of society is not 
entirely value-free. Although he chooses social systems, and not human 
individuals, as analytical units of his analysis of modern society, he, 
nonetheless, builds his analysis on the primordial principle of human 
interaction, namely trust. Hence, Luhmann arrives at a deeply subjective 
conception of civil society as produced by meaningful communication 
between the organic/psychic and social systems.  
Possibly, the concept of societal differentiation is not as suitable for the 
description of non-Western civil societies, as it is for the redescription of 
Western civil societies. It might be a relative concept, and other categories 
might be much more promising. Cohen and Arato presume, “The 
teleological interpretation of history may well involve impermissible 
projection of modern Western categories to premodern and non-Western 
societies, so that the universal applicability of a category such as 
differentiation is therefore open to doubt. The relevance of this category to 
modern development itself is, nevertheless, highly plausible” (Cohen and 
Arato 1992: 120). The main merit of the sociological embedding of civil 
society theory consists in revealing the relative independence of the sphere 
of civil society from the spheres of politics and the economy, and in 
underpinning the tripartite model of relations between these there spheres. 
Having established the differentiated modus of their relationship, let us 
undertake a new challenge and consider how religion reacts to the prevalent 
trend of societal differentiation. 
 
  
4 
 
Civil Society and Religion:  
Insights from the West and  
from the East 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
So far, I have purposefully confined the analysis to the secular reading of 
civil society theory. Nonetheless, I could not avoid a persistent feeling that 
the idea and the reality of civil society entail certain aspects that fall beyond 
the categories of sociological and political analyses. On this view, I have 
decided to introduce a religious perspective in civil society theory with a 
view to revealing how civil society and religion relate to each other in 
Western and Eastern societies of the Christian origin. The announced goal 
necessitates examining the historical background of the relationship 
between civil society and religion. Given an overwhelming amount of 
available studies on the concerned problem in Western societies, I shall 
concentrate in section 4.1 only on certain, in my view, most important 
aspects of the Western view on the role of religion in the public domain. 
Subsequently, in section 4.2, I shall examine the history of the relationship 
between Eastern Christianity and secular society in Russia. Finally, in 
section 4.3, a possible religious reading of civil society theory will be 
suggested on the basis of the inspiring thoughts of the eminent Russian 
philosophers Vladimir Solov’ëv and Semën Frank.  
The involvement of a religious perspective dictates a specific approach. 
The specificity of the approach is determined, to my mind, by the 
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assumption that religion supersedes the rationalized, immanence-reliant 
method of secular science. In contradistinction to secular science, a 
scientific study of religion entails the possibility of a transcendental referent 
and hence goes beyond the boundaries of a reason-based method. The 
phenomenon of religion is different from tangible, visible, perceptible, and 
testable phenomena of the empirical world, as it comprises the element that 
can be called supernatural, transcendent, irrational, mystical, or spiritual. It is 
due to this element that religion expresses human ontological connectedness 
with transcendence. On this view, the scientific study of religion will 
inevitably involve examining an empirically unprovable reality.  
There are two main approaches to study religion scientifically: the social-
scientific approach and the theological approach. The social-scientific 
approach, identified by certain scholars as “the functionalistic approach,” is 
employed in the field of sociology of religion and aims at examining of 
religion in its functional relation to society (Wils 2004: 11). Theology, on the 
contrary, employs an essentialistic approach, as it aims to investigate the 
internal logics of religion and thereby address the essence of religious belief. 
The core difference between the two stipulated approaches pertains to the 
way they position themselves. Sociology assumes a standpoint external to 
religion, trying to conceive transcendence by immanent means, whereas 
theology assumes an internal standpoint, viewing society through the prism 
of internal religious logic and thus trying to conceive the immanent with a 
reference to the transcendent. For that reason, these two approaches are 
essentially incompatible; however, they are both necessary to provide a 
more encompassing and unbiased study of religion.  
Hence, when we address the posed question (What is the relationship 
between civil society and religion?), we are immediately confronted with a 
following dilemma. From a sociological perspective, the question can be 
restated as follows: What is the place and role of religion in the system of 
modern civil society? In this case, the answer pertains to the influence that 
religion exerts on the public sphere. The influence can be reckoned positive 
when religion fosters the cultural-ideological and ethical integrity of society. 
On the other hand, religion also contains an implicit negative potential, for 
it has been the force notoriously known for provoking aggressive conflicts 
in the history of the humankind, such as ethnical cleansing, religious wars, 
or religious fundamentalism. In addition, religious organizations can be 
neutrally assessed by sociologists of religion as voluntary associations of 
civil society. Alternatively, if we address the question of the relationship 
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between religion and civil society from a theological point of view, the 
question can be restated as follows: How can the religious ideal relate to the 
idea and the reality of civil society? Which religious arguments endorse or 
refute civil society theory? These questions concern the intrinsic logic of a 
religious doctrine. 
In the analysis to follow, I shall employ both sociological and theological 
approaches to examine the relationship between civil society and religion. 
This attempt to intertwine these approaches in one coherent analysis 
accounts for the strength, as well as for the inevitable weakness of my 
analysis. 
 
4.1 The Western View on the Role of Religion in the Public 
Domain  
 
The problem of how religion and civil society relate to each other in 
modern societies of the Christian origin pertains to the profound question 
of how Christianity conceives of secular society in general. This question 
acquired special relevance during the Renaissance when the process of 
secularization set up in Western Christian societies. Western Christianity 
was challenged then to find a way of meaningful adjusting to the instigated 
trend of secularization. On the conceptual level, an argument flared up 
between two antagonistic standpoints: the standpoint of Christianity and the 
standpoint of modern secularism. This argument appeared more 
complicated than a straightforward opposition. It deserves therefore a more 
detailed investigation, which will be the next focus (§ 4.1.1). Consequently, I 
shall address the problem of the relationship between religion and civil 
society from the sociological perspective. Then, we will attempt at defining 
the role that religion plays in a functionally differentiated society (§ 4.1.2). 
Involving a political-philosophical perspective, I shall stipulate the 
conditions under which religion can assume a legitimate form in a liberal 
constitutional democracy. In this connection, the pluralistic character of 
civil society will be studied (§ 4.1.3). Finally, we will be challenged to 
consider a possible situation when modern secularism is interpreted as a 
coherent ideology (§ 4.1.4). Addressing these questions, I shall rely on those 
scholars whose studies I have used to establish a theoretical framework in 
the previous chapters of the book: John Keane, Charles Taylor, and Max 
Weber. In addition, the argument will be enriched by new insights provided 
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by the contemporary leading experts on the problems of modern religion 
and secularization, José Casanova and Robert Audi. 
 
4.1.1 Christianity and Secularism: The Relationship of Reciprocal Influence 
 
My intention to examine the dynamic relationship between Christianity and 
modern secularism was invoked by Keane’s incisive perception, which he 
articulated in his article ‘Secularism?,’ that secularity as “a key organizing 
principle of an open, non-violent civil society is indeed anchored in deep 
time and in surprising ways that are still poorly understood.” I agree with 
Keane that we need to revitalize an understanding of the genealogical 
connectedness between secularity, Christianity, and modern civil society. 
For this purpose, “a convincing genealogy of the birth and maturation of 
the modern ideal of civil society” is required, for it would clarify “various 
‘pathways’ that led towards the politically established division between ‘the 
secular’ and ‘the spiritual’ ” (Keane 2000: 10). Bearing this in mind, I 
presume that a qualified genealogical analysis will elucidate important 
factors that determined the relationship between religion and secular civil 
society in the modern West. 
The key to the suggested analysis lies, I believe, in Taylor’s definition of 
civil society as the pivotal feature of Western secular modernity. The scholar 
underscores functional independence of civil society from the state, which 
entails the capacity of civil society “to generate or sustain a certain 
condition, without the agency of the state.” However, it is not the ability of 
civil society “to operate as a whole outside the ambit of the state” that 
renders Western modern civil societies unique, but their “purely secular” 
nature (Taylor 1997: 259). The question arises why secularity is so important 
for Western theorists of civil society. Possibly, they intend to clarify the 
genealogical connectedness of modern secularism and Western Christianity. 
Elaborating on this presumption, I shall try to expose the idea of civil 
society as an attempt at a secular normative vision of social order. 
 The idea of secular civil society became a central category in the epoch 
of European modernization, when it served as the main symbol of 
overcoming the medieval religious worldview. As Dominique Colas reveals 
in his study Civil Society and Fanaticism: Conjoined Histories, the concept of a 
secular tolerant and pluralistic civil society originated from the need to put 
an end to religious fanaticism. The idea of civil society emerged during the 
Reformation as “the antidote of religious fanaticism.” It was invoked against 
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the background of rising religious pluralism to prevent the destructive 
influence of religious fanaticism and articulate the argument for toleration 
(Keane 2000: 11). Colas scrupulously depicts how the term ‘civil society,’ 
inherited from ancient and medieval philosophy and political theology, took 
on a new meaning “in the tragic dawn of the German sixteenth century” 
(Colas 1997: 8). At that time, Martin Luther refuted fanatics’ endorsement 
of the sacralized legitimacy of political power by proposing the law-
regulated, civilized model of civil society. Philip Melanchthon, the German 
Protestant Reformer and a friend of Luther, explicitly juxtaposed the 
concept of a non-violent, legal, and civil society (societas civilis) with the 
mentality of raving fanatics (homo fanaticus) who were impatient to establish a 
new transfigured world without any delay (Keane 2000: 10-11; Colas 1997: 
8). Thus, with his plea for a secular tolerant society, Luther sanctioned the 
idea of secular civil society “as a positive value to promote both tolerance 
and ‘bourgeois’ values, the free market as well as freedom of thought” 
(Colas 1997: 6). 
In the subsequent history of Western political theory, Colas argues, “the 
conceptual pair fanaticism/civil society would reappear […] in the writings 
of all thinkers seeking to conceptualize the polity” (Colas 1997: 6-7). Insofar 
as the category of civil society was subjected to critical revision by a wide 
spectrum of political-philosophical theories, two polarized positions 
emerged depending on whether they took their foundation from the values 
associated with fanaticism or, alternatively, with a secular and pluralistic civil 
society. Colas makes a distinction between totalitarian political forms, 
founded on value of intolerance and the principle of the single-party state, 
and democratic polities, founded on the value of tolerance as incarnated in 
the law-governed state. 
Hence, the idea of secular civil society originated in European modernity 
as the embodiment of the ideals of tolerance, non-violence, and pluralism. It 
reflected a possibility of a socio-political order based on anti-totalitarian and 
anti-sectarian principles. At the same time, serving as an antidote to religious 
fanaticism, the idea of secular civil society is not antagonistic to Christian 
religion. In fact, as certain Western scholars demonstrate, the concept of the 
secular is deeply engraved in the Christian theological thought, where it was 
conceived as the secular world (saeculum). Taylor, for instance, insists that     
“ ‘secular’ itself is a Christian term, that is, a word that finds its original 
meaning in a Christian context” (Taylor 1999: 31). In the Christian tradition, 
the awareness that there is something different from the divine reality 
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revealed in Jesus Christ arose quite quickly, namely it was the central 
message of Christ Himself when he said, “I am not of this world” (John 8: 
24). On this view, Christianity and modern secularism share the intuition 
that the realm of the divine needs to be distinguished from the realm of the 
secular. According to Taylor, “the existence of these oppositions reflected 
something fundamental about Christendom, a requirement of distance, of 
non-coincidence between the Church and the world.” Insofar as Christianity 
accepted it as “axiomatic that there had to be a separation of spheres,” “the 
need for distance, for a less than full embedding in the secular” was 
consequently understood as essential to the vocation of the Church (Taylor 
1999: 32). Subsequently, the idea of the division between the secular and the 
divine was continuously elaborated by eminent Church fathers of both 
Western and Eastern Christianity, among others Augustine, John 
Chrysostom, and Basil the Great.  
The ancient Christian distinction between the divine and the secular 
significantly influenced the formation of the modern public sphere as an 
independent “extrapolitical” realm. Taylor reveals that the modern public 
sphere inherited from the Christian ecclesiastical tradition its self-perception 
as being external to the political structure, as “forming a society outside of 
the state.” West-European citizens were able to declare the independence of 
the public sphere because they “were used to living in a dual society, 
organized by two mutually irreducible principles”: the principle of secular 
political community and the principle of extrapolitical religious community 
(Taylor 1997: 266-67). Moreover, the public sphere inherited from the 
Christian Church its self-perception as an “extant metatopical space.” Like 
the Church, the public sphere was able to transcend topical spaces and 
embrace instead “a plurality of such spaces” (Taylor 1997: 263).  
Although the modern public sphere inherited from the Christian Church 
the ideas of independence and metatopicality, it introduced an entirely new 
perception of time. The term ‘secular’ evolved within the Christian tradition 
to signify a dimension of Christian life that proceeds in profane time, i.e. 
“the time of ordinary historical succession which the human race lives 
through between the Fall and the Parousia” (Taylor 1999: 32). Within the 
Christian tradition, this profane time of the secular world is opposed to “the 
logic of divine time – God’s time, time as eternity,” which implies “the 
gathering of time into a unity based on a founding act that dictates the 
meaning of subsequent events” (Keane 2000: 9). Whereas the world of the 
divine exists in the dimension of eternity, which Casanova imaginatively 
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characterized as “the sacred-spiritual time of salvation, represented by the 
Church’s calendar,” the secular world is bound to the conditions of 
temporality and exists thus in the “secular age (saeculum)” (Casanova 1994: 
14).  
The secular conception of civil society provided, according to Taylor, an 
alternative answer to the question of how human society inhabits time. 
Namely, it refuted the premodern “multidimensional” perception of time 
and established a one-dimensional progressive time-perception. In this 
sense, “modern secularization can be seen from one angle as the rejection of 
divine time, and the positioning of time as purely profane.” The modern 
“notion of simultaneity” emerged, which means that “events utterly 
unrelated in cause or meaning are held together simply by their occurrence 
at the same point in this single profane time line” (Taylor 1997: 270-71).  
In its turn, the conception of time as profane “militates the idea of 
society as constituted by metasocial principles, such as the Will of God” 
(Keane 2000: 9). Modern understanding of time as secular contradicts the 
medieval Christian idea of metaphysical order and allows a secular self-
conception of society as a web of associations “constituted by nothing 
outside the common action we carry out in it: coming to a common mind, 
where possible, through the exchange of ideas” (Taylor 1997: 267). With 
that, the modern public sphere arises as an upshot of immanent common 
action, which has been previously unthinkable within the metaphysical order 
predetermined either by God, or by natural law, or by a historical destiny 
(Taylor 1997: 271). Instead, the secularity of the modern public sphere 
“nurtures the political principle, vital for public life in a democracy, that the 
interaction of speaking and acting citizens within a worldly public sphere 
anchored in a civil society is primary, overriding all other competing 
foundational principles” (Keane 2000: 9).   
The secular perception of time and the secular self-conception of society 
have produced, as Taylor has articulated it, “a revolution in our social 
imaginary.” The revolution has come about gradually, being facilitated by 
three main factors in the modern history of Western civilization, “the rise of 
a public sphere, in which people conceive themselves as participating 
directly in a nationwide (sometimes even international) discussion; the 
development of market economies, in which all economic agents are seen as 
entering into contractual relations with each other on an equal footing; and, 
of course, the rise of the modern citizenship state.” Embodying the moral 
ideals of equality and individualism, the three indicated factors contributed 
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to the “immediacy of access,” which became a typical feature of modern 
society. In contradistinction to pre-modern hierarchical societies, modern 
societies are essentially horizontal. In modern societies, individuals perceive 
themselves as “belonging to ever wider and more impersonal entities such 
as the state, the movement, the community of humankind.” In this sense, 
modern individuals share the immediacy of access. Consequently, the 
revolution of social imaginary endorsed a vision of society as located in a 
purely secular time, for it “no longer sees the greater translocal entities as 
grounded in something other, something higher, than common action in 
secular time” (Taylor 1999: 39-41). Instead, the horizontal structure, the 
radical secularity, and the immediacy of access for all citizens “forms the 
background to the contemporary sources of legitimate government in the 
will of the people” and allows contemporary Western scholars to conceive 
of civil society as a “given political form by an act of the people” (Taylor 
1999: 43). At the same time, as it has become clear from the above, Western 
scholars recognize that it was Christianity that provided an initial impulse to 
the formation of the ideas of tolerance, independence, and pluralism, which 
are now associated with civil society and liberal democratic polity.  
 
4.1.2 Religion in a Functionally Differentiated Society  
 
Having established that modern secularism and Christianity are involved in 
a relation of reciprocal influence, we are confronted with the ensuing 
questions: Which role does religion play in the secular public sphere of 
modern society, and what impact does secularization have on the internal 
dynamics and self-identification of religion? These questions induce us to 
analyze the process of secularization in a broader framework of the theory 
of modernization and functional differentiation. Such an attempt has been 
already undertaken by the contemporary sociologist of religion José 
Casanova. In his study Public Religions in the Modern World, the scholar 
insightfully demonstrated that Weber’s thesis of secularization can be justly 
regarded “both as the premise and as the end result of processes of 
differentiation” (Casanova 1994: 18). On this account, I consider it 
necessary to explain what constitutes the essence of the process of 
secularization.  
Notwithstanding the multifaceted interpretations provided by different 
scholars, the theory of secularization is grounded in one central idea, namely 
the idea that the transcendent tends to be systematically reduced to the 
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secular. Characteristically, this idea has foundations in the originally 
Christian distinction between the religious and secular spheres. However, if 
in medieval Christian societies, the institution of the Church declared itself 
to be the earthly representation of the eternal Kingdom of God and thus 
“the all-encompassing reality within which the secular realm found its 
proper place,” with the rise of modernity, the secular spheres of society 
acclaimed their autonomy from the sphere of religion and elevated 
themselves to a position functionally independent from religion. As a result 
of “the actual historical process whereby the dualist system within ‘this 
world’ and the sacramental structures of mediation between this world and 
the other world progressively break down,” the secular sphere emerges, 
becoming then “the all-encompassing reality, to which the religious sphere 
will have to adapt” (Casanova 1994: 15).  
The question of how religion responds to the structural trend of modern 
secularization has been addressed by many eminent Western scholars. I 
suppose, the quintessential conclusion we can draw from this extended 
debate is as follows: Secularization allows religion to become increasingly 
independent from the secularizing society, concentrate on the internal 
dynamics, and intensify its essentialistic self-identification. To substantiate 
my presumption, I rely on the accounts provided by Weber, Taylor, and 
Casanova.  
In his extensive study on sociology of religion, Weber brilliantly analyzed 
the complex process of internal transformation that religion undergoes 
when adapting to the conditions of secularization. His theory surpasses the 
boundaries of methodological sociologism, for it incisively exhibits not only 
the external societal processes accompanying the process of secularization, 
but also the internal transformations that religion undergoes under the 
conditions of secularization. With an immaculate precision, Weber revealed 
that secularization emerged in the modern West as the result of religious-
ethical rationalization, which is typical of religion in general and of Western 
Christianity in particular. Religion’s withdrawal from the secular sphere into 
its own separate sphere had been determined long ago before Western 
society started to secularize. In the chapter ‘Sociology of Religion’ of his 
Economy and Society, Weber stipulated the significant transformation of the 
nature of religion, which occurred when religion abandoned its original 
magical form and started to assume a form of prophetic religion. 
Historically, this transformation occurred already in the religion of Judaism 
and later became the prevailing trend in the Judeo-Christian civilization.  
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In contrast to magic, prophetic religion is free from primordial magical 
irrationality. Religion becomes prophetic when it overcomes the permanent 
existential uncertainty and liberates the world from the magical spell by 
getting as close as possible to the comprehension of the world as a 
meaningful totality. According to Weber, certain leading representatives of 
prophetic religion successfully accomplished this task by establishing “a 
unified view of the world derived from a consciously integrated meaningful 
attitude toward life.” In this sense, Weber clarifies, “to the prophet, both the 
life of man and the world, both social and cosmic events, have a certain 
systematic and coherent meaning, to which man’s conduct must be 
patterned in an integrally meaningful manner” (Weber 1978: 450). 
Consequently, as soon as prophetic religion had conceived of the world as a 
meaningful totality, it started organizing practical behavior of people toward 
an ordered social life. Thereby, religion contributed to eliminating of taboos 
and stereotyping of social relations (Weber 1978: 406).  
However, Weber recognizes that religion’s stabilization and 
stereotypization of social relations produced an unpredictable outcome. By 
rationally systematizing practical behavior, religion promoted a more 
rigorous spiritual self-discipline, thereby making the reality of social life 
more controllable and explicable. In result, society became able to maintain 
an established rationalized ethical code of behavior and acquire more self-
management and self-sustenance. Weber depicts this process in a more 
sophisticated way in the chapter ‘Zwischenbetrachtung,’ which is part of his 
Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie:  
Denn die Rationalisierung und bewusste Sublimierung der Beziehungen des 
Menschen zu den verschiedenen Sphären äußeren und inneren, religiösen 
und weltlichen, Güterbesitzes drängte dann dazu: innere 
Eigengesetzlichkeiten der einzelnen Sphären in ihnen Konsequenzen 
bewusst werden und dadurch in jene Spannungen zueinander geraten zu 
lassen, welche der urwüchsigen Unbefangenheit der Beziehung zur 
Außenwelt verborgen blieben (Weber 1988: 541-42). 
Once organized, society became capable of sustaining and explaining 
itself without a direct appeal to the rational system of religious concepts. 
Accordingly, it became gradually independent from the cohesive and 
explanatory power of religion as well. It is the moment when society 
became aware of its independence from religion and its self-reflexive 
capacity that we can signify, relying on Weber, as the origin of the 
secularization process. Whereas religion attempts at a “conception of the 
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world as a meaningful totality, which is based on the religious postulate” 
(Weber 1978: 451), modern social order is permeated by considerations of 
efficiency, bureaucracy, and proceduration; hence, it is indifferent to 
considerations of substantive commitment and internal value. With the rise 
of the Western type of modern society, religion, due to its “metaphysical-
ethical rationalism,” can no longer sustain its central position in the social 
order and transforms from a once all-encompassing social system into a 
mere subsystem of the all-compassing system of complex, highly 
differentiated, self-regulating, and self-sustaining modern society.  
Under the circumstances of secularization, religion seeks to renew its 
self-identity by appealing to its inherent capacity of mediating between 
transcendence and immanence. In doing so, religion adjusts to modern 
secularization, as Weber explains, by means of moving from a previous 
legalistic-conventional form toward a more reflexive and ethicized form. In 
this sense, Weber characterizes modern religion as an ethic of inner 
conviction – Gesinnungsethik. He explains, “An inner religious faith does not 
recognize any sacred law, but only a ‘sacred inner religious state’ that may 
sanction different maxima of conduct in different situations, and which is 
thus elastic and susceptible of accommodation” (Weber 1978: 578). 
Notwithstanding his positive belief in religion’s capacity of 
transformation, Weber remains somber when recounting the ways in which 
religion adapts to the process of functional differentiation. He is particularly 
anxious about the unrelenting conflict between the ethicized loftiness of the 
religious doctrine and the functional profanity of the world. To more 
religion approaches Gesinnungsethik, the greater its conflict with the secular 
world becomes. The more sterile a codex of religious convictions is, the 
more irreconcilable religion’s schism with the world is. This is due to the 
fact that the world appears increasingly illogical from the perspective of 
religious metaphysical-ethical rationality. Weber elucidates that “with the 
increasing systematization and rationalization of social relationships and of 
their substantive contents,” the primary task of religion, i.e. explaining the 
consequences of theodicy, becomes substituted by “the struggles of 
particular autonomous spheres of life against the requirements of religion.” 
With that, the enduring tension between religion and the secular world is 
rather perceptible in ethical terms, “To the extent that a religious ethic 
organizes the world from a religious perspective into a systematic, rational 
cosmos, its ethical tensions with the social institutions of the world are likely 
to become sharper and more principled.” This is, Weber maintains, “the 
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more true the more the secular spheres (Ordnungen) are systematized 
autonomously” (Weber 1978: 578-79). Hence, we cannot but draw a 
dubious conclusion from Weber’s account. On the one hand, he suggests an 
inspiring insight that the process of secularization instigates a re-
identification of modern religion in the direction of enhanced reflexivity and 
ethicization. Assuming reflexive and individualistic forms, modern religion 
becomes able to adjust to the structural complexity of modern differentiated 
society. On the other hand, Weber remains precautious and critical of the 
established trend of secularization, as it aggravates the schism between 
sublime ethical rationality of religion and functionalistic rationality of 
modern efficiency-oriented society.  
The discussion on the dialectics between religion, especially in its 
modern form of Gesinnungsethik, and secularism has been reinvoked in the 
works of Taylor and Casanova. The scholars refute simplistic 
understandings of secularization as a one-direction process. For instance, 
Casanova distinguishes three meanings of modern secularization. In the first 
and most widely-accepted sense, secularization can be conceived as 
differentiation of the secular spheres from religious institutions and norms. 
In the second sense, secularization can be conceived as decline of religious 
beliefs and practices. Finally, in the third sense, secularization can be 
conceived as marginalization of religion to a privatized sphere, i.e. as 
privatization of religion (Casanova 1994: 211). Taylor concedes that 
although these three processes are indeed observable in the modern West, 
none of them, either the decline of personal religious belief, or the 
institutional changes associated with the retreat of religion from the public 
space, constitutes the main driving force of secularization. The scholar 
correctly refutes the popular conceptions of secularization because they 
tend to depict the process of secularization as singularly leading “to a 
diversity of relative autonomous subsystems (the economy, politics, science, 
etc.) that took many facets of social life out of the purview of the church 
institutions.” On such a simplified view, “the waning of belief is simply 
presented as a value-indifferent consequence of institutional complexity,” 
whereby religion, loosing its overarching framework, becomes “simply 
another parallel subsystem” (Taylor 2003: 78). According to Taylor, this is 
not an exhaustive and plausible conception of secularization process.   
To mend the one-sidedness of the criticized theory, Taylor introduces a 
moral framework, within which one could properly perceive “the spiritual 
and moral force of secularization.” The scholar is convinced that 
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“secularization is not so much as process that has developed on neutral 
epistemic or institutional changes, but rather on moral and spiritual 
grounds.” On Taylor’s account, the process of secularization sets in when 
people start to realize that there are alternative moral sources, such as reason 
or moral sentiments, beyond God, to make sense of people’s moral 
predicament. The scholar associates this realization with the impact of the 
Reformation, in the course of which “the locus of religion became identified 
with the individual experience, and not with corporate life.” At the same time, 
“the stress on the inner commitment together with a rejection of external 
conformity made it possible that religious traditions became fragile and 
contested” (Taylor 2003: 79). Accordingly, within a modernizing and 
secularizing society, religion approaches what Taylor denotes as “ethics of 
authenticity,” which conceptually resembles Weberian Gesinnungsethik.  
Taylor’s ethics of authenticity introduces a modern kind of individualism, 
which enables each individual to redefine his individual originality 
independently from any model imposed from the outside – by society, 
religious authority, or tradition. The very possibility of retaining one’s 
individual religious identity in the form of ethics of authenticity is 
preconditioned by the distinctively modern structural shift from 
“hierarchical, mediated-access societies to horizontal, direct-access 
societies.” If the hierarchical society was structured on the dichotomy 
between the sacred and the secular, the modern type of society “came about 
by a process where the vertical and hierarchical orientation slowly 
transformed into a horizontal order without an explicit place for the 
sacred.” In secular modernity, Taylor explains, “society became structured 
around a more horizontal social imaginary in which God’s presence is not in 
the sacred, but in the form of a providential design that affects everyone in 
the same way. The divine is not longer located in the priest of the king, but 
instead resides in the design that structures the whole society” (Taylor 2003: 
79-80). God’s actual presence in the world has been substituted by the idea 
of moral order established by God. In consequence, the sacred hierarchy is 
destroyed, and society becomes structurally reconfigured as a society 
“without a top and without a center,” to use Luhmann’s unbeaten exposé 
(Luhmann 1990: 16). 
If Taylor suggests that religion transforms, under the conditions of 
modern secularization, toward the “ethics of authenticity,” Casanova 
believes that modern religion can attain a legitimate form in the secular 
public sphere if it embraces the principles of liberalism and individualism. 
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Casanova explicates that insofar as religion assumed in modern society “a 
less central and spatially diminished sphere within the new secular system,” 
it became able, for the first time, to fully specialize in its own religious 
function by either dropping or losing “many other ‘nonreligious’ functions 
it had accumulated and could no longer meet efficiently” (Casanova 1994: 
21). However, the twist of modern religion consists in that it became 
capable, while remaining “structured around its own autonomous internal 
axis,” to discover new ways of realizing its potential as a public religion. On 
this view, Casanova insists that the theory of secularization should be 
“complex enough to account for the historical ‘contingency’ that there may 
be legitimate forms of ‘public’ religion in the modern world, which have a 
political role to play which is not necessarily that of ‘positive’ societal 
integration; that there may be forms of ‘public’ religion which do not 
necessarily endanger modern functional differentiation; and that there may 
be forms of ‘public’ religion which allow for the privatization of religion and 
for the pluralism of subjective religious beliefs” (Casanova 1994: 39).  
Hence, even when differentiated from the main secular institutions and 
norms, confined to the private sphere and suffering general decline, modern 
religion still can assume a legitimate public form. Casanova defines the 
process whereby religion acquires its legitimate public form as “the process 
of deprivatization of religion.” The prerequisite for such deprivatization of 
religion is that religion accepts the principles of individualism and liberalism. 
Only when perceived as an individual choice motivated by considerations of 
“metaphysical-ethical” rationalism, religion can assume a legitimate place in 
pluralistic modern society. On this view, the following question is whether 
religion can assume a public form without inflicting upon the principle of 
individual freedom – the principle that is pivotal to liberal democratic polity.   
 
4.1.3 Religion in the Context of Secular Liberal Democracy 
 
The problem of positioning religion in a system of modern liberal 
democracy gets at the root of what Robert Audi called in his study Religious 
Commitment and Secular Reason “one of the greatest challenges to both the 
theory and the practice of democracy.” This is because the mentioned 
problem pertains to the question “how to balance the competing forces that 
tend to arise from the pursuit of its two central ideals” of liberal democracy, 
namely the ideal of freedom and the ideal of equality (Audi 2000: 5). In 
other words, we are challenged to define the conditions under which it is 
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possible to sustain the ideal of equality without undermining the ideal of 
individual freedom and without infringing the principle of basic political 
equality. With regard to religious policy, I restate the question as how to 
give freedom to every form of expression of individual religious belief 
without creating a (politically provoked) situation of inequality among 
public forms of expressing one’s religious belief. 
Addressing this question, I want to re-emphasize Taylor’s defense of the 
principle of secularism as the political principle of neutrality in the 
framework of a liberal democratic state. He asserts, “Secularism in some 
form is a necessity for the democratic life of religiously diverse societies,” 
for it enables the voice of the minority to really penetrate the public debate 
and fully participate in self-rule. On such consideration, Taylor warns 
against the temptation “to build the common identity around the things that 
strongly unite people, and these are frequently ethnic or religious identities” 
(Taylor 1999: 46). The danger arises when “the very functional requirement 
of a democratic ‘people’ that seems to make secularism indispensable can be 
turned around and used to reject it.” In the end, he concludes, “the logic of 
non-secular or exclusionary regimes in the democratic age is frightening,” 
which makes secularism for a civilized coexistence of diverse groups “not 
optional in the modern age” (Taylor 1999: 48). 
Nevertheless, if we agree with Taylor that secularism is not optional in 
the context of secular liberal democracy, we still need to explain how a 
liberal democratic state can behold its secular nature and simultaneously 
recognize freedom of religion, which is for liberal democracy “a central 
value to be preserved” (Audi 2000: 31). Trying to resolve this problem, Audi 
proposes a number of conditions under which religion can assume a 
legitimate public place in the liberal democratic order. These conditions 
include the institutional separation between Church and state, and the 
principle of ecclesiastical political neutrality. Let us consider these 
conditions in more detail. 
On Audi’s account, the institutional separation between Church and 
state prescribes the way in which government institutions should relate to 
religious organizations, namely on the grounds of three basic principles 
(Audi 2000: 31). First, the libertarian principle, or the principle of tolerance 
means that the state must permit the practice of any religion, unless a 
religion poses threats to citizens’ life or public health. Second, the egalitarian 
principle (or the principle of impartiality), requires that the state may not give 
preference to one religion over another. Third, the principle of neutrality 
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precludes governmental favoritism by prohibiting the state to give positive 
or negative preference to institutions or persons because of their religious or 
secular background (Audi 2000: 32-33). Audi’s argument becomes feasible if 
we attend to the religious policy in post-Soviet Russia. The egalitarian 
principle warns, “If the state prefers one or more religions, its people might 
well find it hard to practice another or would at least feel pressure to adopt 
or give preferential treatment to the (or a) religion favored by the state. The 
degree of pressure would tend to be proportional to the strength of 
governmental preference” (Audi 2000: 35). If the egalitarian principle 
requires the state’s neutrality among religions, the neutrality principle calls for 
state neutrality toward religion. Put differently, the neutrality principle 
precludes governmental discrimination between religious and non-religious 
citizens by means of allowing religious arguments to exert influence on 
legislation and policy concerning religion (Audi 2000: 37-40). If government 
favors one particular religion, mostly in the form of an established Church, 
the tendentious concentration of power in this specific religious group 
would threaten religious freedom of other believers and non-believers. 
Hence, it would preclude the voice of minorities to be heard at the level of 
legislation, as well as at the level of public debate.  
This is particularly true in the case of post-Soviet Russia where the 
Russian Orthodox Church (henceforth: the ROC) is the religion of the 
overwhelming majority of the population. The question how the Russian 
state, which is constitutionally polyconfessional, defines its relationship with 
the dominant religious group represented by the ROC will be addressed 
further (in section 6.1). 
So far, we have considered the normative prescriptions for regulating 
religious polity in a liberal democratic state. Now, we need to consider the 
problem from the opposite angle and depict how the Church should 
coordinate its relations with the secular state. Audi tentatively suggests the 
principle of ecclesiastical political neutrality as a partial solution to the problem of 
how best to understand the role of churches in a democratic policy. This 
principle requires churches to abstain from supporting candidates for public 
office or pressing laws that would restrict religious or other basic liberties. 
Audi insists, “For many of the same reasons why the state should not 
interfere in religion, churches should not interfere in government.” 
Accordingly, if churches abstain from political action, the very protection of 
religious liberty and of governmental neutrality could be better served (Audi 
2000: 41-42). Moreover, churches have a prima facie obligation to be 
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politically neutral as this very principle “may also protect the integrity of 
religious institutions themselves.” In supporting a free and democratic 
society, religious institutions should exert their influence by functioning as a 
counterpoise to political authority and should provide a major alternative to 
secular institutions in the competition for citizens’ loyalty. The scholar 
concludes that in order to exercise their positive role churches should be 
independent from both the state and secular institutions “in matters of 
value,” and further be “vigilant toward the abuse of power and supportive 
of individuality among citizens” (Audi 2000: 49-50). Indeed, Audi claims 
that the principle of ecclesiastical political neutrality guarantees the Church’s 
independence with regard to values and norms.  
In the normative model of liberal democracy, as depicted by Audi, the 
differentiation between the spheres of politics and religion is necessitated by 
the constitutionally protected citizens’ rights. In a strong constitutional 
framework, both religion and politics, instead of pursuing the interests of a 
particular church or of a political clan, should stay focused on the two 
fundamental commitments of democracy defined by Audi as “the freedom 
of citizens” and “their basic political equality.” Such a developed 
constitutional framework is the outcome of a vibrant civil society, whereby 
potentially conflictual political, religious, and secular considerations are 
openly discussed and resolved.  
 
4.1.4 The Phenomenon of Religious Fundamentalism 
 
In the above, we have argued that secularism is needed by the liberal 
democratic system as the regulative principle for a multicultural and 
polyconfessional state. Now, we are challenged to consider a situation in 
which secularism is interpreted as a coherent ideology. In this case, as many 
scholars claim, secularism is liable to provoke a radicalized reaction on the 
part of religion, expressed in the form of religious fundamentalism. The 
phenomenon of religious fundamentalism has become a pertinent problem 
for contemporary secular societies and therefore needs a more detailed 
examination. In what follows, I want to explore the origin and the 
ideological core of religious fundamentalism. In that way, I shall try to 
explain which role and place religious fundamentalist movements acquire in 
contemporary secular societies, and how these organizations manage to 
retain the acquired role and place.  
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Pertaining to the origin of religious fundamentalism, I share the opinion 
of those scholars who understand the phenomenon of religious 
fundamentalism as a typical spin-off of the general secularization process 
that occurs in modern societies. For instance, the British scholar and former 
Catholic nun Karen Armstrong compellingly argues in her comprehensive 
study The Battle for God that religious fundamentalism is essentially a reaction 
to the secular scientific rationalism of modernity. The scholar traces the 
genesis of the phenomenon of fundamentalism in the context of modern 
culture, demonstrating how fundamentalism emerged in the modern West 
as a global response to the scientific and secular culture. Religious 
fundamentalists erroneously identify modernization with inexorable 
secularization, in the sense that modernization inevitably leads toward total 
banishment of religion from the secularized world. Armstrong averts, “The 
fundamentalist movements that have evolved in our day have a symbiotic 
relationship with modernity. They may reject the scientific rationalism of the 
West, but they cannot escape it” (Armstrong 2000: xi-xii). Although 
fundamentalists may seem anti-modern because they adopt a novel 
stringency in their observance of traditional religious rites, they do not 
intend, nonetheless, to revise the modernization process. Instead, they try to 
make sense of their religious views in the changing context of 
modernization. In contradistinction to the privatization of religion in the 
individualized form (like Weber’s ethicization, Taylor’s ethics of 
authenticity, Casanova’s thesis of religion’s functional specialization and 
Audi’s insistence on political neutrality), the sectarian reaction of religion to 
the process of secularization is expressed in the form of the political 
privatization of religion.  
On this view, Armstrong astutely perceives “the fundamentalist rebellion 
against the hegemony of the secular” as “an attempt to relocate modernity 
within the ambit of the sacred.” Thereby, fundamentalists aspire to bring 
“God back into the political realm from which he had been excluded” when 
a secular constitution was adopted (Armstrong 2000: 369). That is the 
reason why fundamentalists consistently reject the modern differentiation 
between the secular and religious realms, between state and Church, and try 
to re-create the lost wholeness based on a theonomic worldview. 
As we have learnt from the analysis of state-church relations in a secular 
democratic polity, the principle of secularism presumes the separation of 
Church and state, so that, as Keane explains, “citizens be emancipated from 
state and ecclesiastical diktat” and thus be “free to believe or to worship 
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according to their conscience and ethical judgments.” In essence, the secular 
principle of religious freedom creates the necessary preconditions for an 
open and tolerant civil society. On the other hand, the same principle of 
religious freedom requires more than a tolerant attitude: It requires what 
Keane denotes as “religious indifference.” It is the secularist requirement of 
religious indifference that contradicts the nature of religious faith as 
proclaiming the truth. Accordingly, religious associations can take advantage 
of the secularist attitude of indifference and neutrality in the context of a 
free democratic society. Keane clarifies, “The implied agnosticism and 
potential atheism of secularism is a godsend to religious believers” because 
it justifies their battle against the perceived decline of religion in modern 
society (Keane 2000: 12). In secular society, fundamentalist movements 
constitute the “campaign to re-sacralize society” (Armstrong 2000: 370). 
The crux of the changing balance between sacralization and secularization is 
insightfully summarized by Keane in the formula, “when God dies, it can be 
said, atheism dies and so God is reborn” (Keane 2000: 12).  
According to the fundamentalist vision, the political-ethical ideal of 
tolerance and neutrality is regarded as an anti-religious attitude and thus the 
one to be fought. Such a belligerent attitude conceals the tensions inherent 
in fundamentalism. First, fundamentalist “theologies and ideologies are 
rooted in fear” because, as Armstrong explains, “the repression has bitten 
deeply into the souls of those who have experienced secularization as 
aggressive, and has wrapped their religious vision, making it violent and 
intolerant in turn” (Armstrong 2000: 368). Second, fundamentalist 
movements, representing what Keane calls “the contemporary rebirth of 
God through protest,” assume a visible public form in secular societies. The 
intrinsic tension acquires then a broad public outburst. The religious zeal 
reorganizes the whole life of religious believers, making them confess their 
private belief before others in public spectacles, forums, ceremonies, etc. 
The noticeable outburst of religious fundamentalism in post-Soviet Russia 
can be seen as evidence of how religious believers can misuse 
constitutionally protected freedom of (religious) associations. Certainly, this 
case is not endemic only in Russia. As Keane confirms, “Such public 
affirmations of religious ethics […] are nowadays commonplace in open 
societies” (Keane 2000: 12). Possibly, public demonstrations of private 
religious and moral tensions are inevitable reactions to secularizing civil 
societies.  
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The view that religious fundamentalism should be considered in 
connection with modern culture is shared also by the Russian contemporary 
sociologist of religion and philosopher Konstantin Kostjuk. In his study 
‘Orthodox Fundamentalism: A Social Portrait and the Sources,’35 Kostjuk 
asserts that fundamentalism is not constructive but in one respect – namely 
in its insurmountable conflict with soulless modernity wherein it functions 
as an appeal for spiritual awakening and regeneration (Kostjuk 2000a). It is 
against the background of modernity perceived by religious fundamentalists 
as a process of enhancing secularization, accompanied by the loss of 
traditional values and norms, a decreasing interest for any sort of spirituality 
and general moral relaxation, that the fundamentalist positive counter-
reaction to modernity generates so much appeal to doubting and searching 
individuals.  
Through battling the feared atheism of secular modernity, religious 
fundamentalism embodies an attempt at compensating existential 
uncertainty in the context of modern differentiated and pluralized society, 
i.e. Gesellschaft. Keane contends in this respect that secularizing societies are 
indeed liable “to replace religiosity with existential uncertainty” and thus to 
provoke “the return of the sacred.” Thereby, he relates the return of the 
sacred in everyday life of modern individuals to the structural complexity of 
modern differentiated society, “Modern civil societies, ideal-typically 
conceived, comprise multiple webs of ‘fluid’ social institutions whose 
dynamics and complexity prevent citizens from fully comprehending, let 
alone grasping the social totality within which they are born, grow to 
maturity and die” (Keane 2000: 12). Indeed, in modern differentiated 
Gesellschaft, which Luhmann characterized as “a society without a top and 
without a center” (Luhmann 1990: 16), we, modern individuals, are bound 
to search for meaning in the multiplicity of various rationalities. We are 
bound to search for a haven of certainly and steadfastness in the ever-
changing environment, as we are bound to search for answers in the 
kaleidoscope of metaphysical puzzles. No wonder, some individuals cannot 
stand the pressure of metaphysical uncertainty and resort to the unfading 
explanatory and healing power of religion, which is especially ‘well-
presented’ in the fundamentalist credo. On this view, I cannot but share 
Armstrong’s conception of fundamentalism as “the battle for God” meant 
                                               
35 Константин Костюк, «Православный фундаментализм: Социальный портрет и истоки» 
// Полис – Политические исследования (№ 5, 2000). Internet publication, last visited on 17 
September 2010. 
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“to fill up the void at the heart of a society based on scientific rationalism” 
(Armstrong 2000: 370). 
In addition to the feeling of metaphysical uncertainty provoked by 
modern pluralization, secularization, and differentiation of society, we can 
also recall that a liberal democratic order, however liberal and serviceable it 
can be to its citizens, does not protect them from a complex of social-
economic and personal problems, which sharpen emotions of frustration, 
stress, and uncertainty. According to Keane, the persistent awareness of 
uncertainty makes people “prone to stress and confusion and hence prone 
to involvement in shock-absorbing institutions, of which churches, sects, 
and crusades remain leading examples, especially in times of personal crisis” 
(Keane 2000: 12-13).  
Religious communities retain certain elements of Gemeinschaft in the 
context of modern Gesellschaft, which allows those communities to function, 
upon Keane’s characterization, as shock-absorbing mechanisms in a secular 
society. Keane concedes that religious organizations cannot only serve as 
“living reminders of the importance of solidarity among the shaken,” but 
also, through appealing to the repertoire of traditional values, they can help 
“to keep open individuals’ emotional channels to reservoirs of morality.” 
What makes religious communities even comparable to the Gemeinschaft 
structures is their capacity to offset boredom and isolation in the 
differentiated modern Gesellschaft. Religion provides answers to the 
continuous metaphysical quest of modern individuals. It allows people to 
surpass the secular dimension of time and participate in the drama of 
eternity. As Keane has formulated it, religious intuition “heightens the sense 
of mysterious importance of life’s rites of passage by baptizing such events 
as birth, marriage and death in the waters of theological time, thereby 
reminding mortal human beings, existentially speaking, that life is an 
inevitable defeat.” Religious belief allows human beings to conceive of the 
empirical reality as just one realization of a primordial order of existence 
and thus to experience “the feeling of awe and absolute dependence upon 
this larger order which is thought to be anterior to human reflection, speech 
and interaction” (Keane 2000: 13). 
Religious fundamentalism can be said to exploit the experience of 
existential uncertainty, and it does so by proposing a clear-cut religious 
credo to battle the feared atheism of the secular world. In this sense, it 
radically refutes any sublimated and individualized forms of religious 
sentiment. Fundamentalism radicalizes the religious doctrine by employing 
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the mechanisms of doctrinal reductionism and intolerance. It rejects 
modern secularism and advocates instead “a theonomic worldview,” which 
envisages the world as having foundations in the supreme law of God. 
Therefore, “the metaphysics of theonomy” produce a syncretical and even 
mystical experience of the totality of being and of the almightiness of God’s 
providence. According to the fundamentalist theonomic formula, the whole 
creation is in the sovereign power of God who is the only absolute source 
of all wisdom, good, and morality. Kostjuk regards the theonomic 
worldview as “strictly monistic.” He comments, “The more straightforward 
this monism is, the more radical Manichean dualism is,” which allows 
fundamentalists to visualize the mundane world as a mere mirror reflection 
of the eternal kingdom regulated by the divine law, yet, an essentially bad 
and corrupted reflection. For instance, Kostjuk argues, Orthodox 
fundamentalism promotes in present-day Russia such postulates as 
theocentrism, piety, loyalty to the church tradition and scriptures, virtue 
morality, chastity, and, above all, a comprehensible and sufficient 
explanation of the world by the antagonistic categories of good and evil, 
truth and lie (Kostjuk 2000a). 
It is also typical that the dualistic view presupposes a static and 
mythologized conception of the world order. Fundamentalists conceive of 
both the mundane world and the kingdom of absolute good as completed 
and hence explicable in mythologized terms. Kostjuk compellingly 
demonstrates that it is easy indeed “to reveal in fundamentalism its 
irrationalist and anti-intellectualist mind-set, which a priori precludes any 
potential reflection on foundational principles” (Kostjuk 2000a). 
In essence, through upholding the theonomic worldview, 
fundamentalism safeguards its religious credo from any attempts at rational 
reflection. However, as we can recall from Weber’s theory of increasing 
rationalization, the dynamics of modernity is determined by rationalization 
and critical reflection. On this view, fundamentalist anti-reflexive tendency 
contradicts the very core of modernity. Fundamentalism represents the 
collection of remaining archaic elements of modernity and thereby displaces 
itself from the main trend of differentiation. This constitutes the role of 
fundamentalism: It gives a concrete location and expression to archaic 
elements that still remain in the reflexive and dynamic texture of modern 
society. That is why Kostjuk typifies religious fundamentalism as “a 
dysfunction of modern culture” (Kostjuk 2000a). 
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Despite, or exactly due to its anti-reflexive nature, fundamentalism 
retains a great psychological-emotional appeal under the conditions of 
existential uncertainty. This presumption also corroborates Keane’s thesis of 
the return of the sacred. As it has become clear from the above discussion, 
religious fundamentalism remains appealing to modern individuals because 
modernity produced permanent existential anxiety. Kostjuk explains, relying 
on D. Funke, why the epochs of affective and cognitive uncertainty typically 
trigger the archaic forms of security instead of encouraging individuals’ 
capacity for independent maturing. The fundamentalist trouble-free formula 
of the theonomic cosmos is suitable to compensate the loss of trust in the 
future. In result, a fundamentalist community becomes the magnetic center 
for psychologically unstable individuals, who see there a possibility of their 
own adaptation and find a great number of those who share their views 
(Kostjuk 2000a). Concisely, fundamentalism emerges as a shelter from all 
anxiety caused by, in the sociological parlance of Anthony Giddens, the 
“disembedment of social systems” (Giddens 1990: 115). 
The psycho-emotional appeal of religious fundamentalism is also 
enhanced by the typically modern pluralization of moral views. The rigorous 
traditional morality of fundamentalism is the reaction to the loosening 
moral censorship in secularizing and pluralistic societies. Kostjuk explicates 
this contrast in terms of a collision between two antagonistic ethoses: the 
ethos of an archaic society, which constitutes the core of fundamentalist 
moral teaching, and the ethos of a modern society, which builds upon the 
ideas of secularism and individualism. If archaic morality is mainly 
preoccupied with sexual-family problematics and aims at regulating the 
sexual life of an individual, the ethos of modern secular society ensues from 
the priority of individual and individual freedom. Kostjuk eloquently depicts 
the antagonism between these two ethoses as follows: 
If family morality is closed and prohibitive, oriented towards preclusion of 
social innovations and suppression of creativity, individual morality is, on 
the contrary, open and promoting creative innovations. If family morality is 
sacral-irrational, forbidding the individual to reflect on moral foundations, 
individual morality is secular-rational, i.e. modified by the individual and 
society according to the emerging problems and challenges. If family 
morality uses, when explaining the social order, such notions as taboo, 
myth, and ritual, individual morality substitutes those with the notions of 
self-restriction, communication, and right. In other words, individual 
morality does not suppress freedom as family morality does, but realizes it in 
an ethical way (Kostjuk 2000a). 
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Drawing these parallels, Kostjuk argues that the modern phenomenon of 
fundamentalism has foundations not in the system of cultural and religious 
values, but rather in the archaic-biological nature of a human being. The 
archetypes of fundamentalist morality are inherently close to the archetypes 
of family morality, and that is the reason why religious fundamentalism gets 
on extremely well with those secular political-social ideologies that support 
archaic family morality, such as communism and nationalism. The evidence 
for this alliance can be found in certain tendencies of social-religious life in 
contemporary Russia. 
By way of conclusion, we can assert that the greatest misinterpretation of 
religious fundamentalists consists in that they interpret modern secularism 
exclusively in terms of atheism and consequently “feel that they are battling 
against forces that threaten their most sacred values” (Armstrong 2000: xvi). 
Having originating as a force able to provide a considerable counterweight 
to secular modernity, fundamentalism chooses to use dialects of myth, 
taboo, and cult as entirely opposite to the logos-oriented scientific 
rationalism of Western modernity. The main difference between the liberal-
individualist ethos of civil society and the religious-fundamentalist ethos of 
archaic community consists in the divergent conceptions of individual 
freedom. If civil society accepts individual freedom to be realized in 
ethically responsible ways, archaic community fears and forbids individual 
freedom, imposing instead rigid family morality.  
 
4.2 Eastern Christianity and Secular Society in the History of 
Russia 
 
Having considered the dynamic relationship between modern secularism 
and Christianity in connection to the idea of civil society, I shall now 
concretize the general theoretical expertise by focusing on the history of 
secularization in Russia. I shall elucidate important milestones in the history 
of state-church relations with the intention of revealing the distinctively 
Eastern Christian attitude to the problem of secularization. Specifically, I 
shall examine how the secular state and the secular public sphere emerged in 
the history of Russia and which developments in political, ecclesiastical, and 
public life accompanied this complex process. Three historical landmarks 
will be considered: the impact of the Byzantine legacy on the political 
system of medieval Russia (§ 4.2.1), the establishment of a secular autocracy 
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during Peter’s rule (§ 4.2.2), and the liberalization of Russian society 
accompanied by the rise of the public sphere (§ 4.2.3).  
To start with, I want to stipulate two major factors that largely 
determined, in my view, the specificity of the secularization process in 
Russia. In the first place, state-church relations are usually conceptualized 
within the Eastern Christian tradition in terms of Byzantine symphonia. The 
model of Byzantine symphonia shaped the organization of political-
ecclesiastical life in the medieval Russia and thereby significantly affected 
the way in which the ROC conceived of itself in relation to the secular 
world. The second decisive factor refers to the dominant trend of 
modernization, which started with the reign of Peter the Great in the early 
eighteenth century and reached its summit in late imperial Russia, i.e. in the 
late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Being part of the overall 
modernization of the socio-political order, the process of secularization had 
an enormous impact on the self-perception of the ROC. As a result of the 
modernizing reforms, Russian Orthodoxy was confronted with the problem 
of secularization and challenged to act in response. 
The stipulated factors testify to the underlying tendency traceable 
through the history of secularization in Russia. As a rule, secularization in 
Russia was initiated by the state. The modernizing reforms, which were 
aimed at adjusting Russia to the West-European standards, were 
systematically undertaken in a top-down way, being sanctioned by the ruling 
elite. Hence, it would not be an exaggeration to assert that the government’s 
reforms frequently assumed an enforced character, whereby the broad strata 
of Russian society (peasants, clergy, professionals, merchants, etc.) 
functioned as passive recipients of the reforms. Thus, the process of 
secularization in Russia pertains in a much lesser degree, as it was the case in 
Western Europe, to the problematic relationship between an independent 
secularizing society and the Church. In Russia, alternatively, the 
secularization process gets to the core of the troubled relationship between 
the state and the Church, or, more specifically, between the secular ruler and 
the head of the Church. Doubtlessly, the inextricable link between those 
two powerful institutions was aggravated by the fact that Russian state had 
been for centuries, since Russia’s Christianization in 988 until the Bolshevik 
revolution in 1917, a confessional state, where the ROC, as embodying the 
faith of the majority, had enjoyed the privileged position.  
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4.2.1 The Theocratic Legacy of Byzantine Symphonia 
 
The model of symphonia36 was imported to Kievan Rus’ in the late tenth 
century after the grand duke of Kiev Vladimir was baptized in 988 
according to the Byzantine Christian tradition.37 Implementing the model of 
symphonia, the Christianized Russian state adopted the Eastern Christian 
view on how the Church should relate to the secular world. This view 
determined the subsequent history of state-church relations in Russia. It also 
affected the way in which Russian Orthodoxy accommodated the idea of 
secular society.  
Although the concept of symphonia was for the first time clearly 
formulated in the sixth century in the Codex of Emperor Justinian,38 the 
deep ideological foundation of the concept can be traced back to the period 
of Christianization of the Roman Empire in the early fourth century A.D. 
The Christianization is generally associated with the miraculous conversion 
and baptism of Emperor Constantine (272-337), which led consequently to 
the Edict of Milan of 313. The meaning of the Edict of Milan consisted in 
that it radically redefined the principle of religious freedom in the Roman 
Empire. In this respect, the eminent Orthodox theologian, a Russian émigré 
in the USA, Alexander Schmemann (1921-83) provokingly asks in his study 
The Historical Road of Eastern Orthodoxy, “What did this religious freedom 
mean? If Constantine, proclaiming it, had been inspired by the Christian 
idea that one’s religious convictions should be independent of the state, 
then why was it enforced for so short a time and then replaced by the 
unlimited and obligatory monopoly of Christianity, which destroyed all 
religious freedom?”39 (Schmemann 1963: 67). In Schmemann’s opinion, the 
                                               
36 The Russian analogue is симфония (simfonija). Given the Byzantine roots of the concept, I 
choose for the transliteration from the Greek συµφωνία.  
37 We should bear in mind that the metropolitan of ROC was, for the period of four and a half 
centuries (from 988 until 1448), invariably Greek, being appointed by the Greek Church. 
Accordingly, the model of symphonia served Greeks as a useful instrument to control the newly-
formed Russian state (Kievan Rus’), which had been previously a real military threat to the 
Byzantine Empire. The memory of Slavs’ military violence was still vital after the assaults of 
princes Oleg and Igor, in the early and mid tenth century.  
38  Specifically, in the sixth book Leges Novellae of the Codex. Later, in the ninth century, it became 
the pivotal concept for the Epanagogue, the Byzantine imperial law book. 
39 Half a century after the Edict of Milan, which proclaimed freedom of religion and thus 
abolished persecution of Christianity on the territory of the Roman Empire, Emperor 
Theodosius the Great issued the edict of 380, which declared Christianity the required faith and 
made it finally state religion. After 380, the Church was no longer a community of believers, but a 
community of those obliged to believe. In the established Christian theocratic state, citizens were 
brought to Christ not only by grace but also by law. 
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significance of Constantine’s conversion consisted in that it actually 
reinforced “the very nature of the ancient state, whose basic feature is a 
theocratic conception of itself” (Schmemann 1963: 110).40 On that account, 
it can be argued that Constantine’s conception of Christianity resided in the 
theocratic conception of the state. The emperor regarded religion primarily 
as “a state matter, because the state itself was a divine establishment, a 
divine form of human society” and, accordingly, the state as the ‘bearer’ 
religion because it “directly reflected and expressed the divine will for the 
world in human society” (Schmemann 1963: 69). In essence, Constantine’s 
conversion signified a new union between the state and Christianity, 
whereby the emperor brought his kingdom under the protection of Christ’s 
Church and expected in return the sanction that he had previously received 
from pagan gods. 
Constantine’s religious policy contributed to the situation, whereby “two 
logics, two faiths, the theocratic and the Christian, were interwoven in this 
ambiguous union which was to define the fate the Church in newborn 
Byzantium” (Schmemann 1963: 70). Schmemann perceives the fact that 
theocratic absolutism of the Roman Empire became an inseparable part of 
the Christian worldview as the greatest tragedy of Eastern Christendom, 
“The fact that the most Christian of all ideas in our world, that of the 
absolute value of human personality, has been raised and defended 
historically in opposition to the church community and has become a 
powerful symbol of the struggle against the Church” (Schmemann 1963: 
69). Concisely, Constantine’s religious policy laid the foundations for a 
subsequent structuring of the Byzantine Christian Empire according to the 
model of symphonia.  
The idea of symphonia became an official doctrine during the reign of 
Emperor Justinian (482-565), who is legitimately regarded as the first 
systematic ideologist of the Christian Empire. An excellent expert on 
Byzantine theology, a Russian émigré in the USA, John Meyendorff (1926-
92) reconstructs Justinian’s conception of symphonia in his theological 
writings. The model of symphonia prescribed that the secular ruler did not 
exercise unlimited authority, but shared responsibility with the head of the 
Church, in a symphonic alliance. The administration of the Byzantine 
                                               
40 The dominant role of the emperor in religious policy of the Roman Empire became painfully 
obvious in the schism of the Donatists in Africa, when Constantine issued an act without it being 
approved by the ecclesiastic hierarchs. Schmemann comments, “This was the first blow to the 
independence of the Church, and the distinction between it and the state became obscured” 
(Schmemann 1963: 68).   
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Empire was divided between the bishop of secular affairs (the Emperor) 
and the bishop of Church affairs (the Patriarch). Together, the two 
administrative organs constituted the greatest unity of the Empire’s 
existence. In fact, Justinian never distinguished the Roman state from the 
Christian Church and therefore sincerely believed that he was 
simultaneously the Roman Emperor and the Christian Emperor. In fact, 
this unity seemed to Justinian self-evident and indivisible. The Church and 
the state became inextricably dependent on each other: The state became 
dependent on the sacralizing power of the Church, whereas the Church 
expected protection by the state.  
The historical legacy of the model of symphonia consisted in obliterating 
the frontiers between the secular and the sacred, and in exposing state-
church relations as the summit of the unity between the Empire and the 
Christian religion (Meyendorff 1974: 214-15). In this respect, Kostjuk 
correctly characterizes symphonia in his study ‘The Social Doctrine as the 
Challenge of the Tradition and the Present Life of the ROC’41 as “a 
compromise between the Eastern tradition of sacralization of political 
power and the authentically Christian tradition of an independent Church” 
(Kostjuk 2003). On this view, the scholar compellingly argues that symphonia 
embodied a typically Eastern solution, a great synthesis, which eventually 
deprived both politics and religion of autonomy.  
Theologians discern in the model of symphonia even a greater threat. It 
was exactly the unity between the Empire and the Church that turned to be 
for Eastern Christianity “the fatal element.” This is because, as Schmemann 
rightly observes, the model of symphonia reserved “simply no place for the 
Church” (Schmemann 1963: 145-46). However, the situation when the 
ecclesiastical and the political communities are identical contradicts the 
essential Christian idea of the otherworldliness of the Church. Schmemann 
perceives this rejection of the true independent nature of the Christian 
Church as “the deepest of all the misunderstandings between the Church 
and the empire.” Although “the Roman state could accept the ecclesiastical 
doctrine of God and Christ comparatively easily as its official religious 
doctrine,” it could not fully recognize that the Church was a community 
distinct from itself. Eventually, “the religious absolutism of the Roman state 
                                               
41 Константин Костюк «Социальная доктрина как вызов традиции и современности РПЦ», 
доклад на конференции «Начало новой эры? – Социальная доктрина Русской 
Православной Церкви августа 2000 г.» (Mülheim, 19-20 febr. 2003). Internet publication, last 
visited on 28 July 2010. 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND RELIGION 
177 
 
 
and the emperor’s belief that he was the representative of God on earth” 
prevented the Byzantine state from acknowledging the Church’s ontological 
independence from the world (Schmemann 1963: 148).  
Instead, Justinian’s political views reinvigorated the theocratic 
conception of the pagan state, where religion performed a mere state 
function. Consequently, “the idea of the Church as a body or community 
had dropped out of sights and was replaced by or exchanged for that of the 
state.” The most important Christian idea of the Church’s genuine 
independence and otherworldliness was unambiguously renounced by 
Justinian’s symphonia. Since the adoption of the model of symphonia, as 
Schmemann astutely notices, “there is no longer a problem of Church and 
state, but only one of the relationship between two authorities, the secular 
and the spiritual, within the state itself” (Schmemann 1963: 151-52). 
Subsequently, the more the Church coincided with the Empire, the more 
state-church relations were redefined in terms of relations between the 
secular authority and the ecclesiastical hierarchy (Schmemann 1963: 149).  
Therefore, we can argue that Justinian misinterpreted the very truth 
about the world, which was proclaimed by Christianity. Schmemann 
corroborates, “the Church revealed to the world that there are only two 
absolute, eternal and sacred values: God and man, and that everything else, 
including the state, is first limited by its very nature – by belonging wholly 
only to this world […]. Hence a true postulate for a Christian world was not 
a merging of the Church with the state but, on the contrary, a distinction 
between them.” For Christianity, the state can be considered Christian only 
“to the extent that it does not claim to be everything for man – to define his 
whole life – but enables him to be a member as well of another community, 
another reality, which is alien to the state although not hostile to it” 
(Schmemann 1963: 151-52). Accordingly, the idea of the symphonic unity 
between Church and state as the unity between soul and body substituted 
the original Evangelic idea of the Church as the only true body of Christ. If 
the early Christian Church perceived itself as one body, a living organism, a 
new people, essentially incompatible with any other people or any other 
earthly community, the Church in Byzantium perceived itself no longer as 
the body, but rather the soul breathing life into the body of the Byzantine 
state. 
Nonetheless, the obliteration of the frontiers between the spiritual 
community of the Church and the political community of the state did not 
totally distort the foundations of Byzantine ecclesiology. On the contrary, 
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the obliteration of the borders strengthened the Church’s self-conception in 
essentialistic terms and invigorated theological reflection on how Christians 
should live under the conditions of the symphonic secular-divine synthesis. 
Schmemann comments, “The coincidence between these two communities 
meant, however, that from the time of Christianization of the Empire the 
boundary between the Church and the world had gradually shifted from an 
external one, dividing Christian from pagan, to an inner one, within the 
Christian mind itself” (Schmemann 1963: 147). In Christian mind, however, 
there has always been a strict differentiation between two ontologically 
different communities: the Church as a spiritual community and as a natural 
community. In the history of the Orthodox Church, the awareness of this 
differentiation provided the foundation for the intrinsic dualism inherent in 
Orthodox ecclesiology and moral theology. The model of symphonia, instead 
of bringing the realm of the divine closer to the realm of the secular, 
produced an opposite result. It intensified the Orthodox perception of the 
ontological distinction between the Church and the world and contributed 
to the internal dualism whereby Orthodox Christianity relates to the secular 
world.42  
The unification of the political and ecclesiastical domains in the 
Byzantine state administration also resulted in the underdevelopment of the 
Byzantine ecclesiastical, or canon, law, which has been the object of many 
Western Christian critics. Notwithstanding the fact that the Byzantine 
Church did not provide itself with an elaborated and consistent canon law, 
it succeeded in defining itself as essentially a divine institution whose 
internal existence might never adequately be comprehended in juridical 
terms. According to the Orthodox patristic conception, “the Church was, 
first of all, a sacramental communion with God in Christ and the Spirit, 
whose membership – the entire body of Christ – is not limited to the earthly 
oikoumene where law governs society” (Meyendorff 1974: 79). Since there is 
no question of legislation in the heaven, legislation on earth had also a 
limited function. Insofar as Byzantine ecclesiastical lawyers realized that 
secular concepts of the juridical law were unable to exhaust the ultimate 
reality of the Church of God, they understood law as transitory and hence 
“subordinate to the more fundamental and divine nature of the Church, 
expressed in a sacramental and doctrinal communion, uniting heaven and 
earth” (Meyendorff 1974: 80). This trend testifies again to the Church’s 
                                               
42 The intrinsic dualism typical of Orthodox theology is also discussed with reference to Russian 
Orthodoxy in chapter six, in section 6.3. 
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deep inclination toward the essentialistic self-conception. On that account, 
the Orthodox Church can be legitimately claimed to be more concerned 
with its theological self-conception and internal dynamics than with a dialog 
with the secular world.  
The essentialistic character of the Byzantine theological tradition 
determined the specificity of Byzantine monasticism. Meyendorff clarifies 
that Byzantine monasticism had always opposed the theocratic pretensions 
of the Byzantine state and therefore prevented, to a certain degree, the 
identification of the Church with the empire, “which constantly tended to 
sacralize itself and to assimilate the divine plan of salvation to its temporal 
interests.” In the fourth century, a significant number of Christians 
disapproved of Christianity becoming an official state religion and left 
booming Constantinople for ascetic life in the dessert. In this sense, 
Meyendorff justly characterizes the monks as “the real witnesses of the 
Church’s internal independence.” Spread all over the Byzantine Empire and 
numbering thousands only in Constantinople itself, the monks acquired an 
enormous social and intellectual worth. In fact, ardent theological 
arguments frequently achieved the most elaborated form exactly within the 
monastery boundaries. These arguments resulted in the seven Ecumenical 
Councils of the Orthodox Church, the first held in 325 and the last in 787. 
The doctrinal rigorousness of the monks determined the general character 
of Byzantine theology as a monastic one. Meyendorff justly observes, “That 
Byzantine Christianity lacked what today would be called a ‘theology of the 
secular’ is largely the result of the predominant position of monasticism” 
(Meyendorff 1974: 6). On this view, the tradition of monasticism can be 
considered as an important factor in the increasing essentialistic self-
conception inherent in the Eastern Orthodox Church in general.  
The model of Byzantine symphonia became a standard program in Slavic 
countries. With the Christianization in 988, Kievan Rus’ adopted the 
Byzantine religious doctrine and policy.43 Due to the fact that the 
ecumenical Patriarch was not only an ecclesiastical, but also a state official, 
his secular function was expressed in the right to crown the emperor (a 
privilege dating back to the tenth century), and through the custom of his 
assuming the regency in case of need (Meyendorff 1974: 86). This principle 
of the Patriarch’s appointment as a state official was consequently 
                                               
43 The canon law in the ROC was regulated by the so-called Kormchaja Kniga, which was the Slavic 
translation of the Nomocanons written by John III Scholasticus, Patriarch of Constantinople (565-
577), during the reign of Emperor Justinian. 
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transported to Kievan Rus’. With that, as Schmemann poignantly observes, 
the Byzantine heritage “simultaneously poisoned the Slavic world with its 
theocratic mechanism, and fertilized it forever with the riches of its striving 
for Godmanhood” (Schmemann 1963: 269). Indeed, the path of Russia’s 
political and religious history reveals much of both theocratic pretensions of 
the Russian sovereigns and of the ardent struggle for attainting the ideal of 
Godmanhood (Bogochelovechestvo), instigated by the dualistic attitude to the 
world.44 
I endorse the view, shared by many experts in the field of Russian 
history, that the Mongol Yoke (1240-1480) signified a turning point in the 
history of the Russian state. This invasion divided Russian history into the 
pre-Mongol Kievan period, when the kingdom of Rus’ basically consisted of 
a number of independent feudal principalities, and the post-Mongol period 
of the centralized Muscovite Tsardom, when the political and ecclesiastical 
centers coincided again as it was the case in the Byzantine Empire. During 
the Kievan period, state-church relations were characterized by an active 
engagement of the Church in the life of society and by its relatively high 
independence from the political influence of the princes. This was possible 
because almost all metropolitans at that time were invariably appointed by 
the Patriarch of Constantinople and had Greek nationality. The Mongol 
invasion changed the politico-social and ecclesiastical structure of Kievan 
Rus’ dramatically. It instigated what Kostjuk calls the typically Eastern 
political centralization and the subsequent subjugation of all societal 
institutions, including the Church, to the central authority of the state 
(Kostjuk 2003).  
The period of the Muscovite Tsardom (XV-XVII cc.) is, in my opinion, 
an extremely dynamic and interesting period not only because of the newly 
established state-church relations, but also because of a vibrant theological 
debate. The centralization and empowerment of the Muscovite Tsardom 
began since Moscow became in 1325 the seat for both the Russian Prince 
and the Metropolitan. In 1448, the ROC gained its autonomy and national 
character when the first Russian hierarch Iona was ordained as 
                                               
44 The Orthodox concept of Godmanhood, which implies that the human being possesses two 
natures, the divine and the human, has turned crucial for the development of Russian Orthodox 
theological thought. I shall address the concept further in my study: § 4.3.3 provides a religious-
philosophical understanding of the concept pertaining to Frank’s theory of society; § 6.3.3 and § 
6.3.4 discuss the implication of the concept for the Russian Orthodox teaching on human rights 
and human dignity. Finally, § 6.4.2 is concerned with the revitalization of the concept in the 
religious dissidents’ and liberal Orthodox discourse on conscience and individual freedom.  
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Metropolitan. A century later, in 1589, the establishment of the institute of 
patriarchate completed the instigated nationalization of the ROC. Besides, 
the empowerment of the Muscovite Tsardom was promulgated by the 
developments in the international arena. Constantinople unsuccessfully tried 
to get military support from Rome for the price of theological concessions, 
which resulted in the Union of Florence in 1439. Eventually, the capital of 
the Byzantine Empire was captured in 1453 by the Ottoman Empire, and 
the Catholic Patriarch of the Eastern Orthodox Churches found himself in 
captivity. These events gave the necessary impulse to the development of 
the idea of Moscow as the third Rome. The architectural ensemble of the 
Moscow Kremlin, build at the end of the fifteenth century, can be 
considered as an embodiment of this idea in stone.  
With the establishment of the national Church and with an 
unprecedented centralization of political power in the hands of the 
sovereign, the medieval Russian Tsardom seemed fully prepared to adopt 
the model of Byzantine symphonia. However, the trans-historical realization 
of this experiment revealed the deep antagonism of this model. The political 
ruler continuously tried to claim its priority over the head of the Church. 
Thus, in 1666, the conflict between ambitious Patriarch Nikon and equally 
ambitious Tsar Aleksej Mikhajlovich exhibited the internal drama inherent 
in the model of symphonia. Consequently, the patriarch was deprived of his 
title and sent to banishment. The fact that the Byzantine model proved 
unsuitable for Muscovite Rus’ reveals, as Kostjuk rightly notices, that 
Russian governors started to emancipate from the sacralizing power of the 
Church and view this sacralizing power in purely programmatic terms 
(Kostjuk 2003). On this account, we can date the beginning of the process 
of secularization in Russia by the end of the seventeenth century.45 
 
4.2.2 The Holy Synod and the Idea of a Secular Autocratic State 
 
The church reform of Peter the Great46 (1721) instigated the process of 
secularization and thereby inaugurated the epoch of modernizing reforms in 
Russia. As a result of Peter’s reform, the institute of patriarchate was 
abolished and was replaced by the Holy Synod, which became the highest 
                                               
45 Kostjuk argues further that Russian tsars became aware of their secular power and sovereignty 
earlier than the rulers in Western Europe did. For this reason, he claims Russia to be “the 
historical leader of secularization” among other Christian countries (Kostjuk 2003).  
46 Peter the Great was born in 1672 and died in 1725. He was the tsar of Russia from 1682 to 
1725. 
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ecclesiastical council of the ROC. Such a drastic reorganization of the 
ecclesiastical administration signaled in the history of the ROC the 
beginning of the two-century Synodal period, lasting from 1700 until 1917.  
Peter’s church reform has had a deep impact on the relationship between 
the ROC and the secular state, being extensively discussed by many eminent 
ecclesiastical historians. Thus, the eminent Russian émigré theologian and 
historian Georgij Florovskij (1893-1979) insists in his renowned book Ways 
of Russian Theology that we should not underestimate Peter’s church reform, 
as it was not “an incidental episode” in the system of his modernizing 
reforms. Peter was not the first Westerner in Muscovite Russia at the end of 
the seventeenth century; instead, he was a successor of “the entire 
generation reared and educated in thoughts about the West.” In this sense, 
his “church reform constituted the principal and the most consequential 
reform in the general economy of the epoch: a powerful and acute 
experiment in state-imposed secularization” (Florovskij 1979: 114).  
In fact, Peter’s reform signaled not the beginning of Russia’s 
westernization, but rather the beginning of systematic controlled 
secularization. Anton Kartashëv47 (1875-1960), whom I consider one of the 
shrewdest analysts of Russian ecclesiastical history, concedes in The Essays on 
the History of the Russian Church48 that Peter ingeniously revealed the spirit and 
the worldview of a new modern Europe and symbolized for Russia the end 
of its medieval history. The most significant upshot of Peter’s instigated 
secularization consisted in that it substituted the previous model of 
Byzantine theocracy by the political model based on the ideas of Western 
humanism and laicism (Kartashëv 2000: 453). At the same time, as 
Florovskij correctly comments, Peter’s secularization caused “the great and 
genuine Russian schism” between Church and state. Precisely, “a certain 
polarization took place in Russia’s spiritual life. In the tension between the 
twin anchor points – secular life and ecclesiastical life – the Russian spirit 
stretched and strained to the utmost. Peter’s reform signified a displacement 
or even a rupture in Russia’s spiritual depths” (Florovskij 1979: 115).  
Kartashëv relates Peter’s decision to substitute the institute of 
patriarchate by “the non-orthodox and anti-canonical from of the college,” 
i.e. the Synod, to his traumatic experience as a child (Kartashëv 2000: 456). 
                                               
47 As an expert in the field of church history and theology, Kartashëv was appointed as the last 
chief procurator of the Holy Synod; after the Bolshevik revolution, he was the professor at the 
Orthodox Theological Institute in Paris. 
48 Антон Карташёв, Очерки по истории русской церкви, том II (2000 [1959]). 
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First, little Peter witnessed the aforementioned conflict between his father, 
Tsar Aleksej Mikhajlovich, and Patriarch Nikon. Second, at the age of ten, 
Peter survived the Strel’tsy revolt (1682), when ravaging strel’tsy (the 
shooters), a military subgroup loyal to the old-believers tradition, brutally 
stormed into the Kremlin in an attempt to usurp the Russian throne. Since 
then, Peter assumed a deep abhorrence toward everything associated with 
the old tradition that persevered in Moscow boyar houses and in the 
dispersed groups of old-believers. Trying to escape the traditional spirit of 
medieval Moscow, Peter founded in 1703 the new capital – St-Petersburg.  
Peter started the reform after the death of Patriarch Adrian in 1700. He 
delayed the appointment of a new candidate for two decades until the 
establishment of the Synod in 1721.49 Thereby, Peter obviously aimed “to 
disinfect the head of the local Church” (Kartashëv 2000: 456) and avoid a 
new potential conflict with the head of the ROC. In the meantime, Peter 
delegated the authority over the Church not to the canonical Church 
Council, but to the board of state officials appointed by the emperor 
himself. This board was called the Synod; it was headed by an unfamiliar 
and young Metropolitan Stefan Javorskij, whom Peter anti-canonically titled 
as the ‘exarch’.50  
The direction of the reform was clear for Peter. However, he was 
powerless to implement it in juridical and canonical terms because he could 
not find canonical foundations for his design either in the Eastern 
Orthodox or the Roman-Catholic Churches. For that reason, he turned to 
the experience of Western Europe51 with the intention to learn how the 
monarchical principle of Western Christian episcopate was broken by the 
Reformation. Insofar as the Protestant model supported primacy of the 
secular ruler over the head of the Church, it matched Peter’s idea. 
                                               
49 According to the canon law of the Orthodox Church, the leadership of the Church after the 
death of its patriarch is transferred to the ecclesiastic council, until the new patriarch is elected. 
50 According to the Orthodox canon law, the exarch can be appointed only by the patriarch and 
not by a secular ruler.  
51 Kartashëv presents interesting historical facts concerning Peter’s acquaintance with Western 
culture. Peter learnt much in the so-called Nemetskaja sloboda (the German neighborhood) located 
in South-East Moscow. At that time, all foreigners in Russia were called Germans. One of Peter’s 
mentors was a Swiss Frans Lefort. Now, this region in Moscow is called ‘Lefortovo.’ In the 
Nemetskaja sloboda, Peter came to know about the collegial form of church administration, which 
implied relatively high self-government of Protestant parishes. During his journey to England, 
Peter consulted King George as well as the bishop of Canterbury and the bishop of York on 
matters of church policy. Curiously enough, the Dutch King William of Orange advised Peter to 
copy the model practiced in Holland of that time and to become himself the head of the Church 
in order to attain the total sovereign power.  
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Therefore, Peter decided to reform the ROC according to the Protestant 
model (Kartashëv 2000: 459).  
To realize this project, Peter relied on Archbishop Feofan Prokopovich, 
who can be said to have become the brain behind the reform. Kartashëv 
characterizes Feofan as a genuine reformer, a bright representative of 
Western erudition and culture. Even in his temperament, Feofan was the 
successor of “the cheerful humanistic idealism, which flourished in the 
fourteenth century, was carried through the Reformation and was reborn in 
the Catholic circles during the epoch of the Enlightenment (XVII-XVIII 
cc.)” (Kartashëv 2000: 478). Being a man of Western scholarship, Feofan 
collected a rich library, three quarters of which consisted of Protestant 
authors; for Peter, he was thus “the live academy on all issues concerning 
state-church relations.” Relying on the Protestant ideas, “Feofan formulated 
his solution to the church-state tension according to the principle of 
Protestant territorialism” (Kartashëv 2000: 487). He announced this 
solution in the Spiritual Regulation (Dukhovnyj reglament), which was 
subsequently enacted by the emperor’s power in 1721. 
By this enactment, Peter sanctioned the establishment of the Holy Synod 
(originally called ‘the spiritual college’) as the highest administrative and 
juridical institution of the ROC. Stefan Javorskij was appointed the 
president of the spiritual college. However, after Stefan’s death in 1722, a 
new president never followed. Instead, the post was filled by a secular 
representative – the so-called chief procurator, who was directly chosen by 
the emperor.52 This structural change suited Peter’s plan. The Synod 
functioned as a secular institution, a kind of the ministry of spiritual affairs, 
whereas its primary functions remained ecclesiastical, including observing 
the dogmatic purity of Russian Orthodox theology, the purity of Orthodox 
rites, regulating internal church affairs, providing spiritual education and 
social care, establishing church feasts, canonizing new saints, and subjecting 
both secular and spiritual literature to church censorship.  
The meaning of the Spiritual Regulation consists in that it sanctioned 
regulation of ecclesiastical affairs by a secular authority. The contemporary 
Russian historian Vladimir Fëdorov (born 1926) concedes in his recent 
                                               
52 In the nineteenth century, the authority of the chief procurator increased significantly. During 
the reactive reign of Nicolas I, the chief procurator was entitled to the prerogatives of the 
minister, and since 1839, his office began functioning independently of the Synod. Chief 
procurator Pobedonostsev, holding the post for almost a quarter of the century (1880-1905), was 
notorious for his unlimited involvement into all state affairs; he enjoyed more influence than any 
other minister of that time (Fëdorov 2003: 15).   
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that if prior to the Synodal period the ambivalence in state-church relations 
lurched in the struggle between the ecclesiastical and political authorities for 
their institutional dominance, during the Synodal period, “the ROC became 
in fact totally subjugated to the secular authority, and the church 
administration became part of the governmental apparatus on ecclesiastical 
matters” (Fëdorov 2003: 8). For the first time in Russian ecclesiastical 
history, state-church relations were defined in strictly juridical terms, as the 
Russian historian Igor’ Smolich (1898-1970) argues in his seminal book 
Russian Monasticism. Genesis. Development. Essence (988-1917).54 The Spiritual 
Regulation defined the state as a legal patron of the Church and legalized 
thereby the state’s involvement into ecclesiastical affairs. As a result of 
Peter’s reform, the Church lost its independent legal status, which it has 
enjoyed in Muscovite Rus’, and became a government institution that was 
expected to perform social service to the state (Smolich 1997: chapter XIII). 
Hence, Peter’s reform drastically changed the balance between the 
secular and ecclesiastical authorities. For Russia, it signified the transition 
from the medieval model of theocratic symphonia toward the early modern 
model of secular monarchy. If symphonia presumed the equality between the 
two authorities, secular monarchy asserted primacy of the secular authority 
over the ecclesiastical authority. Peter’s reform substituted the theocratic 
dualism of Orthodox symphonia by the sovereign monism of a secular state. 
In result, “the old theocratic ideal was simply forgotten,” as the new system 
reserved no space for the symphonic dualism. Peter’s secular state became 
totalitarian, and the Church could only but assume a subordinate position in 
its totalitarian structure (Kartashëv 200: 460-62). In the secular Russian 
Empire, the previous dualist formula of the two powers became invalid. 
Assisted by Feofan Prokopovich, Peter grounded his absolute 
monarchical power in natural law theory (jus naturale). If the theocratic state 
is legitimized by the sacralizing power of the Church, the secular state 
obtains its legitimacy through its utilitarian mission. Kartashëv explicates 
that if the theocratic state ultimately aims at leading the Christian nation 
toward the eternal kingdom of Christ, the secular state defines its ultimate 
goal in utilitarian terms such as promoting the universal welfare (Kartashëv 
                                               
53 Владимир Фëдоров, Русская Православная Церковь и Государство. Синодальный период. 1700-
1917 (2003).  
54 Игорь Смолич, Русское Монашество. Возникновение. Развитие. Сущность (988-1917) (1997). 
Internet publication, last visited on 28 July 2010. 
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2000: 454). By taking over from the Church its genuine soteriological 
mission, the secular state assumed the authority to lead people toward 
achieving the common good (bonum commune). It promised to achieve the 
common good not in the afterlife, but already in the earthly life.55 In 
consequence, Florovskij explains, “the state affirmed its own self-
satisfaction and confirmed its own sovereign self-sufficiency.” It demanded 
not only “obedience of the Church as well as its subordination; but also 
sought some way to absorb and include the Church within itself; to 
introduce and incorporate the Church within the structure and composition 
of the state system and routine.” Having deprived the Church of its 
canonical rights and unique soteriological meaning, the state did not permit 
the Church any longer “to retain any independent or autonomous sphere of 
activity,” affirming itself “as the sole, unconditional, and all-encompassing 
source of every power and piece of legislation as well as of every deed or 
creative act” (Florovskij 1979: 115).  
However, Florovskij warns that the described model of secular sovereign 
monarchy tends to become dangerously paternalistic, when the monarch’s 
urge for universal welfare “all too quickly becomes transformed into 
surveillance.” The scholar presumes that exactly such a paternalistic ‘police 
state’ was introduced and established in Russia by Tsar Peter. Insofar as the 
police state “takes on the undivided care for the people’s religious and 
spiritual welfare,” it tends to usurp the Church’s proper functions and 
eventually turns against the Church. Florovskij clarifies, “Historically, such a 
police Weltanschauung derived from the spirit of the Reformation, when the 
mystical sense of the Church dimmed and evaporated; when the Church 
became to be seen as no more than an empirical institution for organizing 
popular religious life […]. Such a new system of state-church relations was 
introduced and solemnly proclaimed in Russia under Peter in the Spiritual 
Regulation.” Accordingly, the historian makes a provoking conclusion, 
asserting that “the Regulation’s meaning is very simple and all too plain: It is 
the program for a Russian Reformation” (Florovskij 1979: 115-16). 
Insofar as Peter’s police state was grounded in the Protestant model of 
territorialism, it excluded any possibility of the competition between public 
institutions. This prohibition also applied to religious organizations, with no 
exception for the ROC, because on the territory of the sovereign state, the 
                                               
55 Notwithstanding his utilitarian view on religion, Peter did not lose a profound and dynamic 
understanding of Biblical God. Kartashëv averts that Peter’s positive mind did not simply lead 
him toward deathly deism (Kartashëv 2000: 454-55).  
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monarch was considered to be above all religions and all Churches, and 
even if one particular Church dominated on the concerned territory, its 
priority was acknowledged in terms of physical prevalence of the Church as 
the faith of the majority, or as the major national-historical organization 
(Kartashëv 2000: 460). Concisely, a full plenitude of rights and power in 
ecclesiastical affairs was ascribed to the territorial ruler. However, this 
principle of territorial sovereignty was at odds with the Orthodox model of 
symphonia, where the boundaries of the state coincided with those of the 
national Church. Evaluating the changed balance between the ecclesiastical 
and political authorities in Peter’s Russia, Florovskij contends, “Peter’s 
Reformation resulted in a Protestant pseudomorphosis in the life of the 
Church. The dangerous habit acquired for calling things, or rather 
concealing things, by names known to be inappropriate” (Florovskij 1979: 
121). The root of this pseudomorphosis consisted, as we can conclude from 
diverse historical accounts, in Peter’s utilitarian view on religion. 
In essence, Kartashëv claims, the church reform was “the product of the 
absolute monarch” (Kartashëv 2000: 491), whereby the Church fell victim 
to the monarch’s utilitarian worldview. Peter’s utilitarian approach to 
religion became particularly obvious in his policy aimed at systematic 
reduction of monasteries, monks, and nuns. Fëdorov presents some 
interesting facts from Peter’s legislation, added to the Spiritual Regulation. 
Peter forbade admitting to monastic vows the following groups: men 
younger than thirty, women younger than fifty, those in military or civil 
service, debtors, and parents of underage children. Thus, as long as 
someone had social obligations or could be useful in any kind of secular 
vocation, he or she was not allowed to leave it for a spiritual one. Moreover, 
taking of monastic vows was allowed only when a monastery announced an 
available vacancy (Fëdorov 2003: 55). As a result of the depicted policy, 
monasteries became primarily the locations hosting military hospitals, 
mental hospitals, and prisons. The subsequent repressive policies of Peter’s 
successors, such as the secularization of monastic lands by the state during 
the reign of Ekaterina II (1762-95) provided sufficient ground to call the 
eighteenth century the century of the wide-scale secularization.  
Peter’s secular legitimation of sovereign power, as well as his instigated 
secularization policy had drastic consequences for the public and spiritual 
role of the ROC during the Synodal period. The greatest challenge for the 
Church consisted in that it had become factually subordinated to the secular 
political authority. In my view, in comparison with the medieval period of 
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the symphonic state-church relations, the Synodal period was characterized 
by an increasing intensification of the otherworldly self-definition of the 
ROC. Neither in the theocratic model nor in the secular model of the state, 
was the Orthodox Church able to attain the full-pledged social dimension as 
the body of Christ. If in a theocratic symphonia, the Church was recognized 
as the soul of the state, in the framework of secular monarchy it became a 
mere state institution. Assessing the effect of Peter’s reform on the public 
significance of the ROC, historians remain generally on a critical side. 
Florovskij claims, for instance, that “any sense of the ‘Church’ collapsed in 
the face of state centralization and succumbed to it” (Florovskij 1979: 116). 
Smolich agrees that the ROC did not have sufficient inner resources to be 
able to resist coercive secularization by the absolutist state and thus chose to 
adapt to the new situation (Smolich 1997: chapter XIV). Despite the 
troubled relations with the state, historians are still convinced that “the 
Church’s mind and conscience never became accustomed to, accepted, or 
acknowledged this actual ‘caesaropapism,’ although individual churchmen 
and leaders frequently with inspiration submitted to it” (Florovskij 1979: 
121).  
To preserve its mystical fullness, the Church focused on its otherworldly 
self-identity. The evidence of the Church’s internal orientation can be found 
in the revitalization of the monastic tradition, especially in the form of the 
institute of starchestvo (eldership). In contradistinction to the aforementioned 
decrease of monastic life in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, 
the emergence of starchestvo in the second half of the eighteenth century and 
its expansion throughout the nineteenth century embodied the inspiration 
to restore the ancient Orthodox monastic tradition of spiritual guidance. 
The tradition of starchestvo required volunteer submission of a young monk, 
or even of a layperson, to the spiritual guidance of an experienced starets, i.e. 
pater spiritualis, the elder. Smolich remarks in this respect that the institute of 
starchestvo combined asceticism with Eastern Christian mysticism, as it 
attempted at intertwining mystical contemplation with ascetic practice 
(Smolich 1997: Chapter XV). In this sense, it is also interesting that 
Orthodox monasticism, despite its otherworldly orientation, did not lose a 
vital bond with society.56   
                                               
56 This observation brings us to the long history of interaction between monasteries and public 
life in Russia. Since Russia’s Christianization, monasteries became important centers of culture 
and education and, due to their social obligations, did not gain the possibility of withdrawing 
from the worldly life. As Smolich confirms, the internal ambiguity of monastic life was 
determined exactly by the double task of monasteries (Smolich 1997: Chapter XV). On the one 
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By way of conclusion, during the Synodal period, the ROC deepened its 
self-identification as a spiritual community. This tendency is typical of a 
religious institution under the circumstances of modern secularization. On 
the one hand, Russian Orthodox Christianity assumed, in the eighteenth 
century, some distinctive features of a spiritualized and individualized form 
of religion. On the other hand, it also experienced a decline of its public 
significance. Florovskij remains pessimistic when evaluating the upshots of 
secularization in Russia. Specifically, the scholar describes the clergy of 
Peter’s epoch as becoming a “frightened class” and sinking into lower social 
strata. While the upper ranks of the clergy remained silent, “the best of the 
clergy withdrew into themselves, retreating into the ‘inner hermitage’ of 
their hearts, for no one was permitted to withdraw into real hermitages 
during the eighteenth century […]. Subsequently, Russian ecclesiastical 
consciousness languished into the double imprisonment of administrative 
decree and inner fear” (Florovskij 1979: 121-22).  
In light of the above, I suggest assessing the secularization process in the 
history of Russian Orthodoxy as a period of religious maturation. On the 
surface, we could discern typical syndromes of the secularization process, 
which Casanova and Taylor defined as general decline of religious life and 
gradual exclusion of religion from the public domain. At the deepest levels, 
religious transformation and spiritual maturation allowed the ROC to 
develop theological perceptiveness of the secularizing world and 
communicate this perceptiveness through an open intelligent critique. The 
time for such a critique matured after one and a half century of the Synodal 
period. The open critique of the Synodal system started in the early 
                                                                                                              
hand, possessing richest libraries and consisting of educated monks, monasteries were the main 
centers of education and cultural enlightenment in Kievan Rus’. Later, since the dawn of 
monastic life in North-Eastern Russia, which is associated with the name of St. Sergij of 
Radonezh, monasteries became closely intertwined in political and economic life of the state: 
They served as missionary and economic centers on the vast colonized territories of Russia. 
However, despite this inextricable link with the secular world, Russian monasticism still regarded 
asceticism as the primary task of monastic life. The ascetic practice experienced several periods of 
revitalization. The late eighteenth century can be rightly considered as one of those periods. 
Then, the aspiration to revitalize the ascetic and mystical tradition of the Eastern Orthodox 
Church manifested itself in the movement of starchestvo. Studying this movement, Smolich typifies 
starchestvo as a natural phenomenon, which originated and developed spontaneously, in a bottom-
up manner, without any stimulus on the part of ecclesiastic hierarchy. Due to this spontaneity, 
starchestvo resembled the spiritual regeneration that had occurred five centuries earlier, being 
inspired by St. Sergij of Radonezh. 
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nineteenth century,57 in result of the liberal reforms of Alexander II. Then, 
as Kartashëv asserts, secular theologians and philosophers, ecclesiastical 
historians and university lawyers “explicitly emphasized the anti-canonical 
nature of the ecclesiastical administration during the whole imperial period” 
(Kartashëv 2000: 530).  
 
4.2.3 The Revival of Public and Ecclesiastical Life in Late Imperial Russia 
 
The Great Reforms of 1861-64, instigated by Tsar Alexander II, were aimed 
at modernizing the main structures and institutions of Russian society. The 
reforms symbolized the reinvigoration of public and ecclesiastical life and 
prepared the period of intensive intellectual search that preceded the 
Bolshevik revolution of 1917. Rapidly modernizing Russian society 
resembled, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the process of 
functional differentiation, which broadly occurred in Western-European 
societies. As Pauline Schrooyen argues in her doctoral thesis Vladimir 
Solov’ëv in the Rising Public Sphere, “These reforms enabled Russian society to 
differentiate and emancipate itself from the autocratic state, which resulted 
in the emergence of considerably autonomous domains, or, to use 
Luhmann’s terminology, ‘subsystems of society’ ” (Schrooyen 2006: 27). 
Although relatively autonomous social systems stated to form, late imperial 
Russian society represented rather “a combination of a stratified society and 
a functionally differentiated society.” It was “horizontally structured with 
self-referential societal subsystems such as law, medicine, the press and 
education, while at the same time it was vertically divided into unequal 
social estates which were interconnected by a national perspective 
permeating the entire society” (Schrooyen 2006: 28). 
Aimed at the structural emancipation of Russian society, the Great 
Reforms of Alexander II concerned a broad scope of urgent social 
problems that needed institutional reorganization. Most importantly, the 
manifesto of 19 February 1861 abolished the reprehensible institute of 
serfdom. Furthermore, Alexander’s government sponsored industrial 
liberalization and actively supported liberal policies in the fields of high 
education, army, law, press, and local self-government. 
                                               
57 For instance, the Synodal system was criticized in the early nineteenth century by the historian 
Nikolaj Karamzin. However, during the reactionary period of Tsar Nicolas I reign (1825-1855), 
the critique was silenced.   
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Alexander’s reforms also changed ecclesiastical life by entitling the ROC 
with more autonomy. New decrees on religious tolerance were 
implemented; at the same time, parochial life and ecclesiastical education 
were given a highly needed stimulus. However, the real impact of the 
reforms mainly concerned the miserable social and legal status of the clergy. 
We can better understand the liberalization of the clergy in connection to 
the general process of functional differentiation. Alexander’s decrees 
permitted children of the clergy, who previously had been bound to pursue 
the ecclesiastical carrier, to choose their professions freely in the field of 
civil or military service. Commenting on these decrees, Fëdorov rightly 
asserts, nonetheless, that the discrimination of the clergy was significantly 
undermined, but not eliminated in practice (Fëdorov 2003: 215).  
Although the liberal policies of Alexander’s reign did not produce 
sufficient practical result, they preconditioned subsequent transformations 
in public and ecclesiastical life in pre-revolutionary Russia. The instigated 
process of functional differentiation entailed loosening of state control over 
the Church, and this, in turn, enabled the Church to coordinate its efforts 
and organize the first Local Church Council after two hundred years of 
ecclesiastical silence. The Local Church Council of 1917-18 can be 
considered thus as the sign that the Church finally conceived of its 
functional autonomy from the secular autocratic state and became ready to 
implement the privileges of its autonomous position. 
The general liberalization of Russian society in result of the Great 
Reforms created the necessary preconditions for the emergence of civil 
society. The reinvigoration of public life resulted in the first sprouts of civil 
society in pre-revolutionary Russia. Dramatically, these sprouts were 
trampled upon by the Soviet totalitarian state. Nevertheless, the dawn of 
public life in late imperial Russia was successfully documented by its 
contemporaries, amongst others by the philosopher Vladimir Solov’ëv, as 
well as by the next generation of Russian émigré intelligentsia: Georgij 
Florovskij, Anton Kartashëv, Sergej Bulgakov, and Semën Frank.  
Civil society presumes, above all, the existence of independent public 
opinion and free press. These were exactly the developments that occurred 
in late imperial Russia. Florovskij characterizes the epoch of the Great 
Reforms by the universal need for glasnost’ (publicity) and characterizes the 
emergence and rapid development of Russian religious, or ‘spiritual,’ 
journalism as one of the typical symptoms of this epoch. The revival of 
religious journalism testifies to increasing public interest and the desire to 
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discuss interrelated social and religious issues. In the capital as well as in 
province, new journals continuously emerged owing to private initiatives. 
Florovskij remarks that the majority of these new journals survived until the 
Bolshevik catastrophe (Florovskij 1991: 335). Furthermore, ecclesiastical 
scholarship started to obtain public influence and therefore the bond 
between the Church and society became remarkably vivacious. Religious 
thinkers were convinced that the Church needed to be enlightened by the 
awakening spirit of independence, whereas public life should be inspired by 
the Christian belief in moral transformation. Thus, due to the liberalization 
of the public sphere during the Great Reforms, both ecclesiastical thinkers 
and the secular public became aware that two cardinal principles needed to 
be restored: the principle of the Church’s autonomy and the Orthodox 
principle of conciliarity (sobornost’). Otherwise, Florovskij argues, the Church 
will not be able to profit from the granted freedom, for “the constrained 
truth is helpless” (Florovskij 1991: 333).58 
Despite the invigorated dialog between religious and secular intellectuals, 
the real state of ecclesiastical life in late imperial Russia left much to be 
desired. Although the Great Reforms of Alexander II doubtlessly gave a 
new impulse to the ecclesiastical revival, they did not radically change the 
structures and traditions in which state-church relations had proceeded 
previously. The most urgent question of the legitimacy of the Holy Synod 
was not put at stake. Furthermore, the achievements of the Great Reforms 
were contradicted by the reactive political course taken by the son of 
Alexander II, Tsar Alexander III. During this period of conservation, the 
Holy Synod was headed by chief procurator Konstantin Pobedonostsev 
whose name, upon Florovskij’s perceptive observation, “became the symbol 
of the epoch” (Florovskij 1991: 410). Steadfastly holding the opinion that 
the Church should be inextricably connected with the state, Pobedonostsev 
executed the function of the chief procurator for a quarter of the century 
(1880-1905) so enthusiastically that he eventually reduced the institutional 
role of the Synod to the minimum and conferred all ecclesiastical affairs on 
himself (Fëdorov 2003: 221).  
In literature, the period of Pobedonostsev acquired an ambiguous 
evaluation. On the one hand, the circulation of ecclesiastical press increased 
                                               
58 I use two different publications of Florovskij’s book Ways of Russian Theology. The English 
version, which I refer to as Florovskij 1979, contains only the first five first chapters of the 
original Russian version [1937]. The Russian version, which I refer to as Florovskij 1991, contains 
nine chapters. The quoted text from the Russian version is my translation.  
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immensely at the end of the nineteenth century. On the other hand, 
Pobedonostsev’s stringent censorship and conservative view on public 
morality caused certain stagnation in public and ecclesiastical life. Florovskij 
provides a perceptive characteristic of the famous chief procurator, 
“Pobedonostsev believed in the solidness of patriarchal way of life and in 
organic wisdom of folk nature; he did not trust individual initiative. He had 
confidence in common people in virtue of folk simplicity and primitiveness, 
and was reluctant to corrupt this naïve wholeness of the feeling by the 
poisonous injection of rational Western civilization” (Florovskij 1991: 410). 
Opposing any kind of individual creativity and critical reflection, 
Pobedonostsev preferred to publish his booklets anonymously, lingering in 
the semidarkness and dissolving in the faceless mass. When speaking about 
faith, Pobedonostsev implied rather faith of people (vera naroda) than faith of 
the Church, which remained in his eyes primarily a universal public 
institution (vsenarodnoje uchrezhdenije). Accordingly, the chief procurator 
tended to avoid any theological disputes on dogmatic issues, for “he 
appreciated the primordial and the basic above the true” (Florovskij 1991: 
411). This explains the ambiguity of Pobedonostsev’s religious policy. 
Founding numerous parochial schools, building temples in remote Russian 
provinces, publishing spiritual and moral literature and prayer books, 
promulgating ecclesiastical charity and financial support of the clergy – 
these are undeniable credits of Pobedonostsev’s management. However, 
Pobedonostsev considered public and cultural influence of the clergy to be 
undesirable, and that is why his name would be forever associated with a 
primitive kind of Orthodox religiosity, a simplified and folkloristic form of 
ecclesiastical life.  
The overall stagnation of ecclesiastical and public life under 
Pobedonostsev’s vigilant surveillance was followed in the early twentieth 
century by the remarkable epoch of spiritual revival, which resulted in the 
emergence religious-philosophical societies and the renewed ecclesiastical 
discussion on the necessity of church reforms. In contradistinction to the 
public invigoration during the Great Reforms of Alexander II, which 
contained “too much perilous light-mindedness, too much mystical 
irresponsibility and mere play” (Florovskij 1991: 452), the public discussion 
at the turn of the century assumed a much more serious and relevant 
character. Florovskij points at the intensity of religious experience in the 
intellectual search, which is typical of the Silver Age of Russian literature 
and philosophy. Given the new comprehension of human being as 
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essentially a metaphysical being, religion became rather “the theme of life” 
than “the theme of thought” (Florovskij 1991: 452). Indeed, the religious 
search in pre-revolutionary Russia engaged the whole generation of Russian 
intelligentsia.  
 Both secular and ecclesiastical press dedicatedly promulgated then the 
idea that the basic reason for the crisis of ecclesiastical life lurched in the 
Church’s subordination to the state. Accordingly, many intellectuals 
proposed various solutions of how to liberate the Church from the 
meticulous control of the state (Fëdorov 2003: 248). In December 1904, 
Antonij Vadkovskij, Metropolitan of St. Petersburg, sent Tsar Nicolas II a 
note in which he investigated whether the tsar should grant the Church 
more freedom in administering its internal affairs, so that the Church could 
follow ecclesiastical canons and moral-religious demands of its members. 
Metropolitan Antonij wondered whether “the Church, liberated from direct 
state or political mission, could serve, in virtue of its regenerated moral 
authority, to support the Orthodox state” (Florovskij 1991: 476). Seeing the 
ultimate solution to the ecclesiastical crisis in the separation of Church and 
state, Fëdorov recognized, however, that no ecclesiastical hierarch would 
dare to propose this kind of solution. The adherents of the ecclesiastical 
renewal insisted on the state remaining confessional and not atheistic, so 
that the secular ruler would need and support the Church. Otherwise, an 
atheistic state would compromise the prestige of the Church itself. That is 
why, Fëdorov concludes, “while claiming more autonomy, the Orthodox 
Church wanted to preserve its political significance” (Fëdorov 2003: 249).  
Besides Metropolitan Antonij, Prime Minister Sergej Vitte was also 
concerned with the status of the ROC. Vitte advised the church 
administration to return the old canonical principle of sobornost’, or 
conciliarity. With that, Vitte demanded the abolishment of Peter’s reform, 
i.e. of the Synod, and the restoration of the conciliar principle in 
ecclesiastical life (Florovskij 1991: 476-77; Fëdorov 2003: 250). The 
principle of conciliar decision should be applied, according to Vitte, at all 
levels of the church administration: Priests should be elected by the local 
community, in contrast to the widespread practice of transmitting the parish 
hereditably, high hierarchy should become autonomous from state control 
and take decisions in the framework of conciliar discussion.  
The daring projects proposed by Metropolitan Antonij and Vitte were 
immediately rejected by chief procurator Pobedonostsev. The subsequent 
argument between Vitte and Pobedonostsev revealed the antagonistic 
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positions in public debate of that time. Pobedonostsev regarded the 
patriarchal system to be dangerous for the sovereign power of the tsar, 
whereas Vitte stipulated bureaucratism as the “most painful sore in the 
church administration” of the ROC (Fëdorov 2003: 251). Tsar Nicolas II 
assumed, upon Fëdorov’s characterization, “a half-hearted position” in the 
debate. After a couple of years, he announced the impossibility of 
organizing the Local Church Council and established the pre-council board 
for managing ecclesiastical affairs.  
The established state-church relations in imperial Russia changed 
drastically in consequence of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. In the 
course of the February Revolution, the monarchy was overthrown, and the 
Russian Provisional Government became the ruling organ of a new 
republic. Almost immediately after the abdication of Tsar Nicolas II on 2 
March 1917, chief procurator L’vov announced on behalf of the 
Provisionary Government that the emancipation of the ROC was one of the 
urgent issues and directed the calling of the Local Church Council.  
The short period of the Provisional Government, between the February 
Revolution and the October Bolshevik revolution, turned to be extremely 
dynamic both for Russian society and the ROC. On 20 March 1917, the 
Provisional Government abolished former restrictions on religious and 
national grounds and enacted, on 14 June, the Decree on Freedom of 
Conscience. In the meanwhile, eminent Russian religious philosophers, 
ecclesiastical historians and critics actively discussed necessary 
transformations in political and ecclesiastical life. Thus, the historian Anton 
Kartashëv was appointed on 25 July 1917 as the chief procurator of the 
Holy Synod. Consequently, Kartashëv participated in the Local Church 
Council of 1917-18 and left his valuable memoirs. However, just a few days 
later, on 5 August, the Holy Synod was abolished and the public ministry of 
religious affairs was founded instead. This event signified the end of the 
Synodal period in the history of the ROC.  
The abrupt change of the political situation had crucial consequences for 
the ROC. The contribution of the religious philosopher, later the priest and 
émigré theologian, Sergej Bulgakov bears testimony of these changes. On 2 
June 1917, Bulgakov delivered the lecture ‘Church and Democracy’59 at the 
national congress of the clergy and laity. The turbulent year of 1917 turned 
to be a year of great hopes and grievous disappointments for Russian 
                                               
59 Сергей Булгаков, «Церковь и демократия» // Труды по социологии и теологии (1917). Internet 
publication, last visited on 28 July 2010. 
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Orthodox intelligentsia. Bulgakov’s lecture reflects the dynamism of that 
period. While hailing the new democratic constitution of the Russian state, 
Bulgakov urges to preserve the purity of Russian ecclesiastical self-
consciousness and abstain from the temptation to amalgamate the political 
secular ideal of democracy and the Orthodox ecclesiastical ideal of sobornost’ 
(Bulgakov 1917). He renounces the historical mistake of both the Eastern 
Orthodox Church and the Roman-Catholic Church, which consisted in 
their close cooperation with the Caesar’s empire. In the contemporary 
inclination of the ROC to embrace the democratic ideal of sovereignty of 
the people, Bulgakov discerns “the new and simultaneously old temptation: 
to surrender oneself to a new master, to bow before a new idol,” whereas 
“the highest instance should never bow before the lower one” (Bulgakov 
1917). Bulgakov considers the amiable attitude of the ROC toward 
democracy quite logical, given the conciliar principle of the Church. Exactly 
for that reason, he warns against the eagerness of the Orthodox Church to 
measure itself by democracy and idolize democracy. That is why, Bulgakov 
insists, “it is absolutely vital to differentiate between the nature of 
Orthodoxy from the nature of democracy: Convergence and divergence are 
equally possible between those, depending on the spiritual contents of 
democracy” (Bulgakov 1917).  
Bulgakov apprehends that the substitution of the ecclesiastical principle 
of sobornost’ by the democratic principle of sovereignty of the people might 
lead to the secularization of the Church. Although Bulgakov agrees that the 
voice of the majority is a good way to express public interests and needs, the 
practical rationality of democracy “by no means legitimizes its alleged sacred 
or mystical authority” because the latter is the exclusive privilege of the 
Church. Bulgakov objects identifying the Church with democracy on the 
ontological grounds, “The Church is the highest and unconditional principle 
of life, the kingdom not of this world, albeit aiming at elevating this world 
to itself. Democracy, on the other hand, is merely the natural humanity in its 
sinful state, sometimes elucidating itself and inspiring, but sometimes 
assuming a savage form” (Bulgakov 1917). Hence, democracy invariably 
needs the spiritual guidance of the Church. When analyzing Bulgakov’s 
standpoint, we should take into consideration the historical context wherein 
Bulgakov articulated his views on democracy. The lecture was given at the 
background of a collapsing monarchy and severe struggle between 
numerous political parties, amongst which the Bolsheviks eventually 
managed to concentrate power in their hands.  
CIVIL SOCIETY AND RELIGION 
197 
 
 
 It was in the depicted historical context that the Local Council of the 
ROC took place in 1917-18. In this regard, I rather agree with those 
historians who consider the Council as the manifestation of the Church’s 
long-awaited autonomy. The Council was festively inaugurated in the 
Assumption Cathedral of the Moscow Kremlin on 15 August 1917 and was 
held in three sessions, until the Soviet government interrupted it on 20 
September 1918. The Council decided to restore the old institute of 
Patriarchate and elected Metropolitan Tikhon (Bulavin) as the new Patriarch 
of Moscow and All Russia. The agenda of the Council comprised not only 
urgent ecclesiastical issues, such as state-church relations, reorganization of 
the church administration, the status of parishes and monasteries, 
autocephaly of the Ukrainian and the Georgian Churches, but also social-
moral problems caused by the hardships of the World War I and the 
revolutionary upheavals of 1917. Fëdorov rightly discerns the meaning of 
the Council in that “it regenerated the conciliar principle in the ROC”: By 
resuming the results of the Church’s previous existence, the Council 
prepared the Church for a new epoch of trials and tribulations (Fëdorov 
2003: 272). It was the renewal of ecclesiastical life that consequently would 
allow the ROC to survive the terror of Soviet atheism, which was unleashed 
by the decree of 23 January 1918 on the separation of Church and state.60  
 
4.3 Civil Society in Orthodox Christian Philosophy  
 
Having considered the organizing question of the chapter (how civil society 
and religion relate to each other in Western and Eastern societies of the 
Christian origin?) from the historical perspective, I now move on to the 
conceptual level of analysis. In what follows, I shall expose a religious 
reading of civil society theory based on the Orthodox Christian tradition. As 
it has been averted in the introduction to the chapter, the religious reading 
of civil society theory presumes the world-transcendent metaphysical order. 
Consequently, it conceives of civil society not only as constituted by 
temporal world-immanent structures, but also as a reflection and a partial 
realization of this metaphysical order. Relying on the theories of two 
prominent Russian religious philosophers, Vladimir Solov’ëv (1853-1900) 
and Semën Frank (1877-1950), I shall provide an Orthodox religious 
conception of civil society.  
                                               
60 The significance of the Soviet period for the history of the ROC in the twentieth century will 
be analyzed further (§ 6.1.1).  
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My choice of these particular philosophers can be explained by the great 
intellectual and constructive potential of their contributions. Both 
philosophers do not seek to devaluate the secular idea and practice of civil 
society, but rather try to discover religious-moral foundations for the 
existence of civil society. In addition to philosophical profoundness, the 
chosen theories are interesting, since Solov’ëv and Frank belong to the pre-
revolutionary tradition of Russian religious philosophy. This enables us to 
revitalize the richness and versatility of Russian philosophy of the Silver 
Age, considering it as a fruit of the complex historical process depicted 
above as the Synodal period.  
Analyzing Solov’ëv’s book The Justification of the Good: An Essay on Moral 
Philosophy (1897)61 and his essay ‘Law and Morality’ (written between 1877 
and 1900),62 I intend to clarify the sources of the religious-philosophical 
conception of civil society in pre-revolutionary Russia. In contradistinction 
to Solov’ëv’s conception, Frank’s book The Spiritual Foundations of Society: An 
Introduction to Social Philosophy (1930)63 signifies the next stage in the history 
of Russian religious-philosophical thought. Frank’s study not only builds 
upon Solov’ëv’s moral philosophy, but also contains a critique of the 
established Soviet regime. Considering these two theories jointly, I want to 
emphasize the continuity of Russian religious-philosophical tradition.  
The analysis of the selected philosophical theories is guided by the 
following question: How do Solov’ëv and Frank propose to balance a 
modern secular conception of society with a religious worldview? Put 
differently, I wonder whether it is possible to formulate, from within the 
Orthodox Christian tradition, a solid legal and moral framework where the 
liberal ethos of pluralistic and tolerant civil society would fit in.  
 
4.3.1 Christian Humanism of Vladimir Solov’ëv  
 
Although the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 signified a tragic turn in the 
history of Russian intelligentsia, it did not eliminate the tradition of the 
                                               
61 First published in Russian as Владимир Соловьёв, Оправдание добра. Нравственная философия 
in St-Petersburg (1897). The first English translation appeared in New York (1918). I use the 
English version published in Grand Rapids (2005).  
62 First published in Russian as Владимир Соловьёв, «Право и нравственность» // Собрание 
сочинений, 1877-1900, том 8, in St-Petersburg (1901-3). This essay is available only in Russian. I 
use the Russian version published in Brussels (1966-68). 
63 First published in Russian as Семён Франк, Духовные основы общества: Введение в социальную 
философию in Paris (1930). I use the English version published in London (1987).  
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religious-philosophical renaissance. Many intellectuals, among others Frank, 
lived in exile from Soviet Russia; nonetheless, their mindset was still 
obviously inspired by the ideals of Russian religious philosophy. Solov’ëv’s 
liberal thought was one of the important inspiration sources for those 
Russian émigré’s. Remarkably, Solov’ëv turned to be a key figure in the 
Russian philosophical renaissance not so much during his short lifetime (he 
died at the age of forty seven), but rather posthumously. His works induced 
the whole generation of pre-revolutionary intellectuals to advocate the 
necessity of political liberalization by relying on liberal philosophical, as well 
as on Christian, more specifically Russian-Orthodox, concepts.  
On this view, it is vital to consider Solov’ëv’s liberal philosophy against 
the background of the general emancipatory frame of mind that prevailed in 
late imperial Russian society since the turn of the twentieth century. In his 
elucidating study Civil Society and Academic Debate in Russia 1905-1914, David 
Wartenweiler fairly relates the actual beginning of society’s protest against 
the autocratic state to the Bloody Sunday of February 1905. The revolution 
of 1905 signified “the coming age of Russia society,” since it was then that, 
for the first time, “Russians collectively defied with success the supreme 
authority of tsar and state.” Although the implementation of the 
constitutional order and of political and civil liberties was highly flawed and 
resulted in “a dysfunctional hybrid regime, a semi-constitutionalism,” the 
factual emergence of a national elective representative organ – the State 
Duma – created the ground for the emergence of civil society. 
Consequently, the extension of the principle of rule of law into many areas 
of public life relegated those areas to the independent social activity, and the 
institutions of civil society “could assert themselves to an extent never 
before seen in Russia” (Wartenweiler 1999: 1).  
The intriguing question remains, nevertheless, whether the concept of 
civil society had been borrowed from abroad or evolved naturally on the 
Russian soil, being formulated by Russian liberal intelligentsia. Solov’ëv’s 
contribution to the exuberant debate on law, individual freedom, and 
dignity proves that the very idea of civil society had already aroused the 
interest of Russian intellectuals. To support my hypothesis, I also refer to 
Wartenweiler’s compelling argument that the liberalizing reforms were not 
an accidental upshot of the social resentment in pre-revolutionary Russia, 
since “the ideas and representations at the heart of a civil society were […] 
very much present in contemporary liberal thought.” In particular, the 
notion of the public, or obshchestvennost’, which is central to the concept of 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND RELIGION 
200 
 
 
civil society, figured “prominently in the scholarly and publicist writings of 
liberal academics, to whose demands for civil and political liberties they 
were congenial” (Wartenweiler 1999: 4). Although the exact term ‘civil 
society’ did not appear in that debate, the majority of publications include 
various attempts at specifying “possible organizational and legal frameworks 
and the necessary ethos based on the morally and socially responsible 
citizen” (Wartenweiler 1999: 82). With regard to the impact of Solov’ëv’s 
ideas on civil society debate, Wartenweiler justly concludes, “Solov’ëv with 
his idiosyncratic combination of liberal principles and Christian ideals – 
created a space of law, morality, and social organization, whereas new 
generation of Russian liberal academics found important impulses for 
reviewing the options available to the country” (Wartenweiler 1999: 95). 
Indeed, Solov’ëv can be rightly considered a key figure in the rise of 
Russian social and political philosophy of a modern type. Insofar as 
Solov’ëv treated the human person primarily as a moral, free, and rational 
being, he was a pioneer in advocating human dignity and freedom. And he 
did so by relying on genuinely Christian principles. Despite drawing 
inspiration from the Christian tradition (most significantly, from Orthodox 
Christianity, although for a certain period he deeply sympathized with the 
Roman-Catholic tradition), Solov’ëv steadfastly averted the inherent 
presence of the knowledge of the good in each individual person regardless 
of his religious convictions. Thereby, the philosopher succeeded to defend a 
universal view on social ethics and individual morality. 
The crucial novelty of Solov’ëv’s moral-philosophical thought consists in 
a sublime synthesis of the Christian idea of All-Unity (Vseedinstvo) and the 
liberal ideas of tolerance, plurality, and individual freedom into one coherent 
theory of society. With that, the theorist integrated typically modern 
principles of individualism and liberalism with the religious ideal of All-
Unity, as he firmly believed these two seemingly contradictory standpoints 
to be mutually complementary. Solov’ëv grounded his belief on the 
eschatological vision of the world as radically transformed and freed from 
worldly tensions. In this sense, the contemporary liberal Orthodox 
theologian Veniamin Novik correctly characterizes Solov’ëv’s philosophy as 
“Christian humanism.” In his article ‘Vladimir Solov’ëv: A Social 
Dimension of Spirituality,’64 Novik explicates what makes Solov’ëv so 
unique. Wherever Solov’ëv can identify an ethical dimension to a social 
                                               
64 Вениамин Новик, «Владимир Соловьёв: социальное измерение духовности» // Вестник 
РХД (№ 182, 2001). Internet publication, last visited on 28 July 2010. 
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phenomenon, he immediately considers it possible to comprehend this 
phenomenon from the Christian perspective. This is exactly what 
distinguishes Solov’ëv from the dualistic understanding of spirituality, which 
asserts the radical separation between the secular and the sacred. It is for the 
same reason that Solov’ëv’s philosophy still remains relatively unpopular 
with Russian conservative theologians (Novik 2001: 5). Sympathizing with 
the liberal trend within contemporary Orthodox theology, Novik strives to 
invigorate Solov’ëv’s Christian humanism, tirelessly arguing that Christian 
and humanist principles are in fact deeply interconnected and can be utilized 
for the religious advocacy of democracy, civil society, and freedom of 
conscience.65  
Two important conceptions ensue from Solov’ëv’s philosophy of 
Christian humanism: a new conception of society and a new conception of 
human being. Insofar as they shed a new light on civil society theory, I shall 
analyze these two conceptions in some more detail. 
What makes Solov’ëv’s conception of society innovative is its attempt at 
reconciling the inherent tension between individual and society, which 
Seligman compellingly described as the core dilemma of civil society. As we 
can remember from Seligman’s analysis, the rise of modern individualism 
problematized the “relation between the private and the public, the 
individual and the social, public ethics and individual interests” (Seligman 
2002: 13-14). For his part, Solov’ëv refuses to make a hierarchical 
distinction between the individual and society because he is convinced that 
“there is no essential opposition between the individual and society.” The 
philosopher underpins his argument by the example of “the true moral 
order of the Kingdom of God” as “both perfectly universal and perfectly 
individual” (Solov’ëv 2005: 173). The human individual can accomplish his 
perfectly social and perfectly individual nature only through “an indefinite 
number of relations with the other and with others.” Therefore, it would be 
misleading to abstract the individual from his social relations, as it would 
affirm the existence of the individual as “a self-sufficient and self-contained 
entity.” Even more gravely, Solov’ëv believes “this self-deception of 
abstract subjectivism” to be “the source of many convoluted theories, 
irreconcilable contradictions, and insoluble questions” that presumptively 
permeate the domain of moral and political life (Solov’ëv 2005: 173-74). At 
the same time, Solov’ëv criticizes the adherents of the collectivist view on 
                                               
65 Novik’s views will be considered in more detail in § 6.4.3. 
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the relationship between the individual and society because they understand 
“the life of humanity to be simply an interplay of human masses, and regard 
the individual as an insignificant and transient element of society, who has 
no rights of his own, and may be left out of account for the sake of the so-
called common good” (Solov’ëv 2005: 175). Solov’ëv has enormous 
difficulties to admit how this kind of society, “consisting of moral zeros, of 
rightless and non-individual creatures” can be called human and where such 
concepts as “dignity and the inner value of its existence” would possibly rise 
from (Solov’ëv 2005: 176).  
Instead of contrasting these two mutually exclusive postulates – the 
individual and society – Solov’ëv proposes to reconsider them as “two 
correlative terms each of which logically and historically requires and 
presupposes the other” (Solov’ëv 2005: 176). Solov’ëv retains the thesis that 
the human being has a two-dimensional nature and hence cannot be 
depicted exclusively either in its individual or social dimension. Society, on 
Solov’ëv’s account, is no longer to be conceived as the external limit of the 
individual, but rather as the individual’s inner fulfillment. Insofar social life 
is essential to the definition of human personality as “a rationally-knowing 
and a morally-active force,” the knowledge of truth, as well as the moral 
determination of personality can be realized only in a social environment, in 
relation to other human beings and social institutions. Being “nothing but 
the objective realization of what is contained in the individual,” society 
creates thus the preconditions for the objective realization of the idea of the 
good (Solov’ëv 2005: 175).  
Concisely, from the perspective of Christian humanism, Solov’ëv 
conceives of society in terms of what Wartenweiler astutely called “a 
delicate balancing act between individual freedom and the general good.” By 
asserting the knowledge of the good in each individual and the inalienable 
right of the individual to a dignified existence, Solov’ëv arrives at the 
conclusion that individual striving towards moral perfection is compatible 
with moral pluralism. Insofar as “Solov’ëv drew no categorical distinction 
between morality and law, life in society became an expression of what he 
called ‘organized morality’ ” (Wartenweiler 1999: 94). Society designates the 
space reserved for the realization of private morality, where public concerns 
appear compatible with individual interests. At the root of this highly 
idealistic conception of society as a progressive manifestation of morality 
lies Solov’ëv’s liberal interpretation of Christian anthropological doctrine.  
CIVIL SOCIETY AND RELIGION 
203 
 
 
Maintaining that the dimension of social life is involved in the very 
definition of the human being, Solov’ëv suggests to legitimize human 
dignity and inalienable human rights on new grounds. His definition of 
human being as simultaneously “a rationally-knowing and a morally-active 
force” (Solov’ëv 2005: 175) comprises two constitutive elements. Firstly, the 
definition involves a rational-cognitive element pertaining to “the capacity 
to understand all things with his intellect,” and secondly, it involves the 
moral element implying the capacity of human being “to embrace all things 
with his heart, or to enter into a living communion with everything.” 
Specifying the combination of these two constitutive elements as “double 
infinity,” Solov’ëv emphasizes the importance of two mutually 
complementary modes of human existence: the contemplative and the 
proactive one. The contemplative mode results from the competence of 
rationality and endorses the human being with “the power of 
representation,” whereas the proactive mode ensues from “the power of 
striving and activity” and encourages the human person to engage in 
worldly affairs with a view to transforming the world (Solov’ëv 2005: 176). 
Obviously, Solov’ëv’s ideal of a religious person actively participating in the 
world corresponds to Weber’s portrayal of inner-worldly asceticism; 
however, Solov’ëv’s ideal contains more contemplative mysticism. 
Importantly, Solov’ëv claims that the denoted fundamental qualities of 
the human being – rationality and moral sentiment – can be realized only in 
the interaction with other human beings, i.e. that these qualities require a 
social environment. Similarly, Solov’ëv connects the traditional Christian 
doctrine of man’s creation in the image and likeness of God to the social 
dimension of the individual’s life. On the one hand, the philosopher 
recognizes that the ontological status of human being as created in the 
image of God “necessarily belongs to every person. It is in this that the 
absolute significance, dignity, and worth of human personality consist, and 
this is the basis of its inalienable rights” (Solov’ëv 2005: 176). On the other 
hand, he is convinced that the realization of the absolute significance, 
dignity, and worth of human personality is possible only through the 
individual’s relation to his social environment because it is in the social 
environment that “the real content of the personal life is obtained.” 
Ultimately, every human being needs to find expression of his true personal 
dignity in his relation to the social surroundings, so that “the infinite 
possibilities inherent in the very nature of man gradually become realized in 
the individually-social reality” (Solov’ëv 2005: 178). In light of the above, 
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Solov’ëv eloquently concludes, “Society is the completed or magnified individual and 
the individual is compressed or concentrated society” (Solov’ëv 2005: 177). 
What follows from Solov’ëv’s integrative conception of society and 
individual is that the very existence of society obtains a distinctive 
teleological dimension. Since each individual is born into a certain social 
environment, involuntary participation is inevitably imposed upon him. 
However, this involuntary participation is meant to make each individual 
aware of the ontological solidarity, which is inherent in the nature of things, 
and consequently “to transform it from a merely metaphysical and physical 
solidarity into a morally-metaphysical and a morally-physical one.” 
Solov’ëv’s understanding of the meaning of the universe as a whole requires 
that the unavoidable “involuntary participation of each in everything should 
become voluntary and be more and more conscious and free, i.e. really 
personal – that each should more and more understand and fulfill the common 
work as if it were his own.” The key to understanding Solov’ëv’s social-ethical 
precept is exactly this transition, which he defines as the “spiritualization or 
moralization of the natural fact of solidarity” (Solov’ëv 2005: 177). 
Solov’ëv’s conception of society as the “individually-social reality,” which 
is created for the purpose of “the rightful interaction between the individual 
and his environment,” does not undermine the absolute value of the 
individual (Solov’ëv 2005: 178). The individual for Solov’ëv is “a moral 
being who, apart from his social utility, has absolute worth and an absolute 
right to live and freely develop his positive powers” (Solov’ëv 2005: 229). 
The absolute moral worth of human being means that “no man under any 
conditions or for any reason may be regarded as only a means for ends extraneous to 
himself” because the human dignity of each individual does not depend on 
his social utility. Quintessentially, considering the fundamental tension 
between individual and society, Solov’ëv endorses the priority of individual 
rights and freedom over society’s demands. The philosopher grounds this 
claim in his adamant belief in human’s moral and rational capacity, which is 
obvious from the following:  
The right of the person as such is based upon his human dignity inherent in 
him and inalienable, upon the formal infinity of reason in every human 
being, upon the fact that each person is unique and individual, and must 
therefore be an end in himself and not merely a means or an instrument. 
This right of the person is from its very nature unconditional, while the rights 
of the community with regard to the person are conditioned by the recognition 
of his individual rights (Solov’ëv 2005: 229). 
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Indeed, the status of individual rights poses a serious challenge for 
Solov’ëv’s attempt at constructing a legal and moral framework wherein 
individual and public interests are reconciled. The philosopher qualifies his 
understanding of individual rights in the essay ‘Law and Morality’ by 
proposing a compelling recipe of equilibrium, “Right is a freedom restricted by 
equality. This basic definition of right combines the individualistic principle 
of freedom and the social principle of equality, so that one can assert that 
right is nothing else than the synthesis of freedom and equality” (Solov’ëv 1966: 
530). In Solov’ëv’s account, right is aimed at balancing “the formal-moral 
interest of individual freedom” and “the material-moral interest of the 
common good” (Solov’ëv 1966: 530-32). The balance between private 
interests and public concerns is determined by the degree of “minimum 
morality,” which is obligatory for everyone and is warranted by the state. 
Although law is an instrument whereby the state can guarantee the 
maintenance of minimum morality among its citizens, the state is not 
empowered, however, to put the ultimate limit on human freedom in virtue 
of the state’s ontologically secondary status with regard to the human being. 
Asserting that individual’s freedom is limited by freedom of other 
individuals, Solov’ëv suggests a universal conception of right. While 
recognizing right as universally inherent in each human individual on the 
ground of man’s creation in the image of God, the philosopher warns 
against the absolutization of right through reducing the universal formula of 
right to its component elements such as freedom, equality, and the common 
good.   
In fact, such an ideal formula of right can be applied only to an ideal 
society where individuals strive tirelessly for moral perfection. In this sense, 
Solov’ëv remains a convinced humanist who believes in the good of human 
nature. He admits the possibility of a thorough moral change of society in a 
non-violent way, i.e. as a result of individuals’ free and rational choice. 
Although social institutions, such as the Church, the family, private 
property, civil law, etc., do play an important role in the moral 
transformation of the social environment, they do not constitute the moral 
foundation of society. It is human individuals that should strive inwardly to 
make social institutions “conformable to the one and only moral standard” 
– “the one unconditional moral ideal of the free union of all in the perfect good” 
(Solov’ëv 2005: 236, 238). Nonetheless, Solov’ëv is fully aware that this 
internal struggle is primarily a moral and free struggle of each individual, in 
which God cannot help men by extricating the evil will. It is the task of 
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humanity to overcome social conflicts by employing “the complex effect of 
the collective evil will” (Solov’ëv 2005: 238). 
Solov’ëv’s idealist belief in individuals’ inherent urge for moral perfection 
and in society’s progress is also evident from his vision of societal 
differentiation. As we have seen in the previous chapter, social scientists 
generally conceive of modern society as differentiated into various social 
subsystems according to their primary functions. As early as in the 
nineteenth century, Solov’ëv already described structural complexity as the 
pivotal characteristic of modern society. However, if the key to societal 
differentiation consists, according to sociologists, in the function performed 
by different social subsystems, the key to Solov’ëv’s tacit hypothesis of 
societal differentiation pertains to moral ideals and moral functions ascribed 
to different social subsystems or, as he calls them, domains. Thus, the 
philosopher correlates his conception of society as the progressive 
realization of the idea of the good with three “fundamental and abiding 
moments of the individually-social life – the religious, the political, and the 
prophetic” (Solov’ëv 2005: 176), depicting the differentiation of society into 
three chief domains. Accordingly, Solov’ëv distinguishes between three 
dimensions of Christ’s service: as the Priest, as the King, and as the 
Prophet. Alluding to these biblical concepts, Solov’ëv suggests dividing 
society’s organization into three major domains: the domain of religion 
symbolized in the figure of the Priest, the domain of state-legal 
administration symbolized in the figure of the King, and the domain of the 
public symbolized in the figure of the Prophet. Obviously, the prophetical 
function is ascribed to sphere in which the public plays a pivotal role. 
Although Solov’ëv does not use the term ‘civil society’ or the ‘public 
sphere,’ his depiction of the prophetic sphere is underpinned by his belief in 
a morally progressive society. At the highest level of moral organization, 
society no longer needs to be guided by the Priest or the King, i.e. by a 
political-legislative apparatus; instead, it is guided by the public, i.e. by best 
minds of society itself. Only such a society, where the public is imbued with 
ultimate authority, is, on Solov’ëv’s account, the realization of the innate 
moral unity of all human beings and the embodiment of the universal 
communion of life. In that way, Solov’ëv clearly identifies a self-organizing, 
highly differentiated, and democratically ruled society with a morally 
superior society. 
To conclude, I want to emphasize that Solov’ëv’s moral philosophy 
reached beyond political-philosophical discourse of the nineteenth century. 
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It continuously provided inspiration for those intellectuals who attempted at 
re-invoking fundamental values and principles entrenched in the concept of 
civil society. One of such attempts has been undertaken by Semën Frank.  
 
4.3.2 The Orthodox Concept of Sobornost’ and Its Realization in Civil 
Society  
 
Frank’s oeuvre belongs to the intellectual tradition of Russian émigrés. 
Although the philosopher lectured at Russian universities in the period 
between 1912 and 1921, he gained more recognition abroad than in his 
motherland. Frank’s European education and working experience 
contributed to his European affiliation. In 1899, Frank left Moscow for 
Germany and returned to Russia when the country was wallowed in the 
revolutionary turmoil. After the Bolsheviks came to power, he moved to 
Paris in 1930 and later, in 1945, settled in London.  
The analysis of Frank’s theory of society is elucidating for the present 
study not only because this theory builds upon the key concepts of Russian 
religious-philosophy, but also because it is characterized by the consistency 
and profoundness typical of West-European philosophy. Such a unique 
combination is present in Frank’s eminent study Spiritual Foundations of 
Society: An Introduction of Social Philosophy,66 which I have chosen for 
examining.   
Three concepts distinguish Frank’s theory of society: first, the primordial 
unity of all human beings, second, the dual-unity of sobornost’ and 
obshchestvennost’, and third, the driving force of divine-human synergy, 
expressed in the concept of Bogochelovechestvo (Godmanhood). Analysis of 
these three concepts would allow us to approach a sociophilosophical 
understanding of civil society as a supratemporal reality and provide a 
religious reading of civil society theory. 
Sharing Solov’ëv’s belief that solidarity and spiritual unity are 
ontologically present in society, Frank concedes, “Social life is not some 
purely external form of human life,” but rather an embodiment of 
“primordial unity” of all individual human beings. Resorting to the concept 
of primordial unity, the philosopher aims to elevate the antagonism between 
‘we’ and ‘I.’ As we remember, the tension between public good and 
individual interests was compellingly exposed by Seligman as the most 
                                               
66 This work was originally written in Russian and published in Paris (1930). Since 1987, it 
became also available in an English translation, which I use. 
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poignant dilemma of any social order in general and of modern civil society 
in particular. For his part, Frank attempts to resolve this tension through 
revealing the intrinsic connectedness of all individuals. This allows him to 
infer that ‘we’ is just as primordial as ‘I’ and claim that the spiritual maturing 
and formation of a human being is possible through communion with 
others, that is, through the circulation of spiritual elements we have in 
common with other people. Frank articulates it most eloquently, “The fact 
that human life in all its domains […] has the form of social life, communal 
being, or cooperation – is the necessary and immanent expression of the most 
profound ontological total-unity, which lies at the base of human being. Man lives 
in society not because ‘many’ individuals ‘join together,’ finding this mode 
of life most convenient for themselves, but because man in his essence is 
inconceivable except as a member of society.” On that account, Frank 
argues that society is not “a derivative unification of separate individuals,” 
but rather is “a genuine integral reality” (Frank 1987: 53-54). 
Despite his adamant belief that the primordial unity lies at the heart of 
human society, Frank acknowledges, nevertheless, a considerable degree of 
plurality and individual autonomy that are obligatory for modern society. In 
order to reconcile the collective and individual principles, the theorist 
distinguishes between two ubiquitous strata of society: the inner stratum, 
which consists in the primordial unity of ‘we,’ and the outer stratum, which 
refers to the superficial, empirical manifestation of social being. When 
considered without its inner connectedness in terms of primordial ‘we,’ 
individual autonomy leads inevitably to the theory of social atomism, being 
conceived in terms of separateness, opposition and antagonism between 
individuals (Frank 1987: 54-55). That is the reason why Frank insists on the 
interconnectedness, the “dual-unity” between the inner and the outer strata 
of society. Frank describes the manner in which the inner and outer strata 
of society relate to each other, by employing the conceptual pair of sobornost’ 
– obshchestvennost’. This is a classical maneuver of a Russian religious 
intellectual.67  
Indeed, Frank is not original by invoking the beloved Orthodox 
Christian concept of conciliarity (sobornost’). As Evert van der Zweerde justly 
argues in his article ‘«Sobornost’» als Gesellschaftsideal bei Vladimir 
                                               
67 An approximate translation of the Russian Sobornost’ into English is ‘conciliarity’ or ‘catholicity.’ 
Obshchestvennost’ can be translated as ‘the public,’ ‘public opinion,’ or ‘public sphere.’ The 
conceptual pair sobornost’ – obshchestvennost’ resembles the conceptual pair of Gemeinschaftlichkeit – 
Gesellschaftlichkeit, which is used in the German scientific parlance. 
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Solov’ev und Pavel Florenskij,’ the concept of sobornost’ can be considered as 
“typical” for the whole Russian Christian-philosophical tradition, as it 
assumes recurrently a key position in the accounts of the majority of 
Russian Orthodoxy-based thinkers, although with a different nuance. For 
instance, if Solov’ëv tends to associate the concept of sobornost’ with the 
concept of All-unity, which becomes in his philosophical framework a 
fundamental metaphysical category, Florenskij accentuates rather a political 
dimension in the concept (van der Zweerde 2001: 225-46). Frank, for his 
part, suggests a new interpretation of the concept of sobornost’ when 
coupling it with the concept of obshchestvennost’.  
Frank’s main concern is to provide evidence for the intrinsic 
connectedness, or the ontological dual-unity, between the two indicated 
strata of society. Although sobornost’ signifies the primordial unity of all 
human beings and constitute the “organically inner” stratum of society, it is 
unthinkable without its external expression in the form of obshchestvennost’, 
“whether it be manifested in the free, random interaction of individuals or 
in the organization of wills in law and power.” Likewise, obshchestvennost’, 
while representing the empirical stratum of social life, “is possible only on 
the basis of that living, inner, organic unity of society which we have called 
sobornost’.” Concisely, Frank claims, the ideal of sobornost’, which permeates 
the spiritual foundations of society, cannot and should not be disconnected 
from the ideal of the public, or obshchestvennost’, which permeates the 
complex differentiated structures of modern society and thus reflects the 
complexity and plurality inherent in the public sphere. On that account, 
sobornost’ and obshchestvennost’ are “not different concrete forms of society but 
different elements of social being which are necessarily present together in 
every society” simultaneously. Hence, using Frank’s sociophilosophical 
terminology, we can conceive of civil society as “the outward expression of 
the inner unity and formedness of society, i.e., its sobornost’ ” (Frank 1987: 
57-58). 
Referring to the constitution of social life, Frank views the dual-unity 
between sobornost’ and obshchestvennost’ as manifested in the “the dual-unity of 
planning and spontaneity” (Frank 1987: 165). Considering planning and 
spontaneity as “two necessary and correlative” principles of social life, 
Frank reveals the expression of these principles in two concrete forms of 
social life: the state and civil society. The state retains an element of 
compulsory organization insofar as it embodies the primordial ideal of 
solidarity; civil society, alternatively, retains an element of spontaneity, as it 
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reflects the organic progressive expression of social life. Frank deduces 
from the dual-unity of planning and spontaneity the normative principles of 
solidarity and freedom, which acquire thereby a new complementary value, 
even when they are no longer considered in the light of the all-absorbing 
principle of “free service.” He elucidates, “The planning of the social unity 
is nothing but an expression of social solidarity in the sphere of conscious 
social will, while the spontaneity of the social unity is the realization of this 
unity in the element of freedom” (Frank 1987: 166).  
Insofar as the state manifests “the unity of planning and organizing 
social will,” its primary function consists in the realization of conscious 
social will through institutionalizing and legalizing this conscious social will 
into common laws and procedures. However, the normative regulatory 
function of the state is restricted with the presence of civil society, which is 
essentially “the empirical substrate of social culture” of spontaneity. On this 
view, Frank qualifies his understanding of the task of the state, conceding 
that the empirical substrate of civil society “can be created, organized and 
planned by the state as little as spiritual life itself can be organized and 
planned.” Hence, the task of the state consists in defending “the freedom of 
this inwardly growing life” and “promoting spiritual growth of society.” 
With this, Frank reveals his adherence to a moderate view on state-society 
relations. Repudiating both socialism and conservatism as two extreme 
attitudes to the balance between the state and civil society, Frank affirms a 
mutual connectedness and complementarity of the two forms of social life. 
The dual-unity between the state and civil society is most valuable for the 
theorist because “the state is as inconceivable without its natural foundation, 
civil society with its spontaneously woven fabric, as civil society is 
inconceivable except as shaped by the planning and organizational activity 
of the state” (Frank 1987: 171).  
Underpinning his understanding of civil society by Orthodox theological 
principles, Frank defines civil society as “a social unity that is formed 
spontaneously from free cooperation, from the free agreement of the wills 
of the individual members of society” (Frank 1987: 172). Thus, he asserts 
“the uneliminability of civil society” with regard to the state (Frank 1987: 
170). However, Frank refutes not the dichotomy between state and society, 
but rather the “atomistic” theory of society, which sees society as a simple 
aggregate of ontologically separate individuals. The philosopher overcomes 
this atomistic theory of society by arguing that “it is precisely the presence 
of the spontaneous ‘molecular’ bondedness between separate elements of 
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society which is evidence of their organic primordial inner unity,” expressed 
in the idea of sobornost’. Accordingly, Frank maintains that the structure of 
civil society resembles rather a molecular and not an atomic structure, “Civil 
society is a kind of molecular social bondedness, inwardly connecting the 
individual elements into a free, plastically flexible whole.” In this molecular 
whole, individuals function not as separate atoms, but rather as “genuine 
members of an organic whole that primordially as it were, in their very 
ontological nature, are called to unity in the form of free interaction and 
mutual approach” (Frank 1987: 172). Accordingly, Frank identifies the 
ontological essence of civil society with its functional and teleological 
meaning as “a necessary form of social cooperation, a form of service, the 
realization of objective truth through the free interaction of the individual 
members of the social whole” (Frank 1987: 172-73).  
Although the objective truth can be fully realized in social life through 
the concept of sobornost’, the earthly incarnation of the individual “makes 
impossible in earthly life the pure realization of sobornost’ in its spiritual 
primordial ground, but demands its expression in the form of 
obshchestvennost’, in the dual-unity of the external organization and external 
interaction of individuals.” Hence, Frank concludes that “sobornost’ is 
empirically realized as obshchestvennost’, as the interaction of separate, 
corporeally isolated individuals” (Frank 1987: 174-75). 
This does not cancel, however, the subordination of the individual 
principle of freedom to the collective principle of service, which is obvious 
from the following observation by Frank, “The individualistic element of 
the social structure […] is not the goal of social life, but precisely only a 
function (although a necessary function) of the supraindividual goal of 
society as a unity. The freedom of individual is not is innate and primordial 
right, but his social obligation.” Here, Frank explicitly refuses to ascribe 
absolute value to individual freedom. Equally, he conceives of public life in 
the framework civil society (obshchestvennost’) as a conditional ‘earthly’ 
realization of the divine-human symbiosis expressed through sobornost’. 
Individual freedom appears then “a form of being conditioned and justified 
by the principle of service.” This is because “not the interests and rights of 
the individual but the interests of service of the truth require the division of 
society into separate law-protected centers of social activity and the 
assurance of an appropriate sphere of freedom for each of these centers” 
(Frank 1987: 173). On this view, Frank’s ‘spiritual’ legitimation of societal 
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differentiation is different from the functionalistic legitimation provided by 
social scientists like Parsons and Luhmann. 
 
4.3.3 Civil Society Revisited from the Perspective of Godmanhood and 
Service 
 
Having sketched Frank’s theory of society, I now intend to address the 
question posed in the introduction to this chapter, namely how the religious 
ideal formulated by Orthodox Christian philosophers relates to civil society 
theory. Frank would agree, I think, that the Christian ideal can be indeed 
employed for a normative validation of civil society, but he would insist on 
the preservation of core theological presumptions in such an application. As 
a Christian philosopher, Frank envisages civil society in a supratemporal 
perspective, whereby the supratemporal and temporal dimensions relate to 
each other in a way corresponding to that in which the Church relates to the 
world. Thereby, he grounds his vision of civil society in Christian ethics.  
Importantly, conceived within a Christian sociophilosophical framework, 
civil society becomes an empirical manifestation of “the supratemporal 
unity of sobornost’ ” (Frank 1987: 65). Endorsing this argument, Frank 
emphatically asserts the centrality of the supratemporal element to social 
life. This allegation obviously challenges Taylor’s thesis of the radical 
secularity of the public sphere, which has been discussed earlier (§ 4.1.1). If 
Taylor contends that all social relationships in the context of the secular 
public sphere need to be understood as temporal, Frank persistently tries to 
surpass the secularity of the public sphere and discern a supratemporal 
dimension in various aspects of social life. He warns that if we confine an 
understanding of society to a complex of social relationships that occur at 
the present moment, “we would miss what is most essential in society and 
would understand nothing else in its life” (Frank 1987: 66). He is convinced 
that the external, temporal aspect of social life conceals the “supratemporal 
unity” of its present behind its past and its future. This supratemporal unity 
of social life should be seen as “an expression of the supratemporality that 
characterizes the consciousness and psychic life of the individual man: 
Human life is possible in general only on the basis of memory and 
foresights,” whereas the present is “only the ideal boundary” between what 
has already been experienced and what is yet to be experienced. Moreover, 
insofar as social memory and social foresight transcend the supratemporality 
of the individual, the social consciousness appears to be “nothing else but 
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the supratemporal unity of supraindividual memory and supraindividual 
goals” (Frank 1987: 66-67). Given the essential “conservatism” and the 
essential “futurism” of social life, society lives in every temporal segment of 
its “present” by “its invisible, inner, supratemporal sobornost’,” so that “every 
visible communion is the empirical aspect of invisible sobornost’ as the 
supratemporal unity of human generations.” It is “the mysterious unity in 
which the past and future live in the present and which forms the enigmatic 
essence of the living organism” that constitutes the “invisible core from 
which society acquires its life-giving force” (Frank 1987: 67). 
Envisaging civil society from the supratemporal perspective, Frank 
explains the temporal dimension of civil society in a way similar to the one 
in which the Church substantiates the existence of the secular world. For 
this purpose, he resorts to the concept of dual-unity between sobornost’ and 
obshchestvennost’, using it here in the context of Orthodox Christian 
ecclesiology. When arguing that sobornost’ is the foundation of all social life, 
Frank inevitably arrives at the conclusion that “religiousness and sobornost’ 
are fundamentally one and the same, that they are two aspects of the same 
all-determining principle of human life” (Frank 1987: 61). If sobornost’ 
corresponds to “the mystical religious feeling of rootedness in the 
mysterious depths of being which embrace the individuals,” the religious 
feeling is accordingly the feeling “of belonging to the absolute principle 
which lies at the base of the universal sobornost’ of being.” On Frank’s 
account, the primordial spiritual unity of people pertains to “a unity of faith, 
a unity of service of the truth and groundedness in superhuman holiness” 
(Frank 1987: 109). Identifying sobornost’ with the unity of faith, Frank points 
at the Church as the embodiment of the idea of sobornost’. Accordingly, he 
explicates the dual-unity between sobornost’ and obshchestvennost’ as the dual-
unity between the Church and the world, visualizing this dual-unity as “the 
fundamental, immanent, and therefore eternal connection” between the 
organic inner core and the empirical external incarnation of social being 
(Frank 1987: 110). 
As we remember, the concept of dual-unity implies differentiation. 
Therefore, sobornost’ should be distinguished from obshchestvennost’ as the 
Church should be distinguished from the world. Frank is convinced that 
despite all “diverse attempts of the social consciousness to change, distort, 
or destroy them,” the difference between these two entities should be 
preserved. Accordingly, he criticizes the two opposite tendencies that 
underlie those attempts. On the one hand, the philosopher rejects the 
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theocratic tendency “to transform the Church from the inward organic, 
invisibly nourishing and directing core of social life into external power over 
society.” On the other hand, he condemns “the opposite effort of the 
‘world’ to reject the principle of the Church […] and to replace it with its 
own empirical social forces and outer organizational measures than 
primordial organic unity, rooted in holiness, which lies at the base of the 
world” (Frank 1987: 111). Succinctly, Frank maintains that the Church, as 
the ultimate embodiment of sobornost’, and a secular society, as grounded in 
the ideal of obshchestvennost’, should not be amalgamated, but need to coexist 
next to each other without losing their ontological characteristics.  
The third and, possibly, the most important meeting point between 
Christian philosophy and civil society theory pertains to the sphere of 
ethics. What is very characteristic of Orthodox Christian philosophy is that 
it envisages civil society through the prism of Christian ethics, specifically, 
through the key concepts of Orthodox moral theology such as holiness, 
Godmanhood, and service. According to the Orthodox moral theological 
teaching, the concept of holiness determines a great deal in the life of 
individual, as well as of society. It also proposes a solution to the core 
dilemma of civil society. When Frank identifies the tension between ‘I’ and 
‘we’ as fundamental to modern social order, his standpoint bears a striking 
resemblance to that held by Seligman, who similarly juxtaposes individual 
interests and the common good as the driving antagonistic forces of civil 
society. Agreeing with Seligman, Frank concedes that “social life is full of 
permanent conflict between the principle of solidarity and the principle of 
individual freedom, between the power that protects the interests of the 
whole and anarchic tendencies, between centripetal and centrifugal forces.” 
Nonetheless, unlike Seligman, Frank believes that “this conflict cannot find 
higher resolution within the conflicting principles themselves” and therefore 
argues that “stable harmony and reconciliation can be found only through 
the groundedness of both principles in a higher principle: the service of 
God, absolute truth” (Frank 1987: 111). In that way, Frank clearly correlates 
the ultimate sources of social order with the Orthodox Christian principle 
of service and grounds his idea of social unity in the ideal of holiness. On 
that account, the reconciliation between public and individual concerns 
becomes attainable when all members of a society perceive their individual 
and collective contribution to the common good as service to the ultimate 
source of existence – God himself.  
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The idea of holiness apparently connects Orthodox moral theology and 
Orthodox anthology, suggesting thereby a new Orthodoxy-inspired vision 
of society. Sharing the conception of human being as an Imago Dei with the 
Judeo-Christian world, Orthodox Christianity develops a unique concept of 
Godmanhood (Bogochelovechestvo), which becomes pivotal in the intellectual 
tradition of Russian religious philosophy. Bogochelovechestvo signifies the dual-
unity of the divine and the human natures in a human individual. The divine 
component induces the individual to pursue the path of moral perfection by 
fulfilling the greatest commandment of all times: to love one’s neighbor. 
The purpose of human life consists in attaining Bogochelovechestvo, which 
implies increasing one’s likeness of God through realizing the ideal of 
Godmanhood and transcending thereby one’s empirical limitations.  
Frank argues that the religious-moral commandment to treat another 
human being as one’s neighbor should underlie all external and non-
voluntary relations between individuals. He conceives of this key principle 
of Christian ethics as the regulatory principle of any social order, “The 
commandment of the maximum intensity and awareness of this inwardly 
intuitive relation to him, this relation which is based on the unity of sobornost’ 
among people.” Hence, the pivotal principle regulating relations among 
individuals is not an external moral norm, but is “absolutely obligatory for 
us precisely because it […] is an expression of the uneliminable and 
necessary foundation of our entire life” (Frank 1987: 59-60).  
In the writings of Orthodox Christian philosophers, this basic Christian 
commandment is interpreted in terms of servicehood. Frank confirms that 
attaining holiness through servicehood constitutes the ultimate aim of an 
(Orthodox) Christian, “The higher purpose of human life consists in human 
nature being completely possessed and permeated by grace-giving spiritual 
forces and therefore in the world being completely dissolved in the Church. 
But the complete realization of this purpose is tantamount to the final 
transfiguration and ‘deification’ of man and, as such, it transcends man’s 
empirical being” (Frank 1987: 112).  
At the same time, this eschatological vision of the world imbues 
Orthodox Christian tradition with certain dualism, which is especially 
perceptible in the general Orthodox underestimation of the world. 
Orthodox theologians tend to think in terms of elevating the world towards 
the divine ideal, instead of lowering the divine ideal and adjusting it to the 
worldly reality. Apparently, Frank also adheres to this general tendency, as 
he claims, “Although ultimately the world, transfigured, must become 
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completely incorporated in Divine-human being, the world, remaining the 
world, cannot incorporate into itself Divine-human being, in the limits and 
distorted forms inherent in the world as such. The whole world must 
become the world in God, but God cannot become completely incorporated in 
the world” (Frank 1987: 112).  
Given this coherent vision of how individuals can be inspired by the 
ideals of sobornost’ and Bogochelovechestvo in order to act morally and 
cooperatively, I wonder which status individual human rights and freedom 
attain in Frank’s religious-philosophical discourse. Formulated more 
concisely, the question is whether Frank’s emphasis on servicehood 
contradicts such fundamental principles of civil society theory as individual 
rights and autonomy.  
Insofar as Frank claims that the ideal of Bogochelovechestvo can be attained 
through free service to God, he tends, in my view, to subordinate the 
principle of individual freedom to the supreme principle of service. The 
philosopher argues, for instance, that genuine freedom is the one that “is 
normally realized as free participation in social life and social creativity as free 
service.” Conceived in this “primordial sociophilosophical sense,” the 
principle of freedom does not coincide with “the specific, particular content 
it acquires in the modern concept of ‘political freedom’.” According to 
Frank, political freedom is secondary with regard to primordial freedom 
understood as free service, “The degree to which the citizens of a society 
must and can be given such freedoms as those of speech and press, 
assembly and unionization, and free participation in elections, depends on 
the concrete spiritual conditions of a given society and cannot be 
determined a priori solely from the general principle of freedom as such.” 
Unsurprisingly, Frank recognizes the only kind of political freedom, namely 
freedom of religious belief, depicting it as “a kind of genuinely primordial 
right, which directly emanates from the principle of freedom as the source 
of spiritual life” (Frank 1987: 138).  
The fact that Frank denies what human society has succeeded to achieve 
with the rise of modern liberalism – namely the universal conception and 
legitimation of human rights and freedoms – is all the more striking when 
considered in contrast to the philosopher’s strong belief in the world as 
saturated by the energies of the divine grace. This is evident from the 
following, “All concrete incarnations of social life have an intermediate 
medium which discloses in varying degrees the permeatednesss of the 
worldly principle by the spirit of holiness. The pure life of grace shines 
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through and acts in the moral law and animates and inspires habits, mores, 
law, and political and social institutions” (Frank 1987: 113). A question 
arises why Frank refuses to discern what he calls “the implicit or explicit 
presence of the principle of holiness” in the institutions, which have been 
established to guarantee human rights and freedoms? This is the move that 
Solov’ëv would have definitely made.  
Presumably, a possible answer lurches in the following argument, “The 
individualistic idea that the individual has the right to a definite, strictly 
fixed, inviolable amount of freedom and to definite forms of its 
manifestation, an idea which is based on the false notion of the ‘innate’ 
rights of man, must be rejected as incompatible with the supreme principle 
of service, which alone can justify the idea of individual freedom.” With that, 
Frank affirms the priority of the principle of service over the principle of 
individual rights and hence diverges from his initial explication of the social-
religious ideal of sobornost’ according to which ‘I’ is as much valuable as ‘we.’ 
In this particular part of Frank’s account, ‘we’ overtly acquire more weight 
than the individual ‘I’, “The very interests of general freedom, of free social 
construction, often require restrictions on individual human ‘rights,’ which 
are always relative and derivative, for they are only a secondary 
manifestation and means for the realization of the principle of service and the 
associated principles of solidarity and freedom” (Frank 1987: 139). 
Nevertheless, I still wonder how any form of social interaction can be 
regarded free if it does not presume a priori freedom of its individual 
creators? If any social formation is grounded in the principle of service, it 
makes this principle obligatory for all individual participants; therefore, their 
service cannot be considered free. While advocating the supreme principle 
of free service, Frank should have suggested, in my view, a more qualified 
balance between free service and individual freedom. Service can be 
rendered genuinely free only when it is offered out of individuals’ free will, 
and not when it is imposed by the spiritual foundation of society in which 
every individual is predetermined to participate.  
 
Conclusion  
 
In the two preceding chapters, I have attempted, firstly, at revitalizing an 
understanding of civil society as a normative model of modern social order 
and, secondly, at providing a sociological embedding for the normative 
concept of civil society. In the present chapter, a religious perspective has 
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been introduced in civil society theory, which allowed us to investigate how 
civil society and religion relate to each other in Western and Eastern 
societies of the Christian origin. We have started with systematizing various 
Western approaches to the problem of the relation between civil society and 
Christian religion in the secular public domain. Next, a historical-
sociological analysis of state-church relations has been provided, with the 
intention of revealing the distinctively Orthodox Christian attitude to the 
idea of secular society and secular state. Finally, a religious reading of civil 
society theory has been suggested on the basis of the intellectual heritage of 
Russian religious-philosophical tradition. 
Analyzing various Western theories concerning the role of religion in the 
public domain, I have tried to argue that Christianity and modern 
secularism, when conceived in connection to the idea of civil society, are 
involved not in a relationship of continuous opposition, but rather in one of 
dynamic mutual influence. The genealogical connectedness of modern 
secularism and Christianity has become clear from the exposition of 
secularity as the foundational principle of an open, non-violent, and tolerant 
civil society (Keane 2000: 10-11; Colas 1997: 6-8). The foundational 
principle of civil society – secularity – was for the first time explicitly 
propagated in European history by the German Protestants who used it as 
the antidote of religious fanaticism. The idea of secular civil society became 
a central category in the epoch of European modernity, when it embodied 
an attempt at a secular normative vision of the social order.  
At the same time, the ideals of tolerance, non-violence, and pluralism 
that underlie the idea of secular civil society are also deeply engraved in the 
Christian theological tradition. This is true if we agree with Taylor that the 
very concept of secularity emerged and still acquires its full meaning in the 
Christian theological framework where it designates the realm strictly 
distinguished from the realm of the divine. The originally Christian 
distinction between the divine and the secular enriched European Christian 
culture with the idea of an independent public sphere, an “extrapolitical” 
realm, as Taylor has called it, which does not coincide with the political 
community (Taylor 1997: 266-67). Hence, the genuinely Christian principle 
of separation between the divine and secular realms facilitated the 
conception of society as an independent “extrapolitical” realm.  
Despite being conceptually grounded in Christian theology, the principle 
of secularity turned to be challenging for the Christian Church, particularly 
when the process of structural differentiation began in modern societies. 
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Discussion differentiation, I have tried to develop an understanding of the 
process of secularization as a sub-process of the general trend of 
differentiation, in the course of which secular spheres of society started to 
claim their autonomy from the sphere of religion. With that, the previous 
dualist division of society into the realms of the sacred and the secular 
gradually disappeared. Due to modern secularization, religion underwent a 
crucial transformation: Once an all-encompassing system, religion became a 
subsystem of society, which started to perceive itself as the all-
encompassing system. The consequences of the secularization process are 
depicted in Casanova’s account of modern secularization. The scholar 
distinguishes three interrelated sub-processes: the process of institutional 
differentiation between the religious and secular spheres, the process of 
decline of religious practices and beliefs, and the process of privatization of 
religion (Casanova 1994: 211). 
Given the depicted structural change, new questions arose: How does 
religion respond to the structural trend of modern secularization, or, put 
differently, what impact does secularization have on the internal dynamics 
and self-identification of religion? And, on the other hand, which role does 
religion play in the secular public sphere of modern society?  
Concerning the first question, I have argued that secularization exerts a 
significant influence on the character and self-identification of religion, as it 
allows religion to become increasingly independent from the secularizing 
society, concentrate on its internal dynamics and intensify its essentialistic 
self-identification. For instance, Weber insightfully described the complex 
process of internal transformation of religion towards an individualized and 
ethicized form of Gesinnungsethik (an ethic of inner conviction). Sharing 
Weber’s view by and large, Taylor enriched it by emphasizing the reflexive 
character that religion acquires under the conditions of modern 
secularization, approaching thereby what he calls “ethics of authenticity” 
(Taylor 2003: 79). Such an individualized understanding of religion is 
necessary in modern societies if one wants to provide sufficient space for 
“the pluralism of subjective religious beliefs” (Casanova 1994: 39). It is also 
indispensable given the non-hierarchical structure of modern differentiated 
societies.  
With that, we have arrived at the question concerning the role of religion 
in the secular public sphere of modern society. Any attempt at positioning 
religion within the system of secular liberal democracy involves the question 
how to reconcile the principle of liberalism, which endorses individual 
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freedom, with the principle of egalitarianism, which proclaims equality 
among all individual citizens (Audi 2000: 5). Relying on the accounts of 
Audi, Keane, and Taylor, we have clarified that the principle of secularity is 
indispensable for the model that grants freedom to every form of 
expression of individual religious belief without creating inequality among 
public forms of expressing one’s religious belief. Moreover, I can but agree 
with Taylor that secularism, as the manifestation of the political principle of 
neutrality, is “a necessity for the democratic life of religiously diverse 
societies,” since the principle of religious neutrality enables the voice of the 
minority to be heard and respected. Otherwise, the tendency “to build the 
common identity around the things that strongly unite people, and these are 
frequently ethnic or religious identities” would lead eventually to an 
“exclusionary, anti-liberal and anti-egalitarian regime” (Taylor 1999: 46).  
Although an open, tolerant, and pluralistic civil society does not 
contradict or limit the principle of religious freedom, it does prescribe 
certain conditions under which religion can assume a legitimate public place 
in liberal democracy. According to Audi, these conditions include the 
institutional separation between Church and state, and the ecclesiastical 
political neutrality. Both conditions aim at sustaining an impartial, tolerant, 
and neutral attitude of the state toward religion, as well as at preventing any 
possible amalgamation of religious and political interests. 
While we have argued that secularism is needed by the liberal democratic 
system to serve as the regulative principle for a multicultural and 
polyconfessional state, we have also considered a situation in which 
secularism is interpreted as a coherent ideology. When interpreted as a 
coherent ideology, secularism is liable to provoke a radicalized reaction on 
the part of religion, expressed in the form of religious fundamentalism. 
Although religious fundamentalists claim to distance themselves from the 
culture of secular modernity, the very phenomenon of religious 
fundamentalism should be regarded in connection to the secularization 
process. Religious fundamentalists depart from an erroneous identification 
of modernization with inexorable secularization, as they are afraid that 
modernization would inevitably lead toward the total banishment of religion 
from the public domain. In contradistinction to the tolerance-inspired 
privatization of religion in the individualized form (like Weber’s ethicization, 
Taylor’s ethics of authenticity, Casanova’s thesis of religion’s functional 
specialization, and Audi’s insistence on political neutrality), fundamentalist 
movements exhibit a sectarian reaction to the banishment of God from the 
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public domain and request the political privatization of religion. Insofar as 
fundamentalists consider religion not as an individual choice, but as a matter 
of state interest, they contradict the principle of religious freedom, which is 
freedom to believe or not to believe. On this view, fundamentalist religious 
movements remain, within civil society theory, a point of contention and 
require an equilibrated and objective investigation.  
Having considered the dynamic relationship of modern secularism and 
Christianity in connection to the idea of civil society, I have consequently 
concretized the theoretical discussion by focusing on the history of 
secularization in Russia. I decided to redirect attention to the relationship 
between secular state, society, and the Church in the history of Russia 
because I intended to reveal the Eastern Christian attitude to the problem of 
secularization. The analysis of the general dynamics of the secularization 
process in Russia has demonstrated the continuous influence of the two 
important factors: the theocratic legacy of Byzantine symphonia and the 
radical modernization instigated by Peter the Great. The denoted factors 
point at the underlying tendency in the history of secularization in Russia. 
Namely, the modernizing reforms, which were aimed at adjusting Russia to 
the West-European standards, were systematically undertaken in a top-
down way whereby political authority was the one to sanction the reforms, 
while society was destined to accept the instigated reforms and policies. As I 
have tried to argue, the process of secularization in Russia pertains in a 
much lesser degree, as it was the case in Western Europe, to the 
problematic relationship between an independent secularizing society and 
the Church. On the contrary, the secularization process in Russia process 
gets to the core of the troubled relationship between the political and 
ecclesiastical authorities. 
Such a conclusion makes applying the mainstream secularization theory 
to the case of Russia even more interesting, as it provides a new perspective 
on Casanova’s thesis of privatization of religion. I suppose that the way in 
which religion became privatized explains the main difference between 
Russian and West-European societies. In the West, privatization of religion 
can be conceived “as a historical option,” “preferred internally from within 
religion as result of modern processes of religious rationalization” 
(Casanova 1994: 215). This tendency toward privatization appears then as a 
natural option concordant with the individualistic and reflexive form of 
religion in the modern West. Thereby, the emergence of the secular public 
sphere has been a determinate factor in the process of privatization of 
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religion. Insofar as society became increasingly autonomous from the 
tutelage of both the state and the Church, new institutional forms were 
established with a view to protecting the distinction between the private and 
the public and thereby to securing the values of liberalism and 
individualism. Consequently, the emancipation of secular spheres from 
religious institutions and norms triggered religion to develop its own 
institutional autonomy and retreat into the sphere determined by its own 
intrinsic functional dynamics (Casanova 1994: 212).  
Subsequently, the process of privatization of religion assumed a 
normative dimension. As we can remember from the previous discussion, 
individual rights to privacy and to freedom of conscience became the 
keystones of the normative idea of civil society. Referring to the normative 
role of religion in the public domain, Casanova insists on the juridical-
constitutional separation between religion and politics but adds that this 
separation proves insufficient, however, to guarantee freedom of the state 
from religion, as well as freedom of conscience from both the state and 
organized religion. For this purpose, the liberal social system requires 
religion to be privatized in order to protect the right to privacy and freedom 
of conscience from religion. The crux of Casanova’s argument consists in 
his claim that civil society allows religion to “enter the public sphere and 
assume a public form only if it accepts the inviolable right to privacy and 
the sanctity of the principle of freedom of conscience” (Casanova 1994: 57). 
On this account, privatization of modern religion obtains “normative 
foundations in the liberal model of the public sphere and in the rigidly 
juridical separation of the private and public spheres” (Casanova 1994: 58). 
Privatization of religion occurred in Russia in a fairly different manner. If 
in the West, it occurred as the natural outcome of society’s emancipation 
from the surveillance of the Church, in Russia, the process of privatization 
of religion, or, more specifically, of the ROC, occurred as the outcome of 
religious absolutism of the state. The Russian state persistently sought to 
gain control over the ecclesiastical structures: first, in Kievan Rus’, through 
implementing the model of Byzantine symphonia, subsequently, during 
Peter’s epoch of rapid modernization, through abolishing the institute of 
patriarchate and imposing the anti-canonical semi-secular organ called the 
Holy Synod. After the two-hundred-year Synodal period, the state’s 
suppression of the Church became painfully obvious during the Soviet 
regime, when religious citizens were blatantly persecuted by state 
authorities.  
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As a result of the consistent privatization of religion by the state, the 
Church in Russia has developed a distinctive coping mechanism. In reaction 
to the enforced secularization, the Church intensified its self-definition in 
essentialistic terms, conceiving of itself as an ultimately otherworldly 
community, ontologically independent from worldly power of the state. 
Insofar as the institute of the ROC was consistently subordinated to the 
state, the Church became simultaneously liberated from the necessity to 
secularize itself by responding to emergent problems of the increasingly 
secularizing society. At the same time, this dependent position allowed the 
Church to contemplate on fundamental theological questions. I suggest that 
this is the reason why Orthodox theology systematically neglected a social 
dimension in theological issues but achieved such a high stance in the fields 
of asceticism, mysticism, spirituality, eschatology, ecclesiology, and religious 
philosophy. This also explains why nowadays the ROC still tends to 
produce dubious answers to the unresolved dilemma of how to perceive the 
secular character of the contemporary democratic state and civil society: 
Russian Orthodoxy lacks the long-term tradition of social ethics. 
Despite the general dualist attitude of the Orthodox Church toward the 
secular world, the liberal thought and an intelligent public critique 
characterized the period of religious-philosophical renaissance in late 
imperial Russia. In particular, the dawn of religious-philosophy testified to 
the genuine interest that Orthodox intellectuals took in their direct social 
and political environment. The rise of the public sphere and independent 
civil society, instigated by the Great Reforms of Alexander II, inspired 
Solov’ëv and Frank to elaborate an Orthodox Christian conception of civil 
society.  
Attempting to reconcile a modern secular conception of society with the 
core dogmas of Orthodox theology, these philosophers succeeded to 
formulate, from within the Orthodox Christian tradition, a solid legal and 
moral framework where the liberal ethos of pluralistic and tolerant civil 
society would fit in. The analysis of their theories has disclosed certain 
tensions and discrepancies, like, for instance, Frank’s subordination of the 
liberal principle of individual freedom to the Orthodox principle of 
servicehood. However, neither Solov’ëv nor Frank meant to devaluate 
secularity and autonomy of civil society, but rather sought to discover 
religious-moral foundations for civil society and thereby to contribute to the 
general open-mindedness that characterized the whole generation of 
Russian pre-revolutionary and, subsequently, émigré intelligentsia. In their 
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search for foundational principles, Solov’ëv and Frank invoked the pivotal 
concepts of Orthodox Christian philosophy: conciliarity, Godmanhood, and 
servicehood. The concept of sobornost’ (conciliarity) means the ontological 
total-unity of all human individuals and is expressed in the empirical form of 
obshchestvennost’ (the public, or, more specifically, civil society). The concept 
of Godmanhood (Bogochelovechestvo) legitimizes moral struggle for perfection 
as the highest purpose of human life, whereas the concept of servicehood 
denotes a kind of solidarity and balances the principle of individual freedom 
by the principle of equality.   
The analysis of these theological concepts allowed me to address a 
pertinent problem of formulating certain foundational principles that the 
normative idea and social reality of civil society rest upon. Various 
arguments whereby theorists endorse the normativity of civil society can be 
roughly categorized into two main groups, namely secular and religious 
arguments. Most importantly, these seemingly opposite arguments can be 
employed to uphold one and the same ideal – the ideal of tolerant, 
pluralistic, and civil society, where the principle of individual freedom co-
exists with the principle of solidarity and the common good. 
 
  
5 
 
Civil Society in Post-Soviet Russia: 
Institutional Weakness in the  
Context of Public Morality 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Russia’s transition to democracy and civil society has confronted scholars 
with pertinent questions such as: On which theoretical and practical 
foundations do relatively successful Western democracies and civil societies 
actually rest? Are these foundations (re)producible in principle? And, if so, 
do these reproduced preconditions create sufficient ground for civil 
societies to rise and flourish in a post-communist context? These questions 
have been on the agenda of both academics and policy-makers during the 
last two decades. A systematic and comparative reassessment of their 
contributions constitutes the general objective of the present chapter. I 
consider such a reassessment necessary, as it allows evaluating the progress 
that the democratic project has achieved in post-Soviet Russia since the 
transition.  
In comparison to the experience of other post-communist countries, the 
evolution of civil society in post-Soviet Russia is even more peculiar owing 
to two important factors. First, Russia’s experience of the communist 
regime was significantly longer than that of other countries of East-Central 
Europe, such as Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Rumania, 
where the communist regime was imposed after World War II. The 
enduring legacy of more than seventy years of communism in Russia (1917-
CIVIL SOCIETY IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA 
226 
 
91) renders the transformations that occurred in the spheres of politics, the 
economy, culture, and religion even more difficult, but at the same time, 
more radical and therefore interesting to study.68 The second decisive factor 
refers, in my opinion, to the distinctive religious-cultural identity of Russia 
and has to do with the pivotal role of Orthodox Christianity in the country’s 
history. On this view, I presume that the intended analysis of main 
achievements and failures of Russian democracy necessitates consideration 
of the delineated factors. That is why these two factors will be the focus of 
the present and of the next chapters. In the present chapter, I shall address 
the problem of the communist legacy at the level of institutional and moral 
transformations in post-Soviet Russia, whereas in the next chapter, I shall 
examine the civil role of Orthodox Christianity and elucidate the theological 
conceptions that determine the specifics of Russian political and social 
ethics. 
If we cast a general glance on the contemporary geo-political map of the 
world, we would not be able to claim that Russia is lagging behind Western 
democracies. Over the last two decades, the country seems to have survived 
the liberal reforms and have reorganized its socio-political and economic life 
in accordance to the democratic constitution. However, despite Russia’s 
break-through to democracy and a market economy, the initiated reforms 
have not yet exerted a profound and lasting influence on major political and 
social institutes, through which democratic polity, civil society, and free 
market operate. To explain this incongruence, I suggest that the more 
organized civil society is at the institutional level and the denser and more 
complex its network is, the more receptive society is to democratic 
transformations. Democratic transformations entail the establishment of 
new institutional forms, among which the rule of law, the market economy, 
the constitutional-legislative system, private property, and, last but not the 
least, a vibrant and independent public sphere. The latter is a normative 
prerequisite for the emergence of civil society because the public sphere is 
exactly the locus where communication between the democratic state and its 
citizens occurs. With regard to contemporary Russian democracy, we can 
make the following observation: Although the objective preconditions for 
the transition towards a democratic polity and a market economy have been 
                                               
68 To illustrate this point, much corroborative research can be relied on. For instance, Otto Latsis 
emphasizes that the previous socialist Soviet mentality has been the ruling mentality in Russia for 
a longer period than in any other country of the world and has been continuously reconfirmed by 
not only mythological, but also real achievements, such as the victory in the Great Patriotic War 
(i.e., the Russian equivalent for World War II), or space exploration (Latsis 2003: 21).   
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created, the actual democratization and liberalization of the post-communist 
society did not follow with an expected speed. Logically, this problem 
attracted attention of many scholars.  
Institutional weakness is frequently stipulated by scholars as one of the 
main causes of the delayed development of civil society in post-Soviet 
Russia. The growing awareness among scholars is evident from recent 
studies. Thus, German Diligenskij asserts that contemporary Russian civil 
society is still in “an embryonic stadium of development” because the 
institutional transformations occurred only at the level of microstructures. 
However, these are exactly macrostructures that urgently need being 
reformed by separate uncoordinated initiatives coming from civil society 
(Koval 2001: 104).69 Similarly, in the article ‘What Kind of Civil Society 
Exists in Russia?’,70 Dianne Schmidt identifies the problem of institutional 
weakness with the structural “atomization” of civil society. She concedes 
that Russian civil society exists rather in the form of separate islands than in 
the form of network constructions (Schmidt 2006: 9-10). The problem of 
institutional weakness inhibits also the lack of innovative potential, which is 
typical of post-communist societies in general. This standpoint is central to 
Tat’jana Zaslavskaja’s distinguished study The Societal Transformation of Russian 
Society: An Action-Structural Conception.71 On Zaslavskaja’s account, the 
solution consists in a new cycle of vital democratic reforms (Zaslavskaja 
2002: 503). The aim of these subsequent democratic reforms is to create an 
all-embracing institutional framework, which would allow civil society 
organizations to function at the macro-level of political, economic, and 
societal processes.   
My particular interest in the institutional aspect of contemporary Russian 
civil society has been provoked by the emerging awareness among scholars 
that the very focus of their research needs to be shifted. This awareness has 
been correctly noticed by Schmidt (Schmidt 2006: 10). If previously, 
scholars focused on the positive influence of civil society on the process of 
democratization in post-Soviet countries, nowadays they discover the 
opposite causal relation. The question at stake pertains to the stimulating 
influence of democratic transformations on the development of civil 
                                               
69 Б. Коваль (ред.), Гражданское общество в России: проблемы самоопределения и развития. 
Материалы научной конференции, Москва 7 дек. 2000 (2001). 
70 Диана Шмидт, «Какое гражданское общество существует в России?» // Pro et Contra 
(Январь – февраль 2006). 
71 Татьяна Заславская, Социетальная трансформация российского общества: деятельно-структурная 
концепция (2002). 
CIVIL SOCIETY IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA 
228 
 
society. If during the perestrojka period and the early 1990s, the term ‘civil 
society’ was employed as a panacea against all post-communist diseases, 
now it is used to evaluate the success of the institutional changes in 
democratic Russia. Scholars tend to regard new democratic institutions as 
feasible manifestations of civil society. The establishment of democratic 
institutions is, however, difficult given the unyielding moral attitudes typical 
of the majority of post-communist citizens.  
Given the above, I define the aim of the present chapter as twofold: first, 
to reveal the complexity of problems that accompanied Russia’s transition 
to democracy and civil society, and second, to explain the causes of the 
indicated problems by discussing the institutional weakness of 
contemporary Russian civil society in the context of public morality of post-
communist citizens. The central question of the chapter can be succinctly 
formulated as follows: How can we assess the process of institutional 
transformation that Russian society has undergone in the span of the last 
twenty years? The posed question entails a complex approach, as it pertains 
to four interconnected levels of analysis. Firstly, I shall spell out the 
relationship between civil society and political power in Russian democracy 
(5.1). Next, I shall analyze the emergence of civil society in the context of 
socio-economic reforms that accompanied Russia’s transition to democracy 
and a market economy, with a specific focus on the formation of the middle 
class (5.2). In addition to the analysis of political and economic problems, I 
shall provide a moral assessment of the institutional weakness of civil 
society and discuss the significance of trust for a liberal democratic system 
in general and for Russia’s democratic project in particular (5.3). Finally, I 
shall reveal the influence of institutional transformations on individual and 
public morality in Russian society today (5.4).   
 
5.1  Civil Society and the Democratic State  
 
The terms ‘imitation democracy’ and a ‘controlled,’ or ‘coordinated,’ civil 
society have became immensely popular with those contemporary Russian 
and Western political analysts who choose to remain critical and 
independent in their evaluations. The recurring use of these terms testifies 
to the disappointment of Russian citizens who hailed, some twenty years 
ago, the country’s revolutionary transition from socialist communism to 
liberal democracy. After two terms of Vladimir Putin’s presidency, scholars 
express their fear and critique concerning the restoration of authoritarian 
rule. Analyzing these critical accounts, I intend to answer the following 
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questions: Under which circumstances did imitation democracy and a 
controlled civil society emerge in Russia? (§ 5.1.1) Is the fear of 
authoritarianism justifiable, given the current political context? Which 
arguments do the critics employ to characterize the contemporary political 
context by such terms as ‘imitation democracy’ and a parody on 
independent and robust civil society? (§ 5.1.2) Finally, what are the causes of 
the restoration of authoritarian regime in post-Soviet Russia and what are 
the prospects of the democratic project in future Russia? (§ 5.1.3) 
 
5.1.1 Russia’s Transition to Democracy  
  
The question of how imitation democracy and a controlled civil society 
emerged in Russia has to do with the way in which the country moved to 
democracy. According to the contemporary Russian legal and political 
scholar Andrej Medushevskij, Russia’s transition to democracy occurred 
under the conditions of “the constitutional crisis.” In the article ‘The 
Russian Model of Constitutional Transformations in a Comparative 
Perspective,’72 the scholar argues that the adoption of the democratic 
constitution in 1993 was accompanied by the process of accelerated 
politico-legal modernization of the post-communist society. To support this 
claim, Medushevskij points at the crucial difference between two models of 
constitutional transformation from an authoritarian regime toward 
democracy. The first model depicts constitutional transformation under the 
conditions of deliberative democracy and presumes public consensus. 
Alternatively, the second model depicts constitutional transformation as a 
result of civil conflicts and of the subsequent domination of one political 
party. Medushevskij specifies this model as “delegated democracy,” 
asserting that it has been reproduced in Russia’s democratic project 
(Medushevskij 2003: 33-34). 
Medushevskij’s analysis clarifies an important causal connection in the 
problematic rise of Russian civil society. Insofar as Russia’s transition to 
democracy occurred as a consequence of the constitutional crisis, the new 
democratic regime was formed under the conditions of a weak civil society, 
that is, without broad public involvement in major politico-constitutional 
decisions and thus without due public deliberation. However, the normative 
model of democracy is based on public consensus and thus is premised on 
                                               
72 Андрей Медушевский, «Российская модель конституционных преобразований в 
сравнительной перспективе» // Проблемы становления гражданского общества в России (2003). 
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an effective and robust civil society, whereby the public is free to articulate 
its opinion openly and effectively. This essential condition was missing in 
Russia in the early 1990s. In his contribution ‘Russia’s Fourth Transition,’ 
Steven Fish correctly observes that although Russia witnessed, during the 
Gorbachev era, “the rise of myriad organizations growing of social 
movements, most of which focused their energies on bringing down the 
communist regime and ushering in some form of democracy, it never 
produced a well-developed civil society of the type found in the West or in 
many developing countries” (Fish 1994: 31). After the period of remarkable 
spontaneous mobilization in the public sphere between 1989 and 1991, the 
nascent civil society turned to be short-lived. This is because “most of the 
groups that spearheaded the democratic movement during the 
communism’s twilight have not fared well in the post-Soviet setting. Instead 
of evolving into more coherent and better-organized formations many have 
weakened and fragmented, or even disappeared altogether” (Fish 1994: 32).  
Critique of Russia’s transition to democracy also underlies Lilia 
Shevtsova’s recent study Russia – Lost in Translation. The Yeltsyn and Putin 
Legacies. Shevtsova reveals that although Boris El’tsyn’s appeal to democracy 
attained wide public support during the coup in August 1991, the nascent 
democratic consolidation was trampled upon shortly afterwards, when 
El’tsyn’s military horde suppressed the Parliament during the assault of the 
White House in October 1993. As a result of the forced resolution of the 
opposition between the executive and representative powers, the 
“superpresidency […] was enshrined in a new constitution adopted in 
December 1993” (Shevtsova 2007: 17). Dmitrij Furman concedes, for his 
part, that in Russia the democratic movement came to power by employing 
an undemocratic unlawful method of overpowering the alternative political 
minority. In Furman’s estimation, the militant usurpation of political power 
by the democratic movement has determined the character of the emergent 
post-communist political system (Furman 2003: 25). Indeed, as Shevtsova’s 
analysis reveals, El’tsyn’s exercise of power started to assume, since 1993, a 
distinct authoritarian edifice but remained, nonetheless, within the legal 
framework of constitutional democracy. She succinctly summarizes the 
outcomes of El’tsyn’s legacy, “Power remained personalized and 
monolithic. There had been no dispersing of authority among the branches 
of government. The Russian leader continued to hold the main levels of 
control. He was elected, but he was not accountable to the electorate,” and, 
most sadly, “state interests retained their primacy over those of the 
individual and society” (Shevtsova 2007: 3). Moreover, the El’tsyn 
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administration did not have a clear strategic plan, as it struggled for self-
preservation in the face of public disappointment with the government and 
regular outbursts of protest. 
Thus, the announcement of the transition to democracy occurred in 
Russia, as Medushevskij justly claims, without a due preparation and 
therefore led to “the acute crisis of legitimacy and the schism of the ruling 
elite.” On the legal part, the constitutional crisis entailed the discrepancy 
between the constitution and the political reality, as it signaled the situation 
when the law lost its legitimacy. If in most countries of Southern and 
Eastern Europe, the process of democratic transformation followed the 
model of consensus between social movements and political parties, in 
Russia the same process resembled rather the model of the rupture of legal 
continuity. This meant that “the adoption of the Democratic Constitution 
of the Russian Federation in 1993 was the result not of the constitutional 
reform, but of the constitutional revolution, whereby the winning party has 
enforced its will upon the losing parties” (Medushevskij 2003: 34-35).  
The fact that the democratic constitution has been adopted in Russia by 
the authoritarian methods is not new for Russian political history. Political 
authority frequently took the lead in taking decisions during periods of 
political instability. The tendency toward reforming society in a top-down 
manner is evident from the crucial moments in the political history of 
Russia, such as, for instance, the modernizing reforms of Peter the Great 
and Alexander II (considered earlier in § 4.2.2 and § 4.2.3). During the 
recent transition to democracy, political authority again took the lead and 
promised to sustain social order and stability, juxtaposing anarchy and chaos 
as appalling alternatives of the newly established democratic rule. 
Medushevskij astutely observes that the paradox of constitutional 
transformation consists in the explicit incongruence between the noble 
democratic goal of proclaiming the Rechtsstaat and the undemocratic means 
of attaining this goal (Medushevskij 2003: 43). Obviously, the political-
constitutional regime in contemporary Russia retains this paradoxical 
combination. On the one hand, it declares and guarantees citizens’ rights, 
but on the other hand, it has been brought to life by the decision of political 
authority.  
In view of the above, Shevtsova is right when asserting that 
notwithstanding the establishment of the democratic regime and the 
adoption of the Democratic Constitution in 1993, the foundational principle 
of sovereign power, or derzhavnichestvo, has remained unaltered. In the 
scholar’s opinion, the El’tsyn administration was based on “a hybrid system 
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that regulates relations between the regime and society on the basis of 
conflicting and irreconcilable principles: state authorities are elected, but 
candidates to elective office are appointed from above, and elections are 
manipulated; the rule of law is enshrined in the constitution, but 
surreptitious deals are the order of the day; although society has a federal 
structure, the center dictates policy to the regions; there is a free market, but 
officials constantly meddle in the economy” (Shevtsova 2007: 4). Such a 
hybrid system of government administration, as combining democratic and 
authoritarian strategies, did not only characterize the first term of El’tsyn’s 
presidency, but also lingered through the second term, following the 
managed elections in 1996. 
This short sketch of El’tsyn’s legacy leaves little doubt whether the first 
democratic president has secured the country’s successful transition to a 
free market economy and democracy. Nonetheless, the difference between 
the evaluations made by Western and Russian scholars is astonishing. 
Shevtsova correctly notices that Western assessments are prevailingly more 
positive than are those of the Russians (Shevtsova 2007: 29). Indeed, while 
Western analysts were external observers of Russia’s transition to a market 
economy, Russian scholars were actually experiencing all the difficulties of 
the transition. In the course of the liberal reforms during the 1990s, a clear 
preponderance of Russian intellectuals, scholars and professionals struggled 
to survive when all major public sectors, sponsored previously the Soviet 
budget, became almost bankrupt. It would be no exaggeration to say that 
the memories of El’tsyn’s period are still haunting most Russians, which is 
also confirmed by public surveys conducted by the Levada Center. 
According to the results of the surveys, in 2000, 56 percent of respondents 
evaluated El’tsyn’s presidency as a negative experience and a disaster; by 
2006, the percentage of the disappointed increased up to 70 percent. A 
positive assessment of El’tsyn’s legacy was given in 2000 by 18 percent of 
respondents; by 2006, this number decreased to 13 percent (Shevtsova 
2007: 28).  
On the eve of 2000, El’tsyn handled his presidency to Vladimir Putin. 
Thereby, “the manner in which power was handled over to his successor 
only emphasized the authoritarian complexion of the system Boris El’tsyn 
had created,” as El’tsyn’s hasty departure and the indisputable appointment 
of the new president “had little in common with a democratic transfer of 
power” (Shevtsova 2007: 27). Nevertheless, El’tsyn and Putin interpreted 
democracy quite differently. Shevtsova astutely compares their conceptions 
of democracy, “If El’tsyn’s model can be classified as a moderately 
CIVIL SOCIETY IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA 
233 
 
authoritarian oligarchic regime, then Putin’s rule resembles the bureaucratic-
authoritarian regimes of Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s.” Putin 
established “a system of government under which power is concentrated in 
the hands of a leader who relies on the bureaucracy, security forces, and big 
business” and which works under the condition that these major branches 
are loyal and cooperative toward the political leader (Shevtsova 2007: 40-
41). Indeed, immediately after being officially elected as the president, Putin 
initiated “recentralization of power” by spreading presidential control over 
the independent mass media, the courts, the Federation Council, the Duma, 
and security services (Shevtsova 2007: 41-42).  
How did Putin succeed to gain such immense public support? Insofar as 
the overwhelming majority of ordinary Russians were tied of the turbulent 
reforms during the 1990s, they began to long for stability, certainty, and 
order. Putin was the adequate political figure to meet these public 
requirements, as he proposed to lead the country out of crisis and chaos, 
although at the price of restricting democratic liberties. Thus, when 
Russians were confronted with a choice between chaos but liberty or order 
but curtailed liberty, the nation demonstratively opted for the second 
option. This choice was also influenced by the schism between the upper 
and lower strata in post-El’styn’s Russia. Sergej Kuleshov and Andrej 
Medushevskij clarify in the study Russia in the System of World Civilizations73 
that both the ruling elite and ordinary people obviously lacked the ability to 
lead a tolerant public dialog. The ruling elite turned to populism, neglecting 
thereby basic norms of democratic legality and political ethics, whereas 
ordinary people decided to sacrifice democratic values in the name of 
“order and discipline” (Kuleshov and Medushevskij 2005: 717).  
 
5.1.2 ‘Imitation Democracy’ and a Controlled Civil Society 
 
Obviously, the entrenchment of Putin’s bureaucratic-authoritarian model of 
democracy exerted much influence on the public sphere and civil society. In 
his highly informative study Russian Politics and Society, Richard Sakwa justly 
observes that “one of the key questions of the democratic transition in 
Russia was how society was to be integrated into the post-communist 
political order.” In Sakwa’s opinion, “the experience of democratization in 
Russia demonstrated that the autonomous representation of social interests 
was subsumed into a broader process of regime consolidation, and 
                                               
73 Сергей Кулешов и Андрей Медушевский, Россия в системе мировых цивилизаций (2005).  
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independent civil society associations were eclipsed” (Sakwa 2008: 330). The 
significant decrease of independent public organizations was ‘compensated’ 
by the intensive growth of the bureaucracy. This allows Sakwa to avert that 
“the reconstruction of state authority in the 2000s was accompanied by ever 
tighter regulation of public life in general, and civic activity in particular” 
(Sakwa 2008: 341). Nonetheless, political power intended to stimulate the 
development of civil society. For this purpose, as Shevtsova notices, “the 
center managed […] to rally around itself servile social groups that were 
willing to support every initiative the Kremlin took. A special forum was 
created for the most loyal: the Public Chamber, whose function was to 
mimic civil society” (Shevtsova 2007: 47). The simulative character of state-
controlled organizations of civil society became an axiom for many other 
scholars. Maria Lipman and Nikolaj Petrov, Russian scholars affiliated with 
the Carnegie Moscow Center, confirm in their recent study Society and 
Citizens in 2008-201074 that the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation 
was designed as “a kind of ministry of civil society,” as “a controlled voice 
of publicity” (Lipman & Petrov 2010: 22). 
Hence, civil society in Putin’s Russia assumed a hybrid model comprising 
the characteristics of public openness and independent judgment on the one 
hand, and the characteristics of managed civic activity on the other. With 
that, the relations between the spheres of politics and civil society became 
increasingly regulated by what Sakwa calls “the technocratic ethos” of the 
Putin presidency, implying that Putin’s understanding of democracy “did 
not repudiate democracy but it did encourage a para-constitutional 
bypassing of the constitution. Putin’s system was legalistic, but it often acted 
in a spirit contrary to that of constitutionalism” (Sakwa 2008: 341). 
If the greatest disaster of El’tsyn’s presidency can be associated with the 
systemic crisis and the emergence of oligarchism, the main problems of 
Putin’s presidency were the unprecedented expansion of the state 
bureaucracy and the imitative character of core democratic institutions, such 
as civil society, the rule of law, the judicial system, the public prosecutor’s 
office, and the free press. In this regard, it is vital to understand the 
implications of imitation democracy for the life of society. In general, 
imitation democracy entails “the retention of the formal institutions of 
democracy in order to conceal authoritarian, oligarchic, or bureaucratic 
tendencies and most often all three at once”; this leads to the public 
denouncement and distrust of the whole system of government 
                                               
74 Мария Липман и Николай Петров (ред.) Общество и граждане в 2008—2010 гг. (2010).  
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administration (Shevtsova 2007: 49). Under the conditions of pervasive 
public distrust, the political leader has no other option than to criticize the 
seemingly powerful but ineffective system of bureaucratic administration. 
Nonetheless, the president’s critique does not improve the situation because 
the bureaucratic apparatus has no stable and developed system of 
democratic institutions to rely on. In result, “Putin continues to distance 
himself successfully from his apparatchiks in the eyes of the populace […] 
meanwhile the bureaucracy has society firmly ensnared in its tentacles” 
(Shevtsova 2007: 59). 
I suppose, the key remedy to overcome imitation democracy is the 
reinvigoration of people’s trust in government or, using the concepts of 
liberal democratic theory, the reinvigoration of an understanding of 
government as trust. Because, unless citizens regain trust in democratic 
principles and democratic institutions, the political system will be bound to 
proceed on artificial politics and simulated public debate and therefore will 
not be able to become effective and responsive to the interests and needs of 
the electorate. However, instead of the reinvigoration of trust in the 
democratic system, Putin made his choice in favor of the “imitation” of the 
democratic system. Shevtsova clarifies, “In the Russian case we are dealing 
not with the ‘collapse’ of democracy, as many think, but with the 
deliberative use of democratic and liberal institutions in order to conceal 
traditional power arrangements” (Shevtsova 2007: 50). In essence, the 
system of government administration and the nature of political power have 
not radically changed with the transition to democracy. This conclusion is 
also corroborated by Sakwa’s assessment of the Putin administration as “the 
heir of the oversight functions once fulfilled by the Party apparatus.” 
Furthermore, the scholar notices, the preservation of traditional power 
arrangements is mainly maintained by the executive power itself. When 
“executive power is […] exercised by the president and the government,” 
there emerges “a dual executive system with an unclear relationship between 
the two,” which is the case in Russia. The constitution endows the president 
with control over foreign and domestic policy, whereas the government, 
analogous with its Soviet and Tsarist predecessors, remains traditionally 
restricted to managing the economy and the social sphere (Sakwa 2008: 
114).   
The overt indicators of imitation democracy can be specified, according 
to Shevtsova, as three interdependent dysfunctions, namely: corruption, 
centralization of resources, and favoritism. All three dysfunctions are 
evident in present-day Russia. First and foremost, Shevtsova reveals how 
CIVIL SOCIETY IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA 
236 
 
“the burgeoning of officialdom is accompanied by a burgeoning of its 
corruption” by arguing that “Russian corruption received its boost when the 
state authorities returned to the mechanism of appointing officials on the 
basis of their loyalty to the leader rather than their professional 
competence” (Shevtsova 2007: 59). With Russia’s transition to democracy 
and a market economy, the bureaucracy managed to get control over the 
corporate sector. As a result of its amalgamation with governmental 
structures, business lost its independence and public accountability, which 
became more than ever notorious during the privatization in the early 
1990s. In fact, Shevtsova correctly observes, “the merging of power and 
business was just one more manifestation of the principle of indivisibility” 
of political power (Shevtsova 2007: 3). The centralization of political power 
gave impetus to the subsequent centralization of financial and economic 
recourses. However, this trend is dangerous because the redistribution of 
economic resources between the center and the regions, with a clear 
centralization of financial recourses in Moscow, “could become the source 
of growing social dissatisfaction and even turmoil in the regions in the 
future” (Shevtsova 2007: 61).  
Moreover, the Russian political system is affected by “one more 
inevitable consequence of personalized power – favoritism,” which also 
testifies to the underdevelopment of democratic institutions and civil 
society. On the one hand, the formation of what Shevtsova calls “a political 
family” or “kitchen cabinet” is the unavoidable upshot of “the technical 
impossibility of the leader’s fully exercising all his tremendous powers.” On 
the other hand, “the elimination of independent institutions by the 
executive makes the executive itself dependent on random individuals in the 
service of the presidency” (Shevtsova 2007: 61). The formation of “the 
political family” consolidates gemeinschaftliche dependence of the leader on his 
favorites and, as a result, contradicts the system of governance by chief 
officials who are democratically elected according to their professional 
qualities. In the end, “the leader, with no institutions to back him up, 
inevitably tends to convert functional relations to personal relationships 
based on trust” (Shevtsova 2007: 62). Using the German sociological 
parlance, I define the described process as the Vergemeinschaftung of relations 
within the political system. Insofar as the Vergemeinschaftung of political 
relations is founded on the combination of authoritarianism and favoritism, 
the political leader is bound to balance between the trust in his favorites and 
the fear of betrayal. The stability of such a political system is even more at 
risk when institutions are immature and civil society is weak, because then 
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the dysfunctions within the political system reach neither the leader’s 
controlling organ nor the public. Shevtsova explicates that the difference 
between institutionally developed and institutionally underdeveloped 
democracies consists in “that in developed democracies there are systemic 
checks, among them freedom of the press, political opposition, and 
independent institutions that prevent favorites from taking over the 
dominating the system.” Alternatively, if these systemic checks are absent, 
“the authority of the state is inevitably privatized by the leader’s entourage, 
sometimes without the leader’s even noticing” (Shevtsova 2007: 62). In this 
case, we are dealing with underdeveloped democracies, manifestations of 
which are perceptible in the political system of contemporary Russia. 
Obviously, the sketched political climate influences the development of 
civil society in contemporary Russia. Jurij Krasin insightfully reveals this 
influence in the article ‘Civil Society, Pluralism, and Tolerance.’75 Now that 
“the huge credit of trust, which political power received from society in the 
early 1990s, has been almost totally exhausted as a result of radical liberal 
experiments,” political power “intends to receive new credits of trust and 
does so by demonstratively endorsing civil society, yet trying to shape it in 
the desired direction” (Krasin 2002: 34). As a reaction to the declining trust 
in public and political institutions, the Putin administration tried to 
compensate for the dysfunctions of core democratic institutions by 
stimulating democratic initiatives from above. Thus, in 2006, the 
government initiated the establishment of the Public Chamber of the 
Russian Federation and supported the organization of the National Civil 
Forum, the first held in 2001 and the second in 2008. The fact that the 
dialog between politics and society is necessary in present-day Russia is 
obvious for the representatives of both civil society organizations and 
government institutions. Nonetheless, the question who will play the leading 
role in the dialog is unresolved. Is it the administrative bureaucratic 
apparatus or the effective and vibrant network of grassroots initiatives? I 
suppose, both parties should contribute to the dialog. With a view to 
facilitating an equal and balanced dialog, past misconceptions need to be 
refuted, and future prospects need to be mapped out.  
 
                                               
75 Юрий Красин, «Гражданское общество, плюрализм и толерантность» // Владимир 
Марахов (ред.) Стратегии формирования гражданского общества в России  (2002). 
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5.1.3 Hindrances and Prospects of Russia’s Democratic Project 
 
The main hindrance to Russia’s democratic consolidation pertains, in my 
view, to the state’s underestimation of the normative value and function of 
civil society in the system of democratic government. The more the state 
tends to monopolize political power and equalize the political landscape, the 
lesser freedom civil society retains. Hence, the monopolization of political 
power tends to undermine the significance of civil society for public 
politics.76 
The sources of the current tendency toward monopolizing political 
power by the state are related to the specifics of Russian political culture 
because this tendency mainly reproduces the mechanisms typical of the 
previous political regimes. On this account, the state’s underestimation of 
society’s independent value ensues from the long-term tradition of the 
state’s primacy over society. Konstantin Kostjuk claims in the contribution 
‘Political Morality and Political Ethics in Russia’77 that by undermining the 
independent value of society, “Russian political culture has demonstrated its 
persistent incompetence to harmonize social order as an independent order 
and establish institutional relations when the traditional hierarchical 
authoritative-legal structures weaken” (Kostjuk 2000b: 34-35).78 Agreeing 
with Kostjuk, V. Dakhin concedes in the article ‘Historical Determinants of 
the Political Development of Contemporary Russia’79 that the old 
characteristic features of Russian political power, such as “indivisibility, 
irremovability, autonomy from society, as well as structural amalgamation of 
power and property,” have been again reproduced in Russia’s democratic 
polity. The re-establishment of these old features has been also promoted 
by the fact that the ruling elite, despite the political change in 1991, 
                                               
76 The centralization of the political-administrative system has been frequently legitimized by the 
geopolitical position of the Russian state, which historically evolved as a composition of many 
nationalities, spread over vast territories and continuously expending its frontiers. The diversity 
among Russia’s regions was so high that it required the ideology of integral unity to keep up the 
appearance of an empire.  
77 Константин Костюк,  «Политическая мораль и политическая этика в России» // Вопросы 
философии (№ 2, 2000). 
78 Kostjuk specifies consequently a number of external as well as internal factors that determine 
the idiosyncrasy of Russian political morality. In the first place, he points at the political 
geographic position of Russia as ‘squeezed’ between the West, with its European Christian 
civilization, and the East, with its prevalent tradition of power and collectivist values. Indeed, 
Russian culture has been forged by the distinct influences coming from Byzantium and Western 
Europe; it absorbed both the ideas of Christian humanism and Eastern authoritarianism.  
79 В. Дахин, «Исторические детерминанты политического развития современной России» 
// Т. Заславская (ред.), Куда пришла Россия?.. Итоги социетальной трансформации (2003). 
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remained unchanged. Dakhin explains that the ruling elite, with a view to 
retaining its political monopoly, systematically precluded the formation of 
any political rivals and did so by means of social engineering. Eventually, 
social engineering consolidated the practice when spontaneously emerging 
social groups and movements were submitted to the controlling organ and 
subsequently deprived of their autonomy and responsibility (Dakhin 2003: 
37). Thereby, the state managed to behold its tutelage over society. 
Obviously, the forced centralization of society around the political center 
and the directly coordinative role of political power contradict the very logic 
and structure of functionally differentiated society. As Seweryn Bialer 
noticed in the article ‘The Question of Legitimacy,’ in a politics-centered 
society “the symbolic sphere of all order is centrally managed and controlled 
from the political sphere, and no rival claims to legitimate symbolic 
communications are recognized” (Bialer 1983: 429). Consequently, the 
dominant self-positioning of the state and the homogenization of the 
political sphere are no longer sustainable under the conditions of liberal 
democracy because then society becomes the subject of politics. Indeed, as 
Jurij Solonin convincingly demonstrates in his contribution ‘Civil Society in 
the Context of Russian Problems,’80 the democratic state should assume the 
‘secondary status’ in relation to society because the state is just one of the 
functions generated by society itself and thus has a serving role (Solonin 
2002: 17). In society that can organize itself, channel and direct its diverse 
social needs into adequate functional subsystems, the state becomes one of 
the subsystems of society. Hence, it is impossible to build civil society: civil 
society emerges in an organic manner. In this connection, Solonin points at 
the socialist project in Soviet Russia, aimed at building up an artificial 
society according to a certain theoretical model. Then, the organism of 
society was treated as a mere material for the designed experiment. 
However, “the coerced nature of the socialist experience has determined its 
fate,” as the experiment has failed (Solonin 2002: 17-18). In 
contradistinction to the universal normativity typical of the socialist model 
of society, “the function of the theoretical model of civil society does not 
have a firmly normative character; it is essentially flexible, guiding, and 
allowing definition of varying value parameters” (Solonin 2002: 18). In this 
sense, society itself becomes an ultimate value and goal of societal 
organization.  
                                               
80 Юрий Солонин, «Гражданское общество в контексте российских проблем» // Владимир 
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Hence, it is not the very idea of the dialog between government 
institutions and organizations of civil society that is particularly worrying, 
but it is the intent of the state to construct civil society. Indeed, many 
contemporary Russian scholars and analysts regard state interference in the 
sphere of civil society as impeding the spontaneous and voluntary character 
of public life in a democratic state. For instance, the volume Strategies of the 
Formation of Civil society in Russia, the proceedings of the Second National 
Scientific-Public Forum ‘Civil Society in Russia as the Democratic Project,’81 
held in 2002, criticizes the negotiations between civil society and political-
administrative structures. Amongst others, Krasin warns that the state 
should abandon the “ambitious idea of ‘building-up’ or ‘formation’ of 
Russian civil society from above” (Krasin 2002: 34, 35) because this 
ambitious idea would revive the principle of derzhavnichestvo (autocracy) and 
thus would put again the interest of the state above that of society.  
Analyzing the principle of derzhavnichestvo from a historical perspective, 
the contemporary political analyst and historian Irina Glebova82 
compellingly argues that in Russia, communication between society and 
state has always reminded communication between ruler and ruled. Such 
kind of communication presumes unifying the supreme power of the state 
and the power of the people in the symbolic figure of the ‘tsar,’ whereby the 
tsar becomes “the embodiment of overcoming the contradiction between 
the world of people and state power” (Glebova 2006: 83). The key figure of 
the tsar, called during the Soviet period vozhd’ (the leader) and nowadays the 
president, provided and continues to provide the direct organic link 
between the people and the state, which allows Glebova to classify Russian 
political culture as “power-centered” (Glebova 2006: 84). The scholar 
explains that the ubiquitous identification of the nation with the tsar is a 
“confidential” procedure. Unlike public consensus, it does not presume any 
conditions and thus is legitimized only within the ideological framework of 
“collective salvation,” whereby the nation is supposed to attain salvation 
through the state while the state functions as the instrument of the nation’s 
salvation (Glebova 2006: 85-86). The soteriologically oriented unification of 
the nation and the tsar makes the tsar responsible for the people, i.e. for their 
collective salvation, and not in front of the people. Hence, it is public 
                                               
81 Владимир Марахов (ред.), Стратегии формирования гражданского общества в России // 
Материалы Второго российского научно-общественного форума «Гражданское общество 
в России как демократический проект», 21-23 февраля 2002 г (2002). 
82 Ирина Глебова, Политическая культура России: образы прошлого и современность (2006).   
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accountability that distinguishes autocracy from liberal constitutional 
democracy, where government is legitimized primarily by people’s trust.  
The monopolistic character of Russian political power attained an 
unprecedented scale during the Soviet period. The Soviet state aimed at a 
total unification of homo Sovieticus and the supreme power of the Party in the 
notion of the Soviet nation. While, “the monolith of the Party was 
corresponding to the monolith of the nation,” Soviet society became 
subsequently deprived of any independent, individual forms of social 
relationships, of any possibilities of free self-expression. It was shackled by 
the terror of the Soviet system, which operated by means of punishments, 
threats, and privileges. The ultimate goal of the Soviet system consisted in 
the eradication of individuality and in the creation of a society without 
individual. In other words, it was ultimately aimed at the “dehumanization 
of society” (Glebova 2006: 182). The consequences of this dehumanizing 
politics of the Soviet state are still very perceptible in the behavior of homo 
post-Sovieticus: post-Soviet citizens tend to avoid any contact with the 
representatives of state authority.  
  Reflecting on the presented critical accounts, I became gradually aware 
that Russia’s democratic project is impeded not only by the state’s tendency 
toward monopolizing political power and the resultant state’s 
underestimation of the significance of civil society, but also by the persistent 
political attitudes held by a significant number of post-communist Russian 
citizens. Examining these attitudes, scholars generally admit the pervasive 
influence of the communist experience. They argue that the communist 
experience is so deeply engraved in the political consciousness of post-
communist citizens that it still determines citizens’ wide-scale alienation 
from political activity. Diligenskij maintains that contemporary Russia is an 
example of a transforming country where “the sphere of political 
consciousness is strongly affected by society’s homogenization at the 
restorative communist basis” (Koval’ 2001: 105). The homogenization of 
political activity becomes even more visible in comparison to the 
differentiation in the sphere of social and economic activity.  
It is vitally important to realize that the depicted homogenization of 
political activity in post-communist Russia has resulted not only from Soviet 
ideology of political passivism, but also from the learnt practice of alienation 
from political institutions and structures. This practice had been entrenching 
the mentality of Soviet citizens during the seventy years of the Soviet 
regime, when the Party claimed to know what is good and what is bad for 
all citizens alike. Citizens’ wide-scale alienation from political activity was 
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not cured by the democratic reforms in the early 1990s. Instead, it was 
rather facilitated by these cardinal transformations, as they made many post-
communist citizens even more confused, disillusioned, and suspicious. Otto 
Latsis asserts in the article ‘The Political System: Power and Society’83 that 
societal transformations have had a traumatic effect on Russian society 
insofar as they touched upon almost all spheres of society and changed the 
whole complex of social processes. Presumably, this has to do with the fact 
that the transformations led to “the collapse of so-called socialism and 
transition toward a market economy with unclear social policy.” They led to 
“the breakdown of the empire, whereby the center of the previous empire 
became just another ordinary big state.” Moreover, the transformations 
involved the collapse of communist ideology and transition to no ideology 
at all, while they were accompanied by “fruitless efforts to fill up the 
vacuum by nationalism or by nostalgic imperial motifs.” Latsis is convinced 
that these traumatic and radical transformations did not eradicate but rather 
enhanced “marginal political consciousness,” which was typical of Soviet 
citizens and later was inherited by post-Soviet citizens (Latsis 2003: 21). 
Noteworthy, Latsis’s conception of marginal political consciousness bears 
resemblance to Weber’s classification of charismatic leadership. Both 
phenomena are characterized by the prevailing focus on the figure and 
image of the political leader instead of the political program. Thus, citizens 
with marginal political consciousness tend to follow their emotions and 
intuition, rather than to rely on rational debate and logic. They also tend to 
believe in complot theories and exaggerate the influence and competence of 
the state. 
Contending that contemporary Russians inherited “marginal political 
consciousness” from the Soviet past, Latsis identifies the causes of this 
legacy with the specific mode of industrialization and urbanization practiced 
in the Soviet Union. During the Soviet period, industrialization and 
urbanization were, as a rule, artificially stimulated by the authorities. Relying 
on the demographic data, Latsis claims that the urban population of Soviet 
cities consisted of the migrant peasants, who usually held marginal political 
views. However, when the processes of industrialization and urbanization 
occur naturally, the marginal individual, a former peasant, constitutes the 
minority in the city. In Latsis’s view, the influence of marginal political 
consciousness is still very perceptible in post-Soviet Russia. The reason is 
                                               
83 Отто Лацис, «Политическая система: власть и общество» // Т. Заславская (ред.), Куда 
пришла Россия?.. Итоги социетальной трансформации (2003). 
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obvious. Only since 1968, the majority of the whole population of the 
Soviet Union consisted of urban citizens by birth. However, this group of 
urban citizens still constitutes the minority of all politically active population 
in present-day Russia, whereas the majority is still constituted by those born 
in the village.  
Deliberation about the prospects of democratic development 
necessitates us to examine whether the discussed two hindrances, namely 
the monopolization of political power and citizens’ alienation from political 
activity, indeed pose serious problems for democratic consolidation and the 
development of civil society in Russia. Certain scholars hold an opinion that 
these hindrances are caused by the current demographic composition of 
Russian society and will be resolved with time. For instance, Latsis 
optimistically assesses the prospects of democratic development in future 
Russia. He claims that marginal political consciousness is not engraved in 
Russian political culture, but rather is a symptom of the transient stage in 
general social evolution (Latsis 2003: 22). As soon as the group of urban 
citizens prevails over the group of peasants, political consciousness will lose 
its marginal character and gradually assume a more rational and engaged 
character.  
Pertaining to the problem of citizens’ alienation from political activity, I 
hold a more precautious view, presuming that the problem will not be 
simply resolved by the change in the demographic constitution of Russian 
society. More precisely, the predicted political reinvigoration among future 
generations will probably collide with the persistent tendency of political 
power toward homogenization and centralization. In this regard, I would 
agree with Dmitrij Furman, who provocatively discusses in his contribution 
‘The Political System of Contemporary Russia’84 the crisis scenario. The 
collision between two incongruous tendencies, i.e. liberalization of society 
on the one hand, and centralization of political power on the other, will 
destabilize the political system in general. Conceding that the political 
system has achieved in Putin’s Russia a stage of completion and stability, the 
analyst claims that this currently stable system is liable to reveal over time 
certain elements of a deep crisis. The crisis will break out because the 
centralizing tendency of Russian political power contradicts the process of 
democratization and societal modernization. Post-Soviet Russian society 
undergoes the process of rapid functional differentiation, which is also 
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evident from the demographic data. In this process, the structural edifice of 
Russian society transforms from a traditional Gemeinschaft, which prevailed 
in Soviet cities due to the imposed Soviet urbanization, toward a modern 
Gesellschaft, which is characterized by a highly differentiated and pluralized 
structure. In this sense, Furman is correct when affirming that the 
generation of Soviet citizens who were brought up with the fear of political 
power and of one’s individual choice is going away. The new generation is 
accustomed to such phenomena as private property, freedom of speech, and 
life without totalitarian control. That is why this new generation is naturally 
inclined toward democracy founded on the alternative elections of power 
(Furman 2003: 33). To the extent that Russian society becomes emancipated 
and open, it tends to reject the system of unchangeable and centralized 
political power, requiring instead the system of rotation of political power.  
Besides the increasing incompatibility of emancipating society with 
centralizing political power, the crisis of the political system will be 
stimulated, as scientists predict, by the authoritarian element within the 
democratic system. The authoritarian element will put the stability of the 
democratic system at risk. Pertaining to the problem of stability, Tat’jana 
Vorozhejkina provides a compelling account in the article ‘Is Contemporary 
Russia Stable?’,85 where she asserts that the stability of a political system is 
dependent on “the established mechanism of reproduction and continuous 
reconstruction of societal relationships and thus on the established balance 
of interests in a given society.” This means that the stability of social-
political development cannot be undermined by emerging alternatives. On 
the contrary, a stable system requires alternatives because it is the choice 
among alternatives that renders social-political development stable 
(Vorozhejkina 2003: 59). Hence, the crisis of Russian political system is 
preconditioned, as Furman presumes, by the system’s intrinsic tendency 
toward elimination of alternatives (Furman 2003: 33). 
This tendency is especially evident, as Vorozhejkina maintains, from the 
non-alternative character of democratic elections. To draw an explicit 
example, she depicts the appointment of El’tsyn’s successor, which 
occurred on the eve of 2000, as the act that precluded any alternative. The 
non-alternative character of democratic elections, both at the presidential 
and parliamentary levels, testifies to the incapability of Russian political 
authorities to use elections as the mechanism of achieving public consensus 
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between concurrent ruling elites. It also testifies to the incapability of 
political authorities to create an effective relationship with the elites in any 
other form than vertical subordination (Vorozhejkina 2003: 59). Moreover, 
as the scholar fairly observes, the non-alternativeness of presidential 
elections is not only the result of clever manipulation of public opinion by 
coordinating mass media and using administrative resources. The non-
alternativeness of so-called democratic elections is also rooted in the 
behavior and mentality of the citizens who are ready to support the actual 
power for the fear of the worst, or because of their passive hope for the 
better (Vorozhejkina 2003: 56).  
The latent problem of the non-alternative character of democratic 
elections consists, according to Furman, in that “the illusionary character of 
democratic elections, when one candidate stands for an office unopposed, 
will gradually but inevitably become even more explicit, degenerating thus in 
a boring ritual.” Given that the legitimacy of the democratic system is 
founded on free elections, the eradication of the illusions concerning 
democratic elections cannot but lead to the de-legitimization of the system. 
When loosing legitimacy, political power simultaneously loses its vital bond 
with society, and the task to govern society becomes then almost 
insurmountable. Furman rightly asserts, “As soon as political authority has 
achieved formal control over society, it loses real control, because it ceases 
to receive timely the alarming signals,” which constitute essentially the task 
of civil society. Consequently, “with the loss of the direct feedback from 
society, the crisis threatens to strike the whole political system all of a 
sudden” (Furman 2003: 34). 
Without the dialog between civil society and political authorities, the 
crisis of the democratic system is inevitable. For that reason, it is especially 
worrying that Russian political power still chooses to function in the 
framework of an “institutional vacuum,” which is filled with “nothing more 
than the president’s high rating.” The institutional vacuum is an evident 
symptom of the process of deinstitutionalization, whereby independent 
organs of executive power are consistently liquidated, and political 
institutions and mass media lose their autonomy (Vorozhejkina 2003: 60). 
In the conditions of institutional vacuum, the direct link existent between 
the leader and the public, endorsed solely by the high rating of the 
president’s person and the low rating of public trust in the presidential 
administration, testifies to the deficient institutional structure and 
unsustainable legitimacy of the political regime.  
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However, what is even more disappointing is that the condition of 
institutional vacuum precludes political authorities to discern and use 
society’s innovative potential. The destructive consequences of such 
“incapability of internal renovation,” coupled with the absence or the 
suppression of any alternative to the monopolistic system, undermined 
Russian political system during the twentieth century already twice: during 
the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and during the break-through to the 
democratic polity in 1991 (Vorozhejkina 2003: 60-61). Each time, the social, 
economic, and cultural crisis thrust Russian society back in its progressive 
development and necessitated the reproduction of the same authoritarian 
model of political power as the only option to help society out of crisis. 
At the present moment, politicians can better attend to the instigated 
differentiation of Russian society and employ society’s innovative potential 
with a view to legitimizing the political system. Such a move is essential 
because “a social system can be considered stable if it is capable of 
reproduction, self-development, resistance to destructive external 
influences, continuity, and renovation of human resources in the sphere of 
government institutions” (Levada 2003: 168). Political authority should 
abandon “the flattened vision of societal processes” (Kuleshov and 
Medushevskij 2005: 717) and re-assess the actual impact of the transition on 
social, cultural, and moral life of post-Soviet citizens. In this sense, I agree 
with Medushevskij that the ultimate meaning of democratic transformation 
consists in “the gradual overcoming of the dualism between the nominal 
and real law, the substitution of an ideological monopoly by an ideological 
pluralism, and the substitution of the dogma of class theory by the 
principles of civil society” (Medushevskij 2003: 39). Indeed, the 
democratization process entails transformation of moral norms and values 
upheld by society. In this sense, it requires a significant degree of 
autonomous and critical judgment, civic initiative, respect for the rule of 
law, and a critical and qualified perception of the socio-political reality. Only 
when these conditions are met, i.e. when these values and norms are 
accepted and endorsed by the greater part of population, one could 
justifiably confirm the implementation into public life of such cardinal 
principles of civil society as publicity (glasnost’), individual rights, multi-party 
system, strength and efficacy of public judgment.  
On this account, I associate the hope for the future progress of Russia’s 
democratic project with the increasing differentiation of society, which 
warrants the genuine heterogeneousness of public, cultural, economic, and 
political life. I concur with Kuleshov and Medushevskij on the importance 
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of the economic factor for the diversification of the political and public 
landscape. The diversity of the political landscape is directly connected with 
the socio-economic stratification and strengthening of the middle class 
because the diversity of political parties reflects the diversity of socio-
economic interests and needs of the citizens. The insufficient social 
representation of the middle class explains the underdevelopment of the 
multi-party system and the general perplexity of existing political parties in 
contemporary Russia. Insofar as there is vagueness about what certain social 
classes want, and how they intend to achieve their goals (as, for instance, 
through establishing and participating in civil society organizations), political 
parties are forced to speak on behalf of a certain, often mythical, social class 
(Kuleshov and Medushevskij 2005: 718). On this view, we have arrived at 
the following point of discussion: the evaluation of contemporary Russian 
civil society in the context of economic reforms.   
 
5.2 Civil Society in the Context of Economic Reforms 
 
The conception of civil society typical of the late-perestrojka period has 
changed drastically as compared to the conception established during the 
Putin era.86 In the late-perestrojka period and the early 1990s, the concept of 
civil society was used in academic debates and in the rhetoric of liberal 
democrats as a counterbalance to the dominating state-bureaucratic 
apparatus. Alternatively, the current discussion on civil society tends to 
consider civil society in the framework of its relations with the spheres of 
politics and business. According to the strategic conception of 
democratization project, the three involved spheres are supposed to 
function mutually supportive.87 
 The noticed shift in the perception of how civil society functions (or 
should function) in its relations with the state and the corporate sector 
induced me to reconsider the structural and socio-economic background of 
Russia’s transition to a market economy during the 1990s and trace the 
emergence of the middle class, which constitutes the important social basis 
of civil society (§ 5.2.1). Furthermore, I shall address the impact that the 
economic transformations have had on the political attitudes of Russian 
                                               
86 For the discussion of the ‘adventures’ of the concept of civil society in late Soviet and post-
Soviet Russia, see an interesting survey by Evert van der Zweerde, which he characteristically 
calls “a major sideshow” (Van der Zweerde 1997). 
87 The tripartite model of relations was discussed in § 2.3.2. 
CIVIL SOCIETY IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA 
248 
 
citizens (§ 5.2.2). Finally, the state’s strategy with regard to the sectors of 
business and civil society will be evaluated (§ 5.2.3). 
 
5.2.1 Socio-Economic Consequences of Russia’s Transition to a Market 
Economy  
 
Russia’s transition to democracy and a market economy implied drastic 
changes both for the agents and for the structures of post-communist 
economic space. What constituted the core of these changes and which 
effect did they have on the development of civil society?  
Radical transformations in the economic sphere, provoked by the 
“shock-therapy” of 1992, was experienced by many Russians as extremely 
painful. The reform of market liberalization was implemented too rapidly, as 
it had not been preceded by the preparation of a proper social policy or by 
the necessary transformation of social-economic and legal structures. In 
result, people started to lose any feeling of being in control.  
This turbulent experience had deep structural causes. After the collapse 
of the Soviet system, post-communist Russia was immediately confronted 
with the legacy of a state-controlled economy. One of the main deficiencies 
relates, according to Fish, to “a highly peculiar and weakly differentiated 
social structure.” The scholar explicates, “State control over property and 
employment, the absence of markets, and the pervasiveness of policies that 
compressed wage differentials and divorced material compensation from 
occupational station and economic performance have left Russia with a 
social structure,” characterized by the visible elimination of divisions 
between classes and private economic interests (Fish 1994: 33). In the article 
‘On the Meaning and the Provisional Results of the Russian 
Transformation,’88 Tat’jana Zaslavskaja corroborates Fish’s presumption. 
She maintains that although the democratic revolution was aimed primarily 
against the authoritarian power of the party nomenclature, the social forces 
involved in the protest appeared immature to assume power and implement 
democratic reforms on behalf of Russian citizens. That is why the 
revolutionary exaltation dropped rapidly, whereas real power remained in 
the hands of the slightly renewed ruling elite, which was primarily 
concerned with their private interests (Zaslavskaja 2003: 390). A fair 
question is how this situation emerged.  
                                               
88 Татьяна Заславская, «О смысле и предварительных итогах российской трансформации» 
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Although the reforms touched upon the fundamental structures of 
transforming Russian society, these reforms did not suffice to unlock a 
genuine revolution. For instance, Zaslavskaja points at the generally absent 
conception of the events of 1991-93 in terms of revolution. In accordance 
with the established tradition of a hierarchical relationship between political 
power and society (elucidated also in § 4.2.2), the main initiator of the 
reforms was state power, whereas actual subjects of social revolutions were 
supposed to be broad social forces in the form of diverse self-organizing 
social movements. On this view, Zaslavskaja is right when observing that 
Russia underwent in the 1990s not a revolution, but “a long sequence of 
poorly prepared, contradictory, one can say, convulsive reforms and explicit 
political measures, which caused a range of political and socio-economic 
crises.” That is why the scholar classifies this process as a “crisis 
transformation” (krizisnaja transformatsija) (Zaslavskaja 2003: 391-92). 
To systematize the socio-economic consequences of Russia’s “crisis 
transformation” toward a market economy, Zaslavskaja distinguishes three 
stages in the transformation process: the period of radical liberal democratic 
reforms and the resultant wide-scale privatization (1991-93), the period of 
spontaneous social reorganization as a reaction to the reforms (1994-98), 
and finally, the present period of legal regulation and economic stabilization.  
 The period between 1991 and 1993 was characterized by the 
implementation of radical political and economic reforms, generally defined 
by their initiators as liberal democratic reforms. While the reforms in the 
political sphere were aimed at creating legal and political preconditions for 
transforming the communist system toward a Rechtsstaat, the socio-
economic reforms were aimed at creating the preconditions for 
transforming a state-controlled economy towards a free market economy. 
The main goal of the economic reforms was to establish the institute of 
private property. However, the unleashed privatization of the former Soviet 
state’s property did not lead to the expected economic liberalization and 
prosperity of all post-communist citizens. As Vladimir Mau explains, the 
intended course of the economic reforms was undermined by general social 
instability because social chaos precluded any proper functioning of the 
institutes of the market economy (Mau 2003: 68).89 This general social 
instability inhibited the subsequent reforms of taxation policy, budgetary 
system, land codex, labor legislation, pension, natural monopolies, customs 
                                               
89 Владимир Мау, «Экономические реформы в России: итог и перспективы» // Т. 
Заславская (ред.), Куда пришла Россия?.. Итоги социетальной трансформации (2003). 
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service legislation, banking industry, and financial markets. Although these 
reforms were aimed at establishing “a favorable climate for investment and 
entrepreneurship” and contributing to the stable economic growth” (Mau 
2003: 68), the actual result of Russia’s transition to a market economy 
diverged from this normative ideal. 
As far as state bureaucracy is concerned, liberalization of the economy 
stimulated the formation of a new financial elite. While the reform was 
initially meant to distribute state property by means of voucher privatization 
among the whole population of post-Soviet Russia, the majority of ordinary 
citizens did not profit, however, from this privatization. Instead, a new 
narrow class of financial-bureaucratic oligarchy emerged. Zaslavskaja justly 
remarks that the institutional reforms of the early 1990s served primarily the 
interests of the ruling elite, of the state bureaucracy, and of private capital 
(Zaslavskaja 2003: 392). Vladimir Sogrin corroborates in his article 
‘Revolution and Thermidor. On the Historical Typology of the Socio-
Political Process in Russia in the 1990s’90 that the consequences of the 
economic liberalization were immediately used by the emerging economic 
elite, who, in turn, generously returned the favor to the representatives of 
the state bureaucratic apparatus (Sogrin 1998:13). Once the prerequisite 
institutions had been established, the elite focused on their private interests, 
abandoning the initiated reforms unfinished and the nation disoriented and 
discouraged. In the meanwhile, a terrifying preponderance of ordinary 
people found themselves outside the free market economy and were viewed 
by the political and economic elite as a burden (Zaslavskaja 2003: 394). 
Reassessing the disappointing result of the radical liberal reforms, Sogrin 
wonders whether the fair redistribution of state property was possible in 
principle. The scholar provides a positive answer. The fair redistribution of 
state property was possible under the conditions of “rational and moral 
bureaucracy, a strong and unbiased state, which is able to legally balance and 
serve the interests of all citizens, and a developed civil society, which is apt 
to control state-bureaucratic activity and citizens’ equal access to 
entrepreneurial opportunities” (Sogrin 1998: 13). However, because these 
conditions had not been fulfilled before the commencing of the reform, 
Russian society was absorbed in the 1990s by the savage market mentality. 
It did not last long before the socio-economic consequences of the 
radical liberal reforms became obvious. During the socialist era, the official 
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economy was frozen by state policy of fair distribution, but the unofficial 
market thrived. This resulted in the increasing breach between the official 
state economy and the citizens. With the transition to a market economy, 
the pursuit of private economic interest by utilizing private interpersonal 
networks was suddenly legalized. However, given the weakly differentiated 
social structure of communist society, the unprepared liberalization of the 
market unleashed the mechanisms of underground economic exchange and 
hence sharpened the muffled conflict between quickly differentiating social 
classes.  
During the next period (1994-98), broad social strata took initiative in 
their hands and began adjusting to the newly established institutional setup. 
Citizens started to engage in diverse forms of legal and semi-legal activity to 
improve their living standards. Accordingly, new social practices and 
institutional forms started to emerge spontaneously, without administrative 
control. Zaslavskaja comments, “Eventually, the actual transformations of 
social structures were not so much the upshot of the purposeful and 
controlled reorganization from above, but rather the upshot of spontaneous 
transforming activity from below, because these transformations were guided 
by conflicting interests of participating groups” (Zaslavskaja 2030: 393). The 
process of planned economic reforms gave place to “a spontaneous 
transformation of society, which was guided by the struggle between 
interests of totally different groups” (Zaslavskaja 2003: 392). Hence, in the 
eyes of many ordinary Russians, the major economic, cultural, and social 
transformations had the spontaneous and disorganized character and 
signified rather degradation then progress. 
Having reached the bottom point during the default of August 1998, 
Russian economy started to recover, stimulating other sectors of the society 
to recover as well. By 1999, the process of redistribution of state property 
and natural resources seemed was completed. Subsequently, the elite 
considered possible and appropriate to resume liberal reforms and renovate 
the extant legislation with a view to securing the institute of private 
property. Zaslavskaja holds the opinion that contemporary Russia is 
undergoing the period of the resumed reforms, which appears similar to the 
early 1990s, but which is, nonetheless, qualitatively different from it. 
Presently, the institutional structure obtains support from broad social strata 
and employs already established social mechanisms, not excluding “the 
corrupted bureaucracy and criminality” (Zaslavskaja 2003: 393).  
From the above analysis, it has become clear that Russia’s transition to a 
market economy instigated radical changes in the field of national social 
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policy. Indeed, the conditions for the free market economy have been 
created, albeit at a very high social price: High inflation caused immense 
disproportions at the socio-economic level of life. A. Klepach91 correctly 
noticed that the specificity of Russian dramatic experience of societal 
transformation consists in “the barbarian and cruel character of 
transformation, which has turned destructive for the majority of the 
population, as well as for the material and scientific-technical potential 
accumulated during the Soviet period” (Klepach 2003: 76). The elite took 
important decisions without a due preparation and initiated a radical type of 
reforms without public consensus. In result, these reforms were perceived 
by the majority of post-communist citizens as aggressive. Instead of 
benefiting from the free market economy, post-Soviet Russian society 
became internally polarized between the ruling elite and the rest of the 
population. More than a half of the national wealth is accumulated in the 
hands of the elite (5-7 percent of the population), whereas the lowest social 
ranks, representing  one-third of the whole Russian population, can be 
classified as poor, because they are totally deprived of private property and, 
even more grievously, of normally paid labor (Zaslavskaja 2003: 394). 
Moreover, this class of the poor comprises not only the so-called ‘socially 
weak’ individuals, like invalids and pensioners, but also qualified and 
working people, whose salary is hilariously low compared with the standards 
of an affluent society. As a result of the indicated schism, Klepach fairly 
observes, the intended transformation of the whole economic system never 
occurred, and the breakthrough toward consumer society became a reality 
only for a small group of new economic elite (9-15 percent),92 which is 
essentially the group comparable with the Western middle class (Klepach 
2003: 76-77).  
Obviously, the socio-economic polarization in post-Soviet Russia 
significantly inhibited the formation of the middle class. Debating on this 
issue, certain scholars make a pessimistic prognosis, as they are convinced 
that the Russian middle class has not yet emerged, and the process of its 
formation will take, even under favorable conditions, the greater part of the 
present century (Solonin 2002: 14). Others are rather inclined to assert the 
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Т. Заславская (ред.), Куда пришла Россия?.. Итоги социетальной трансформации (2003). 
92 In contrast to Zaslavskaja, Klepach argues that the new economic elite includes, beside the thin 
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existence of the middle class in Russia, with an important reservation, 
however, that the Russian middle class can be properly conceived only 
within the corresponding societal structure that has been established in 
post-Soviet Russia. In this regard, Zaslavskaja explicates that the Russian 
‘middle class’ designates a social stratum that is quite different from the 
middle class in Western societies. The sociological description of the 
Russian middle class is closely associated with the problem of poverty and 
of the unjust redistribution of economic and political resources after the 
collapse of the USSR (Zaslavskaja 2004: 288-305). Notwithstanding which 
particular point of view one would hold, I share Tat’jana Maleva’s general 
presumption, which she formulated in the contribution ‘Social Policy and 
Social Strata in Contemporary Russia’.93 The very fact of the formation of 
the middle class can be considered as a crucial evidence and even as a 
criterion of the effectiveness of the reforms, which indicates the stability of 
the whole system of political, economic, and social institutions in 
contemporary Russian society (Maleva 2003: 103).  
Taking into consideration the importance of the economic factor in the 
formation of the middle class, Maleva developed a complicated method to 
evaluate which classes of the Russian population can be considered as the 
middle class. The scholar specified three chief criteria for a household to be 
reckoned as belonging to the middle class: first, the material resources, 
including the level of income, consumption, savings, property; second, the 
non-material resources, including the level of educational, professional 
qualification and social status; and third, the social self-identification of the 
individual, including evaluation of one’s social success and capacity to adapt 
to changing social conditions (Maleva 2003: 105). Maleva’s study has 
demonstrated that only 7 percent of the whole Russian population can be 
said to have all the mentioned criteria and therefore can be reckoned as the 
most stable middle class, or “the nuclear of the middle classes.” 
Furthermore, 12 percent of Russian households meet two other criteria; 
nonetheless, they can be reckoned as the representatives of the Russian 
middle class. In total, the average middle class constitutes only 19 percent of 
all Russian households (Maleva 2003: 106). The question is whether these 
19 percent provide a sufficient social basis for civil society to flourish. 
I presume, the posed question needs to be considered in relation to the 
moral evaluation of the institutional transformations because the problem 
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of slow development of the middle class cannot and should not be 
restricted to the success or failure of government policies. The problem of 
the emergent middle class and of the emergent civil society is intimately 
connected not only with the constitutional and economic crisis, which 
accompanied Russia’s transition to democracy, but also with the general 
moral crisis, which affected every member of post-communist society. I 
suppose that the moral crisis has manifested itself most obviously at the 
level of political orientations held by contemporary Russian citizens. What 
do Russians think about the results of the liberal democratic reforms? Are 
they still content with the liberalization of the market? Do they endorse 
democracy with the same vigor as they did during the perestrojka, or have 
they become disappointed with and indifferent to the perpetual changes in 
the political, economic, and social sphere? Reflection on these questions 
provides new trajectories for assessing the impact of the economic reforms 
on the democratic project in post-Soviet Russia.  
 
5.2.2 The Shift in Russians’ View on Democracy  
 
How has the depicted ‘crisis’ transformation influenced the political 
orientations of Russian citizens? This is a legitimate question and needs to 
be considered seriously.   
El’tsyn’s successor cleverly employed the major economic crisis 
associated with the radical liberal reforms of the early 1990s. Rejecting the 
assaults of Western critics that his administration was becoming increasingly 
authoritarian, Putin defended his politics by referring to the negative 
experience of the liberal reforms. In contrast to the liberal course of 
El’tsyn’s politics, the two subsequent terms of Putin’s presidency 
demonstrate, as analysts generally agree, an opposite, rather paternalistic, 
attitude on the part of the government toward the corporate sector. Thus, 
Diana Schmidt perceives Putin’s standpoint as a reaction to the “shifting 
balance of forces and to the dangerous growth of the influence of economic 
clans in Russian regions” (Schmidt 2006: 13). She admits that Putin’s policy 
contradicts the normative conception of democracy as based on pluralism, 
election, decentralization of government administration, and the free market 
economy. Nonetheless, Putin justifies his restricting measures with regard to 
business by arguing that it is the balance between competing economic 
actors, and not economic growth itself, that stabilizes new democracies. On 
this view, he claims that the monopolization of power by the actors on the 
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market is extremely dangerous, and intervention by the state therefore 
necessary. 
Hence, the view that the sphere of business needs governmental control 
gained popularity among the Russian public during the Putin era. Such view 
proceeds on the assumption that Russians adjust the conception of 
democracy to their experience of the socio-economic consequences of the 
transition to democracy. Timothy Colton and Michael McFaul compellingly 
argue in their article ‘Are Russians Undemocratic?’ that “in all democracies, 
especially new ones, dissatisfaction with the practice of democracy has the 
potential to erode the normative preference for democracy” (Colton and 
McFaul 2001: 7). It would be correct to correlate Russians’ general 
endorsement of democracy in abstract and vaguely normative terms with 
their immense disappointment with the actual results that democracy was 
supposed to bring to them. The general passive support of democracy by 
the majority of Russian citizens does not relieve their permanent anxiety 
caused by the far-reaching socio-economic consequences that accompany 
the actual process of transition to a market economy and democracy. I 
suspect that the contrast between the normative idea of democracy, eagerly 
hailed by many Russians at the beginning of the democratization process, 
and the socio-economic polarization, which brought many Russians below 
poverty level, is the main reason why the population largely supports state 
intervention in the sectors of business and civil society.  
 Having explained the reasons of state intervention into the sphere of 
business, we need now to consider another, perhaps, even more radical, 
upshot of the indicated discrepancy between the practice and the normative 
understanding of democracy – the declining public trust in the state. An 
exhaustive investigation of the problem of declining trust has been 
suggested by Rudra Sil and Cheng Chen in their contribution ‘State 
Legitimacy and the (In)significance of Democracy in Post-Communist 
Russia.’ The scholars insightfully address the question as “why continuing 
mass support for ‘democracy’ in the abstract coexists with declining trust in 
a Russian state that is more democratic than any in the past?” (Sil and Chen 
2004: 356). 
Sil and Chen argue that Western liberal democracy is not explicitly 
associated with any specific socio-economic order or policy, whereas a 
distinctively Russian understanding of democracy is “fundamentally 
intertwined with assumptions about the kinds of social and economic 
outcomes a democracy ought to produce. In particular, public order, 
material security and distributive justice figure prominently among the 
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expectations most Russians had of the new democratic state proclaimed 
after the break-up of the USSR.” Now that these expectations proved 
unrealized, permanent anxiety affects the greater part of contemporary 
Russian society. As the results of public surveys indicate, the most 
important source of anxiety pertains to the complex of interconnected 
socio-economic maladies such as increasing inflation, unemployment, a 
growing gap between rich and poor; these maladies are even more 
aggravated by corruption in the public sectors of education and medical care 
and by a high rate of crime. Given the above, Sin and Chen conclude that 
economic insecurity and growing crime have resulted in a strong preference 
“for greater public order and for a more active, paternalistic state that can 
‘look after us,’ a preference that appears to be shared by the Russian middle 
class.” Accordingly, most Russian citizens are ready “to trade off specific 
features of democracy in exchange for any state that can deliver greater 
order and economic security” (Sil and Chen 2004: 356).  
Disappointment with the economic reforms provides “the plentiful 
evidence that most Russians view the post-Soviet Russian state as simply 
unwilling or unable to deliver the collective goods most valued by ordinary 
citizens in the midst of an extended and uncertain process of 
transformation.” On this view, Sil and Chen indicate “the inadequacy of the 
state, and not the insufficient consolidation of democracy” as “the primary 
reason for the low level of state legitimacy in Russia.” I consider this 
conclusion not to be entirely correct, as I believe that the inadequacy of the 
government in resolving socio-economic difficulties is caused exactly by the 
insufficient democratic consolidation and the insufficient vitality of civil 
society in post-communist Russia. This is also evident from the comparison 
the scholars draw between manifestations of public protest against policies 
in consolidated liberal democracies and in Russian democracy, “In long 
consolidated liberal democracies a government’s poor performance on 
substantive policies and outcomes of interest to citizens may lead to low 
popularity ratings for leaders, but generally does not lead to declining trust 
in the institutions, laws, and practices constituting the democratic state. In 
Russia precisely the opposite appears to be true: The government’s poor 
performance on substantive policies and outcomes is associated with low 
levels of trust in institutions, but the President’s popularity has grown 
rapidly and remains high” (Sil and Chen 2004: 358). Insofar as liberal 
democracies are legitimized by citizens’ trust in democratic procedures and 
institutions, the democratic consolidation is the precondition for citizens’ 
judgment about the inadequacy or, on the opposite, the rightfulness of 
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democratically adopted policies. This certainly applies to the case of Russia 
as well.  
Investigating the putative sources of declining legitimacy in post-
communist Russian context, Sil and Chen indicate the general trend of 
dissatisfaction resultant from “the substantive expectations” of the vast 
majority of Russians in relation to the state’s success in addressing social-
economic anxieties. After the turbulent years of the democratic transition, 
ordinary citizens place a high value on such public goods as “social order, 
economic stability, guaranteed welfare, and a greater measure of distributive 
justice.” Therefore, the degree at which the state administration has 
succeeded to attain these public good determines a lot in the legitimacy of 
the post-communist regime. Indeed, as Sil and Chen astutely observe, 
“initial support for democratization rested on assumptions that ‘democracy’ 
was inherently connected to these very outcomes, and evidence to the 
contrary is a key reason for the growing nostalgia for the Soviet regime” (Sil 
and Chen 2004: 349).  
A possible clue to the contradictory situation in post-Soviet Russia can 
be associated with the apparent misbalance caused by the overemphasized 
expectations of Russian citizens concerning the effect of actual policies on 
the one hand, and the inadequacy of the means that the government 
employs to carry out their policies on the other. This suggestion presumes 
an underlying question whether Russian citizens managed to develop, over 
the last two decades, a proper understanding of the theory and practice of 
democracy. Sil and Chen assume that the significance of democratic 
orientations in accounting for declining trust in most democratic institutions 
is “low compared with the significance Russian citizens attach to the state’s 
effectiveness in providing public order, socio-economic stability, reduced 
elite corruption and social stratification and a coherent national identity that 
provides a sense of distinctiveness and continuity with the past.” 
Accordingly, “the hope for resorted state legitimacy, whether under Putin or 
his successors, depends less on democracy and more on measures taken by 
the state” (Sil and Chen 2004: 363). On that account, contemporary Russian 
society is characterized by an essential dualism: It is divided between ample 
public support of a normative idea of democracy and, at the same time, 
ample public distrust of democratic institutions and procedures.  
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5.2.3 The State’s Directive in Regulating Civil Society and Business 
 
Taking into account the tripartite model of the democratic system, I suggest 
that the relationship between the sectors of business and civil society poses 
new problems, as well as new opportunities for the democratic project in 
contemporary Russia. Characteristically, the nexus connecting civil society 
and business has not gained as much attention as the nexus connecting civil 
society and the state. Currently, certain scholars start to focus on the 
relationship between business and civil society, discovering similar 
tendencies in the state’s attitude to the sphere of business as to civil society. 
Obviously, the state tends to take a lead in regulating its relations with both 
civil society and business. The question at stake is whether this tendency is 
inhibitive or facilitative for the democratization process in present-day 
Russia. 
Within the scope of available studies, I can distinguish two different 
evaluations of the state’s involvement with the structures of business and 
civil society. One group of analysts positively evaluates the regulating 
measures of the Putin administration with regard to the corporate sector, 
whereas another group remains rather critical of these measures. Not 
accidentally, the view that an intensive cooperation between the three 
sectors is rewarding for the democratic regime is largely endorsed by the 
members of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation. In 
contradistinction to the ‘balanced’ model of cooperation between state 
institutions, business corporations, and organizations of civil society, critical 
scholars hold the opinion that such a cooperation tends to restrict the 
development of Russian business and civil society. These two antagonistic 
positions ensue from two different evaluations of Russia’s transition to a 
market economy and the effect that the liberal reforms have had on Russian 
society. In what follows, I shall analyze these contradictory evaluations and 
try to sketch future trajectories in the relations between the state, business, 
and civil society. 
 As noticed above, the view that the structures of the state, business, and 
civil society should cooperate is more popular with the experts affiliated 
with the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation. In order to illustrate 
this point, I shall refer to E. Petrenko and G. Gradosel’skaja’s contribution 
‘Russian Civil Society Today: The Revision According to the Results of 
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Wide-Scale Surveys of the Forum of Public Opinion 2007-2008.’94 This 
contribution is a typical example of the ‘pro-cooperation’ standpoint. It was 
published in the volume Empirical Studies of Civil Society, which contains the 
proceedings of the symposium organized by the Public Chamber. The 
scholars endorse the argument in favor of a closer cooperation between the 
mentioned sectors, as they assume that such a cooperation would resolve 
one of the urgent problems underlying Russian society today – the problem 
of diminishing public trust and civic engagement.  
Summarizing the results of public surveys Petrenko and Gradosel’skaja 
observe an important change in the way in which Russians perceive the 
presence of civil society in their private lives and in the life of the country. 
The change consists in a significant decrease of people’s trust in both social 
organizations and state institutions (67 percent of respondents). This 
observation is more worrying because the scholars are convinced that trust 
constitutes “the basis of all grass-root informal economic and social 
relations in society.” Trust emerges from mutual support and friendship at 
the individual level, develops further as confidence in social institutions, and 
attains its highest form as trust in the state (Petrenko and Gradosel’skaja 
2008: 105-6).  
Obviously, the idea of a closer cooperation between the spheres of state 
institutions, business, and civil society gains more support from those 
analysts who interpret this cooperation as facilitating trust and breaking with 
the communist legacy of distrust. While trust is the essential precondition 
for people’s eagerness to engage in the network of civil society 
organizations, the communist legacy of mass distrust, revolt, and fear of any 
kind of public or state organizations remains one of the most important 
obstacles to genuine civic engagement. Insofar as trust is generated primarily 
in the immediate environment of the individual and thus is engraved in the 
individual’s experience of the private sphere (in the form of family and 
friendship), the experience of the public sphere, such as engagement in 
different kinds of associations, clubs, political parties, and interest groups, 
should be as much as possible approximated to the individual’s trust-based 
relations typical for the private sphere. For that reason, the prospect of a 
closer cooperation between state and civil society organizations would 
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facilitate filling up the distance between the citizens’ trusted private sphere 
and the new unfamiliar public sphere.  
Compared with the depicted normative model of trust enhancement, the 
results of Petrenko and Gradosel’skaja’s survey are dramatic: 20,2 percent of 
respondents hoped to receive help from public organizations, but only 2,7 
percent actually got it; 37,8 percent relied on the support of government 
services and government institutions, but there was not a single respondent 
whose hope was justified. Remarkably enough, although public trust in 
religious organizations is relatively low (19,2 percent), the actual support 
provided by religious organizations is confirmed by 3,9 percent of 
respondents, which is significantly higher in comparison with public 
organizations (Petrenko and Gradosel’skaja 2008: 106). On that account, 
religious organizations are able to create new resources of generating trust. 
But what about the role of business in facilitating public trust?  
Indeed, there are few indications that the negative image that is 
traditionally ascribed to business and to the market economy undergoes a 
significant transformation in Russia of the twenty-first century. The 
previously popular association of (private) business and economic success 
with the twilight economy, corruption, and even criminality becomes 
increasingly obsolete. Instead, a new phenomenon of the stable, prosperous 
middle class, consisting of young professionals, entrepreneurs, and 
intellectuals is gradually emerging. Within the new middle class, a special 
place belongs to a group of successful businessmen who are actively 
involved in public life. These publicly conscious representatives of the 
Russian economic elite embody, according to Petrenko and Gradosel’skaja, 
the “ideals of public behavior that positively influence the development of 
civil society” (Petrenko and Gradosel’skaja 2008: 107). Publicly engaged and 
conscious businessmen become increasingly aware of the efficacy of new 
democratic institutions, thus encouraging the growth of social capital and 
social trust. Nevertheless, it is also true that the group of these new 
businessmen/public activists is insignificant, constituting less than 1 percent 
of the whole population of Russia.  
Having said that, I do place my hopes on the positive influence of the 
publicly engaged businessmen because such a positive contribution of the 
entrepreneurial elite to the rise of the public sphere is not absolutely new in 
the history of Russia. The contemporary nascent trend of providing support 
to public initiatives strengthens my belief that the old pre-revolutionary 
tradition of patronage (metsenatstvo) can be restored indeed, even after 
seventy years of the state-owned economy and state-owned art. Moreover, 
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this contribution is essential for Russian civil society due to a relatively 
limited economic potential of the middle class. The Russian middle class is 
still struggling for security after the notorious attempts to reanimate the 
stagnant economy in the 1990s by the “shock-therapy,” whereas active 
public life requires a certain degree of financial independence, as well as 
sufficient freedom from job obligations and private affairs. In this sense, the 
contribution of successful businessmen is necessary and appropriate. 
Evidently, the arena of Russian civil society disposes over diverse recourses 
where public trust can be regenerated, among which a prominent position 
belongs to religious communities and business-charity organizations that 
frequently function jointly in the form of religious charity organizations.  
Concerning the project of closer cooperation between the state, business, 
and civil society, I agree that trust should constitute the common value of all 
three sectors and that certain forms of cooperation indeed can lead to 
generating trust (like, pubic initiatives of successful businessmen, charity 
and educational organizations, etc.). In this sense, publicly engaged 
businessmen can be seen as contributing to relieving the sector of 
entrepreneurship from the stigma of corruption. However, facilitating trust 
by means of joint governmental, entrepreneurial, and public initiatives does 
not overweight the complex of structural problems that underlie the 
relationship between the state and the corporate sector in contemporary 
Russia.  
As we can recall from the analysis of civil society provided by Cohen and 
Arato (extensively discussed in chapter two), the main precondition for a 
balanced cooperation between the spheres of the state, the economy, and 
civil society is the tripartite model. Such a model warrants a relative 
autonomy for each sphere but allows, at the same time, their intersections. 
The differentiation between the three sectors distinguishes the system of 
liberal democracy from the communist system, where the state embodies 
the total authority over economic and societal relations. Taking the tripartite 
model as a normative criterion, we can argue that the pertinent problem in 
post-Soviet Russia consists in the directive role that the government strives 
to retain with regard to business and civil society. In the first place, I am 
concerned with the following possible upshot. The state’s directive might 
inhibit those independent initiatives on the part of business organizations 
that are aimed at expending social responsibility of business and at 
contributing to the development of corporate citizenship. As noticed above, 
Russian business retains much potential for generating trust in public 
institutions of civil society. This potential should not be underestimated, but 
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rather skillfully employed by state authorities. In the second place, the state’s 
directive in regulating both civil society and business touches upon the 
complex of structural problems. 
In the article ‘Civil Society as a Subject of Public Politics,’95 Sergej 
Peregudov analyzes the implications of the state’s dominant position. 
Insofar as state authorities prefer to structure their relations with the 
organizations of civil society and business according to the model of vertical 
subordination, “the relationships between the state and these two subjects 
of politics proceed not in the form of triangular cooperation, but rather in 
the form of separate, detached from each other channels – ‘the verticals’.” 
With regard to business, the main channel is represented by the 
Government Council on Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship; with 
regard to civil society, the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation serves 
as the regulative organ (Peregudov 2006).  
A legitimate question can be posed: Why is the democratic state still able 
to uphold the directive in its relations with business and civil society? I 
would agree with Peregudov that the underlying problem lurches in the 
distinctively Russian “relations of property, which have been forming and 
continue to form in the post-Soviet period” (Peregudov 2008). In his article 
‘Convergence in the Russian Way: “A Golden Middle” or a Halt 
Halfway?’,96 Peregudov compellingly argues that the redistribution of 
property in Russia has continuously involved the interaction between two 
distinct authorities, namely the state bureaucracy and economic structures. 
The vertical line of political power operates by command, whereas the 
horizontal line of economic power operates at the level of business deals. In 
the Russian system, these two lines structurally intersect. During the Soviet 
period, the bureaucratic-administrative apparatus merged with major 
economic structures. Subsequently, during the redistribution of state 
property in the 1990s, the intersection between the structures of business 
and bureaucracy facilitated the re-creation of the Soviet symbiosis between 
these two authorities. As a result, big business and the bureaucratic-
administrative apparatus amalgamate not only as two mutually interested 
parties, but also as functionally equivalent elements of one whole, 
                                               
95 Сергей Перегудов, «Гражданское общество как субъект публичной политики» // Полис – 
Политические исследования (№ 2, 2006). Internet publication, last visited on 28 July 2010. 
96 Сергей Перегудов, «Конвергенция по-российски: «золотая середина» или остановка на 
полпути?» // Полис – Политические исследования (№ 1, 2008). Internet publication, last visited on 
28 July 2010. 
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constituting the ‘ruling class’ that controls all national affairs in the name of 
so-called society (Peregudov 2008).  
The evidence of such structural intersection can be found in post-
El’tsyn’s Russia as well. The Putin administration aimed to weaken the 
horizontal power of Russian business and increase state ownership of major 
industries. This purpose was achieved by appointing influential 
administrative officials and politicians as CEO’s of major industrial 
enterprises (Peregudov 2008). However, these new (partially) state-owned 
enterprises did not assume the status of commercial ones and thus remained 
constrained yet real participants of market relations. The fact that the 
leaders of these companies are bound with governmental structures not 
only enhances the political role of Russian business, but also precludes 
business from becoming a full member of political process. This explains 
why the relationship between big business and political power is so different 
in post-El’tsyn’s Russia and in the West. As Peregudov astutely formulated 
it, Russian business is not free in choosing its party-political commitments. 
The established arrangement of political forces endowed business with the 
prerogatives of the market economy but allowed state authority to regain its 
monopoly on taking major political decisions. Peregudov remains 
pessimistic in his prognosis. As long as the relations between the state and 
business remain “state-corporative,” partnership and trust will be 
substituted by hierarchy and exterior loyalty; this will preclude creating 
optimal conditions for entrepreneurial initiative and a healthy competitive 
economy.  
A similar tendency is traceable in the relationship between the state and 
civil society. Namely, the state’s directive aims at depriving civil society of 
its political autonomy (Peregudov 2008). Given that Russian civil society, as 
compared with business, disposes over a more modest arsenal of 
instruments of political influence, state power does not have to resort to 
force, as in the case of Mikhail Khodorkovskij, the chief of Yukos Oil 
Company. Moreover, state power was and is aware that civil society is an 
essential element of the democratic system, for it mediates urgent needs and 
moods of society to political authority. Without civil society, any democratic 
system loses its legitimacy and assumes the character of dictatorship. In 
order to avoid this scenario, the Russian state makes concessions in creating 
the space for relative autonomy of civil society organizations. 
Despite the pervasive tradition of the powerful vertical in Russian 
political culture, the process of political democratization and economic 
liberalization is carrying on. One cannot speak about a return of Soviet 
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totalitarianism, simply because, as Peregudov justly notices, the totalitarian 
system is incompatible even with a minimal freedom presumed by the 
market economy. Consequently, a crucial factor in balancing the relations 
between political authority, business, and civil society is the institute of 
private property. Once private property has become fully legitimized, no 
illegitimate redistribution is any longer possible, even under the conditions 
of political upheaval or economic instability. For that reason, chief figures 
of Russian big business are extremely interested in the process of property 
legitimization and in securing their property from a new wave of (coerced) 
redistribution (Peregudov 2008). Ultimately, Russia’s transition toward 
liberal democracy and a market economy has not only led to a qualitative 
change in the political-social system, but has also created the situation when 
political power is continuously controlled by either civil society 
organizations or business structures. Notwithstanding rigid control on the 
part of the state bureaucracy, contemporary Russian market is premised on 
the legality of property, on the mobility of people and capital, and on a 
relative openness of both society and the economy.  
 
5.3 The Moral Crisis and the Problem of Trust 
 
In the above, I have examined the effect that major political, social, and 
economic reforms have had on the development of civil society in post-
Soviet Russia. Now, I want to address moral problems that have 
accompanied Russia’s transition to democracy and a market economy. I 
shall start with explicating the reasons why an ethical evaluation of the 
democratic project is necessary and which new aspects it will reveal (§ 5.3.1). 
Next, the function of trust in the system of liberal democratic society will be 
explicated (§ 5.3.2), and finally, on the basis of the attained theoretical 
insights, the problem of public distrust will be addressed (§ 5.3.3).  
 
5.3.1 Ethical Evaluation of the Democratic Project in Post-Soviet Russia 
 
My core presumption is that the institutional weakness of Russian civil 
society resides in the moral attitudes that the majority of Russian citizens 
retain with regard to the state, the economy, and civil society. The success 
of the democratic project is determined prevailingly by the civic maturity of 
citizens, namely by the degree to which citizens perceive themselves as 
autonomous, responsible, and engaged participants of a democratic society. 
On this view, an ethical evaluation becomes an indispensable part of the 
CIVIL SOCIETY IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA 
265 
 
broad-spectrum evaluation of the democratic project in post-Soviet Russia. 
Doubtlessly, the ethical evaluation entails also an empirical descriptive 
component, for it allows examining the existing network of civil society 
organizations, associations, clubs, social movements, which all together 
constitute the public arena of civil society and which frequently border with 
the sectors of business and government (in the form of such organizations 
as political parties and business-charity associations). At the same time, the 
theoretical component of the ethical evaluation allows examining the 
institutional makeup of civil society as a reflection of the core values and 
norms that underlie public and civil life.  
Furthermore, the ethical evaluation of Russia’s democratic project 
provides a deeper conception of the traumatic experience that is generally 
inherent in the citizens of post-communist societies. In this sense, William 
Outhwaite and Larry Ray correctly notice in the study Social Theory and 
Postcommunism that the concept of civil society attains its moral significance 
insofar as it strikes a delicate balance between “excessive state power and 
atomized individualism” (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 147). The scholars 
clarify that the normative understanding of civil society is invoked whenever 
the rise of authoritarianism and totalitarianism on the one hand, or the rise 
of citizens’ alienation from the allegedly democratic state and the free 
market on the other, threatens to destabilize the balance in the legally 
regulated relationships between civil society, the state, and the market.  
Specifically, the ethical evaluation of civil society elucidates cultural and 
moral preconditions that are necessary for the establishment of fundamental 
democratic institutions, which regulate interactions of civil society with the 
sectors of business and state government. As the experience of the speeded 
democratic reforms in East-Central Europe has demonstrated, civil society 
cannot emerge out of a historical vacuum; on the contrary, it requires 
traditions and conceptions in order to be sufficiently entrenched in the 
culture of a society. That is why the claim that a certain moral maturity 
should precede societal transformations became a well-known refrain in the 
studies on the emergence of civil society in post-communist countries. With 
a disarming frankness of argumentation, this statement was also suggested 
by Charles Taylor in his broad definition of civil society as an heir to the 
Western tradition of liberalism (Taylor 1995: 204-24). What seems to be 
fundamentally wrong with the democratic revolution in Russia is that it 
occurred at high speed, whereby crucial socio-political and economic 
transformations were implemented in a top-down manner, being initiated by 
the state. However, as we have concluded from the analysis of the 
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emergence of civil society in the West, civil society develops in an organic 
bottom-up manner, as an upshot of uncoordinated and voluntary activity of 
citizens who are eager to communicate with each other on matters of public 
concern (chapter two). 
Contemporary Russian scholars have already underscored the 
importance of an ethical perspective in the research on Russian civil society. 
Evgenij Rashkovskij provides a critical yet correct observation in his 
publication ‘Civil Society: A Religious Assessment of the Problem.’ He 
states that although societies of Eastern Europe did succeed to outgrow 
“ideologies of socialistic change and the atheistic pressure accompanying 
them,” nonetheless, “they made the transition even without deep 
comprehension of the principles of personal dignity, of law-regulated 
society, or social support” and therefore proved unable to put these 
concepts in practice (Rashkovskij 2004: 114). Ruben Apresjan and 
Abdulasam Gusejnov also concede in their work Civic Participation. 
Responsibility. Community. Power97 that “the question of civil society is 
ultimately the question of how individuals become citizens.” Grounding 
their conception of civil society on the idea of citizenship, the scholars 
understand civil society to be “constituted by the conjunction and the 
legitimate concordance of different forms of autonomous activity of people, 
wherein they perceive themselves in their sovereignty, or, in other words, 
perceive themselves as citizens” (Apresjan and Gusejnov 1997: 13).  
Ethical analysis of the institutional transformations induces us to focus 
on such relevant yet insufficiently studied aspects as the development of 
political ethics and social morality in post-communist Russian society. 
Kostjuk perceptively claims that the degree of the development of political 
ethics determines the degree of stability of the democratic system, as it 
provides the mechanism of social trust in democratic institutions. On this 
view, Kostjuk sees the main cause of the chronic failure of Russian reforms 
in the insufficient interest of the populace in institutional ethics. In the post-
communist context, this prevalent lackadaisical attitude inhibits the 
formation of institutional democracy (Kostjuk 2000b: 32). The analyst 
emphasizes the moral character of the main disastrous social phenomena, 
which have become the symbols for Russia’s thorny path to democracy and 
a market economy. Namely, these are the rise of mafia, interpenetration of 
semi-legal structures and officialdom, oligarchism, corruption, privatization 
                                               
97 Рубен Апресян и Абдуласам Гусейнов (сост.), Гражданское участие. Ответственность. 
Сообщество. Власть (1997). 
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of privileged functions, ‘new Russians,’ financial pyramids, flight of capital, 
contract murders, moral decadence, ethnic and civil conflict, criminality, and 
narcomania (Kostjuk 2000b: 34). In this sense, I cannot but fully agree with 
Kostjuk that contemporary Russia undergoes “the moral crisis,” which is 
predominantly caused by “the underdevelopment of the principles of social-
ethical consciousness” (Kostjuk 2000b: 33).  
Hence, I maintain that the success of the democratic consolidation 
cannot be assessed only by socio-economic, political, or legal aspects that 
altogether contribute to the institutional weakness of contemporary Russian 
civil society. An ethical perspective is indispensable for the research, as it 
allows analyzing moral attitudes typical of contemporary Russian citizens. 
However, prior to this step, we need to elucidate the role and the 
significance of trust in the framework of civil society theory. 
 
5.3.2 Trust as the Foundational Principle of Democracy and Civil Society  
 
Trust is, in my view, one of the crucial mechanisms that enable 
interpersonal and inter-institutional relations in liberal democratic society. In 
what follows, I want to investigate why trust is vitally important for the 
system of liberal democracy and which specific function trust performs in 
that system. 
Trust touches upon the typically modern distinction between the public 
and the private. The distinction between these two domains frequently leads 
to contradictory decisions on the part of modern individuals and thus needs 
to be related to the original source of potential contradistinctions – namely 
to the perception whom and what we, modern individuals, trust or, 
alternatively, reckon as too risky and not to be trusted. Analysis of trust in 
relation to the theory of civil society and to the theory of structural 
differentiation offers a new opportunity to combine the ethical and 
sociological perspectives. From the ethical perspective, trust can be viewed 
as the foundational principle of communal life in liberal democratic society. 
In this sense, the concept of trust suggests a solution for resolving the 
ethical dilemma that arises from the contradiction between individual right 
to freedom and public plea for individual responsibility. Alternatively, from 
the sociological perspective, trust can be conceived as a structural 
precondition for the working of a complex system of differentiated society. 
These two different yet complimentary understandings of trust need to be 
researched more thoroughly. 
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Trust became the foundational principle of Western civil society with the 
rise of new social order in early modernity. In the process of structural 
differentiation, “sovereignty was transferred from the figure of the monarch 
to the state, which also underwent a process of differentiation into 
administrative, judicial, and representative functions. Further, the 
development of trade, commerce, and markets increased the complexity of 
economic organization” (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 149). This “new 
commercial social order” came to be grounded not on “any kind of informal 
or private social relations, which exist in all societies,” but rather on 
“morally guided, rule-following relations that make possible anonymous 
social exchanges” (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 148, 151). Thus, when 
individuals started to act as autonomous political and economic subjects, 
that is, to engage in anonymous, formal, and rational relations, they started 
to ground their interactions on the principle of trust: trust in each other and 
trust in new social institutions.  
Pertaining to the focus of my research on civil society, we can make the 
following conclusion. Insofar as the normative idea of civil society presumes 
a complex differentiated societal structure, it requires all members of the 
society to attain a certain degree of civic maturity, which is expressed in 
their political engagement, rule-following behavior in the sphere of the 
economy, respect of the rule of law and of each other’s right to privacy. 
Civic maturity can be seen as the behavioral reflection of citizens’ trust in 
the institutions of society, as well as in the integrity of each individual 
person. Hence, it would be correct to maintain that the democratic system 
functions properly when it is endorsed by moral agreement of participating 
individuals to have confidence in social, political, and economic structures 
and in each other. This suggestion has been corroborated by Outhwaite and 
Ray, “Civil society is linked to trust in that it is dependent on the existence 
of norms of reciprocity and civic engagement” (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 
164). For his part, Seligman also argues that “a specific form of generalized 
trust – rooted in modern individualist norms – is necessary for the workings 
of civil society” (Seligman 1997: 6). 
Such observations point at the inherent connectedness between trust and 
individuals’ primary rights to freedom, autonomy, and responsibility, which 
necessarily underlies the interactions of autonomous, contracting, market-
oriented individuals. Commenting on this point, Seligman explicates that 
trust, which underlies our primordial human longing for mutual promise-
keeping, “arises from the moral agency and autonomy, from the freedom 
and responsibility, of the participants to the interaction. Moreover, without 
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the prior existence of these conditions, rights really – to freedom, 
autonomy, and responsibility, the moral dimension of promise-keeping, and 
hence of trustworthiness – cannot be adequately explained” (Seligman 1997: 
6). In fact, the ethical understanding of trust is invoked every time when we 
want to conceive of the foundational principle of civil society. Every time, it 
is invoked to strike a delicate balance between the individual’s fundamental 
right to freedom and the individual’s moral obligation to act trustworthy.  
Besides the objective conditions of trust, such as the rule of law, right to 
political activity and individual privacy, we need to consider the function of 
trust in the system of modern differentiated society. The structural 
understanding of trust excesses what Seligman called “an understanding of 
trust as a discreet form of human interaction and an ideal model of 
communal life.” It makes possible to explain in which way trust “among 
social actors is necessary for the continued operation of any social order” 
(Seligman 1997: 7). Insofar as a modern understanding of civil society is 
premised on the web of “complex, organic, and differentiated orders” 
(Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 148), structural analysis of trust would elucidate 
which mechanisms help to hold differentiated civil societies together and 
prevail a systemic crisis.  
To deepen the structural understanding of trust, I resort to Niklas 
Luhmann’s study Trust and Power.98 This choice is motivated by Seligman’s 
presumption that Luhmann’s analysis would let us better grasp the 
structural nature of trust as a phenomenon tied to the specific social forms 
of functional differentiation (Seligman 1997: 8). Luhmann’s approach to 
trust brings us back to the problem of structural complexity of modern 
society we have discussed earlier (in 3.3). In the framework of systems 
theory, trust performs the pivotal function of reducing complexity and, in 
this sense, proves indispensable for an increasingly organized social 
structure of modern societies (Luhmann 1980: 25).  
According to Luhmann, insofar as modern social order has foundations 
in trust, society’s advancement depends on the degree of trust individuals 
have in their social environment. Trust takes various shapes depending on 
the degree of societal complexity of a given society. In archaic societies, 
trust “arises spontaneously,” thus, it is “personal and built up in a tactical-
perceptive manner.” Conversely, in modern functionally differentiated 
societies, trust implies “trust in general system mechanisms” (Luhmann 
                                               
98 The English translation of Luhmann’s work Trust and Power was first published in German as 
two separate volumes: Vertrauen in 1973 and Macht in 1975. 
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1980: 93). That is why Luhmann considers the system of modern 
differentiated society to be advanced to the extent that individuals trust 
social systems and institutions. In the context of functionally differentiated 
society, the pivotal function of system trust consists in reducing “social 
complexity by going beyond available information and generalizing 
expectations of behavior,” whereby trust “replaces missing information with 
an internally guaranteed security” (Luhmann 1980: 93). 
Why is this understanding of trust vital for functionally differentiated 
society? It is important, as Luhmann explains, because the world, while 
“being dissipated into an uncontrollable complexity,” contains an infinite 
number of possibilities for each individual to act freely. Modern societies 
managed to structure themselves in such a complex and organized way that 
they are able to survive under the conditions of permanent contingency. 
The mechanism of complexity reduction by means of trust allows modern 
individuals to deal with contingent decisions and actions of other 
individuals. In Luhmann’s estimation, trust “reflects contingency,” for it 
allows individuals to rationally assess and structure their expectations with 
regard to contingent actions of others (Luhmann 1980: 24). Accordingly, 
system trust is also an essential precondition for the democratic system 
because “system trust builds upon the fact that others also trust and this 
common possession of trust becomes conscious.” Concisely, system trust 
“rests on trust in trust” (Luhmann 1980: 69).  
Given this presumption, the consolidation of trust constitutes exactly 
“an advantageous solution for the primordial problem of social order, the 
existence of a free alter ego, though one which is subject to all kinds of 
conditions.” On that account, Luhmann’s systems theory provides an 
insightful answer to the underlying ethical dilemma of modern social order, 
denoted by Seligman as how to achieve the common good without 
suppressing individual autonomy and freedom. Specifically, Luhmann 
suggests that “instead of arming oneself against the unpredictability of the 
other person in the full complexity of all possibilities, one can seek to 
reduce the complexity by concentrating on the creation and maintenance of 
mutual trust, and engage in more meaningful action in respect of a problem 
now more narrowly defined” (Luhmann 1980: 64).  
Having said so, Luhmann emphasizes that both reflexivity (i.e. trust in 
trust) and highly risky character of system trust often remains latent because 
“latency can make the creation of trust more simple and act as a safeguard 
against uncontrollable fears” (Luhmann 1980: 69-70). To illustrate his 
argument, Luhmann addresses the topical issue of trust in the financial 
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sector. He asks what would happen if everybody lost confidence in the 
system of the economy and cashed all their money. Or, what would happen 
if everyone suddenly lost confidence in the security on the streets and 
appeared armed in public places? On this view, we can agree with Luhmann 
that “the rational basis of system trust lies in the trust placed in the trust of 
other people” (Luhmann 1980: 70).  
Having concluded that trust appears in Luhmann’s account as latently 
ubiquitous in complex differentiated society, we can better understand now 
such a pertinent problem for post-communist societies as widespread public 
distrust. If not based on trust, are these societies inherently undemocratic? 
Or is public distrust a consequence of the institutional dysfunction of the 
new democratic system? Within Luhmann’s systems theory, distrust can be 
conceived as an equivalent negative strategy of citizens’ adaptation to the 
democratic polity and the market economy. Let me resort to Luhmann’s 
work to clarify this assumption.  
For Luhmann, distrust is essentially “a functional equivalent for trust.” 
Because distrust and trust constitute the “binary code” of the system, “only 
a choice between trust and distrust is possible.” However, the primary 
function of trust, which is to reduce social complexity by means of avoiding 
risks in the contingent environment, does not resolve the problem of 
complexity. Anyone who refuses to confer trust restores the original 
complexity of infinite potentialities of the situation and puts too many 
demands on oneself. Therefore, anyone who does not trust must turn to 
“functionally equivalent strategies for the reduction of complexity” and 
substitute one’s positive expectations by negative ones. The repertoire of 
negative strategies is wide. It includes combat, mobilizing reserves, as well as 
renunciation of all needs that can be written off. Eventually, these various 
negative strategies do not only make possible individual’s existence without 
trust, but also create such a situation where individual can act rationally 
within the imaginative boundaries of individual’s hostile and not-to-be-
trusted world. In Luhmann’s words, “The consciousness of distrust is thus 
often lost and the strategies of reduction demarcated by it become 
autonomous, become a habitual outlook on life, a routine” (Luhmann 1980: 
71). 
Although distrust is also able to reduce social complexity, its mechanism 
of reduction leads, nonetheless, to “often drastic simplification” of societal 
structures. Luhmann elucidates, “A person who distrusts both needs more 
information and at the same time narrows down the information, which he 
feels confident he can rely on. He becomes more dependent on less 
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information. The possibility of his being deceived becomes once more 
something to be reckoned with” (Luhmann 1980: 72). In result, negative 
expectations tend to absorb “the strength of the person who distrusts to an 
extent which leaves him little energy to explore and adapt to his 
environment in an objective and unprejudiced manner” (Luhmann 1980: 
72), that is, to be open to learning and reflecting on information. 
At the same time, the implication of the conceptual pair ‘trust/distrust’ 
to the systemic view on society excludes personal motives of action. On 
Luhmann’s account, trust and distrust can be secured in modern 
differentiated society by means of organization that operates by impersonal 
motives of action. Such “organization in no way makes trust and distrust 
superfluous but it depersonalizes these mechanisms.” In result, “the person 
who trusts no longer does so at his own risk but at the risk of the system.” 
Conversely, “the person who distrusts no longer does so by going back to 
personal modes of reduction, such as personal animosity, hostility or safety 
precautions.” The person who distrusts relies on “the strength of the 
system, which has already programmed in advance the mode of behavior for 
cases of disappointment, and guards the distruster against any excess” 
(Luhmann 1980: 93).  
In modern functionally differentiated society, this organization theory 
performs a function analogous with that of ethics, namely it provides 
rational directions whether to trust or distrust but never tells the actor how 
he should act. Systems are “rational” insofar as they “possess understanding 
of how to make use of trust and distrust without placing too heavy demands 
on the person who finally shows trust or distrust: the individuals” 
(Luhmann 1980: 93). However, there is an important difference between 
ethics and organization theory. From the perspective of ethical theory, the 
choice between trust and distrust is essentially a moral choice, whereas in 
Luhmann’s systems theory, the choice between trust and distrust pertains to 
the system’s capacity of reducing complexity through institutionalizing the 
consequences of trust and distrust.  
For his part, Luhmann remains a convinced value-free sociologist. He 
asserts, “Trust is not the sole foundation of the world; but a highly complex 
but nevertheless structured conception of the world could not be 
established without a fairly complex society, which in turn could not be 
established without trust” (Luhmann 1980: 93-94). In Luhmann’s opinion, 
trust does not have an ultimate normative value, or a foundational 
metaphysical significance; it is rather a sociological instrument to measure 
the degree of structural complexity of a given society. As for me, I consider 
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trust both as a sociological instrument and as a moral value because trust 
has a deep moral significance for civil society theory. Let me shortly clarify 
the connection between trust and democracy.  
According to the ethical interpretation of civil society theory, political 
engagement attains a high priority, for it embodies a core civic virtue. Civil 
society theory presumes thus “an active public sphere in which citizens 
engage in reasoned argument over affairs of state and morality” and builds 
on such key concepts as “virtue, the moral requirement to be a good citizen, 
and rational debate” (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 148). Thus, democratic 
consolidation is possible if citizens perceive political engagement as their 
moral duty. However, to express this moral duty publicly, citizens need to 
learn to trust their social environment. Considering trust to be a prerequisite 
for successful democratization of post-communist societies, I cannot but 
entirely share the following admonition astutely uttered by Seligman, “To 
call for the establishment of civil society without taking into consideration 
the fundamental terms of trust in society is but an empty enterprise” 
(Seligman 1997: 6). Besides, it is also vital to realize that “the development 
of trust is dependent on a number of conditions, including a legitimate and 
legal-rational state, relative (or perceived) absence of corruption in public 
life, active regulatory bodies, and embeddedness of economic and political 
institutions” (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 164). If these conditions are weak, 
massive distrust is likely to affect the formal channels of economic exchange 
and political engagement.  
 
5.3.3 Distrust of Public Institutions as the Post-Communist Legacy  
 
In the context of post-communist society, the conceptual pair ‘trust-distrust’ 
reveals a lot in the moral-psychological portrait of a common homo post-
Sovieticus. If we agree, given the above analysis, that trust is an essential 
precondition for the stability of any democratic system, the lack of trust can 
be considered one of main factors that inhibit democratic consolidation and 
institutional development of civil society in post-Soviet Russia. Therefore, 
the communist legacy of persistent distrust of public institutions can be 
reckoned among main sources of the crisis that permeated public morality 
in post-Soviet Russia.  
Evidence for this claim is abundant in the relevant literature. For 
instance, Marc Morjé Howard confirms in his study The Weakness of Civil 
Society in Post-Communist Europe, “One might think that the disappearance of 
the communist system and its mass organizations would lead to an 
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outpouring of public participation in new organizations that are truly 
voluntary and autonomous.” However, notwithstanding the period of 
spontaneous mobilization between 1989 and 1991, the nascent civil society 
turned to be short-lived. New opportunities that emerged in democratic 
Russia did not lead to an increase in participation. Instead, as Howard justly 
observes, “If anything, participation has actually decreased in recent years” 
(Howard 2003: 27). 
Reluctance of post-communist citizens to engage in the democratic 
process can be explained by their negative memory of obligatory 
participation in Soviet formal organizations. Indeed, many scholars associate 
the fact that the most citizens of post-communist Europe “still strongly 
mistrust and avoid joining any kind of formal organizations” with “a direct 
legacy of the communist experience” (Howard 2003: 27). In the article 
‘Postcommunism and the Problem of Trust,’ Richard Rose investigated the 
circumstances under which distrust emerged in Soviet Russia. He assumed, 
“Since the communist party insisted that it alone knew best how society 
ought to be ruled, there was no point in individuals’ expressing their views 
through elections or through institutions organized independently of the 
party-state” (Rose 1994: 18). Hence, distrust grew in Soviet society as the 
upshot of totalitarian organization of society by the rigid communist logic. 
Insofar as Soviet citizens were forced to participate in formal organizations 
without their active cognitive and moral attachment, now they tend to cling 
to this negative memory, viewing any kind of participation as semi-
mandatory. 
However, having concluded that trust is a necessary precondition for 
citizens’ participation in public institutions, we need to understand how the 
Soviet system managed to sustain itself, given the mandatory character of 
civil participation. An interesting insight has been suggested by Seweryn 
Bialer. His publication ‘The Question of Legitimacy’ can be considered, in 
my view, as one of the most qualified and objective accounts of citizens’ 
participation in Soviet Russia. His initial claim is daring, “Depending on 
one’s point of view, an analyst could maintain with equal justification that 
political participation in the Soviet Union is very high indeed or that it is 
almost non-existent” (Bialer 1983: 420). The choice would depend primarily 
on the difference between what Bialer signifies as “high politics” and “low 
politics.” Therefore, analysts who make such a distinction would confirm 
apathy and alienation from the sphere of high politics on the one hand, but 
invigoration and involvement in the sphere of low politics on the other.  
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On that account, in order to compare citizens’ participation in Soviet 
versus Western democratic societies, a correct research question should 
pertain not to the kind of participation, but rather to the function performed 
by citizens’ participation. Instead, Bialer recognizes that many analysts 
erroneously focus on the distinction between “authentic” and “controlled” 
participation and thus disregard the pivotal legitimating function of 
participation, which is common to both Western democratic and Soviet 
socialist societies (Bialer 1983: 421). It does not matter whether citizens’ 
participation originates from below or from above because participation 
performs the same legitimizing function and serves the same goal, which is 
to maintain political order. Bialer’s comparison between Soviet and Western 
democratic societies confirms the importance of “the elite dimension of 
legitimation of power for the stability of political regimes with regard both 
to their survival and effectiveness” (Bialer 1983: 423). Moreover, the 
evaluation of Soviet citizens’ participation depends even more on the very 
definition of participation. Bialer comments, “If one were to define ‘real,’ 
‘authentic’ participation as consisting of spontaneous actions alone, fully 
voluntary and largely uncoordinated from a center, one would describe the 
Soviet phenomenon as ‘penetration’ of the society by the authorities, 
‘mobilization’ of the society by the party, ‘transmission belts,’ and other 
such terms; but one would not use the term participation” (Bialer 1983: 
421). 
Taking Bialer’s account seriously, we cannot employ the term 
‘participation’ to designate coerced, non-voluntary, and artificial engagement 
of Soviet citizens in formal organizations. Such kind of participation, 
although serving the legitimizing function, contributed to a lingering 
psychological trauma of Soviet citizens. It nourished the attitude of 
hypocritical submission and deep distrust with regard to official authorities. 
Insofar as the totalitarian system was aimed at acquiring total control over 
civic and private life of the citizens, “the state systematically invaded and 
undermined relations of trust, privacy and intimacy” (Outhwaite and Ray 
2005: 156). Ultimately, “the nature of communist rule meant that centralized 
power undermined norms of cooperation by eliminating negotiation from 
public life and undermining respect for anything other than official 
positions, which themselves came to be distrusted” (Outhwaite and Ray 
2005: 164).  
This clarifies the paradox of the Soviet system. On the one hand, it 
required public engagement and respect of official political life, but on the 
other hand, by curtailing citizens’ freedom of thought and speech, it 
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consistently eradicated public trust in official political life. In result, as 
Outhwaite and Ray astutely observe, “the intrusion of the security services 
and other state agencies into everyday life meant that anyone, including 
friends and relatives, could be an informer, which undermined relations of 
informal authority and trust […]. Increasingly a gap appeared between 
official and private realms, the latter based on informal conduct, while the 
former had only limited relations of trust” (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 156-
57). The gap between official and private realms became particularly 
noticeable in the sphere of economic relations, where “high levels of 
impersonal distrust are likely to be combined with trust based in personal 
commitments, client networks and strong particularistic identities.” This gap 
between public distrust and personal trust stimulated “the creation of new 
impersonal market transactions” (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 164), which is 
still noticeable in private networks in post-communist Russia.  
Given the pervasive cynicism that resulted from the bifurcation between 
public acquiescence to the communist system and private rejection of it, we 
can correctly define the negative memory of semi-mandatory participation 
as the main source of current public distrust of democratic institutions and 
citizens’ reluctance to participate in any kind of official organizations. In 
reaction to the entrenched widespread public distrust, the concept of civil 
society was invoked in the post-communist context exactly as the “key to 
closing the chasm between public and private realms” (Outhwaite and Ray 
2005: 156). In the invigorated public discussion in late Soviet and post-
Soviet Russia, the concept of civil society denoted the balance between the 
totalitarian control of the state and the atomized individualism of post-
communist society. In this discussion, the pertinent question arose as to 
how post-Soviet citizens would deal with the communist legacy of public 
distrust, avoidance, and cynicism.  
Addressing this question, Glebova provocatively suggests that there is a 
common way in which Russians deal with traumatic experiences in their 
history, and that the communist experience is no exception from this rule. 
In her opinion, Russians tend to reflect on their historical past in terms of 
national guilt and responsibility, national identity and self-sufficiency; 
however, they tend to avoid an important question as ‘For which past do 
we, Russians, bear responsibility?’. Instead, Russians’ historical memory is 
concerned with the questions like ‘Which past should be responsible for us? 
Which past can support and justify us, let us be proud of ourselves and let 
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us love ourselves?’. Exactly these questions underlie “the practice of 
overcoming of the communist legacy”99 (Glebova 2006: 46).  
Although the practice of overcoming of the communist legacy involved 
repentance and denouncement of the past, this repentance was short-term 
and had a utilitarian character. As Glebova observes, once the confession 
had been offered to the world public, the communist legacy was regarded as 
overcome and buried in the historical memory. Indeed, the maneuver of 
ardent yet short-term denouncement followed by total rejection 
characterizes the way in which Russians integrate traumatic experiences into 
the national historical memory. Every time when the time is ripe, massive 
dissatisfaction leads to a political coup, and the tragic and wrong past is 
publicly denounced. This public exposure would release huge amounts of 
negative social energy, creating an illusion “as if the past ceases to exist and, 
despite its presence in the public domain, does not exert any influence on 
actual political practices” (Glebova 2006: 47). 
Nevertheless, whenever it is required and can be used by certain social 
forces, the past definitely returns but does so “in a transformed, acceptable 
for the society condition” (Glebova 2006: 47). Thereby, the images of the 
past are reproduced artificially. We can better understand this tendency if 
we conceive of it in the context of Russian political culture. According to 
Glebova, the nation’s self-identification through collective ‘we’ constitutes 
one of the ubiquitous features of Russian political culture. Insofar as the 
unification through this depersonalized ‘we’ denies the very possibility of 
plurality, Russian historical memory rather tends to create a unified, 
monolithic picture of the past, instead of a plurality of diverse, potentially 
contradictory pictures. This is even more true because for Russians, history 
is “not the place for disputes or discussion, but the space for firm, rigid 
certainties and exact formulations” (Glebova 2006: 77). Such a utilitarian 
selective approach to the historical past disrupts the organic continuity. 
Accordingly, the tradition becomes invented, and the historical memory can 
be easily manipulated by utilitarian considerations. Glebova presumes that 
the function of these artificially created images consists in providing the 
present system with compensation, protection, and relative stability 
(Glebova 2006: 88).  
What does Glebova’s critical account contribute to the discussion 
concerning the enduring impact of the communist experience on the 
                                               
99 Reflection on these pertinent questions started during the Soviet period, in the circles of Soviet 
political dissidents. The dissident movement will be addressed in § 6.4.1.  
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conduct of contemporary Russians? By artificially reproducing the historical 
past, Russians replace the ‘wrong’ past with the acceptable images of the 
past and, in so doing, evade a critical self-conception. However, the 
mechanism of exposure and rejection does not relieve public awareness of 
past negative experiences. The problems of the past are continuously carried 
to the present, so that this transmission of the manufactured past renders 
the present order to be susceptible to crises. This explains why the political, 
economic, and social transformations that accompanied Russia’s transition 
to democracy did not proceed in a smooth and gradual manner. Until now, 
the burden of the communist experience remains extremely difficult to be 
accepted, comprehended, forgiven, and yet not forgotten.  
Taking into account the traumatic experience of the communist past, we 
can better realize why the reinvigoration of public trust proves problematic. 
In the post-Soviet context, the technique of exposure and rejection is 
incapable of eradicating the entrenched practice of avoiding obligatory 
participation. Thus, distrust continues to form “a major obstacle of a civil 
society in which representative institutions can link the interests of 
individuals and families with the actions of government” (Rose 1994: 18). 
Consequently, Rose explains, “substantial majorities of citizens in post-
communist regimes want democracy, but find that their societies lack a key 
ingredient: trustworthy institutions capable of mediating between individuals 
and the state,” among which trustworthy political parties. In result, “the 
citizens of post-communist Eastern Europe do not trust the parties that they 
vote for” (Rose 1994: 19). In 1994, Rose had sufficient evidence to claim 
that “about half of all Russians do not trust any significant cluster of 
institutions” and “continue to see their country as divided between ‘us’ (the 
individual and his family and friends) and ‘them’ (distrusted institutions of 
authority)” (Rose 1994: 27-28).  
Moreover, it is important to underscore that heavy reliance on informal 
connections and mutual support, which is typical of the Soviet system, 
testifies not only to the overall corruption of the party machinery, but also 
to the weak legitimacy of the communist countries (Outhwaite and Ray 
2005: 165). In the early 1990s, the acute crisis of legitimacy induced Russian 
political elite to take the problem of legitimacy more seriously. Politicians 
started to search then for the traditional sources of legitimacy, such as the 
Church, the idea of national unity, the army, etc. Thus, the problem of 
participation and trust gradually came to be considered in relation to the 
problem of legitimacy.  
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It is not accidental that the evaluation of public trust includes the 
discussion of “the level and sources of state legitimacy.” As the analysis of 
Sil and Chen demonstrates, legitimacy “depends not so much on the 
behavior of leaders or the design of institutions as on how these are judged 
by those whom the leaders and institutions claim to represent” (Sil and 
Chen 2004: 347-48). Viewing legitimacy as “analytically and normatively 
prior to arguments about the functioning and robustness of democracy,” 
the scholars correctly argue that “the absence of widespread social 
upheavals, the popularity of top leaders and the overall stability of national 
political institutions do not constitute evidence of state legitimacy.” On the 
contrary, the deficiency of state legitimacy is evident from “mass attitudes 
reflecting a low level of trust in national institutions, growing protest at the 
local level, mass detachment from political and economic elites, the 
pervasiveness of informal private networks and arrangements to bypass 
official public channels, and frustrations over crime and corruption” (Sil and 
Chen 2004: 348).  
Relying on Sil and Chen’s account, we can aver that post-Soviet Russia 
currently undergoes the crisis of legitimacy and public trust because “any 
optimism accompanying the arrival of a new ‘democratic’ Russian state 
quickly gave way to growing dissatisfaction with political institutions and 
actors” (Sil and Chen 2004: 353). Putin’s wide popularity notwithstanding, 
public opinion surveys indicate widespread dissatisfaction with almost all 
social-political institutions, as well as with the key political figures that form 
the edifice of representative democracy. Sin and Chen are concerned about 
declining public trust in democratic institutions and representative bodies in 
Russia because trust citizens place in government institutions is especially 
important for the legitimacy and effectiveness of newly democratized 
regimes (Sil and Chen 2004: 349-50). Although social unrest has not yet 
occurred on a nationwide scale, mass social-economic anxiety determines 
“the frequency and intensity of collectivist protest at the local level,” as it 
provokes ordinary citizens to evade the rule of law in order to improve the 
level of one’s individual welfare (Sil and Chen 2004: 353).  
As we can conclude from the above, the institutional weakness and 
insufficient efficacy of Russian civil society can be explained by Russians’ 
subjective experiences of democracy. Moral attitudes play in this respect a 
pivotal role. In present-day Russia, democratic institutions do not function 
properly not because these new institutions deserve no credit, but rather 
because Russians do not have confidence in these institutions initially and 
thus avoid participating in democratic institutions in a legal, transparent, and 
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formal way. Preferring to use illegal and informal methods instead, Russians 
maintain the vicious circle of self-fulfilling prophecy: Insofar as the informal 
method repetitively proves quicker and more effective, the formal 
institutional way appears as deficiently functioning, and consequently the 
new institutions prove legitimately distrusted.  
 
5.4 The Human Individual and Public Morality in the Context of 
Institutional Transformations   
 
In the context of institutional transformations, the revealed problem of 
public distrust affects both the individual existence of each citizen and the 
common life of society. On this view, I consider examining the moral-
psychological portrait of homo post-Sovieticus necessary for the ethical 
evaluation of civil society in Russia. In what follows, I shall indicate, firstly, 
some core mechanisms of social behavior whereby contemporary Russians 
tend to compensate for their distrust of democratic institutions and cope 
with the declaiming state legitimacy. In this context, the pertinent question 
of whom and why Russians tend to trust will be examined (§ 5.4.1). Next, I 
shall speculate whether it is (im)possible to define contemporary Russian 
society in terms of functionally differentiated society and which prospects 
for Russia’s democratization ensue from the provided sociological depiction 
(§ 5.4.2).  
 
5.4.1 Adaptation and Collective Trust as Strategies of Survival 
 
Adaptation is frequently considered a widespread mechanism of social 
behavior that is typical of post-communist citizens. As the contemporary 
Russian sociologist Boris Dubin confirms in the article ‘Institutions, 
Networks, Rituals,’100 adaptation has become, since the second half of the 
1990s, the prevailing behavioral mechanism, whereby homo post-Sovieticus 
copes with the undesired consequences of the transition to democracy 
(Dubin 2008: 24). In what follows, I intend to trace the function of 
adaptation in Soviet society and consequently to elucidate the impact of this 
recurring mechanism on the behavior of contemporary Russian citizens. 
The behavioral mechanism of adaptation is inextricably connected with 
the state’s intrusion into private life of each individual citizen. Dubin 
convincingly argues that the mechanism of adaptation has been engraved 
                                               
100  Борис Дубин, «Институты, сети, ритуалы» // Pro et Contra (Март-июнь 2008). 
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into the mentality of homo Sovieticus as a reaction to the omnipresent fear of 
illegitimate punishment or persecution on the part of state authorities. In 
search of security, Soviet citizens retreated into the private sphere and 
restricted it only to trusted family members and close friends. For years, 
they led such a binary existence, characterized by the retreat into the private 
sphere and alienation from public life. Now, after the democratic 
revolution, this habitual pattern of adaptation recurs, albeit, in a new form 
and in a new context.  
It the public sphere, adaptation evolved as a reaction to the totalitarian 
system, which allowed no alternative thinking or acting. In the article 
‘Institutional Deficiencies as a Problem of Post-Soviet Society,’101 Lev 
Gudkov and Boris Dubin explain that totalitarian control of the public 
sphere, while producing a myth of common control and civil participation, 
precluded genuine individual involvement in public life. Since the contents 
of public activities had been a priori prescribed, only a mere performance 
was needed on the public scene (Gudkov and Dubin 2003: 43). In this 
sense, Bialer correctly characterizes the behavior typical of Soviet citizens as 
“unconscious, amorphous, and unfocused,” based not on the citizens’ 
commitment to the system, but rather on unanimous and passive 
“acceptance.” This behavior went hand in hand with “mass absenteeism, 
lack of labor discipline, turnover at the workplace – all of which testify to 
dissatisfaction with many policies and, most importantly, to the 
overwhelmingly private concern of the working man with his own 
wellbeing” (Bialer 1983: 421-22). 
With regard to the post-Soviet situation, Dubin correctly observes that 
the mechanism of adaptation, coupled with the deficiency of basic 
economic resources, leads to drastic fragmentation of social life, which is 
evident from the decrease of social relations and the growing isolation of 
citizens. Citizens’   social life becomes again restricted to their family and 
friendship relations. Outside this trusted private niche, citizens perceive 
themselves as essentially vulnerable, unprotected by law, abandoned by 
social organizations, silent, and submissive. Dubin signals the alarming fact 
that the described self-perception still haunts two thirds up to three quarters 
of Russians. Consequently, he understands distrust and adaptation as 
widespread strategies of survival (Dubin 2008: 26). 
                                               
101 Лев Гудков и Борис Дубин «Институциональные дефициты как проблема 
постсоветского общества» // Мониторинг общественного мнения (Май-июнь 2003). 
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Adaptation denotes the reluctance to take control over the situation and 
the liability to compromise. It depicts “passive and prevailingly reactive 
behavior of the majority of social strata” as the behavior entirely dependent 
on the centralized power of the state and the alienated, unchangeable, and 
uncontrollable order. Glebova associates this behavior with the distinctively 
Russian virtue of patience and qualifies the mechanism of adaptation as 
passive. The scholar emphasizes that Russians rather hope to survive the 
far-reaching turmoil of the economic reforms instead of tackling the arising 
problems in a serious and constructive way (Glebova 2006: 66). According 
to Dubin, Russian citizens avoid autonomous action and individual 
responsibility. In so doing, they also avoid making choices, which is 
necessary for change. Instead, essential non-inclusiveness, coupled with the 
rhetoric of exclusiveness, is pivotal to the way in which Russians tend to 
identify themselves (Dubin 2008: 30). Obviously, individual activism and 
desire of change are at odds with the habit of passive adaptation. Change 
needs activism, whereas the preponderance of Russian citizens, consisting 
mostly of elderly generations, still longs for the old system and looks for the 
smart mechanism of adaptation to the new system. As the results of Colton 
and McFaul’s public survey of 1999 indicate, a significant number of 
respondents over age 60 (29 to 45 percent) prefer either a reformed or 
unreformed Soviet political system (Colton and McFaul 2001: 17).   
What does the mechanism of adaptation clarify about Russians’ attitude 
towards public life and participation? Bialer argues that the self-centered 
orientation and the retreat into the private sphere are overt symptoms of 
political apathy (Bialer 1983: 422). For his part, Dubin is convinced that 
widespread adaptation betrays the general negative attitude towards any 
kind of social activity. This general aversion to public activity has become an 
established collective norm. Russians not only avoid participating in public 
organizations but also despise public achievements, ambitions, and activities 
of others (Dubin 2008: 24). This depreciative attitude towards civic 
engagement also affects the attitude towards new democratic institutions. 
Russians tend to blame these institutions for their “persistent paternalistic-
repressive character, essential unaccountability, and irresponsibility” 
(Gudkov and Dubin 2003: 43-44). 
The deep-lying cause of the indicated problem pertains to the fact that 
the institutional system was formed in democratic Russia under the 
influence of the interests of the ruling elite instead of the actual needs of 
common citizens. As a result, Russians tend to judge new democratic 
institutions by the “degree of damage reduction” (Gudkov and Dubin 2003: 
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45) and not by the criteria of transparency, predictability, and accountability. 
This criterion of minimum damage confirms that Russians recognize the 
dysfunction of the institutional system and, for that reason, avoid 
participating in the new institutions.  
Notwithstanding the prevailing negative attitude towards public activity, 
certain institutions still deserve trust in the eyes of many Russians. It is 
interesting to investigate whom and why contemporary Russians tend to 
trust. For the most part, Russians trust institutions that are predictable and 
contributive to the ideals of social order, stability, and national unity. As the 
results of the longitude study conducted by the Russian Public Opinion 
Research Center (VTsIOM) demonstrate, public trust in the figure of the 
president has significantly increased during the Putin era. In addition to the 
charismatic figure of the president, Russians trust the Russian Orthodox 
Church (henceforth: the ROC) and, to a lesser degree, the army and security 
structures (Dubin 2008: 28). 
Concerning Russians’ trust in the president, the army, and the Church, 
Dubin insightfully observes that Russians’ conception of trust is quite 
different from system trust, which is central to Luhmann’s theory of 
functional differentiation (discussed in § 5.3.2). Trust in the institutions that 
embody superior authority testifies to society’s institutional weakness, non-
differentiation, and socio-cultural poverty (Dubin 2008: 27). This is true 
because the institutions, which represent a vertically structured authority, do 
not require individual responsibility or engagement on the part of the 
citizens. By contrast, those institutions that presume individual participation 
and responsibility are considered by most Russians as unreliable. But these 
are exactly the institutions that are indispensable for democratic polity: the 
media, government administration (not to be confused with the figure of 
the president!), local authorities, the court of law, trade unions, public 
prosecutor’s office, police force, The Federation Council, the State Duma 
(Parliament), and, at the lowest rate, political parties (Gudkov and Dubin 
2003: 39). On this account, Dubin fairly concludes that “for Russians, ‘trust’ 
denotes a habitual, pre-modern, even archaic conception of the ‘proper’ 
social order. The social order is understood then as hierarchical and 
unconditional, undisputable and invariable, symbolized by the institutions of 
the army and the Church. In this understanding, trust is grounded in the 
embodiment of a superpower, which is freed from personal responsibility – 
the president” (Dubin 2008: 28). This is trust in the absolute supreme ruler 
who stands above the expectations and needs of his subjects. 
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The source of wide public trust in the president, the Church, and the 
army resides, according to Gudkov and Dubin, in the fact that most 
Russians can collectively identify themselves with the values and goals of 
these institutions. Russians eagerly speak about “our army, our educational 
system, our science, our Church, our sport,” and the like (Gudkov and 
Dubin 2003: 43). Dubin presumes that the images and figures of collective 
trust function as “compensatory mechanisms of release,” as they release 
citizens from their individual responsibility for involvement, efficacy, and 
change (Dubin 2008: 28). 
However, it would be unjust to argue that public trust is undermined 
only by Russians’ tendency to avoid individual responsibility. Distrust of 
new democratic institutions is also preconditioned by citizens’ disarming 
ignorance about the aims and functions of those institutions. As the results 
of Dubin’s study ‘Universal Adaptation as the Tactic of the Weak’102 show, 
only one respondent in five maintains that public organizations should 
defend citizens’ rights and interests, whereas almost one in two (45 percent) 
thinks that the primary task of public organizations consists in cooperating 
with the administrative apparatus. Thereby, this cooperation aims at 
facilitating the implementation of government policies (Dubin 2006). On 
that account, Jurij Levada is right when calling the motifs and mechanisms 
that underlie the high rating of public trust in the president “realistic and 
prosaic.” In the article ‘Tendencies of the Development of Culture and 
Public Consciousness,’103 the scholar argues that Russians trust the 
president because of his personal successful accomplishments (21 percent), 
or because they hope for his accomplishments in the future (44 percent), or 
because they simply acknowledge that there is no one else to trust (31 
percent). It is hope, or, more exactly, the desire of hope, that motivates 
Russians to trust the president (Levada 2003: 168). As far as other tools of 
political efficacy are concerned, the majority of ordinary Russians remain 
either distrustful or simply ignorant. Hence, the addressed problems of 
socio-cultural poverty, ignorance, and collective trust call for examining the 
structural profile of contemporary Russian society.  
 
                                               
102 Борис Дубин, «Всеобщая адаптация как тактика слабых» // Неприкосновенный запас (№6 
(50), 2006). Internet publication, last visited on 28 July 2010. 
103 Юрий Левада, «Тенденции развития культуры и массового сознания» // Т. Заславская 
(ред.), Куда пришла Россия?.. Итоги социетальной трансформации (2003). 
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5.4.2 Russian Society Today: Between Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft 
 
In contemporary Russia, the prospects of democratic consolidation and 
development of civil society are directly connected to the prevalent type of 
societal relations and communication. The prospects are more likely to be 
optimistic if the model of modern Gesellschaft prevails over the model of 
traditional Gemeinschaft. However, insofar as contemporary Russian citizens 
are still inclined to trust informal networks instead of official public 
organizations, Russian society remains pervaded by the mechanisms and 
structures that are typical of traditional Gemeinschaft. How does this tendency 
manifest itself at the structural level? This question is addressed in the 
present section. 
The persistence of particularistic relations and private networks is 
evident from the research carried out by the ‘Levada Analytical Center.’ 
Among other scholars who are affiliated with the Levada Analytical Center, 
Dubin argues that contemporary Russian society is “simple, one-
dimensional, secluded from the external world, paternalistically oriented, 
and vertically structured.” Interestingly enough, he associates the source of 
this societal de-complication not only with the citizens’ preference of 
trusted informal networks over distrusted public institutions, but also with 
the general course of the presidential administration. Dubin is radical in his 
critique when asserting that the economic, cultural, and societal 
complication of contemporary Russian society is purposefully inhibited by 
the presidential administration. The rigid powerful administration causes 
“political paralysis and social stagnation” and hence contributes to the 
ritualization and ceremonialization of politics. Moreover, public politics 
starts to resemble a public spectacle, as it employs integrative symbols with 
a view to invoking an illusion that everyone belongs to the collective whole 
of the nation-state (Dubin 2006). 
When analyzing contemporary Russian society from the perspective of 
the theory of functional differentiation, we are confronted with certain 
discrepancies. In the first place, the process of functional differentiation 
entails universalization of societal relations, equally at the level of social 
institutions and at the level of individual interactions. The practice of 
universalization of societal relations embodies the political-philosophical 
ideal of egalitarianism, which is one of the foundational principles of civil 
society theory.104 However, as Dubin convincingly argues, Russian society 
                                               
104 The ideal of egalitarianism is discussed in section 2.2. 
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undergoes rather the process of personification than the process of 
universalization of societal relations and explains this phenomenon by the 
inclination of Russian society towards pre-modern, traditional social order 
(Dubin 2008: 31). This process of personification of societal relations 
contradicts the logic of modern differentiated order  
In the second place, contemporary Russian society exhibits certain 
mechanisms that are typical of the process of societal fragmentation, which 
again opposes the process of societal differentiation. Having said so, we need 
to understand the important distinction between these two processes. If 
societal differentiation entails increasing complication of societal structures, 
whereby new relatively autonomous social subsystems continuously emerge 
(for instance, the process of institutional differentiation between different 
social agents whereby new interest groups, communities, and parties are 
formed), societal fragmentation denotes the process of subdivision of extant 
social forms into smaller parts, whereby originally simple social forms 
preserve their simple structure. The process of societal differentiation 
facilitates the mobility of social agents in the complex horizontally 
structured network of social institutions and forms. However, Dubin’s 
analysis demonstrates that the societal stratification of Russian society 
usually involves “virtual, simulative, and mythologized images of the whole, 
as well as personified figures representing that wholesomeness.” On this 
view, Russian society employs the mechanisms of social integration that are 
completely different from those accompanying the process of functional 
differentiation. On this view, Dubin claims that Russian society undergoes 
the process of societal fragmentation (Dubin 2008: 30).  
The tendency toward integration of society by means of the ideas of 
unity and wholeness is not typical only of the post-Soviet period. There 
were many examples in Russian political history when society overtly 
expressed its longing for a strong figure of the political leader who can 
restore unity and overcome disintegration. The most obvious example was 
the ‘public’ election of Tsar Boris Godunov in 1598. The German political 
philosopher Gerhard Simon suggests an interesting explanation why 
Russians tend to identify the ruler with the people so that any possibility of 
political conflict can be eliminated. Analyzing this tendency, the scholar 
emphasizes “integral mentality” of Russian political culture. While Western 
political systems evolved in the culture of conflict, struggling to reconcile 
different classes, mentalities, and interest groups, Russian society strove for 
the culture of integrity and therefore cherished the ideals of wholesomeness 
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and unity (Simon 2001: 115).105 Simon claims that the “need of consensus” 
is grounded in the belief that underpins not only Russian politics, but also 
traditional Russian religion (i.e., Russian Orthodoxy), philosophy, and 
culture. It is the belief that “there is only one truth, which should be 
discovered, and that every individual is responsible for this truth” (Simon 
1998: 26).106  
From a sociological perspective, this distinctively Russian tendency 
towards avoiding conflict corresponds to the widespread phenomenon in 
Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, namely “the phenomenon of a construable 
majority” (Dubin 2005). The phenomenon of a construable majority means 
that the views and orientations of the citizens are easily manipulated by 
political power. In contemporary Russia, political power aims at integrating 
the fragmented society with the aid of the ideals and symbols of national 
unity, wholeness, and consensus. In this strategy, ideology plays a pivotal 
role. 
Tracing the origin of the typical post-Soviet phenomenon of a 
construable majority, Dubin points at “the process of averaging 
popularization,” which largely determined the development of Russian 
society in the second half of the 1990s. In his article ‘Outsiders: Power, 
Mass, and the Media in Present-day Russia,’107 the scholar clarifies an 
important distinction between the process of popularization that occurred 
in Western Europe and the current process of popularization in post-Soviet 
Russia. If in the modern West, popularization completed the process of 
modern institutionalization and resulted in the establishment of an open 
society with a developed public sphere, in post-Soviet Russia, popularization 
occurs without institutional modernization (Dubin 2005). Contemporary 
Russian society transforms towards a mass society, which inevitably leads to 
the simplification of citizens’ political vision and the homogenization of the 
public sphere.  
According to Dubin, the disappearance of the periodical press and its 
substitution by telecommunication contributed to the creation of a 
construable majority in post-Soviet Russian society. Russian society 
becomes “simpler and more homogeneous, flattened, and fragmented, and 
                                               
105 Герхард Зимон, «Специфика России глазами немецкого ученого» // Общественные науки 
и современность (№ 4, 2001). 
106  Герхард Зимон, «Заметки о политической культуре в России» // Вопросы философии (№ 
4, 1998). 
107 Борис Дубин, «Посторонние: власть, масса и массмедиа в сегодняшней России» // 
Отечественные записки (№ 6, 2005). Internet publication, last visited on 28 July 2010. 
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therefore more acquiescent to external influences exerted on each separated, 
atomized member” (Dubin 2005). Moreover, the amalgamation between the 
ruling elite and the key figures in the field of telecommunication aggravates 
the homogenization of Russian society. The state owns two central 
television channels. In this fact, Dubin discerns the refusal of political 
power to seek legitimation by appealing to different social groups and 
political partners (Dubin 2005). In general, by propagating the concept of 
the collective majority, the ideologists behind Russian mass media 
pragmatically implant the idea of a new national identity under the banners 
of unity and solidarity.  
As a result of the strategic usage of the integrative symbols and ideas of 
unity, Russian citizens tend to construct their social imaginary through the 
collective image of ‘we.’ In this self-conception, homo post-Sovieticus 
demonstrates his persistent preference of the culture of mediocrity, 
ordinariness, and depersonalized mass, as well as his reluctance to 
participate in the differentiated structures of society. Glebova correctly 
observes in this respect that the symbolical unification through collective 
‘we’ is directly associated with the values of order, stability, and certainty, 
which are essential for Russia’s democratic project. In the eyes of many 
ordinary Russians, the self-conception through collective ‘we’ makes the 
realization of these values more feasible and comprehendible (Glebova 
2006: 68).  
A legitimate question can be asked pertaining to the effect that Russians’ 
collectivist self-conception has on the relationship between society and 
political power. According to Dubin, political power becomes increasingly 
bureaucratic, while society diffuses into an increasingly depersonalized mass. 
Thus, the weak self-organization of Russian society contrasts the 
consolidation of political power in the form of a hierarchical pyramid. 
Paradoxically, citizens’ widespread alienation from the sphere of public 
politics, as well as their growing dissatisfaction with political power, is 
combined with the feeling of profound dependence on political power 
(Dubin 2006).  
Given the above, we can spell out an important trend in contemporary 
Russian society. Although the systematic employment of the integrative 
symbols provides the system of politics with relative stability and continuity, 
these simulative forms of symbolic belonging to the virtual whole determine 
the particularistic and exclusionist character of collective ‘we.’ Thereby, as 
Dubin correctly argues, the collectivist self-conception establishes a series of 
prohibitive sanctions, which produce patriotic mood, trust in social 
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institutions, overall positive socialization, and moral solidarity. However, the 
far-reaching effect of this collectivist optimistic ideology is double-edged. 
The rhetoric of collective exclusiveness consolidates the bureaucratic 
administrative system on the one hand, and confines society to a one-
dimensional and passive existence on the other. It aggravates the 
institutional weakness and underdevelopment of modern Gesellschaft, which 
is characterized by autonomous and differentiated structures. On this 
account, I agree with Dubin’s diagnosis of deinstitutionalization as the core 
problem in post-Soviet Russia (Dubin 2006). 
Are there any solutions to the problem of deinstitutionalization? In my 
view, Solonin correctly suggests that Russian society needs to abandon the 
usual “ideological optimism” and revise the complex of conservative-
mystical ideas about Russia’s exclusive historical mission. Instead of 
ideological optimism and artificial projects, Russian society should invoke 
civil optimism and develop socio-economic programs, whereby civil society 
plays a pivotal role (Solonin 2002: 14). However, this strategy necessitates 
the reconstruction of the whole system that now provides “the utmost 
conservative and patriarchal type of transmission of social information” 
aimed at legitimating the extant hierarchical socio-political order by the ideal 
of unity (Solonin 2002: 15). Hence, I associate the success of Russia’s 
democratic project with the transformation of Russian society toward 
modern differentiated Gesellschaft. 
Given that modern differentiated society, or modern Gesellschaft, 
presumes polycentricism of societal structures and channels of 
communication, the structural transformation toward modern Gesellschaft 
implies increasing rationalization. This suggestion can be also underpinned 
by Weber’s theory of rationalization (discussed in 3.1). During society’s 
transition from Gemeinschaft toward Gesellschaft, formal rationality gradually 
prevails over affective rationality. Accordingly, the rational type of legitimate 
order prevails over the charismatic and traditional types. In Russia, however, 
the emotional-affective component still seems to dominate public mentality, 
which is evident from the fact that many Russians perceive current social 
and political developments emotionally. Thus, in order to evolve toward 
modern Gesellschaft, Russian society should overcome, as Solonin has 
articulated it, its traditional inclination to “rapid progress, impulses, switches 
from social apathy toward enthusiastic action, as well as its naïveté 
concerning illusory projects, susceptibility to dreaminess, and persistent 
aspiration to envisage the ideal in its total completion.” In addition, Russian 
society should not live any longer in expectation of “some miraculous word, 
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a universal answer, and an immediate solution to vital problems and 
complications” (Solonin 2002: 15). At the same time, Russian society should 
discover and welcome existing pluralistic and polycentric tendencies within 
itself. This would help Russian society to find a right balance between value-
oriented rationality, rooted in its cultural-historical and religious tradition, 
and formal rationality, which guides citizens’ behavior in the framework of a 
liberal democratic state.  
Understanding modernization in terms of society’s evolution towards 
Gesellschaft, I assume that the impetus to this structural evolution originates 
from long-term cultural traditions, as well as from the level of institutional 
development of a certain society. On this view, if we want to assess the 
proximity of Russian society to modern Gesellschaft, we are confronted with 
the tragic break of Russian cultural and institutional traditions as a result of 
the Bolshevik revolution. The Bolshevik usurpation of political power 
signified for Russia the break with the pre-revolutionary ideas and 
experiences. It precluded nascent liberalization of late imperial Russian 
society, which was stimulated by the establishment of the Duma and public 
debate about constitutional monarchy.108 
In my view, the far-reaching impact of the Bolshevik revolution on the 
formation of the Soviet type of society can be better explained in the light 
of Russian political culture. Glebova considers this impact as the upshot of 
Russian “persistent tradition of socio-cultural nihilism” (Glebova 2006: 
141). Instead of building upon the foundations of the economic, social, and 
political order that existed in pre-revolutionary Russia, Soviet society chose 
for a total renouncement of the former order. The new social order was 
created “at the expense of liquidating any compromise and as a radical 
solution to resolve all social conflicts” (Glebova 2006: 178). Consequently, 
Soviet society evolved not by employing mechanisms of societal 
complication, but rather by reducing its structural complexity. After the 
redistribution of economic goods and political power, the structural edifice 
of Soviet society became extremely flattened and simplified. According to 
Glebova, the described transformation testifies to the distinctively Russian 
socio-cultural nihilism and habit of simplification. This habit determines the 
way in which Russians treat their historical experience and give place to 
their past. Instead of accumulating historical experience and knowledge, 
nihilistic mentality tends toward a stringent differentiation between the bad 
and the good (Glebova 2006: 142-43). The legitimation of a new order starts 
                                               
108 These developments were discussed in § 4.2.3. 
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from refuting the previous ‘bad’ order. Thus, Russia’s transition to the 
Soviet order signified the break not only with the pre-revolutionary 
resources, but also with the West-European trend of modernization in the 
sense of societal differentiation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In the present chapter, I set out to provide a multi-level evaluation of the 
democratic project in post-Soviet Russia. The focus of this evaluation was 
on the development of civil society. Such an evaluation suggested a way to 
highlight four different problem-areas that determine a distinctively Russian 
conception and practice of democracy: the problems of political, economic, 
social, and moral order. Thereby, I revealed firstly the deep interconnectedness 
of the problems that accompany Russia’s transition to democracy and civil 
society. Secondly, by analyzing the institutional weakness of Russian civil 
society in the context of public morality, I have elucidated the moral-
cultural causes of the revealed problems.  
We have started with spelling out the general dynamics of the 
relationship between civil society and political power in post-Soviet Russia. 
As we have seen, the dynamics is chiefly determined by the state’s tendency 
to centralize its political power and gain more control over the sector of 
civil society. Notwithstanding Russia’s breakthrough to democracy, the deep 
authoritarian edifice of political power has remained unchanged. Bypassing 
the normative model of public consensus and rather employing the model 
of “delegated democracy,” El’tsyn’s government came to power in 1991 as a 
result of the constitutional crisis (Medushevskij 2003: 33-34; Furman 2003: 
25). Such an abrupt and militant transformation revealed the lack of a 
robust and developed civil society, which should have served as an 
instrument for expressing public will and attaining public consensus. After a 
short period of spontaneous mobilization in the public sphere during the 
last years of the perestrojka and early 1990s, most of public organizations did 
not evolve into “more coherent and better-organized formations” and 
gradually dissolved (Fish 1994: 32). Remaining organizations of nascent civil 
society faced the consequences of El’tsyn’s “moderately authoritarian 
oligarchic regime,” namely: the lack of political strategy, oligarchism, market 
liberalization, inflation, and the lack of stable national financial resources 
(Shevtsova 2007: 40).  
Subsequently, Putin’s “bureaucratic-authoritarian” reorganization of 
democracy (Shevtsova 2007: 41) confronted civil society with qualitatively 
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different challenges. The new challenges consisted in the unprecedented 
expansion of the state bureaucracy and the imitative character of core 
democratic institutions. The prevalence of “the technocratic ethos” in 
establishing a new kind of relationship between society and political power 
caused “ever tighter regulation of public life in general, and civic activity in 
particular” (Sakwa 2008: 341). Putin’s initiated recentralization of political 
power led to the spreading of presidential control over the independent 
mass media, the courts, the Federation Council, the Duma, and security 
services. Within this trend, a special civil forum was created – the Public 
Chamber of the Russian Federation. Insofar as the stipulated developments 
prompted critical scholars to employ such terms as “imitation democracy” 
and a “controlled civil society” (Shevtsova 2007: 47ff; Sakwa 2008: 330ff), 
we can conclude that the primary task of contemporary Russian politics 
consists in bridging the nominal conditions for democratic government and 
the actual realization of democratic principles.  
Obviously, one of the significant obstacles to democratic consolidation 
in post-Soviet Russia consists in the state’s underestimation of the 
normative value and function of civil society in the system of democratic 
government. By diminishing society’s independent value, the state not only 
re-establishes its primacy over society, but also demonstrates its “persistent 
incompetence to harmonize social order as an independent order and 
establish institutional relations” (Kostjuk 2000b: 34-35). The more the state 
tends to monopolize political power and equalize the political landscape, the 
lesser freedom civil society retains. For that reason, I have argued that an 
equal, tolerant, and equilibrated dialog between politics and society is 
indispensable for the future of Russian democracy. In view of such a dialog, 
political power should revise its entrenched self-conception as “indivisible, 
irremovable, and autonomous from society” (Dakhin 2003: 37). 
In addition, we have also considered the impact of the regulative 
tendency of the political center on the nascent democratic system. The 
strategies of imitation democracy, inadequacies of economic policies, and 
the persistence of public distrust of new democratic institutions can 
provoke altogether the crisis of political legitimacy and public trust. Insofar 
as democratic institutions are deliberately used “to conceal traditional power 
arrangements” (Shevtsova 2007: 50), they lose their trustworthiness in the 
eyes of the citizens, which leads to the public denouncement of the whole 
political system.  
Pertaining to the immanent crisis of legitimacy, I emphasized the pivotal 
role that civil society plays in the restoration of public trust. Under the 
CIVIL SOCIETY IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA 
293 
 
conditions of a weakly represented civil society, the democratic system lacks 
systemic checks in the form of the free press, political opposition, and 
independent institutions (Shevtsova 2007: 62). Without being checked by 
independent institutions of civil society, the dysfunctions within the political 
system remain unnoticed and thus do not reach the leader’s controlling 
organ or the public. Functioning as the mediator between the public and the 
government, civil society provides the key remedy to overcome imitation 
democracy. Imitation democracy can be surmounted when civil society 
represents public concerns to the government, makes these representations 
effective at the level of policies, and invigorates citizens’ understanding of 
democratic government as trust.  
Furthermore, I have argued that the paternalistic self-positioning of the 
Russian state has become a dominant trend not only in its relations with the 
sector of civil society, but also in its relations with the sector of business. A 
putative source of this trend consists in the “structural amalgamation of 
power and property” that already occurred in the Soviet period and, later, 
persisted through the re-distribution of state property during the liberal 
reforms (Dakhin 2003: 37). Nowadays, after the decade of El’tsyn’s 
oligarchic monopoly and the decade of Putin’s bureaucratic control, two 
different positions have been crystallized. On the one hand, there is a view 
that an intensive cooperation between the three sectors (i.e. civil society, the 
state, and business) is rewarding for Russia’s democratization. This view is 
widely supported by the members of the Public Chamber of the Russian 
Federation. In contradistinction to their support of the ‘balanced’ model of 
cooperation, certain scholars hold the view that such a cooperation restricts 
the development of business and civil society. Hence, they are suspicious of 
any attempts on the part of the state to intervene into these spheres. 
Whatever position one would endorse, one should remember that the 
image of business has been significantly damaged by the socio-economic 
consequences of Russia’s transition to democracy and a market economy. 
Analogous with the gap between the nominal democratic constitution and 
its deficient implementation, the socio-economic sphere came to be 
characterized by an immense chasm between the nominal conditions of the 
market economy and the positive impact of these conditions on economic 
welfare of common Russian citizens. We have spelled out a number of 
reasons for the aggravation of the socio-economic conflict in post-Soviet 
Russia. In the first place, the reform of the market liberalization was 
implemented in 1992 as a “shock-therapy,” without due preparations in the 
field of social policy and legislation. While El’tsyn’s radical liberal reforms 
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were aimed at the redistribution of state property by means of voucher 
privatization, ordinary people did not noticeably profit from the reform. 
Accordingly, the establishment of the middle class has failed. Secondly, after 
the collapse of the state-controlled economy, the post-Soviet economy was 
immediately confronted with the legacy of communist rule, which consisted 
in “a weakly differentiated social structure” (Fish 1994: 33). Thirdly, the 
Soviet state’s control over the economy inhibited spontaneous market 
exchange and drove it into the sphere of illegality. The transition to a 
market economy legalized pursuing private economic interest but also 
unleashed corrupt mechanisms of underground economic exchange. 
Together with the weakly differentiated social structure, the privatization of 
economic relations strengthened the conflict between quickly differentiating 
social classes.  
As a result, the economic reforms led to the polarization between the 
new financial-bureaucratic elite and the overwhelming majority of 
disoriented and disappointed ordinary citizens. The conditions for the free 
market economy were created at a very high social price. Swift inflation 
caused immense disproportions in the socio-economic composition of post-
communist society, and the majority of ordinary Russians came to associate 
the transition to democracy with anxiety and disillusion. This was further 
worsened by growing unemployment, corruption, and a high rate of crime 
(Sil and Chen 2004: 356). The attainment of the living standards of an 
affluent consumer society became the reality only for a selected class of 
Russians – the new financial elite.  
Understandably, the problems of poverty, enduring anxiety, and socio-
economic polarization significantly inhibited the formation of the middle 
class in post-Soviet Russia. Nowadays, the average middle class constitutes 
only 19 percent of all Russian households (Maleva 2003: 106). It is arguable 
whether 19 percent can provide a sufficient social basis for civil society to 
flourish. Insofar as I consider private welfare as one of the prerequisites for 
civic engagement, I think that Russian civil society needs a more solid socio-
economic basis in the form of a developing middle class. 
In view of the above, we can conclude that the socio-economic 
consequences of the democratic revolution have become the main criteria 
whereby Russians assess the benefits and the drawbacks of democracy. We 
can observe a noticeable polarization between citizens with different 
political orientations. Russian society is characterized by an essential 
dualism, as it is divided between ample public support of a normative idea 
of democracy and, at the same time, ample public distrust of democratic 
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institutions and procedures, which is most obvious at the level of economic 
policies. Blaming the government for implementing inadequate socio-
economic policies, Russian citizens still passively endorse the very idea of 
democracy in abstract and vaguely normative terms. On that account, 
Russian society can be correctly claimed to retain more features of 
developing democracies and than of consolidated liberal democracies. It is a 
typical example of developing democracies where “continuing mass support 
for ‘democracy’ in the abstract coexists with declining trust in a Russian 
state that is more democratic than any in the past” (Sil and Chen 2004: 356). 
Additionally, the analysis of the political and economic problems was 
complemented by a moral assessment of the institutional weakness of civil 
society. Thereby, we have discussed the significance of trust for Russia’s 
democratic project. In my opinion, trust is one of the crucial mechanisms 
that enable all important interpersonal and inter-institutional relations in a 
liberal democratic society. It is possible tot distinguish between the ethical 
and structural meanings of trust. The ethical significance of trust consists in 
providing an ideal for communal life. In this sense, trust underlies the 
primordial human longing for mutual promise-keeping, reciprocity, and 
civic engagement (Seligman 1997: 6; Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 164). 
Conversely, the structural significance of trust is premised on the 
understanding of civil society as a complex web of differentiated systems. 
Relying on Luhmann’s systems theory, we have seen that trust provides 
complex differentiated society with continuity and thereby helps it to 
preclude a systemic crisis. Moreover, trust is indispensable for a democratic 
system because “system trust builds upon the fact that others also trust and 
this common possession of trust becomes conscious,” which allows citizens 
to engage in meaningful societal relations (Luhmann 1980: 69).  
Examining the problems of civil society in post-Soviet Russia, I can 
conclude that not only the establishment of, but also public trust in new 
democratic institutions preconditions the rise and subsequent development 
of civil society. Creating formal preconditions for a democratic regime (such 
as the democratic constitution, Rechtsstaat, market economy, institute of 
private property, citizens’ rights, openness and accountability of the political 
politics to the public, etc.) does not necessarily lead to a smooth and rapid 
transition. Even if the mentioned preconditions are declared by the 
democratic constitution, the actual working of the established institutional-
legal framework requires support and trust on the part of democratic 
citizens. Thus, institutional changes should be comprehended by the citizens 
of democratizing societies and entrenched in the public morality. 
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Ethical analysis of the institutional development of Russian civil society 
has confirmed that the establishment of new institutions is difficult in the 
post-communist context because a significant number of contemporary 
Russians still retain attitudes that are typical of communist citizens. On this 
view, I have argued that the institutional weakness, which is frequently 
considered as one of the main causes of the underdevelopment of Russian 
civil society, is essentially a moral problem. Therefore, the problem of 
institutional weakness should be addressed in the context of public morality. 
We have defined the moral-psychological preconditions that are 
indispensable for both the establishment of democratic institutions and the 
implementation of democratizing reforms. First, the citizens of 
democratizing societies should have a “deep comprehension of the 
principles of personal dignity, of law-regulated society, or social support” 
(Rashkovskij 2004: 114). Second, they need to possess civic maturity, which 
means a developed self-perception as citizens imbued with sovereignty and 
political efficacy (Apresjan and Gusejnov 1997: 13). Finally, they should 
demonstrate civic engagement and interest in the institutional formation of 
democracy. In a nutshell, the overall stability of a democratic system is 
largely determined by the extent of the development of the citizens’ social-
ethical consciousness (Kostjuk 2000b: 32-33). Taking the listed 
preconditions as the criteria for an assessment, we have seen that the 
problems of Russian democracy ensue from public alienation from 
participation in official and voluntary organizations, citizens’ pervasive 
apathy, and their permanent stifled dissatisfaction with the actual outcomes 
of the transition. These moral-psychological traits account for wide-spread 
distrust of new democratic institutions.  
Accordingly, we can conclude that the institutional weakness and 
insufficient efficacy of Russian civil society can be explained by Russians’ 
subjective experiences of democracy. In present-day Russia, democratic 
institutions do not function effectively not because these new institutions 
are not trustworthy, but rather because the citizens do not trust these 
institutions in the first place and thus avoid participating in them. Preferring 
to use illegal and informal methods, Russians maintain the vicious circle of 
self-fulfilling prophecy: Insofar as the informal method proves to be quicker 
and more effective than the formal institutional way, the new institutions 
prove to be legitimately distrusted.  
On this view, we can associate the hope for the future of Russia’s 
democratic project with the increasing differentiation of society, which 
warrants plurality, respect, and trust. To attain this goal, however, the 
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democratization process should exceed a mere constitutional transformation 
and invoke also a moral one. The ultimate meaning of the democratic 
transformation consists thus not only in changing political, constitutional, 
and economic structures of a post-communist society, but also in “the 
gradual overcoming of the dualism between the nominal and real law, the 
substitution of the ideological monopoly by the ideological pluralism, the 
dogma of class theory by the principles of civil society” (Medushevskij 2003: 
39). Democratization requires an immense moral effort on the part of 
citizens because citizens of a democratizing society should abandon a 
simplistic vision of societal processes, cultivate trustworthy relations, and 
abandon marginal political consciousness. They need to develop a critical 
and qualified perception of the socio-political reality, as well as a significant 
degree of autonomous and rational judgment. This allows society to 
transform according to the principles of civil society such as publicity 
(glasnost’), individual rights, multi-party system, strength and efficacy of 
public judgment. The question at stake is whether Russian society possesses 
sufficient moral and cultural resources to adopt the values of pluralistic and 
tolerant civil society. Bearing this question in mind, I turn to the last part of 
my study.  
  
6 
 
Civil Society and Orthodox 
Christianity in Russia 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The role and significance of religion with regard to civil society theory has 
been extensively discussed in chapter four. Then, I analyzed the relationship 
between religion and secular society from a historical perspective. At the 
same time, a comparative perspective was elaborated with a view to 
juxtaposing the historical developments in Western Europe and in Russia. 
The present chapter resumes the discussion on the religious factor, but in a 
different context. Given the primary focus of my study on post-Soviet 
Russia, I intend to examine how Orthodox Christianity, which is the 
traditional religion of Russia, and civil society relate to each other. Thereby, 
my aim is to clarify whether Orthodox Christianity can provide a 
substantive alternative conception of civil society and contribute to the 
democratic project in contemporary Russia.  
The question concerning the relationship between civil society and 
Orthodox Christianity became relevant after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, when the Soviet law on restriction of religion was abolished. 
Abandoning its communist ideology and secular self-identification, post-
Soviet society faced the challenge of finding a new self-identity that would 
simultaneously correspond to new democratic values and suit the specific 
religious-cultural profile of the millennial Russian history. It was in such a 
dynamic context that the Russian Orthodox Church (henceforth the ROC) 
became one of the influential participants in the instigated search for a new 
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national identity. The ROC succeeded to provide, from within the 
Orthodox theological tradition, a strong foundationalist program for 
transforming Russian society.  
Pertaining to this program, the following questions arose: Does the 
foundationalist position meet the needs of democratic society? Is the ROC 
able to substantiate its foundationalist position in the framework of a 
constitutionally guaranteed secular democratic order? Driven by these 
questions, I intend to examine how the ROC conceptualizes its role with 
regard to democratizing reforms such as the emergence of a democratic 
state and civil society.  
Pursuing this suggestive line of inquiry, I look at the relationship 
between Orthodox Christianity and civil society from two distinct 
perspectives: the sociological, or functionalistic, perspective and the 
theological, or essentialistic, perspective.109 The sociological perspective is 
employed to analyze the function of the ROC in the public sphere. Thereby, 
the objective is to sketch the social-political context in which the ROC 
currently functions and develops its self-conception. Such an investigation 
evinces the attempts of the ROC to revitalize its public appearance in a 
constitutionally secular and pluralistic civil society (6.1). On the other hand, 
the essentialistic perspective allows examining how the ROC reacts to the 
prevailing trend of modernization in general, and how the Russian 
Orthodox tradition conceives of and accommodates the modern idea of 
civil society in particular. In that way, we are able to trace the internal 
theological logic that underlies the reaction of the ROC and study the 
cultural-ideological discourse of the Russian Orthodox tradition.  
I suggest systematizing various approaches whereby Russian Orthodoxy 
relates to civil society in three currently popular trends. First, the politicized 
version of Russian Orthodoxy will be explicated by considering the 
movement of Orthodox fundamentalism (6.2). Secondly, the conservative 
theological teaching of the ROC will be studied on the basis of the recently 
published ecclesiastical document, The Fundamentals of the Social Conception of 
the ROC (6.3). In this part, I also want to clarify the established relationship 
between religion and civil society in the post-Soviet context through 
attending to the turning points in the history of state-church relations in 
Russia. Finally, the analysis would be incomplete and biased without 
revealing the liberal-reformative trend in Russian Orthodoxy. This 
                                               
109 The two perspectives have been discussed in more detail in the introduction to chapter four. 
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remarkable attempt at liberalizing the conservative core of Orthodox 
theology will be the last issue to be addressed so far (6.4).  
 
6.1 The Russian Orthodox Church in the Context of Secular 
Democracy 
 
To evaluate the relationship between civil society and Orthodox Christianity 
in the contemporary context of secular democracy, we need to take into 
consideration the consequences of Soviet anti-religious policy. My 
presumption is that the way in which the Church re-appeared in the public 
arena in democratic Russia, has been significantly determined by the 
traumatic experience of Soviet persecution.  
 
6.1.1 The Soviet Trauma: Coerced Secularization of Soviet Society  
 
After nearly seventy years of severe persecution of religion by the Soviet 
state (1917-91), Russian post-Soviet society can be unmistakably ranked 
amongst most secular societies worldwide. The attacks of the Soviet state 
were targeted not only against the ideological influence and the public status 
that the ROC enjoyed in pre-revolutionary Russia, but also against private 
religious belief of the Soviet citizens. Being baptized or being married in the 
Church, let alone attending church services, was equaled to being an ‘enemy 
of the people’ (vrag naroda), where the concept of the people was used as a 
mask, under which the Communist Party disguised itself and pursued its 
own interests. Waging an ideological war against religion, the Communist 
Party persistently tried to impose atheism as the only permitted official 
ideology of the Soviet state. Thus, religion was totally excluded from public 
life. Religious education found no longer any respectable place in the 
curriculum of comprehensive schools and universities. Every aspect of life 
associated with spirituality and religious experience was invariably 
stigmatized as superstitious, out-of-date, hilarious, and despicable. 
Whenever religion was mentioned in the official speeches or publications, it 
was mocked, being juxtaposed with the ‘enlightened’ and ‘humanistic’ 
worldview of Marxism-Leninism.  
A far more rigorous classification of Soviet atheism has been suggested 
by the contemporary Russian philosopher Nikolaj Kozin. In his 
idiosyncratic book Understanding Russia. An Attempt at a Historiosophical 
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Analysis,110 Kozin argues that Marxism brutally intervened in the genetic 
code of Russian civilization trying to substitute Russian Orthodoxy. The 
fact that Marxist ideology resembles in certain respects the Orthodox 
Christian tradition testifies to the enforcement of this “spiritual mutation” 
upon Russia. Kozin draws an interesting parallel, albeit in fairly grotesque 
terms, between the Orthodox doctrine and Marxist ideology, “Marx was 
recognized almost as the new Messiah; proletariat became the Chosen 
nation, the Church was substituted by the Communist Party; the Second 
Advent became the socialist revolution; hell became power of capitalism; 
the Millennium Kingdom became communism.” The scholar points at the 
analogies between the Ecclesiastical and Marxist texts, namely the analogies 
between the Holy Scriptures and Das Kapital, between the Catechesis and 
the ‘Manifesto of the Communist Party.’ Additionally, the tripartite division 
of all Soviet people into the ranks of most devoted revolutionaries, Party 
members, and the rest is similar to the tripartite Christian division between 
the priesthood, the clergy (in the sense of not ordained yet assisting 
members of parishes), and the laity. Finally, the infallibility of the 
communist leaders bears a striking resemblance to the infallibility of church 
fathers (Kozin 2002: 195). With regard to the last analogy, it is necessary to 
clarify, however, that according to the Orthodox tradition church fathers are 
not considered infallible, for no human being can be infallible, and therefore 
some of patristic comments can be erroneous. Perhaps, asserting that the 
‘preaching’ of the communist leaders was presented to the common people 
as truly infallible, Marxist ideology went even further than simply parodying 
the Orthodox Christian tradition.  
 Besides ideological suppression, religious practices in Soviet Russia were 
if not officially prohibited, yet clearly banned from the public sphere and 
marginalized to the private sphere, which was also monitored by the state. 
According to the normative communist model, everything that was private 
would be immediately open to the mutual surveillance and thus would be 
become public, i.e. overtly anti-religious. 
Recent studies illustrate the appalling consequences of Soviet 
suppression of religious freedom. In this connection, I want to emphasize 
that contemporary Russian scholars show an increasing interest in studying 
church life during that tragic period. During the last two decades, a great 
deal of research has been conducted. This testifies to the public awareness 
of the political crimes committed against freedom of religious belief, as well 
                                               
110 Николай Козин, Постижение России. Опыт историософского анализа (Москва: Алгоритм). 
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as to the deep public regret caused by those crimes. St. Tikhon’s Orthodox 
University111 in Moscow is just one of the leading centers where intensive 
research on victims of Soviet repression is continuously carried out. The 
results of the research have been published in the form of two volumes: 
Martyrs for Christ. Persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church, 1917-1956: 
Biographical Handbook (1997) and The Acts of St. Tikhon, the Patriarch of Moscow 
and All Russia, later documents and correspondence concerning the canonical continuity of 
church authority, 1917-1943 (1994).112 In what follows, I refer to the summary 
of the research provided by Nikolaj Emel’janov.113  
On the juridical side, the state’s assault on freedom of religion was 
unleashed by the Soviet decree of 20 January 1918, which legalized the 
separation of the Church from the newly established Soviet state. Adopting 
the decree, the Bolsheviks legalized not only plundering of church 
possessions, but also persecution and execution of the clergy. These crimes 
were committed under the pretext of humanitarian help for the starving 
population of Soviet Russia, which was devastated by the Civil War of 1921. 
The ROC was accused of refusing to submit its wealth for the starving 
people. As Emel’janov indicates, during the subsequent persecution in 1922, 
twenty thousand people were arrested and approximately one thousand 
executed (Emel’janov 2004). 
Later, in the period between 1923 and 1928, the Bolsheviks elaborated a 
more sophisticated plan aimed at destroying the ecclesiastical structure 
within the Church itself. By granting privileges to the renewal movement 
(obnovlentsy), which had split from the canonical institute of the Moscow 
Patriarchate, the Bolsheviks promulgated the internal church schism. The 
renewal movement emerged soon after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, 
being initiated by the Petersburg priest Alexander Vvedenskij (1889-1946). 
However, it did not find wide popularity until 1922, when it gained support 
by the Committee on State Security of the USSR, better known as the KGB. 
Beneath the apparent task of democratizing the ecclesiastical administration 
and modernizing church service, the renewal movement had a clear political 
standpoint, as it declared absolute loyalty to the communist regime. With 
                                               
111 The former St. Tikhon’s Orthodox Theological Institute. 
112 The mentioned publications are available only in Russian: За Христа пострадавшие: Гонения на 
Русскую Православную Церковь 1917-1956: Биографический справочник (1997); Акты святейшего 
патриархa Тихона и позднейшие документы о преемстве высшей церковной власти. 1917-1943 гг. 
(1994). More information is available on the website of St. Tikhon’s Orthodox University at 
www.pstgu.ru. 
113 Николай Емельянов, «Оценка статистики гонений на Русскую Православную Церковь 
(1917 - 1952 годы)». Internet publication, last visited on 28 July 2010. 
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the support of the Communist Party and of the KGB, the renewal 
movement managed to become, in the span between 1922 and 1927, the 
only organization of the ROC that was officially recognized by the Soviet 
state. At that period, the renewal movement embraced more than a half of 
the episcopacy and parishes of the ROC. After 1927, the movement 
continued to exist but lost, nonetheless, its primary political significance. 
Eventually, in 1941, Vvedenskij declared himself the first hierarch of the 
Russian Church of the USSR, establishing thereby an alternative patriarchal 
institute, which existed until Vvedenskij’s death in 1946.  
The third wave of Soviet persecution of religion refers, according to 
Emel’janov, to the period of 1930-31. This wave tragically resulted in sixty 
thousand arrests and five thousand executions, being ‘triumphed’ by the 
demolition of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow. The Cathedral 
was symbolically blown up in 1931, and an open-air swimming pool was 
constructed in its place. Starting from 1932, the Soviet authorities launched 
the ‘godless five-year plan’ with the aim of demolishing all churches and 
exterminating all believers. However, the outcome of this godless project 
was, to use the Bolshevik jargon, ‘unsatisfactory’. The population census of 
1937 demonstrated that one third of the urban population and two thirds of 
the rural population, i.e. the majority of the population of the USSR, still 
identified themselves as Orthodox Christians (Emel’janov 2004). Following 
the relentless Soviet logic, the initiators and executors of that population 
census themselves fell victim to the subsequent Stalin’s terror. 
The summit of Soviet repression can be unmistakably related to Stalin’s 
great terror of 1937-38. The policy of terror was designed to implement a 
large-scale purge of the Soviet state from anti-communist activists.114 
Stalin’s terror came to be associated in Russian history with the name of 
Nikolaj Ezhov (1895-1940) who was then the head of the KGB.115 During 
the years of Stalin’s terror, one and a half million (1.548.366) citizens were 
arrested due to the accusation of anti-Soviet activity; among them almost 
seven hundred thousand (681.692) were put to death. This means that every 
day one thousand people were killed. Approximately, two hundred 
thousand people among these victims of political repression were accused 
of their religious beliefs, and each second one of those accused was 
                                               
114 Vivid descriptions of Stalin’s terror and the Soviet practice of labor camps can be found in 
Robert Conquest’s book The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties (1968) and Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago (1973). 
115 After Ezhov’s dismissal in 1938, Lavrentij Beria (1899-1953) headed the office, and the scale 
of the terror significantly diminished. 
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executed on this charge. Only in 1937, more than one and a half hundred 
thousand (162.500) of Orthodox believers, mostly the clergy and their 
families, were arrested, of whom 89.600 were executed (Emel’janov: 2004).  
The upshot of Stalin’s terror was undeniable. By 1939, all monasteries 
were closed in contrast to 1917, when there were more than one thousand 
monasteries. If in 1917, Russia listed sixty thousand churches, by 1939, 
merely a hundred of churches remained open. It is necessary to notice here 
that the mentioned numbers are very hard to trace because many victims 
have not been found, until now, in the official records, which became 
relatively open to public since 1989. The memory of the victims of Soviet 
repression is now observed on 30 October.  
The turning point in the history of Soviet aggression against religion is 
usually associated with the Nazi occupation of the Soviet Union in June 
1941. It is interesting that in the period prior to the Nazi assault on the 
USSR (between 1939 and 1941), the Soviet army was busy liberating the 
occupied regions in Byelorussia, Baltic countries, and West Ukraine. On the 
liberated territories, the Soviet state persecuted religious groups and leaders. 
However, the situation radically changed in September 1943. This occurred 
during the secret meeting held by Stalin and the chief hierarchs of the ROC: 
Metropolitan Sergij (Stragorodskij), Metropolitan Aleksij (Simanskij), and 
Metropolitan Nikolaj (Jarushevich). Although the proceedings of that 
meeting will remain forever unknown, the outcome of the meeting was 
obvious. Stalin allowed reestablishing the official Moscow Patriarchate,116 
abolishing thereby the abovementioned renewal movement. As a result, the 
ROC partially regained its public role in Soviet society, but in return, the 
hierarchs of the ROC seemed to have promised their loyalty to the state.  
It is not accidental that in the second half of the twentieth century, the 
Soviet strategy shifted from physical destruction of religious citizens 
towards psychological terror. Psychological intimidation was implemented 
by means of permanent public surveillance, condemnation, as well as 
explicit discrimination and restriction of believers’ carrier, educational, and 
medical care opportunities. The latent post-war Soviet persecution of 
religion manifested itself in the fact that a significant number of churches, 
which legally belonged to the state, were unpredictably closed or submitted 
to an alternative public use, such as fabrics, plants, fan clubs, etc. However, 
                                               
116 In September 1943, Metropolitan Sergij (Stragorodskij) was elected the Patriarch of Moscow 
and All of Russia, followed in 1945 by Patriarch Aleksij I (Simanskij).  
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even under these explicit and implicit restrictions, the ROC managed to 
survive the post-war persecution.  
As this concise historical overview has revealed, Soviet persecution can 
be considered as a determinate factor in the recent reappearance of the 
ROC in the public arena of post-Soviet Russian society. Insofar as the 
Church and its believers were seen as martyrs who had sacrificially defended 
their right to religious and intellectual freedom, the Church’s public appeal 
became even stronger and more legitimate after the years of terror. The 
Orthodox theological doctrine reemerged from the ideological battle with 
Soviet militant atheism as the undeniable winner.  
However, if one can understand the triumphant return of Orthodoxy in 
public life after the perestrojka, one would still wonder how a country with a 
developed ecclesiastical and theological tradition, such as pre-revolutionary 
Russia, was able to degrade, in result of the Bolshevik upheaval, to the 
brutal and uncivilized persecution of religion. Imagine, one may give a very 
simplistic answer to this question by suggesting that communist ideology 
was intolerant of any expressions of free thought, as well as of any 
alternative organization that opposed the clear and straightforward ideology 
of the Communist Party. Nevertheless, such an answer avoids the 
discussion of the pre-revolutionary situation in late imperial Russia. Then, 
the ROC functioned as an institution highly privileged by the state, had a 
relatively high moral-ideological status, and enjoyed certain juridical rights 
of an official public organization. How did it happen that in the span of a 
few months, between the October revolution in 1917 and the Decree of 
January 1918, the Russian state and, even more regretfully, Russian society 
shifted from the peaceful, almost paternalistic attitude to religion towards 
total intolerance and severe persecution.  
In my view, that dramatic shift in state-church relations reflects the 
pervasive tendency of the Russian state toward gaining totalitarian 
superiority over each individual element in its state machinery. An individual 
element can be associated with any public institution that claims its 
institutional autonomy or alternative ideology, or with any individual citizen 
who struggles for his right to freedom.117 Against this background, Soviet 
persecution of the Church appears as a quintessential example of the general 
inclination of political power toward totalitarian control. The scale of 
                                               
117 The tendency of political power toward totalitarian domination can be traced back to the 
earlier history of Russia, specifically in relation to the history of state-church relations (the 
argument set forth in section 4.2). This tendency can be also posed in a broader context of 
current political-social developments in contemporary Russia (chapter five). 
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violence and incivility of Soviet persecution was, nonetheless, abhorrent, as 
it testified to a deep hatred and fear that the Soviet authorities and their 
adherents felt with regard to alternatively thinking individuals.  
 
6.1.2 The Privileged Position of the ROC in Post-Soviet Russia 
 
From a moral perspective, the ROC reappeared in the public arena of post-
Soviet Russian society as a victorious martyr and as an institution to be 
trusted. In contrast to the oppressive climate of the Soviet regime, the ROC 
contributed substantially to the religious, cultural, and moral renaissance of 
the Russian nation. However, from a practical-political perspective, the 
ROC was perceived by the new democratic government, formed around 
Boris El’tsyn, as an important remnant of the Soviet regime and thus a 
player influential enough to be taken seriously. In what follows, my aim is 
clarify how the ROC manages to combine these two divergent perspectives 
with a view to gaining a privileged position in the public arena of post-
Soviet Russian society.  
In the early 1990s, the relations between nascent civil society, new 
democratic political power, and the ROC evolved spontaneously. In this 
respect, Alexander Tjakhta rightly asserts in the article ‘Political Positioning 
of the Church in the Time of Putin’118 that such spontaneity was possible 
because none of these three major forces had a clear vision of its own 
strategy and role (Tjakhta 2001). Insofar as the ROC emerged from the 
Soviet system as a powerful public organization with a high economic status 
and clear corporate interests, the El’tsyn administration chose to treat the 
ROC pragmatically, as just another element in the network of civil society 
on a par with professional labor unions, political parties, and cultural 
associations.  
It is only after a decade of the chaotic interrelations between the secular 
democratic state and the ROC that the government’s pragmatic perception 
of the Church faded. In fact, it was gradually substituted by the realization 
that the Church retains real political capital not only due to its legalized 
public status, but also due to its pronounced alternative view on secular 
politics and society. Russian politicians were challenged to apprehend the 
‘extra-political’ subject of politics. Namely, while interacting with the ROC, 
they were dealing with an agent that surpassed the function of a social force 
                                               
118 Александр Тяхта, «Политическое позиционирование Церкви при Путине» // 
Отечественные записки (№ 1, 2001). Internet publication, last visited on 28 July 2010. 
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in the public arena and that was able to legitimize its political and public 
appeal by resources that were radically different from those available in the 
conceptual arsenal of secular policy-makers and politicians.  
This conceptual ambiguity still determines the evasive character of the 
state’s recurring attempts at producing adequate policy with regard to the 
ROC and other religious organizations. Andrej Sebentsov, one of the 
leading experts on state-church relations and the government official of the 
presidential administration, confirms the confusion around religious policy-
making in his report ‘The Law Is Good, So Is the Line?’.119 He argues that 
even though the Constitution of the Russian Federation does contain a 
number of relevant articles, the state does not have an articulated, 
deliberate, and comprehensible standpoint for considered decision-making. 
The administration continues to address various problems related to 
religious policy only as soon as these problems arise. Consequently, 
concrete decisions are taken in an ad hoc manner and in conformity with 
each separate case. In the meanwhile, while governmental structures suffer 
from an alarming shortage of experts in the relevant field, the ROC impedes 
governmental attempts to establish the national organ of control 
presumably because it fears to lose its privileged position (Sebentsov 2001). 
In its turn, the ROC does not undertake noticeable efforts to establish 
procedural norms in state-church relations either. To a certain extent, this 
reluctant attitude can be explained, according to Tjakhta, by the structure 
that the ecclesiastical administration of the ROC inherited from the Soviet 
system. During the Soviet period, social functions of the Church were 
reduced to a minimum. The only connection of the Church with the Soviet 
state was maintained through the so-called Department of the Church’s 
External Affairs (OVTsS), the department that also managed international 
activity of the ROC in the field of peace-making. Nowadays, the OVtsS 
hosts a sort of political-legal and information center, which remains 
responsible for the dialog with the ‘external world’ and, regretfully enough, 
remains feebly connected with the office of the Moscow Patriarchate.   
Revising the legal side of the story, we need to take into consideration 
the fact that in 1990 two different laws were enacted, namely the Soviet law 
on ‘Freedom of Conscience and of Religious Associations’ and the Russian 
law on ‘Freedom of Religious Belief.’ However, the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation was continuously altered until 1993, when a new version 
                                               
119 Андрей Себенцов, «Закон хороший, а линия какая?» // Отечественные записки (№ 1, 
2001). Internet publication, last visited on 28 July 2010. 
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of the law was adopted under the influence of the leading hierarch of the 
ROC, Patriarch Aleksij (Ridiger) (1929-2008). Commenting on this incident 
of interference, Sebentsov understands the ambition of the ROC to increase 
its social and constitutional status but considers it unacceptable that a 
constitutional state permits civil servants to modify the law according to 
their own religious preferences and thus to limit freedom of other 
confessions (Sebentsov 2001). Besides, such a biased attitude is problematic 
given Russia’s historical profile as a multiconfessional and multinational 
Empire.  
The Constitution of the Russian Federation ratified on 12 December 1993120 
clearly defines the secular character of the Russian state without any 
ideological preference, “The Russian Federation is a secular state. No 
religion may be established as a state or obligatory one. Religious 
associations shall be separated from the State and shall be equal before the 
law” (Section One, Chapter 1 ‘The Fundamentals of the Constitutional 
System,’ article 14). Consequently, the Constitution states that “in the 
Russian Federation ideological diversity shall be recognized” (article 13) and 
that “everyone shall be guaranteed freedom of conscience, freedom of 
religion, including the right to profess individually or together with others 
any religion or to profess no religion at all, to freely choose, possess and 
disseminate religious and other views and act according to them” (article 
28). On 19 September 1997, the Russian State Duma adopted the notorious 
‘Federal Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations.’121 
This document reaffirms, on the one hand, “the right of each person to 
freedom of conscience and freedom of religious profession, as well as to 
equality before the law irrespective of religious affiliation and convictions, 
proceeding from the fact that the Russian Federation is a secular state.” On 
the other hand, it recognize “the special role of Orthodoxy in the history of 
Russia and in the establishment and development of its spirituality and 
culture; respecting Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, and other 
religions, constituting an integral part of the historical heritage of the 
peoples of Russia” (preamble). 
The situation of conceptual and legal ambiguity in state-church relations 
noticeably changed when Putin became the president in 2000. Power went 
over into the hands of the Putin relatively young and energetic 
                                               
120 Internet publication, last visited on 30 July 2010. In the present study, the English translation 
available online is used with some minor emendations of the grammar. 
121 Internet publication, last visited on 30 July 2010. The English translation available online is 
used with some minor emendations of the grammar. 
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administration, which suspended El’tsyn’s experimental reforms and 
announced an epoch of stability and conservatism. The chosen conservative 
course required that the image of the new Russian president comprised a 
clear religious element. Since Putin already possessed some vital features of 
a conservative political leader (such as the family and military service), he 
only needed to publicly affirm his adherence to the ROC, which he eagerly 
did. Hence, during the elections of 2000, he gained massive support on the 
part of both the conservative electorate and Orthodox public activists.   
Evaluating the established practice of state-church relations in post-
Soviet Russia, Sebentsov rightfully suggests that the state’s tendency to 
favor the ROC can be explained by its hope for broad support on the part 
of the electorate and by the need to fill up the post-Soviet cultural-
ideological vacuum. Notwithstanding these evident factors, the proclaimed 
distinction between traditional and non-traditional religions (which legally 
endorses the policy of favoring a selected religious group) is at odds with 
the principles of egalitarianism and liberalism, which are central to a liberal 
democratic state. Sebentsov perceives in the attempts of the ROC to attain 
ideological priority over other religious groups “the seamy side of persisting 
bolshevism” (Sebentsov 2001). The experiment of giving control to a single 
ideological organization was once put to practice when the Soviet state 
delegated its controlling function to the Communist Party. Obviously, a 
similar scenario where one particular ideological organization plays a 
controlling function needs to be avoided in the future.  
Hence, the actions of the ROC demonstrate its inclination toward 
gaining a privileged legal position and ideological dominance, even in the 
context of secular democracy and civil society. In the study Russian Society 
and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia after Communism, Zoë Knox rightly 
asserts that in the changing political climate of post-Soviet Russia “the 
Orthodox Church benefited from the new freedoms more than any other 
religious organization and denomination.” Thereby, it succeeded in 
reclaiming its prominent position in the heterogeneous religious sphere. 
Curiously enough, the greatest paradox of the religious renaissance in post-
Soviet Russia consists exactly in “the transition of the Moscow Patriarchate 
from a suppressed institution, directed and regulated by an atheist regime, to 
an institution which directs considerable effort to suppressing other 
religious bodies by discouraging religious pluralism and enjoying state-
sanctioned privileges in a secular country” (Knox 2005: 2).  
Once the liberalism of the perestrojka allowed the ROC to reclaim its 
position at the center of national religious life, it simultaneously 
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problematized the Church’s regained identity. The search for a new public 
identity assumed, as Knox argues, two contradictory trajectories. On the 
one hand, some believers formed a group who expected the Church “to 
encourage the development and consolidation of civil society, integral to 
Russia’s democratic project. Others appropriated the national Church to 
augment antidemocratic platforms and ideologies.” Hence, Knox compares 
the development of the relationship between civil society and religion in 
post-Soviet Russia to “the struggle to appropriate Orthodoxy by these 
diametrically opposed tendencies” (Knox 2005: 1).  
The conflict between the described strategic positions continues to 
underlie the relations between politics, civil society, and religion in present-
day Russia. Agreeing with Knox’s tacit message, I assume that this conflict 
rather testifies to the pluralism of the ideological standpoints existing within 
the ROC itself. When analyzing the civil and moral significance of 
Orthodox Christianity in post-Soviet Russia, we need to consider the official 
position of the Moscow Patriarchate not as a solitary statement, but as a 
response in the dialog with the influential opposition supported by 
nonconformist clergy and active laity (Knox 2005: 11). It is the dialectics 
between the influence emanating from the Moscow Patriarchate and the 
liberal stance of the unofficial Church that characterizes the cultural-
ideological discourse in contemporary Russia. 
What are the consequences of the reclaimed privileged self-positioning 
of the ROC in the political and public arena? Primarily, it would be correct 
to suppose that such self-positioning revitalizes the old ritual of legitimation 
of political power by ecclesiastical authority. In the provocative article 
‘State-Church Relations against Freedom of Conscience and the 
Constitutional State,’122 Sergej Bur’janov confirms this assumption. The 
scholar puts forward even a bolder argument when saying that all models of 
state-church relations extant in the history of Russia share a common 
deficiency, namely that all political regimes presumed exploitation of the 
spiritual authority of religion by the state. All along the millennial Christian 
history of Russia, political leaders would use the ROC with a view to 
fortifying their own power, as well as to promulgating state centralization. 
                                               
122 Сергей Бурьянов, «Государственно-церковные отношения против свободы совести и 
правогого государства» // Отечественные записки (№ 7, 2002). Internet publication, last visited 
on 28 July 2010. 
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Nowadays, in Bur’janov opinion, Russian democratic leaders have not 
avoided the same temptation (Bur’janov 2002).123 
Indeed, I would agree that the constitutional and cultural-ideological 
crisis in post-Soviet Russia has stimulated the revival of certain ideas 
affiliated with the model of Byzantine symphonia.124 This may lead, 
regretfully, to the situation wherein the Church surpasses its function as an 
ideological institute and starts to intervene in questions of property, 
legislation, and election campaigns. Thus, while the ROC invests in 
establishing its status as a trustworthy institute in the public arena of 
Russian society, this self-positioning may have a rather gloomy undertone. 
In return for moral preaching and national stability, the Church reclaims its 
confiscated property and expects the state to provide significant financial 
support for its social mission. Accordingly, in the field of state-church 
relations, the Church insists on respecting the principle of non-interference, 
but at the same time requires a privileged position appropriate for a 
traditional religion of Russia and continues reclaiming its jurisdiction over 
the ‘canonical territories,’ which separated themselves after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union.   
It is unsurprising then that certain Russian scholars tend to criticize the 
way in which constitutional democracy is practiced in contemporary Russia. 
Bur’janov asserts, for instance, that by constitutionally acknowledging of 
Russian Orthodoxy as the privileged state ideology, the Russian state 
abandoned the model of a secular state and moved towards “clericalization 
of the state.” With this, the contemporary democratic state has re-
established the ancient theocratic principle of sacralization of political 
power by religious authority. This is, however, utterly incompatible with the 
secular principle of democratic legitimation, as well as with Russia’s 
multiconfessional and multinational background (Bur’janov 2002). 
The tendency toward revitalizing traditional theocratic principles in the 
context of liberal democracy raises some moral critique as well. If a liberal 
democratic state identities itself as secular, it consequently strives towards a 
minimal regulation of society’s religious-moral life. On the contrary, if a 
state retains certain features of totalitarianism, it strives for accumulating 
ideological control over society on the whole, as well as over its individual 
members. The totalitarian system is premised on distrust of individual 
                                               
123 Bur’janov is quite radical in his critique when claiming that democratic leaders aimed “under 
the guise of the so-called spiritual renaissance to use religion as a moral basis of their amoral 
politics” (Bur’janov 2002).  
124 The model of Byzantine symphonia was examined more thoroughly in § 4.2.1. 
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judgment and disrespect of individual freedom because individual freedom, 
as the totalitarian state fears, entails the possibility of being misused for anti-
regime goals. With a view to extending ideological control over society, the 
totalitarian state seeks to interfere in all possible institutions that are entitled 
to control the ideological-moral sphere of society’s life, starting with 
churches, sects, religious associations, and philosophical-ideological 
organizations, and ending with such seemingly innocent groups as hobby 
clubs and local meeting centers. On this view, Bur’janov is correct when 
apprehending that the contemporary Russian state, notwithstanding its 
democratic-constitutional order, preserves certain features of the totalitarian 
Soviet state. This totalitarian tendency is specifically manifest in the state’s 
attempt to privilege the ROC as the foremost ideological-moral force and 
thereby to control the mindset of Russian citizens (Bur’janov 2002). 
However, in Putin’s and post-Putin’s Russia, some changes emerged. If 
the state’s ideological support of the ROC reached its summit in 2002, 
which gave ground to many observers to speak about a symphonia taking 
shape, since then, the relations between state and church have cooled down. 
As Alexander Verkhovskij notices in his recent publication ‘Religious 
Organizations and the Possibilities of Ideological Engineering in Putin’s 
Russia,’125 the state no longer publicly supports the ideas of the hierarchs, 
but rather undertakes concrete, often financial, projects to cultivate the 
ROC as an influential social force. Obviously, certain strategic political goals 
are pursued through these projects. In result, the cooperation between the 
Federal and ecclesiastical elites is visible only to the experts (Verkhovskij 
2009: 168-69).  
 
6.1.3 The Prevailing Self-Identification of Russians as Orthodox Christians  
 
From the above analysis, it has become clear that the ROC has regained an 
influential position in the public and political arena. Ordinary Russian 
citizens regard it as a trustworthy institute with an immense moral appeal, 
whereas critical analysts, politicians, and policy-makers regard it as an 
important political and fiscal subject. What did this regained position of the 
Church mean for Russian society and culture? I suppose the term 
votserkovlenije reflects best of all the social consequences of the post-Soviet 
                                               
125 Александр Верховский «Религиозные организации и возможности идеологического 
проектирования в путинской России» // А. Малашенко и С. Филатов (ред.) Двадцать лет 
религиозной свободы в России (2009). 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY 
314 
 
religious renaissance. The term votserkovlenije can be approximately translated 
in English as ‘in-churching,’ implying the believer’s increasing growing into 
the organism of the Church, accompanied by his acceptance of the whole 
body of ecclesiastical doctrines, mysteries, rites, traditions, and customs.  
Since the last two decades, the trend of votserkovlenije has become 
immensely popular. It reflected a deepening self-identification of newly 
converted Orthodox Christians and instigated a noticeable shift in the social 
constitution of the ROC. If previously, during Soviet repression of religious 
freedom, the Church comprised mostly aged or alternatively-thinking 
individuals, after the cessation of the Soviet regime, the Church started to 
attract younger generations. Thus, the emergent middle class embracing 
young professionals and the intelligentsia in their thirties-forties, as well as 
the new business and political elite, also constitute the social basis of the 
ROC today. Possibly, it is education, erudition, and general cultural interest 
that encouraged these relatively young believers to pursue their intellectual 
and spiritual search in the Orthodox tradition. 
The popular trend of votserkovlenije in post-Soviet Russia is a clear 
testimony that the privileged position of the ROC is no longer a mere legal 
article, but obtains a feasible social basis (Tjakhta 2001). Various public 
opinion surveys indicate that 32 to 73 percent of the Russian population 
identify themselves as Orthodox Christians. Notwithstanding this high 
percentage, we should be aware that these impressive results do not reflect 
the qualitative element of the citizens’ religious belief. In contradistinction 
to the overwhelming majority of nominal Orthodox Christians, surveys 
indicate a relatively low percentage of the so-called ‘in-churched’ Orthodox 
Christians (4-6 percent) who indeed actively participate in church life and 
are more or less competent in theological and ecclesiastical questions. 
Despite this low percentage of genuinely active believers, general 
incompetence of the majority of self-identified Orthodox Russians does not 
undermine the central position of the ROC in the social-political arena 
because this position relies exactly on the large group of nominal self-
identified Orthodox Christians.  
Thus, it should be emphasized that the overwhelming majority of self-
identified Orthodox Russians ascribe themselves to the ROC in virtue of 
their ethnic background or passive baptism in their early years. However, 
many of them have a fairly vague idea of what this identification entails. 
Probably, a significant number of the respondents would have difficulty in 
answering basic questions like: What is the content of your belief? What 
kind of religious practice do Orthodox Christians have? What are the 
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principles of Orthodox morality (let alone the theological foundations of 
these moral principles)?  
Evidently, Orthodoxy has become for nominal Orthodox Russians a 
matter of fashion, devoid of profound moral consequences and spiritual-
intellectual search. This superficial self-identification does not involve a 
change in the practical side of life according to the established rules, such as, 
for instance, engagement in parish life, frequent praying, fasting, and 
observing religious rites. A high percentage of Orthodox Russians prefer the 
rites performed once in life (baptism, marriage, and memorial service), to 
the rites of repetitive character (communion, confession, common prayer, 
and the like). This preference reveals that nominal Orthodox Russians 
passively adopt their religious identification. For these Christians, as Dublin 
correctly observes in his article ‘Mass Religious Culture in Russia 
(Tendencies and Conclusions of the 1990s)’,126 “Christian belief has a rather 
general ‘psychological’ meaning. It pacifies the mind emotionally but does 
not impose any religious obligations. It does not prescribe any collective 
norms of action or presume any individual responsibility as some practical 
imperatives for behavior” (Dubin 2004: 40). The essence of religion 
consists, according to nominal Russian Orthodox Christians, in inspiring 
people to reflect on the meaning of life, or in teaching patience and 
tolerance towards human weakness. Plausibly, nominal Orthodox Christians 
are motivated in their religious choice by the principle of individualism. 
They consider their choice of religion as an individual way to escape 
unpleasant realities of the social environment. Accordingly, the 
considerations of active moral struggle with social realities remain secondary 
with regard to the individual spiritual search for perfection. 
Moreover, it is revealing that the exhibited mass self-identification of 
Russian Orthodox Christians is susceptible to certain fluctuations over time. 
As Dubin argues in his article ‘Mass Orthodoxy in Russia (the 1990s),’127 
there has been a noticeable increase in Russians’ self-identification as 
Orthodox Christians during the periods of economic and political 
instability, which were accompanied by acute social anxiety. These critical 
periods lasted from 1993 to 1994 and from 1998 to 1999. By contrast, the 
periods of general political mobilization and relative economic stabilization, 
                                               
126 Борис Дубин, «Массовая религиозная культура в России (тенденции и итоги 1990-х 
годов)» // Вестник общественного мнения:  Данные.  Анализ.  Дискуссии (№ 3, 2004). 
127 Борис Дубин, «Массовое православие в России (девяностые годы)» // Индекс ( № 11, 
2000). Internet publication, last visited on 17 September 2010. 
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respectively from 1995 to 1996 and the years after 2000, correspond to a 
significant decrease of Orthodox believers. 
The large group of self-identified Orthodox Christians, which actually 
constitute the social basis of the ROC, is far from homogeneous or stable. 
Its versatility reflects the pluralized social texture of the Russian Orthodox 
community. This community includes individuals with different socio-
economic backgrounds and different views on how to be an Orthodox 
Christian in the context of secular democracy and pluralistic society. The 
examination of these different views is relevant for the present study, as it 
clarifies how Orthodox Christianity relates to the modernizing society. 
According to the specific attitudes towards democracy and civil society, 
two big groups can be distinguished within the versatile body of self-
identified Orthodox Russians. The first group consists of the young and 
progressive believers who tend to interpret the Church’s moral and social 
doctrine in liberal terms. Dubin correctly argues that these young, educated, 
and urbanized Russians instigated, by joining the ROC in the 1990s, some 
crucial changes in the religious culture of Orthodoxy.128 We can also 
associate the group of liberally oriented Orthodox Christians with those 
who invoked the Church “to encourage the development and consolidation 
of civil society, integral to Russia’s democratic project” (Know 2005: 1). In 
contrast to the minority of liberally oriented Orthodox Christians, the 
second larger group can be defined as the conservative core. The percentage 
of elderly or less educated people still prevails over the percentage of 
liberally oriented neophytes. The conservative core comprises “those who 
consistently appropriate the national Church to augment antidemocratic 
platforms and ideologies” (Knox 2005: 1). The conservative view on 
modern culture and the role of the Church in the secular world is the 
pivotal issue that unites the adherents of this group, despite of their 
different political convictions, educational background, social status, age, 
                                               
128 Dubin suggests an interesting explanation of why Orthodox Christianity appeals to young and 
educated individuals. The scholar points at the long tradition of religious syncretism in Russia. 
Religious syncretism motivates those who want to (re)discover their identity within the scope of 
Orthodox Christian teaching and spirituality. Insofar as these young and educated urban citizens 
have access to mass media, internet, and the press, and possess certain analytic skills, they often 
remain unsatisfied with the kind of answers they get in Orthodox parishes. Consequently, they try 
to mend the lack of intellectualism by amalgamating the Orthodox Christian teaching with a wide 
number of alternative worldviews. Amongst others, extremely popular worldviews range from 
nostalgic ideas about the organic unity of society and nation (resulting in ‘social mysticism’ of D. 
Andreev or in ‘social biologism’ of L. Gumilëv) to ideas borrowed from theosophy (E. 
Blavatskaja), or from transhumanism and immortalism (M. Solov’ëv). These syncretism-oriented 
religious individuals frequently identify themselves as Orthodox Christians. 
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gender, etc. This group consists of moderate conservative Orthodox 
believers who are reluctant to form their own opinion concerning social and 
political issues and therefore tend to join the inert majority. In so doing, as 
Dubin rightly claims, they contribute to the weight of the routine and 
conservative convictions, as well as to the general social passivism, which 
dominates contemporary Russian society. Characteristically, moderate 
conservatism underlies the official standpoint of the leading hierarchs of the 
ROC (Dubin 2000).  
We should make a distinction between this conservative core and the 
trend of radical fundamentalism. Hence, we can divide the social strata that 
currently constitute the social basis of the ROC into three major categories: 
fundamentalists, moderate conservative Orthodox Christians, and liberally 
oriented ones. These social groups correspond to the three conceptual 
standpoints of Orthodox Christianity with regard to civil society. The 
examination of these positions will elucidate whether Orthodox Christianity 
can provide a substantive alternative conception of civil society and which 
traditional theological conceptions can be innovatively used to facilitate the 
instigated democratic project.  
 
6.2 Orthodox Fundamentalism as an Alternative to Civil Society  
 
Earlier in the study, the problem of religious fundamentalism has been 
discussed in relation to modern secularism (§ 4.1.4). Then, the discussion 
had a conceptual character; the intent here is to apply the gained insights by 
examining the practice of Orthodox fundamentalism in contemporary 
Russia. Specifically, I want to reveal how Orthodox fundamentalists 
substantiate their political message by theological arguments and how the 
Orthodox fundamentalist movement makes use of the public sphere in 
Russian democratic society today.  
It is plausible to assume that the rise of Orthodoxy-based 
fundamentalism is one of the possible reactions to the process of 
liberalization of society, which inevitably ensues from the establishment of 
secular democracy and civil society. In essence, Orthodox fundamentalism 
is a publicly manifested response to the societal and cultural modernization 
of Russian post-Soviet society. The disturbing question is whether this 
pubic response can be regarded legitimate within the moral-juridical 
framework of a liberal secular democracy. 
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6.2.1  Theological Substantiation of the Fundamentalist Political Program 
 
Orthodox fundamentalism suggests a clear answer to how Orthodox 
Christianity should relate to the idea and the reality of civil society. I use the 
word ‘should’ purposefully in order to emphasize the strong normative 
orientation of the Orthodox fundamentalist movement. As we can recall 
from the above analysis (§ 4.1.4), religious fundamentalism is driven 
primarily by protest against the general trend of modernization. Orthodox 
fundamentalism is no exception from this general definition, as it comprises 
main characteristics of the global movement such as reactivity, a dualistic 
view of the world, consequent separation from the world, and self-
identification as a chosen people (Frey 2007: v). Similar to other religious 
fundamentalist movements, the Orthodoxy-based movement conceives of 
itself as one of the best “embattled forms of spirituality” and consequently 
legitimizes its public role by the principle of “militant piety” (Armstrong 
2000: xi). With that, fundamentalism adopts a far more rigorous political 
impact than other religious movements: Its normative fundamentalist 
ideology proves devastating both for internal and external relations because 
fundamentalists’ protest tends to unleash “the fanatical-irrational and 
destructive behavior of extremism and terrorism” – the term suggested by 
Konstantin Kostjuk in his article ‘Orthodox Fundamentalism: The Social 
Portrait and the Sources’129 (Kostjuk 2000a). Relating to the case of Russia, 
Kostjuk draws the examples of the fundamentalists’ fanatical-irrational 
behavior by pointing at the Jewish pogroms of 1881 and 1903. It was 
already in pre-revolutionary Russia that Orthodox fundamentalism adopted 
a noticeable anti-Semitic orientation. 
In Soviet Russia, the movement of Orthodox fundamentalism has not 
assumed much popularity until the perestrojka. The movement reappeared, 
exhibiting its affinity with the idea of the restoration of monarchy. It would 
be erroneous, however, to perceive the Orthodox fundamentalist 
movement as one monolithic trend. On the contrary, the movement 
embraces many subgroups including extremist-nationalistic movements, as 
well as groups sympathizing with the Communist Party of Russia, which are 
all centered around the distinctive fundamentalist core. This core has no 
extremist character and rather endorses, according to Kostjuk, a moderate 
                                               
129 Константин Костюк, «Православный фундаментализм: Социальный портрет и истоки» 
// Полис – Политические исследования (№ 5 , 2000). Internet publication, last visited on 17 
September 2010. The article has been referred to earlier in the study (in § 4.1.4). 
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national-patriotic rhetoric. The fundamentalist movement gains public 
interest not only due to an impressive network of diverse fundamentalist 
organizations (brotherhoods), but also due to its use of modern 
communication techniques. Notwithstanding its noticeable presence in the 
public arena, we should not overestimate the public potential of Orthodox 
fundamentalist activity in present-day Russia. As Kostjuk correctly argues, if 
fundamentalists want to exert any influence on public opinion, they are 
bound to cooperate with other significant patriotic or religious forces. The 
scholar discerns the traces of such an alliance in the defense of the White 
House in 1993, in public support of the Law on Religious Organizations in 
1997, and in the canonization of the last Romanoff family in 2000 (Kostjuk 
2000a).  
On a closer examination, one can rapidly disclose that neither a 
theological nor a moral aspect constitutes the core of Orthodox 
fundamentalism in contemporary Russia. Instead, Orthodox 
fundamentalists seem to be preoccupied with a distinct political program. 
This political program is pervaded, in Kostjuk’s opinion, by the national-
patriotic ideal of monarchy, the uncompromising anti-ecumenism, and the 
critique of Western modernity, especially pertaining to the principles of 
liberalism and individualism. We should notice that although political 
fundamentalism borrows many symbolic and semantic attributes from the 
religious practice of the ROC, its radical political views diverge from 
moderate conservatism that is officially endorsed by the Moscow 
Patriarchate. Orthodoxy-based fundamentalism tends to amalgamate the 
traditional Orthodox symbols and art (such as canonized saints, church 
feasts, iconography, and hymnography) with the ultra right-wing political 
views. Coupled with an explicit ethnical identification, these political views 
acquire a form of moralizing propaganda (if you are Russian – you should 
join us, otherwise you are against us, the genuine successors of the Russian 
nation). As William C. Gay correctly observes in his introduction to 
Anastasia V. Mitrofanova’s solid study The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy, 
these fundamentalist religious ideologies are dangerous because “they define 
religious differences in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them,’ thus clearing the way for 
xenophobia and religiously-motivated violence” (Mitrofanova 2005: 19). For 
his part, Kostjuk shows how the fundamentalist political program acquires a 
metaphysical foundation when it is legitimized by the myth of the Jewish-
Masonic conspiracy and the myth of the Russian Empire as a state of the 
truth. These myths depict the course of world history as a puppet show 
directed by the Masonic leaders and speak about an ‘Orthodox’ Stalin 
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whose intention to establish an Orthodox monarchy in the USSR was 
precluded by the Jewish-Masonic conspiracy. Absurdly, this populist 
political program of Orthodox fundamentalists coincides with the rhetoric 
of the nationalist and communist movements in Russia. 
The key motif of the fundamentalist political-ideological project is the 
total and unconditional rejection of modernity and of the secular world 
(Mitrofanova 2005: 39). Modernity, in its facets of globalization, 
democratization, and societal differentiation, is perceived by fundamentalists 
as a sign of the Antichrist’s reign, whereas the Orthodox Kingdom appears 
as an earthly manifestation of the Kingdom of God, which needs to be 
established before the coming of the Antichrist. The fact that these 
apocalyptic views are extremely influential in Orthodox fundamentalism is 
corroborated by wide public interest in publications titled like Russia before 
the Second Coming (1992). Insofar as fundamentalists consider the modern 
secularizing world to be totally alienated from God, they propagate the idea 
of escalating apostasy. However, instead of the Weberian flight from the 
world and the sublimated religious practice of asceticism, Orthodox 
fundamentalists do maintain a vital connection with the world, since they 
extol Russia as the only place redeemed from the sinful, secular modernity. 
In fact, the fundamentalist belief in Russia’s leading role among other 
Orthodox brother-countries disguises anti-ascetic nationalism and self-
isolation.  
For a systematic study of the ideological doctrine of Orthodox 
fundamentalists, we can refer to the publications of Ioann Snychev, 
Metropolitan of St. Petersburg and Ladoga (1927-95), and his press-
secretary Konstantin Dushenov. Snychev’s peculiar book Russian Symphony: 
An Essay on Russian Historiosophy130 remains one of the most important 
fundamentalist accounts today. The underlying idea of his apocalyptic 
interpretation of Russia’s history is that the process of apostasy has been 
inevitably advancing in the increasingly godless world and is now 
approaching its end. Since Russia bears a universal soteriological mission as 
the last haven of genuine Orthodox faith, it suffers such aggressive assaults 
by the devil. Among these attacks, fundamentalists are mainly worried about 
the devil’s attempt at reversing and thus misusing pivotal Orthodox 
concepts. If the concept of sobornost’ (conciliarity) means, in the Orthodox 
theological tradition, the unity of all Orthodox Christians in their belief, its 
devilish secular analogue pertains to the ecumenical movement and the 
                                               
130 Митрополит Иоанн (Снычев), Русская симфония. Очерки русской историософии. (1998). 
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consequent political unification of all countries under the banner of the 
Antichrist’s super-state (Snychev 1998: 481-83). Fundamentalists believe 
that, in contrast to the advancing worldwide apostasy, Russia will be the 
only place to be saved and to harbor the coming Orthodox Kingdom, 
which will be established as soon as monarchy is restored in Russia. As 
Mitrofanova correctly observes, “monarchy is, beyond doubt, the most 
archaic of all archaic ideas put forward by political fundamentalists” 
(Mitrofanova 2005: 41). The enduring magnetism of the idea of monarchy is 
reinforced by fundamentalists’ utopian belief in a righteous and good father-
tsar.  
If the legitimation of the fundamentalist doctrine may seem insufficient, 
a fair question arises why the fundamentalist movement still continues to 
attract certain individuals. A partial answer has to do, I suppose, with the 
way in which modern individuals experience modernity. Fundamentalism 
proposes an attractive alternative to the ongoing secularization and 
pluralization; thereby, it provides a stable and comprehensive metaphysical 
structure that opposes the constantly changing world. In response to the 
modern transformation towards “a society without a top and without a 
center,” as Luhmann trenchantly articulated it (Luhmann 1990: 16), religious 
fundamentalism advocates the hierarchical vision of society with a top and 
with a clear center. Kostjuk elucidates in this respect that Orthodox 
fundamentalism attracts primarily Orthodox neophytes who become 
fascinated by the sacralizing power of the theological logic and who 
consequently get absorbed into a mythologized complex of the political-
ideological credos. Characteristically, as Kostjuk remarks, the contemporary 
Russian intelligentsia with a technical background tends to share some of 
moderate fundamentalist credos. Instead, the intelligentsia with a 
humanitarian background is represented in the moderate fundamentalist 
circles to a much lesser degree (Kostjuk 2000a).  
By publicly promulgating their political program, Orthodox 
fundamentalists obviously strive for some changes in actual policy. What do 
they require from the government? In the first place, they assert that 
Russian economy and foreign policy should serve national interests and thus 
remain self-sufficient and fully independent from the global economy. As 
Mitrofanova explains, “all fundamentalists support the economic autarchy 
of Russia” and neglect foreign policy topics because of the isolationist 
orientation of their political vision. This is “the natural outcome of their 
view of the outside world, which for them is nothing more than a source of 
danger” (Mitrofanova 2005: 40). In the second place, the Orthodox 
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monarchic project exhibits an overt totalizing tendency. This claim is 
further elaborated by Evert van der Zweerde in the article ‘Fundamentalism 
in Orthodox Russia’.131 The scholar explains that by radically opposing 
modern differentiated society, the fundamentalist vision tends to blend 
specified social spheres into one totalizing social space, reduced to the 
geographically defined Orthodox kingdom of Russia, Byelorussia, and 
Ukraine. Consequently, relatively independent spheres of the economy, 
politics, public administration, religion, morality, law, esthetics, etc. become 
altogether forged into one undifferentiated entity where there is no place for 
religious tolerance, multiculturalism, and ethnic diversity, nor for society’s 
self-criticism and self-reflection. In this de-dedifferentiated society, the 
whole human community becomes split into two hostile groups: ‘us’ and 
‘them’ (Van der Zweerde 2007: 122). Therefore, the xenophobic 
isolationism, founded on the idea of apostasy, is the chief message that 
Orthodox fundamentalists propagate in the public sphere. 
 
6.2.2  Russian Fundamentalists in the Public Arena Today 
 
The present discussion explicates public manifestations of the 
fundamentalist political program. Mitrofanova rightfully notices in this 
respect that “political fundamentalists commonly use peaceful methods of 
political struggle, such as meetings and so-called ‘worshipings’ (i.e., when a 
group of people publicly worship in the street in response to some political 
event). Nevertheless, some of these organizations are paramilitary” 
(Mitrofanova 2005: 38). If fundamentalists do not use military violence in 
public spaces, they still promote religiopolitical violence, mainly for the sake 
of religious or national-ethnical purity. They see the secular arena of political 
events as a battlefield between Good and Evil and therefore attach a 
religious connotation and a moral assessment to essentially non-religious 
matters. For instance, Mitrofanova traces the genesis of ‘national’ or 
‘Orthodox’ patriotism back to the turbulent period of October 1993, when 
the newly formed democratic parliament was threatened by the communists’ 
attempt at a military coup. This event “had initiated the awakening of 
Russian self-awareness, since subsequent national patriotism then began to 
acquire its religious dimension” (Mitrofanova 2005: 78). 
                                               
131 Evert van der Zweerde ‘Fundamentalisme in Orthodox Rusland,’ in Ignaas Devisch en Marc 
De Kesel (eds.) Fundamentalisme Face to Face (2007). 
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Characteristically, public manifestations of fundamentalist military piety 
find place during various demonstrations. These fundamentalist gatherings 
primarily aim to confront the authorities with civil dissatisfaction with the 
current economic and political situation. In response, fundamentalist 
gatherings frequently provoke military restrictive measures on the part of 
the government. An obvious illustration of this established pattern recurred 
recently during the public celebration of the victory day on 9 May 2008 – 
the day when Russians commemorate the victory of the Soviet army over 
Nazi Germany in World War II. In the Soviet past, the victory day was 
devoted primarily to the commemoration of the achievements of the Soviet 
army, emphasized by the impressive parades processing along the Tverskaja 
Street towards the Red Square. Nowadays, after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the termination of the arms race, the emphasis shifted from 
bragging about ex-glory toward public disapproval of the actual policy. 
Accordingly, these celebrations assume a politicized undertone. Surely, this 
public outcry finds support in the weakest social strata, who see the root of 
the social-economic problems in the government’s reforms, which are 
aimed, in their opinion, at facilitating social injustices. In fact, their message 
is to mourn the consequences of economic liberalization of the 1990s. 
Paradoxically, the defense of the interests of the weakest social strata 
reconciles nowadays two formerly opposed ideological organizations: the 
Communist Party, which holds since the elections of 1996 the second rate 
in the Russian parliament, and the Orthodox fundamentalist movement. 
Both organizations demand social justice by means of a just distribution of 
Russia’s natural recourses after the oligarchism of the 1990s. However, the 
Communist Party and the fundamentalist movement ground their critique 
of the government in two antagonistic worldviews: Communists are 
motivated by the socialist ideals, whereas fundamentalists emphasize the 
national and spiritual treasure of the former Russian Empire and expect the 
return of the Russian tsar.  
Two pictures below depict the Orthodox fundamentalist movement 
during the demonstrations held on the Tverskaja Street on 9 May 2008. 
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Typically, the representatives of the Orthodox fundamentalist movement 
bear the black-yellow-white banner of the Romanovs dynasty with the 
depiction of Christ to accentuate their Orthodox affinity. When 
fundamentalists use the official tricolor Russian banner, they decorate it 
with a picture of the double-headed crowned imperial eagle, which is also 
the key symbol of the Romanovs Russia.  
The next photo provides evidence that the supporters of political 
Orthodoxy march alongside the adherents of the communist regime.  
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As a rule, the nostalgic appeal to the communist past is mostly articulated in 
civil resentment against ‘loose’ governmental control over national property 
and against the powerful oligarchs. The banner on the picture below says, 
“The fruit of the victory is being chewed by the oligarchs,” expressing thus 
a vehement critique of the way state property had been redistributed after 
the collapse of the USSR. 
 
However, the poignancy of the social outcry is somewhat alleviated by those 
who see demonstrations as a place quite suitable for having quality time 
with their pets. 
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The omnipresence of police officers and military cars is typical of the 
demonstration on 9 May, as well as of other public events. If during the 
Soviet celebrations, the military were marching the parade, now their 
primary task is to keep the outbursts of civil resentment under control.  
 
 
To conclude, the fundamentalist movement rejects modernization and 
thereby opposes the very idea of democracy and civil society. Using broad 
public dissatisfaction with governmental policy on socio-economic issues, 
fundamentalists tend to join forces with nationalists and communists and 
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suggest populist solutions. The fundamentalist alternative to the concept of 
civil society can be summarized as follows: the substitution of secular liberal 
democracy by monarchy, the return of theocracy, and the restoration of the 
Church’s central role in society’s life. This program means the de-
differentiation of societal structures. Although the voice of Orthodox 
fundamentalists is surely present in the public arena of present-day Russia, it 
should not be overestimated. It should be also distinguished from the 
official position of the ROC, which is the next issue to be addressed.   
 
6.3 Orthodox Conservatism as an Alternative to Civil Society 
 
A succinct summary of the Orthodox conservative view on modernization 
can be found in the recent ecclesiastical documents of the ROC. These 
documents have inaugurated a new stage in the relationship between civil 
society and Orthodox Christianity. The main ecclesiastical document is, 
doubtlessly, the social doctrine of the ROC. The social doctrine was 
adopted at the Jubilee Bishops Council held in August 2000 in Moscow. It 
was subsequently published together with other documents as The 
Fundamentals of the Social Conception of the Russian Orthodox Church (henceforth: 
the Fundamentals) in the Proceedings of Jubilee Bishops Council of the Russian 
Orthodox Church, 13-16 August 2000.132 After the chaotic period in the history 
of state-church relations during the 1990s, the ROC came out with a clear 
statement about its place and role in the modern world. What does this 
statement mean for Russian society today? Has it sufficiently clarified the 
Church’s attitude towards the problems of a secular society? Has the 
Church proposed a sufficient theological substantiation to the concept of 
civil society? And if not, has it elaborated a substantial theological 
alternative to this concept? These questions form the backbone of my 
investigation. 
 
6.3.1 The Dialectics between Orthodox Theology and Modernity 
 
In the theoretical framework of secular democracy, the role of religion in 
the public sphere is dictated by the logic of functional differentiation. 
Religion becomes just another player in the arena of secular pluralistic 
                                               
132 Основы социальной концепции Русской Православной Церкви // Юбилейный архиерейский собор 
Русской Православной Церкви, 13-16 августа 2000. Материалы (2001). In the present study, the 
English translation available online is used, with some minor amendments of the grammar.  
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society and therefore needs to adjust to the hermeneutical methods of 
secular public discourse. Religious discourse can relate to functionally 
differentiated society by means of adjusting religious ethics to the internal 
rationality of differentiated social systems. As Kostjuk explains in his 
insightful article ‘The Emergence of the Social Doctrine of the Russian 
Orthodox Church,’133 modernization of societal structures involves a way of 
establishing norms and values in societal organization that is different from 
the traditional one. The method of maintaining social order by means of 
traditional morality gives way to rationalized procedures at the structural-
institutional level. Insofar as free and autonomous individual actively adjusts 
to these procedures, “the task of Christian social ethics is to influence these 
institutional changes” (Kostjuk 2001: 117).  
Applying this general theory of secularization to the evaluation of the 
current situation in Russia, we can regard the formulation of the social 
doctrine of the ROC as an attempt of the Church to respond to the trend of 
modernization. In a later publication ‘The Social Doctrine as a Challenge for 
the Tradition and Contemporaneity of the ROC,’134 Kostjuk is, perhaps, too 
optimistic when asserting that with the emergence of the social doctrine the 
earlier hostility between the religious and secular standpoints has been 
pacified. The vein in which the document is written reveals the Church’s 
eagerness to accept the secular contemporary world as it is and start 
working in it and with it; thus, the Church is eager to start a dialog with the 
secular world (Kostjuk 2003). In my view, the social doctrine rather 
articulates the Church’s ambiguous attitude with regard to secular ethics. 
Before delving into a detailed analysis of the document, I need to spell out 
the main sources of the Church’s indecisive attitude. 
An obvious source of ambiguity is the nature of secular ethics: Should 
the Church adopt or reject the ethics dictated by the logic of pluralistic 
secular society? To illustrate the Church’s attitude, I refer to the interview 
given by Patriarch Kirill (Gundjaev) of Moscow and all Russia, then 
Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad and the head of the Department 
of External Relations of the ROC. The interview was published under the 
title ‘The Norm of Faith as the Norm of Life. The Problem of the 
                                               
133 Константин Костюк, «Возникновение социальной доктрины Русской православной 
церкви» // Общественные науки и современность (№ 6, 2001). 
134 Константин Костюк, «Социальная доктрина как вызов традиции и современности 
РПЦ», доклад на коференции «Начало новой эры? – Социальная доктрина Русской 
Православной Церкви августа 2000 г.» (Mülheim, 19-20 febr. 2003). Internet publication, last 
visited on 17 September 2010.  
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Relationship between Traditional and Liberal Values in the Choice of the 
Individual and of Society’135 in Nezavisimaja gazeta on 16 February 2000, in 
the anticipation of the emergence of the social doctrine in August 2000. 
Metropolitan Kirill’s standpoint demonstrates the clash between the 
theological and secular logics in modernizing Russian society. On the one 
hand, the hierarch seems to admit one of the three central theses of 
secularization,136 namely that religion indeed has become privatized in the 
modern world. Nonetheless, he regrets this development because as soon as 
religion becomes a private affair, it loses its universal dimension of a public 
religion. Metropolitan Kirill concedes, “From the perspective of a liberal 
secular society, the religious motivation of individual choice is justified and 
acceptable only when it guides citizens’ private and family life. As far as 
other aspects of human existence are concerned, there is no possible place 
for the religious motivation” (Gundjaev 2000). Metropolitan Kirill claims 
that in opposition to this privatization of religion, the Christian motivation, 
due to its universal and all-embracing character, should permeate every 
single sphere of life of a believing Christian. Thus, his argument entails a 
conflict between secular and Christian ethics. For instance, the hierarch 
admits that the existence of liberal institutions in the spheres of the 
economy, politics, social life, and foreign politics is acceptable, reasonable, 
and morally justifiable only when the principles of philosophical liberalism 
are not enforced onto the spheres of human personality and interhuman 
relations. However, the spheres of education and of interpersonal relations 
should be grounded in traditional Russian values, which oppose the 
liberalism of the democratic polity. The preservation of traditional Russian 
values will determine, according to Metropolitan Kirill, whether Russia will 
survive as an Orthodox nation (Gundjaev 2000).  
In my opinion, Metropolitan Kirill’s position reveals the underlying 
dilemma inherent in the Orthodox theological conception of the secular 
world and morality. The above argument demonstrates a deep moral 
antagonism that rises from the Church’s attempt at conceiving the world 
within the framework of its theological logic: the antagonism between the 
normative universal claim of Christian ethics and the practical morality of 
                                               
135 Митр. Кирилл (Гундяев), «Норма веры как норма жизни. Проблема соотношения между 
традиционными и либеральными ценностями в выборе личности и общества» // 
Независимая газета (Выпуск 28 (2090) от 16.02.2000). Internet publication, last visited on 17 
September 2010. 
136 Casanova stipulates three theses of secularization theory: differentiation of secular spheres 
from religious institutions and norms, decline of religious practices, and privatization of religion 
(discussed in § 4.1.2). 
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Christians acting in the world. The antagonism is evident from Metropolitan 
Kirill’s appeal to uphold secular liberal values at the level of democratic 
institutions but at the same time to uphold traditional Orthodox values at 
the level of personal relations. On this view, society appears split into two 
distinct subspheres: the subsphere of societal relations, or Gesellschaft, which 
is guided by secular ethics, and the subsphere of communal and private 
relations, or Gemeinschaft, which is guided by Christian ethics. However, I 
wonder if Orthodox theology also supports such a schism between public 
and private ethics. In my view, the revealed moral dualism contradicts the 
universal character of Christian moral plea to act always and invariably 
according to one’s Christian belief. Bearing this in mind, I think that the 
greatest obstacle for Orthodox theology to accommodate secular liberal 
ethics consists in adopting the principle of individualism, which indeed lies 
at the foundation of modern liberalism. It is thus interesting to investigate 
whether Orthodox theologians have succeeded, in the social doctrine of the 
ROC, to overcome this obstacle.  
The social doctrine reveals the ambiguous attitude of the ROC not only 
with regard to secular ethics, but also with regard to general modernization 
of contemporary Russian society. On the one hand, the Church has 
undertaken a noticeable step by addressing the new ‘secular’ issues of 
human rights, pluralization, mass media, war, democracy, secularization, 
globalization, and bioethics. Thereby, the taboo has been clearly broken 
(Kostjuk 2003). Alexander Agadjanian also confirms in his article ‘Religion 
between Universal and Particular: Eastern Europe after 1989’ that the 
emergence of such a “semitheological document” as the Fundamentals 
testifies to the intention of the ROC “to become modern and relevant, to 
cut off the inherited endemic other-worldliness and cultural isolation, to 
build a bridge between natural and supernatural, to affirm the value of this 
world.” In this sense, Agadjanian argues, the document “ipso facto is a thrust 
to modernity” (Agadjanian 2004: 80). 
Nevertheless, one can pose, according to Kostjuk, a legitimate question 
whether the social doctrine succeeded to elaborate a substantial theological 
conception of the contemporary world and provide necessary 
methodological tools for such a conception. In his opinion, “the social 
doctrine, instead of suggesting an established postulate, rather manifests the 
very process of conceptualization” (Kostjuk 2003). Agreeing with Kostjuk, 
Agadjanian maintains that the text of the Fundamentals clearly reflects 
“various competing voices within church hierarchy”; it is “multivocal in 
many senses: in vocabulary, in concepts that are used, in references to 
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traditional authorities, and in ideas.” That is why “with a closer approach to 
the text, you would find something quite different from, if not the opposite 
of, the previous.” Specifically, Agadjanian pinpoints the continuous 
juxtaposition of the Church as a God-established institute to the rest of 
society, which is understood in terms of the “non-Christian state, 
associations and individuals.” That is why the document can be said to be 
permeated by an “extremely strong border sensitivity, a constant concern, 
sometimes an obsession with self-identity, and a permanent reification of 
the ‘us-them’ dichotomies operating on several levels” (Agadjanian 2004: 
80). Agadjanian explicates how the universalistic impulse given in the initial 
overture of the Fundamentals is consequently limited by the implicit 
particularistic definitions that emphasize the national identity of Russian 
Orthodoxy. Thus, while “opening itself to the new global order, inscribing 
itself therein, the tradition simultaneously resists it,” as it identifies this new 
social order with secularism, apostasy, and anthropocentrism (Agadjanian 
2004: 81).  
The social doctrine can be seen as a courageous attempt of the Church 
to embrace modernity on the one hand, and rediscover its self-identity 
within this new modern world on the other. However, this intensive search 
for a new self-identity eventually precludes the intended acceptance of 
modernity. This is because the process of the Church’s self-identification 
reinvigorates the traditional Orthodox dualism between the earthly and the 
spiritual, the profane and the sacred, the secular and the divine. A short 
glimpse at the history of the ROC reveals the essence of this dualism. I refer 
to the famous controversy that emerged in the late fifteenth century 
between two influential hierarchs: Iosif Volotskij (1440-1515), the leader of 
the so-called ‘possessors,’ and Nil Sorskij (1433-1508), the inspirer of the 
‘non-possessors.’ The possessors insisted on the Church’s right to property 
and emphasized the socio-political role of the ROC, whereas the non-
possessors rejected the worldly dimension of the possessors’ standpoint and 
concentrated on the hesychast spiritual tradition, which had been 
established by St. Sergij Radonezhskij (1314-92) a century earlier.137 The 
                                               
137 In the end of the debate, the possessors were victorious and the non-possessors were 
condemned as heretics. The hesychast movement went underground for about two centuries and 
reemerged with the publication of The Filokalija in 1793. The book was translated into Church-
Slavonic by the Ukrainian monk Paisij Velichkovskij. The Filokalija contained the anthology of 
ascetic and mystic texts (Boobbyer 2005: 10). Translated into Russian in the nineteenth century, 
The Filokalija became a source of inspiration not only for the Orthodox clergy, monks, and 
believers, but also for Russian writers of the Golden Age. However, as Boobbyer observes, “the 
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controversy between the possessors and the non-possessors exhibited the 
discrepancy between the two distinct tendencies that exist even nowadays 
within the ROC. On the one hand, there is a tendency towards a more 
prominent political and public self-positioning of the ROC; on the other 
hand, there is a tendency towards hesychast contemplation and retreat from 
the world. Accordingly, these two spiritual traditions signify two opposite 
poles in the dualistic self-identification of the Orthodox Church.  
What are the consequences of the Orthodox dualistic attitude to the 
world for Orthodox Christians? In the ‘Analysis of the First Five Chapters 
of the Fundamentals of the Social Conception of the ROC,’138 the contemporary 
Orthodox liberal theologian Veniamin Novik describes the inherent 
Orthodox dualism as “one of the causes of the human drama.” The 
dramatic consequences of the Orthodox dualism ensue from the dilemma 
with which every Orthodox Christian is inevitably confronted. Specifically, 
how can a religious individual pursue one’s earthly path of salvation if the 
temporary world is radically different from the spiritual world, which is 
eschatologically oriented to the moral excellence, the communion with the 
divine, and witnessing of the sacred? That is the reason, Novik maintains, 
why “the temptation of spiritual escapism, inner withdrawal from the 
mundane world, and minimization of any relation to this world is extremely 
great for Orthodox believers” (Novik 2002: 68). As a result, Orthodox 
social ethics underestimates the secular world and the earthly existence of 
the human individual. Instead, Orthodox theological thought is oriented 
towards a theocentric vision of the world; it sees the world in its perfect 
transfigured state, as the eschatological realization of the Divine Kingdom 
on earth. This eschatological vision determines the way in which the ROC 
formulates its social doctrine. Next, I intend to analyze how the depicted 
theocentric dualism manifests itself in the Orthodox conception of politics 
(§ 6.3.2), society (§ 6.3.3), and human rights (§ 6.3.4).   
 
6.3.2 Orthodox Symphonia in Contrast to Secular Democracy  
 
In essence, the Orthodox conception of politics rests on the understanding 
of the state as a compulsory form of political organization of society. In its 
legitimation of political power, the Orthodox social doctrine relies on the 
                                                                                                              
weakness of nineteenth-century Russian Orthodoxy was that it rarely appealed to people with 
radical social and political instincts” (Boobbyer 2005: 14). 
138 Вениамин Новик, «Анализ 1-5 глав Основ социальной концепции РПЦ» // Социология религии 
(2002). 
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distinctively Orthodox theological principle of theocentric dualism. This is 
especially obvious from antagonistic claims that are present in the 
Fundamentals. On the one hand, the document pleads for the Church’s 
greater integration with the state according to the model of Byzantine 
symphonia, but on the other hand, it endorses the idea of an independent 
Church. To safeguard the Church’s autonomy, the social doctrine employs 
such concepts as human rights, civil disobedience to the state, the borders 
of political influence, and non-disclosure of private confession (Kostjuk 
2003). The question at stake is whether the Church is inclined to integrate 
with the state or fight for its institutional and moral autonomy.  
To start with, I need to clarify the significance of the state in the system 
of Orthodox theology. As a temporary transitory organization, the state 
does not obtain a substantive status equivalent to that of the Church. The 
origin and status of the state is related to the core postulates of Orthodox 
anthropology, especially to the doctrine of the original sin. Orthodox 
anthropology is pervaded by dualism, as it makes a distinction between the 
fallen state of the secular world caused by the original sin and the perfect 
state of the Divine Kingdom. From this dualistic perspective, the state is 
considered as an imposed regulative skeleton on the living organism of 
society; this is due to society’s inability to establish social order without state 
intervention. As the Fundamentals explain, the state is necessitated by the 
complication of social relations, whereas it was the family that initially 
constituted the vital cell of human society (Fundamentals III.1). Insofar as the 
world of social relations grew ever more complicated, it offered more 
possibilities for the manifestation of the sinful nature of men. It was after 
the fall of Adam and the murder of Cain by Abel that “people in all known 
societies began to establish laws restricting evil and supporting good” 
(Fundamentals III.2). Thus, in order to prevent society’s self-devastation, 
“God blesses the state as an essential element of life in the world distorted 
by sin in which both the individual and society need to be protected from 
the dangerous manifestations of sin” (Fundamentals III.2).  
Asserting that the state is obligatory for the fallen humanity, the Holy 
Scriptures ascribe a moral value to the state: It is established to restrict the 
dominion of sin over the world and prevent anarchy. Nonetheless, this 
moral value is not identical with the substantive value. The Fundamentals 
comment, “The emergence of the temporal state should not be understood 
as a reality originally established by God. It was rather God’s granting 
human being an opportunity to order their social life by their own free will, 
so that this order as a response to the earthly reality distorted by sin, could 
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help avoid a greater sin through opposing it by means of temporal power” 
(Fundamentals III.1). The law and the state, being authentically human 
establishments, possess no substantive ontological status. Due to the 
restrictive function of the state, “power itself has no right to make itself 
absolute by extending its limits up to complete autonomy from God and 
from the order of things established by Him. This can lead to the abuse of 
power and even to the deification of rulers” (Fundamentals III.2). The state 
cannot claim its preeminence either over social organization or over 
individual, but acquires its legitimacy as a product of collective decisions 
made by members of a certain society. 
While the Fundamentals reject the substantive ontological status of the 
state, the document contains explicitly articulated theocratic ideas. The ROC 
overtly prefers a theocratic model, which was established during the biblical 
Judge’s rule where the semi-political, semi-prophetic authority of the Judge 
was directly sanctioned by God (Fundamentals III.7). Similar to ancient 
theocracy, the Fundamentals extol the model of monarchy because such a 
model is also based on the divine sanctification of the monarch’s political 
power. However, the preference of a theocratic model does not allow the 
ROC to avoid the question of the divine legitimation of political power, 
which has become especially relevant after the adoption of the principle of 
freedom of conscience by the Democratic Constitution in 1993. If in 
theocracy and monarchy, political power seeks legitimation by ecclesiastical 
authority, contemporary democracies “do not seek the divine sanction of 
power” because “they represent the form of government in secular society 
that presupposes the right of every able-bodied citizen to express his will 
through elections.” With that, the Church demonstrates its practical 
awareness that “the form and methods of government is conditioned in 
many ways by the spiritual and moral condition of society.” It is due to this 
awareness that “the Church accepts the people’s choice or does not resist it 
at all” (Fundamentals III.7).  
Theocracy remains an Orthodox dream, and the power of this nostalgic 
dream is particularly evident from the scrupulosity with which the 
Fundamentals discuss the symphonia doctrine. The Orthodox symphonia is 
juxtaposed with the Roman-Catholic and the Protestant models of 
organization of ecclesiastical and political life. The Roman-Catholic 
normative model, which gained recognition in the medieval Western 
Europe, relies primarily on the Augustinian doctrine of “two swords.” 
According to the Augustinian binary model, “both Church and state power, 
the former directly, the latter indirectly, go back to the Bishop of Rome,” so 
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that the Roman-Catholic bishops were “princes with state-like jurisdiction 
over their territories, with their own governments and armies of which they 
were leaders” (Fundamentals III.4). An alternative model emerged in Western 
Christianity during the Reformation. Then, the Roman-Catholic bishops 
were deprived of their power in the Protestant regions, and state-church 
relations were established on the territorial principle, “giving to state full 
sovereignty over territory and the religious communities found in it” 
(Fundamentals III.4). The territorial principle implies that the religion of the 
political sovereign is the religion of the country. Thereby, the official 
religious community is acknowledged as state church and is granted 
privileges over alternative communities. 
In contrast to the Roman-Catholic model of two swords and the 
Protestant territorial model, the model of symphonia was established in the 
Orthodox world as “an explicit ideal of state-church relations. Since state-
church relations are two-way traffic, the abovementioned ideal could 
emerge in history […] only in an Orthodox state” (Fundamentals III.4). As 
we can recall from the above discussion (§ 4.2.1), the model of Byzantine 
symphonia denotes a symphonic cooperation of state and Church with a clear 
differentiation between the spheres of their influence. A peaceful symbiosis 
of ecclesiastical and political authorities is possible, however, only when the 
borders of a state coincide with the borders of a national Church. If this was 
indeed the case in the medieval Byzantine Empire, the same model cannot 
be employed in the political context of contemporary Russia, which is a 
secular democratic state with the multiconfessional population. Therefore, 
the model of Byzantine symphonia is inappropriate to the current situation in 
Russia. 
The practical uselessness of the model of symphonia does not discourage 
certain Orthodox hierarchs and theologians still to adhere to this model. 
This adherence reflects their longing for the biblical period of the Judges 
when the Israelite nation was directly ruled by God whose authority was 
embodied in the figure of the Judge. For instance, Vsevolod Chaplin, the 
vice-chairman of the Department of the External Affairs of the ROC and 
the eminent advocate of the official political position of the ROC, considers 
modern secular democracy, due to its inherent rejection of God, to be an 
inferior form of the state compared with theocracy where political authority 
is legitimized by the divine blessing. He is convinced that only anarchy can 
be worse of secular democracy. In the article ‘Orthodoxy and the Social 
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Ideal Today’,139 Chaplin affirms that “Orthodoxy shows preference to an 
authority that is sanctioned by God and is aware of its religious mission. 
The same is expected from the society, or the nation, which is perceived 
within the Byzantine and the Russian Orthodox tradition as the united 
community of faith (edinaja obshchina very). A society that rejects the God-
established authority and considers possible and desirable to ‘become 
autonomous’ from God is, to say the least of it, far from ideal” (Chaplin 
2005a: 164). Preferring the model of theocracy, conservative Orthodox 
theologians identify society with the religious-political community and 
refute the value of society as an independent extra-political community. 
An obvious weakness of the official political theology of the ROC 
consists, in my opinion, in its persistent amalgamation of two different 
dimensions of the social order: the secular dimension of a worldly 
community and the religious dimension, which perceives interhuman 
relations as grounded in the ontological primordial connectedness of all 
human beings. When the secular and religious dimensions are amalgamated, 
distinctively theological arguments, such as the truth claim or the divine 
sanction, intervene with the rationality of the secular spheres. The described 
amalgamation is evident from the way in which Chaplin uses the theological 
concept of the community of faith to articulate the Orthodox conception of 
society, “It is not so important whether Orthodox Christians […] form an 
Orthodox nation or constitute just a small group. They feel themselves to 
be the nation of God (narod Bozhij), the society-Church (obshchestvo-Tserkov’), 
which has a right to its own social order, without imposing this order on 
others. In a country where Orthodox Christians constitute the majority, this 
must signify their right to the corresponding way of the nation’s life, which 
does not oppose respect for the rights of the minority.” Thereby, this 
universal society-Church is aimed to unite all people beyond their political, 
national, or social differences and to overcome the obstacles towards the 
Evangelic ideal of unification formed by “pluralism, multi-party system, 
poly-confessionalism, and competition” (Chaplin 2005a: 165). This 
argument brings us to the question how the ROC deals with the tension 
between the concept of the nation and the universal character of the 
Orthodox Church.  
Assuming a concrete manifestation in the mundane world, the Orthodox 
Church is confronted with its division into the Local Churches. 
                                               
139 Всеволод Чаплин, «Православие и общественный идеал сегодня» // Александр 
Верховский (сост.) Пределы светскости (2005). 
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Accordingly, the concept of the nation remains a notorious issue in the field 
of Orthodox theology. Wil van den Bercken rightly observes in his article ‘A 
Social Doctrine for the Russian Orthodox Church’ that although the 
Fundamentals contain some disturbing eulogies on Orthodox patriotism, 
monoconfessionalism of the Orthodox nation and loving brothers by 
blood, the document signifies, in general, a clear attempt at moderating 
those insights by setting “the balancing act between Christian universalism 
and Orthodox nationalism” (van den Bercken 2002: 3). Indeed, the 
Fundamentals proclaim that “the universal nature of the Church does not 
mean that Christians should not have any right to national identity and 
national self-expressions. On the contrary, the Church unites in herself the 
universal with the national” (Fundamentals II.2). This is evident from the fact 
that the Orthodox Church consists of many Autocephalous Local 
Churches. However, while the document explains how the cultural diversity 
is expressed in the specificities of liturgy, church art, and lifestyle, it does 
not delve into the character of national organization of the Local Churches. 
In my opinion, the Local structure of the Church does not imply ethnical 
criterion for inclusivity/exclusivity and therefore does not impose an 
ascriptive membership on the members of a particular Local Church. 
Moreover, given the worldwide extension of the Orthodox Churches and 
the increasing globalization of the cultural space, the social conception of 
the ROC should include some kind of welcoming of an intercultural dialog, 
also in view of the growing number of Orthodox newcomers who have no 
ethnical affinity with Russian culture.  
Returning to the discussion of how the ROC conceives of modern 
secular democracy, we should notice, relying on the Fundamentals, that the 
Church recognizes the reality of a secular state and the consequent 
separation between Church and state. The document explicates, “In the 
contemporary world, state is normally secular and not bound by any 
religious commitments. Its cooperation with the Church is limited to several 
areas and based on mutual non-interference into each other’s affairs” 
(Fundamentals III.3). At this point, the Church seems to accept the empirical 
reality of an established secular state in Russia. Accordingly, the Church 
does not require the model of theocracy, or of any kind of alliance between 
Church and state in the form of symphonia. Instead, there is a clear separation 
between the domain of the state as providing well-being of its citizens and 
of the Church as promulgating morality and caring for eternal salvation of 
the people. Hence, the social doctrine of the ROC rather tries to synthesize 
the Church’s normative vision of state-church relations and its realistic 
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acceptance of the established relations. It demonstrates an attempt at 
compromising between the ideal of theocracy and the political reality of 
secular liberal democracy. 
Having said that, I have to admit that the Orthodox social doctrine has 
not been able, nonetheless, to legitimize and accept the model of liberal 
democracy. This rejection is primarily caused by the pluralized texture of the 
democratic multi-party system. The concept of the political, which implies 
the possibility of conflict, is appalling in the eyes of Orthodox conservative 
theologians. The Fundamentals regard the possibility of conflict as a serious 
disease of liberal democracy and not as an encouragement for public debate. 
Accordingly, the ROC neither approves nor criticizes the current political 
system in Russia but opts to underscore its exceptional status in state-
church relations as “a divine-human organism” (Fundamentals I.2). With this 
claim, the Church maintains that it has not only a mysterious transcendental 
nature, but also a historical immanent component through which the 
Church comes in touch with the state (Fundamentals III.1). This immanent 
component is guided by the soteriological mission of the Church because 
the Church’s task in this world consists in promulgating “the unity for her 
children and peace and harmony in society and the involvement of all her 
members in common creative efforts” (Fundamentals V.2). In contrast to 
conflict, “the Church preaches peace and cooperation among people 
holding various political views” but refuses to participate in political struggle 
explicitly through supporting political parties or influencing election 
campaigns. This does not mean, however, “her refusal to express publicly 
her stand on socially significant issues” (Fundamentals V.2). With that, the 
ROC assumes a cautious standpoint, choosing not to intervene into secular 
politics and requiring a similar policy of non-interference from the state.  
 
6.3.3 Dualistic Theocentrism of Ekklesia and Liberal Anthropocentrism of 
Civil Society 
 
Since the Constitution of the Russian Federation established the existence 
of civil society and democratic polity in 1993, the ROC was challenged to 
define its standpoint with regard to civil society, which became an 
independent factor in the political and religious organization of social life. It 
is against this historical background that I address the question whether the 
ROC has succeeded to elaborate a sufficient theological legitimation for the 
concept of civil society.  
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Defining its standpoint with regard to civil society, the Church is 
confronted with the choice between two options: either to deny the 
established reality of secular civil society and focus on its internal 
theocentric self-conception, or, alternatively, to repudiate this traditional 
reflex and try to relate to civil society. I presume that by addressing such 
topical issues as secular law, democracy, (bio)ethics, human rights, human 
dignity, war, conflict, etc. the Church shows its eagerness to abandon its 
traditional “monastically-contemplative character,” which previously 
reinforced the Orthodox focus on liturgical-ascetic ethics instead of social 
ethics (Novik 2002: 68-69).  
At the same time, this attempt at a theological conception of civil society 
has proved challenging for the Orthodox social teaching. The difficulty that 
the ROC experiences when formulating its standpoint with regard to civil 
society is caused by a deep discrepancy between two distinct traditions of 
thought. If the idea and the reality of civil society has foundations in the 
history of modern liberalism and individualism, the Church traditionally 
defines its identity by means of theological God-centered concepts. The 
juxtaposition between the liberal anthropocentrism of civil society and the 
traditional theocentrism of the Orthodox worldview is evident. The 
exhibited juxtaposition points at the distinction between the secular model 
of civil society and the theological imaginary of social order. If the model of 
civil society presumes a horizontal structure, reflected in the tripartite model 
of relations between the state, the market, and civil society, the Orthodox 
social doctrine remains fundamentally theocentric. It opts for a hierarchical 
social imaginary with God at the top of it, the Church as a mediating actor 
in the middle, and the human individual at the very bottom of the social 
hierarchy.  
It should be noticed that the traditional hierarchical vision of the world 
also dominated Western Christianity during the Middle Ages. However, 
later documents on the social teaching of the Roman-Catholic Church 
reconsider the hierarchical theocentric worldview. If we refer to The 
Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (published in 2004; henceforth: 
Compendium), which can be regarded as the Roman-Catholic document 
equivalent to the Orthodox Fundamentals, we can notice that the Compendium 
tends to pose the idea of human individual as the corner stone of the 
Roman-Catholic social doctrine. The Compendium founds this 
anthropocentric vision in the theology of Thomas Aquinas. In contrast to 
the Roman Catholic Church’s attempt at a humanistic revision, the ROC 
consistently endorses the idea of the Church as a pivotal point in the world 
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order, which allows the human being to be conceived only through the 
Church and for the Church. With that, Orthodox social conception remains 
loyal to the theocentric model and leaves very limited space for the 
autonomy of the human individual. 
Similarly, the autonomous, self-reliant sphere of civil society is not 
accommodated by the Orthodox social doctrine. Since Orthodox theology 
employs the theocentric model to conceive of the world order, it adheres to 
the hierarchical imaginary, which can be described as the formula: God – 
Church – man. The established theocentric conception is also employed to 
conceive of social reality, whereby theological categories are substituted by 
social-political categories. In fact, the ensuing theological conception is used 
to legitimate the ideal political system, which is a sovereign state with an 
invisible society. The following formula emerges: sovereign – state – 
subject. At the top of this sovereign-centric model is the figure of the tsar, 
the mediatory position is taken by the institute of the state, and the state 
subject is again at the bottom of the structure. This ‘politicized’ counterpart 
of the Orthodox hierarchical conception of the world order dominated the 
archetypes of political culture in pre-revolutionary Russia; nowadays, it finds 
expression in the nostalgic dreams of the Russian Orthodox Empire. Within 
this triangular model (sovereign – state – subject), I am especially concerned 
about the missing place of society. Society seems to be dissolved either in 
the concept of the Church or in the concept of the state. The lack of a 
pronounced Orthodox conception of society as an independent, self-
regulatory, and self-reliant factor constitutes, in my view, a serious obstacle 
to the emerging civil society in democratic Russia.  
Following the tradition of theocentric dualism, the ROC proposes to 
conceive of society in terms of the normative ideal of the Ekklesia, or the 
community of the universal Church. The emphasized dualism and 
theocentrism are overt from the statement that “the Church is a divine-
human organism.” This means that the Church has sources of legitimacy 
that are different from those of the secular order, which cannot claim its 
foundations in the sphere of the divine. The distinctive feature of the 
Ekklesia is its two-dimensional nature as semi-divine and semi-human, 
which consequently “makes possible the grace-giving transformation and 
purification of the world accomplished in history in the creative work, 
‘synergy,’ of the members and the head of the Church body” (Fundamentals 
I.2). With this statement, the Orthodox discourse clearly distinguishes the 
Ekklesia as a grace-giving organism from the secular world and ascribes a 
limited value to the secular world. The secular world is valued to the extent 
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that it is incorporated into the divine-human organism of the Church. As a 
God-reliant institute, the Ekklesia cannot be identified with civil society, 
which functions exclusively in the secular dimension.  
For that reason, the Orthodox theological attempt at resolving the 
pivotal dilemma of civil society cannot be fully comprehended within the 
conceptual framework of secular public debate. As we recall, the core 
dilemma of civil society has been most saliently articulated by Seligman as 
“how to posit a social whole beyond the particular interests that define 
individual existence” (Seligman 2002: 26). When resolved through the 
concept of the Ekklesia, one would probably get the answer: Insofar as the 
task of every individual is one’s personal salvation, and the salvation is 
obtainable through joining the Body of the Church, there could be no 
disagreement between individual interests and the common good. Since the 
ROC provides answers to socio-moral problems only through the prism of 
the theological concept of the Ekklesia, it chooses to address these 
problems only from the vantage point of its internal theological logics and 
thus refutes to search for alternative sources to legitimate the existence of 
secular civil society 
In this connection, Evert van der Zweerde suggests in his contribution 
‘Civil Society and Orthodoxy in Russia: A Double Test-Case’140 a 
constructive solution to the problem. Namely, if Russian Orthodoxy is 
eager to become an active participant in civil society, “it needs to abandon 
its disapproval of the formal nature of the law and juridical procedures, and 
moreover, to abandon its ‘otherworldliness,’ yet to remain loyal to the idea 
of community,” i.e. the idea of sobornost’ (van der Zweerde 2006: 277). 
However, as van der Zweerde admits, such a modernizing step constitutes a 
serious obstacle for both the ROC and the Orthodox intelligentsia. Indeed, 
to undertake this step, Orthodox intellectuals have to resolve the 
paradoxical situation in which the ROC continues to find itself after Stalin 
adopted the seemingly amiable policy in 1943.141 Although Russian 
Orthodoxy is capable of contributing to the conceptualization of civil 
society by connecting the idea of sobornost’ with the idea of building-up a 
community in a bottom-up fashion, the close relationship between the ROC 
and the state affects the role of the Church. Van der Zweerde explains that 
insofar as the state relies on the Orthodox idea of national unity and the 
                                               
140 Эверт ван дер Зверде, «Гражданское общество и православие в России: двойное 
испытание» // А. Литвинова (ред.) Проблемы философии права (2006). 
141 This policy was discussed in § 6.1.1. 
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Church’s genuine traditionalism, the Church, in order to safeguard its 
privileged position in the public arena, is supposed to endorse the antiliberal 
idea of the community ‘from above’ (van der Zweerde 2006: 276). 
It should be noted, however, that the ROC, while developing its social 
doctrine, tries to break up with the tradition of theonomy, which takes 
origin, as Kostjuk affirms, in the writings of Eusebius of Caesarea (263-
339). Through the formula ‘one God – one Emperor,’ Eusebius envisaged 
the world as one integral entity uniting social and ecclesiastical communities, 
which are at the same time dissolved in the monad of political power. 
Trying to abandon the theonomic vision of the world, the ROC opts for an 
alternative theological tradition, established by John Chrysostom (347-407). 
This tradition revised Eusebius’s logic by asking the question: If the social 
world and political power are united, then why are they not united in the 
Church? In response, John Chrysostom suggested the formula ‘one God – 
one Church.’ However, Kostjuk correctly considers the Church-centered 
tradition of John Chrysostom as inappropriate for conceptualizing modern 
secular society as well, because this tradition denies society’s autonomous 
value and dynamics. The scholar resolutely concludes, “The social doctrine 
is not able to perceive the metaphysics of society. In this sense, it proves to 
be helpless, and that is why the Orthodox public does not accept it. It 
regards society and political power as a fact, and not as a substance. In 
essence, it is not then the social doctrine” (Kostjuk 2003). 
This inability of the Church to perceive the metaphysics of society 
explains the absence, in the Fundamentals, of an important chapter on 
‘Church and Society.’ Typically, the Church discusses its relationship with 
the secular society in the framework of its relationship with the secular state, 
whereby the concept of society entirely dissolves in that of the state. This is, 
presumably, the legacy of the symphonia doctrine, which does not 
differentiate between the political and ecclesiastical communities. The ROC 
acknowledges no independent reality beyond the ecclesiastical community 
(Ekklesia) and the state; in this sense, the alleged cooperation of the ROC 
with diverse NGO’s, as well as the alleged social service, remains merely an 
implicit recognition of civil society (Fundamentals III.8).  
As we can see, a great deal of research needs to be done with a view to 
invoking a genuinely Orthodox theological understanding of the concept 
and the reality of civil society. So far, we are bound to conclude that the 
ROC did not succeed to develop a substantial conception of civil society. 
The Church envisages civil society as an inevitably given reality, against 
which it should defend its transcendence-related identity. While trying to 
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embrace the modern concept of civil society, the Church gets absorbed into 
the intensive search for self-identity. Thereby, the Church affirms its own 
theocentric two-dimensional identity and sees the secular world as temporal, 
profane, and possessing no substantial value.  
Hence, Orthodox theology ascribes no absolute value to the idea and the 
reality of secular pluralistic civil society but considers it as a temporal 
constellation of human relations, which must be transformed, ultimately, 
according to the ideal of the divine-human relationship. The ROC refuses to 
adjust itself to the world and pleads instead for the transformation of the 
world through the deification of the human being, as reflected in the 
concept of Godmanhood (Bogochelovechestvo).142 That is the reason why the 
ROC does not address its message to the whole world but confines it only 
to those who want to belong to the divine-human organism of the Church 
and believe in the possibility of transforming this world through deification. 
With that, Orthodox theology establishes a theocentric model of society – 
the Ekklesia, and repudiates civil society as an erroneous model based on 
the secular principles of individualism and liberalism.  
 
6.3.4 The Orthodox Conception of Human Dignity and Human Rights  
 
It was eight years later, in 2008, that the Bishops’ Council of the ROC 
decided to complement The Fundamentals of the Social Conception of the ROC by 
a follow-up document, The Russian Orthodox Church’s Basic Teaching on Human 
Dignity, Freedom, and Rights (henceforth: Dignity).143 The adoption of this new 
ecclesiastical document testifies to the need for the ROC to deepen its 
understanding of the concerned issues. A legitimate question arose: Has 
anything principally changed in the attitude of the ROC? If I were to give a 
succinct answer to this question, I have to admit that all strategic 
standpoints of the previous conception remain the same; moreover, they are 
further substantiated within the tradition of Orthodox theocentric dualism. 
The Orthodox teaching on human rights and dignity is characterized by 
the relentless conflict between the Christian substantiation of human dignity 
and human rights on the one hand, and the severe antiliberal critique of the 
modern secular concept of human rights on the other. This tension entails 
the distinction between the secular imperfect law and the divine perfect law. 
                                               
142 The Orthodox concept of Godmanhood was studied in § 4.3.2 and § 4.3.3, in the context of 
Russian religious philosophy.  
143 Основы учения Русской Православной Церкви о достоинстве, свободе и правах человека (2008). 
Insofar as this document is available only in Russian, the English translation is mine. 
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Consequently, when the Orthodox social doctrine considers human dignity 
and human rights within the framework of secular law, it ascribes no 
absolute value to these concepts. On the contrary, human dignity and 
human rights obtain their absolute value only when considered in the 
framework of Christian anthropology.  
A single article where human rights seem to be accepted as inalienable 
affirms, “The idea of the inalienable rights of the individual has become one 
of the dominating principles in the contemporary sense of justice” 
(Fundamentals IV.6). The Orthodox substantiation of human rights as 
presented in the Fundamentals bears a close resemblance to the Roman-
Catholic standpoint articulated in the Compendium. Both documents relate 
the idea of inalienable human rights to the biblical conception of human 
being as imago Dei. From an Orthodox perspective, the idea “is based on the 
biblical teaching on man as the image and likeness of God, as an 
ontologically free creature” (Fundamentals IV.6). Similarly, the Compendium 
identifies the ultimate source of human rights not “in the mere will of 
human beings, in the reality of the State, in public powers, but in man 
himself and in God his Creator” (Compendium § 153).  
The point where the Orthodox and Roman-Catholic conceptions of 
human rights diverge pertains to the Church’s attitude towards the 
codification of human rights in secular law. The question at stake is whether 
the Church, besides the Christian substantiation of human rights, is open to 
(re)discovering anything valuable in the secular teaching on human dignity 
and human rights. The answers offered by the Orthodox and Roman-
Catholic doctrines correspondingly are at odds. The Compendium maintains 
that “the movement towards the identification and proclamation of human 
rights is one of the most significant attempts to respond effectively to the 
inescapable demands of human dignity.” Therefore, the Roman-Catholic 
Church sees in the secular codification of human rights “the extraordinary 
opportunity that our modern times offer, through the affirmation of these 
rights, for more effectively recognizing human dignity and universally 
promoting it as characteristic inscribed by God the Creator in his creature” 
(Compendium § 152). The Compendium relies explicitly on the theological 
understanding of human nature provided by Thomas Aquinas, who claimed 
that human nature, irrespective of its fallen state, remains inherently open to 
the revelation of the truth in the world history. This explains the positive 
appraisal of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948, which 
Pope John Paul II called “a true milestone on the path of humanity’s moral 
progress” (Compendium § 152). For its part, the ROC refers in the 
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Fundamentals to the Universal Declaration in the context of its explicit critique 
of the modern juridical notion of freedom of conscience (Fundamentals 
III.6).  
In contrast to the Roman-Catholic Church, the ROC ascribes no positive 
value to the affirmation of human rights by secular law. The Fundamentals 
explain, “As secularism developed, the lofty principle of inalienable human 
rights turned into a notion of the rights of the individual outside of his 
relations with God.” Thus, secularism has overlooked one of the pivotal 
theological postulates that “outside of God, however, there is only the fallen 
man” (Fundamentals IV.7). Secular law has a mere functional significance in 
the Orthodox teaching: Its primary function is to restore “the one divine 
law of the universe in social and political realms” (Fundamentals IV.2). 
Resembling the emergence of the state, the necessity of the law is also 
preconditioned by the fall. Nevertheless, because “the contemporary 
systematic understanding of civil human rights” does not take into account 
the fallen status of human nature, the ROC repudiates the modern notion 
of human rights. Whereas the Compendium regards the fallen humanity as the 
reference point for its affirmation of human rights, the Fundamentals deplore 
this thought as jeopardous. This is because “man is treated not as the image 
of God, but as a self-sufficient and self-sufficing subject,” which means that 
“the freedom of the personality transforms into the protection of self-will” 
(Fundamentals IV.7).  
The most striking difference between the Orthodox and Roman-
Catholic social doctrines is obvious from the way in which the two 
doctrines conceptualize and legitimize the right to freedom of conscience. If 
the Compendium identifies this right with “the right to develop one’s 
intelligence and freedom in seeking and knowing the truth (Compendium § 155), 
the Fundamentals require, while recognizing the right to freedom of 
conscience, “that a certain autonomous sphere should be preserved for 
man, in which his conscience might remain the ‘autocratic’ master, for it is 
the free will that determines ultimately the salvation or death, the way to 
Christ or the way away from Christ.” In view of this assumption, the rights 
to believe, to live, and to have a family are identified as “internal rights”; 
these rights are furthermore complemented by “external ones, such as the 
right to free movement, information, property, to its possession and 
disposition” (Fundamentals IV.6). What is most disturbing about the 
Orthodox standpoint is that the alleged autonomous sphere of individual 
conscience implies only the right to believe or not to believe, and not the 
right to freedom of conscience. With that, the choice of each individual’s 
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conscience is already predetermined and thus articulated in prescriptive 
terms (either to follow Christ or reject Him). Insofar as the ROC 
systematically depicts the possibility of rejecting one’s salvation in Christ as 
morally destructive, it struggles with the self-paralyzing mechanism that 
prohibits it to recognize the right to freedom of conscience as a morally 
neutral principle. That is the reason why the ROC still cannot reconcile with 
the fact that the principle of freedom of conscience is included in the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation.  
Even more astonishingly, the Fundamentals interpret the adoption of the 
principle of freedom of conscience by the constitutions of most democratic 
states not as a triumph of this core Christian principle, but as a token of the 
moral malaise of modern secular society. Given such an overtly negative 
assessment of modern secularization, the ROC also sets off against the 
secular substantiation of the right to freedom of conscience and associates it 
with the general trend of secularization. As we remember from Taylor’s 
account of secularization, there are two popular conceptions of 
secularization: (a) as signifying the decline of religious belief and practice, 
and (b) as signifying the retreat of religion from the public space (Taylor 
2003: 78). The social doctrine of the ROC shares this basic notion of 
secularization in the sense that it censures the decline of personal faith and 
morality, linking the moral malaise to the structural marginalization of 
religion in Russian secular society. Accordingly, the Fundamentals maintain 
that the emergence of the principle of freedom of conscience “testifies that 
in the contemporary world, religion is turning from a ‘social’ into a ‘private’ 
affair of a person”; thereby, it also transforms the state, which was originally 
“an instrument of asserting divine law in society” into “an exclusively 
temporal institute with no religious commitments” (Fundamentals III.6).  
At the same time, the constitutional enactment of the principle of 
freedom of conscience is interpreted by the Fundamentals in a utilitarian 
manner, as securing the undisturbed and legal existence of the ROC in the 
context of a secular state. This utilitarian interpretation is most overtly 
expressed in the following statement, “The adoption of freedom of 
conscience as legal principle points to the fact that society has lost religious 
goals and values and become massively apostate and actually indifferent to 
the task of the Church and to the overcoming of sin. However, this 
principle has proved to be one of the means of the Church’s existence in 
the non-religious world, enabling her to enjoy a legal status in secular state 
and independence from those in society who believe differently or do not 
believe at all” (Fundamentals III.6).  
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Although Orthodox theology does not deny the absolute value of the 
human individual and consequently the individual right to freedom, it still 
unambiguously denounces the secular institute of human rights as 
“promoting ideas, which in essence radically disagree with Christian 
teaching” (Dignity: Preamble). The key to the Orthodox understanding of 
human dignity and human rights lies in a correct theological interpretation 
of freedom, and this is exactly the task that the ROC eagerly takes upon 
itself. As Metropolitan Kirill explains, the foundations of liberalism unite 
the ideas of pagan anthropocentrism, which emerged in Europe during the 
Enlightenment, of Protestant theology, and of Judaic philosophy. These 
liberal ideas criticize the ancient church tradition and provide wrong 
interpretations of the evangelical texts (Gundjaev 2000). Thus, relying on 
the Ecclesiastical Tradition and the letters of apostle Paul, the ROC asserts 
that the genuinely Christian understanding of freedom pertains not to 
freedom of the human being to act as one desires, but to freedom to attain 
the ultimate destination of the human being in one’s worldly life, i.e. to 
liberate oneself from sin in and through Christ. Since the very concept of 
sin is absent in the conceptual framework of liberalism, Metropolitan Kirill 
repudiates the liberal understanding of human freedom. In his view, 
liberalism calls for the emancipation of a sinful individual and, in this sense, 
supports an antichristian idea (Gundjaev 2000). However, as van der 
Zweerde correctly notices, the principle of free individualism should not be 
interpreted in its absolutized version. The Church can recognize the 
principle of individualism as a secular principle fundamental for the modern 
political, economic, and social life (Van der Zweerde 2006: 283). 
Instead, the ROC conceives human dignity and human rights only as 
religious-moral categories, attaching thereby a moral component to the 
juridical and political-theoretical discussion. The Church is eager to endorse 
the legal principle of human rights only when it has a clear moral 
foundation, arguing that “in the Eastern Christian tradition the notion of 
‘dignity’ has first of all a moral meaning, while the ideas of what is dignified 
and what is not are connected with the moral or amoral actions of a person 
and with the inner state of his soul” (Dignity I.2). The inalienable ontological 
dignity of each individual is derived from the image of God and that is the 
reason why “dignified life is related to the notion of God’s likeness achieved 
through God’s grace by efforts to overcome sin and seek moral purity and 
virtue. Therefore, the human being, while bearing the image of God, should 
not exult in this lofty dignity, for it is not his own achievement, but a gift of 
God” (Dignity I.2). On this view, Orthodox social ethics obviously links the 
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notion of dignity to morality. By acknowledging human dignity, it 
simultaneously asserts personal responsibility for one’s morally impeccable 
life (Dignity I.5). 
In contradistinction to God-related dignity of a morally impeccable 
individual, the document speaks about indignity of a sinful individual. 
Although the ROC acknowledges that “morally undignified life does not 
ruin God-given dignity ontologically but darkens it so much that dignity 
becomes hardly discernable” (Dignity I.4), it emphasizes the importance of 
repentance in restoring dignity of the human individual. Dignity is thus 
connected to “repentance, which is grounded in the awareness of one’s sin 
and in the desire to change one’s life. A repentant person admits that his 
thoughts, words, or actions are not consonant with God-given dignity and 
acknowledges his indignity before God and the Church […]. For this very 
reason, the patristic thought and the liturgical tradition of the Church refer 
more often to human indignity caused by sin than to human dignity” 
(Dignity I.5).  
In the light of this morally loaded conception, the Church elaborates its 
view on human freedom. Importantly, Orthodox theologians distinguish 
between two different meanings of freedom: freedom of choice and 
freedom from sin. Despite the fact that freedom of choice is meant to be 
“at the service of human well-being,” it should be restricted because 
“exercising it, a person should not harm either himself or those around 
him” (Dignity II.1). Freedom of choice is established by God to achieve 
genuine goodness. However, insofar as no human effort is sufficient to 
achieve this genuine goodness, another freedom – freedom from sin – is 
needed for the realization of freedom of choice. This freedom from sin is 
impossible “without the mysterious unity of man with the transfigured 
nature of Christ that takes place in the Sacrament of Baptism” (Dignity II.1). 
It is only through the divine-human unification in the Ekklesia, i.e. through 
baptism and becoming a member of the Christian (or even more precisely, 
Orthodox) Church, that the human being becomes absolutely free. Since 
“God alone is the source of freedom,” He alone “can maintain it in a 
human being.” Obviously, this condition is not applicable to all inhabitants 
of the planet Earth. Instead, the universal, religiously neutral concept of 
human dignity, which underlies the secular institution of human rights, is 
considered by the ROC as “weak.” This is due to the fact that the universal 
concept of human dignity, while defending freedom of choice, “ignores the 
moral dimension of life and freedom from sin.” According to the Orthodox 
teaching, “the social system should be guided by both freedoms, 
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harmonizing their exercise in the public sphere.” This is obvious from the 
following formula, “Free adherence to goodness and the truth is impossible 
without freedom of choice, just as a free choice loses its value and meaning 
if it is made in favor of evil” (Dignity II.2). 
Therefore, attaining genuine freedom is possible only through 
participating in the divine-human organism of the Church. The synergy of 
the divine and human actions underlies the Orthodox conception of 
individual freedom and human rights. This divine-human synthesis explains 
why the Orthodox Church ascribes such a great significance to collective 
rights in contrast to individual rights. The Church admits that “a Christian 
needs rights, so that in exercising them he may first of all fulfill […] his lofty 
calling to be ‘the likeness of God” and to be able to approach the ideal of 
perfection realized in Christ (Fundamentals IV.7). According to Orthodox 
ethics, individual freedom and human rights are directly connected to the 
idea of servicehood and collective rights. Human rights attain their value in 
a social order that is based on conciliar action (sobornoje sluzhenije). This is 
because “the acknowledgment of individual rights should be balanced with 
the assertion of people’s responsibility before one another […]. However, as 
the spiritual experience of the Church has shown, the tension between 
private and public interests can be overcome only if human rights and 
freedoms are harmonized with moral values and, most importantly, only if 
the life of the individual and society is invigorated by love” (Dignity III.4). 
With this claim, the Orthodox teaching on human rights positions itself 
within a broader conceptual framework that involves typical Orthodox 
concepts of Bogochelovechestvo (Godmanhood) and sobornost’ (conciliarity). 
In addition to the possibility of grounding the conception of human 
rights in the Orthodox theological theory, there is also a possibility of 
politicizing the theological understanding of human rights. The politicized 
interpretation of the Orthodox view on human rights exists in the 
conservative theological circles, for instance, in the works of Vsevolod 
Chaplin. I consider it necessary to elucidate his political-theological position, 
for it provides evidence that a theological message can be radicalized. 
Chaplin commences his contribution ‘An Orthodox View on Human 
Rights’144 by acknowledging that Orthodox Christians “respect individual 
freedom, respect human dignity and rights – thus respect all these values, 
which are engraved into our [i.e. Russian Orthodox] heritage.” He qualifies 
                                               
144 Всеволод Чаплин «Православный взгляд на права человека» // Александр Верховский 
(сост.) Пределы светскости (2005). 
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this claim by asserting that Orthodox Christians estimate other values “no 
less important, and maybe even more important. These values are faith, 
Fatherland, defense of the Fatherland and of our [i.e. Russian Orthodox] 
sacred places.” Accordingly, Chaplin proposes to structure values in a 
hierarchical order, “The private interest, that is individual interest, is for an 
Orthodox Christian usually not higher that the interest of society, that is the 
interest of a church community, the family, the nation, and the people” 
(Chaplin 2005b: 171). If the ROC unambiguously praises collective rights 
over individual rights, but does so relying on the ideal of sobornost’ and 
recognizing the significance of conciliar service and the primordial unity of 
all human beings, Chaplin rather opts for an explicit political connotation of 
collective rights. In his conception, concrete political and social 
constructions, such as the nation and the family, acquire categorical priority 
over the human individual.  
Further, we are confronted with a terrifying implication of the proposed 
hierarchy of values. Chaplin argues that when collective and individual 
interests clash, the priority should be given to the collective interest. To 
corroborate this claim, Chaplin draws the example of Chechnja, “Yes, 
people are dying there, it is bad. It is bad that the military are dying, and it is 
bad that civilians are dying too […]. When any human being is dying, it is 
bad. However, is it so bad that we can sacrifice the territorial integrity of 
Russia and renounce the value of unity of our country? As for me, it is still a 
question.” Relying on “the whole history of human kind, and not only of 
Russia,” Chaplin concludes, “If a society wants to preserve itself, it should 
recognize that there are higher values than human life and human freedom.” 
Accordingly, “it is only through harmonizing private interests with these 
higher values, such as society’s unity and survival, that the society can live 
normal life. If we show preference only to the value of the individual’s life, 
self-expression, and self-realization, the society will disband” (Chaplin 
2005b: 172). Chaplin’s reference to “the whole history of human kind” calls 
into question the scientific soundness of his argument, especially, if we 
mention just two recent examples of world history – Nazi Germany and 
Stalin’s Terror – to remember the disastrous consequences of proclaiming 
other values higher than human life and dignity. Despite these facts, 
Chaplin’s political standpoint is obvious: The value of national unity secures 
society’s survival and hence supersedes the value of human freedom and 
human rights.  
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6.4 The Liberal-Reformative Trend in Russian Orthodoxy 
 
In addition to the fundamentalist and conservative standpoints, there is also 
a liberal view on the relationship between Orthodox Christianity and civil 
society. The underlying question is whether liberal-reformative theologians 
have succeeded to develop an Orthodoxy-based alternative conception of 
civil society. Pursuing this question, I intend to reveal which traditional 
Orthodox concepts have been innovatively used by liberal theologians with 
a view to validating the model of democratic civil society. First, I shall 
investigate which Orthodox ideas inspired the Soviet dissidents to elaborate 
a moral model of society as an alternative to the Soviet one (§ 6.4.1). 
Secondly, I shall consider the dissidents’ critical assessment of the politics of 
the ROC during the Soviet period as opposed to the genuine Christian 
understanding of the Church’s mission (§ 6.4.2). Finally, I shall elucidate the 
attempts by liberal-reformative theologians at invoking an understanding of 
Orthodox Christianity that refutes Orthodoxy-inherent dualism and 
suggests a way of relating religious insights to the topic of civil society (§ 
6.4.3). To conclude this short introduction, I want to emphasize that the 
authors whose texts and interviews I rely on tend to speak about 
Christianity and not specifically about (Russian) Orthodoxy. Indeed, 
although the majority of the liberally-oriented Orthodox intelligentsia have a 
background in Orthodox Christianity, they strive, nevertheless, to 
contribute to the universal, non-denominational Christian discussion. 
 
6.4.1  Dissidents’ Moral Alternative to the Soviet Model of Society 
 
The activities and the writings of the Soviet dissidents can be considered, in 
my view, as the nascent elements of civil society, which emerged before 
Russia’s transition to democracy in 1991. Although the term ‘civil society’ 
did not play a pivotal role in the dissident discourse, in contrast to public 
debate during the perestrojka period, dissidents’ reliance on such concepts as 
individual, inner freedom, conscience, justice, and law-rule state testified to 
their advocacy of  a free, open society, and their refusal of the closed Soviet 
society based on coercion and lies. Dissidents considered the spiritual and 
moral regeneration of Soviet society as the precondition for the emergence 
of open civil society. For that reason, they employed Orthodox theological 
concepts in their discourse. The ensuing question is how these theological 
ideas underpin the dissident apology of open civil society.  
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In the discussion of the Soviet dissident movement, I rely on Philip 
Boobbyer’s extensive and scrupulous research, specifically, on his seminal 
book Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia (2005) and an earlier article 
‘Religious Experiences of the Soviet Dissidents’ (1999). The Soviet dissident 
movement dates back to the late 1960s, when the movement emerged as “a 
response to the authoritarianism of the Brezhnev regime” (Boobbyer 2005: 
2).145 Notwithstanding this clear identification, Boobbyer admits that “the 
Soviet dissidents are not easy to define.” Insofar as the term ‘dissident’ was 
coined by the Soviet authorities to label their opponents and critics, 
dissidents themselves generally disliked this term, preferring “to describe 
themselves as ‘inakomysljashchie,’ literally, ‘people who think differently’ ” 
(Boobbyer 2005: 75). Hence, we can understand under the Soviet dissidents 
a group of people who dared to think alternatively and proclaim their 
thoughts publicly.  
Although Boobbyer concedes that “the aims of the dissidents were 
political in the sense that to expose Soviet injustices always means finally to 
challenge the legitimacy of the Soviet state,” he underscores that dissident 
activists perceived their actions rather in moral than in political terms. 
Insofar as “the moral discourse, embracing terms such as ‘guilt,’ ‘truth,’ and 
‘evil,’ was one of the defiling features of the dissident movement” 
(Boobbyer 1999: 373), the dissident movement can be regarded as “an 
alternative moral and spiritual culture that undermined the Soviet system 
and ideology” (Boobbyer 2005: 1). The powerful dissident rejection of the 
Soviet system as a morally despicable system was encouraged by the idea of 
conscience, which alone can differentiate between good and evil, truth and 
deceit, justice and discrimination. For that reason, the moral dimension of 
the movement was rooted in the fact that all potential dissidents “had to 
undergo a process of self-overcoming in order to participate in the 
movement; they had to conquer their fear” (Boobbyer 2005: 76). Indeed, 
the moment of conquering one’s fear is central to the dissident writings, 
many of which contain prison memoirs or descriptions of certain 
techniques of overcoming fear in the face of a KGB interrogator. By 
overcoming fear, dissidents believed in the strength of conscience and in the 
commitment to truth and justice.  
The dissident critique of the Soviet model of society had an overt moral 
dimension. Boobbyer agrees that “the Soviet project was from its inception 
                                               
145 Leonid Brezhnev performed the function of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union from 1964 until his death in 1982. 
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a moral one; it sought to create a new society on the basis of a radical 
transformation of values” and thereby to propose “a superior moral 
alternative to Western capitalism and liberal democracy” (Boobbyer 2005: 
3). This moral model of the Soviet system needed a moral critique, which 
was provided by the Soviet dissidents. Despite all deep ideological 
differences between the Soviet dissidents, their movement “gained much of 
its unity from its commitment to certain moral ideals,” such as the defense 
of human rights, of people’s right to speak against injustice, and of the 
principle of non-violence (Boobbyer 2005: 2). Accordingly, if the Soviet 
regime maintained itself by recognizing collective rather than individual 
rights, the Soviet dissidents developed an alternative conception of 
unalienable individual rights and human dignity.  
The struggle for this alternative conception triggered, during the 
Brezhnev era, the inception of the so-called ‘human rights movement’. The 
movement comprised secular intellectuals, such as Vladimir Bukhovskij, 
Elena Bonner, and Pëtr Grogorenko, as well as religious thinkers, amongst 
whom Natal’ja Gorbanevskaja, Andrej Sakharov, and Aleksej Dobrovol’skij. 
Boobbyer considers the human rights movement partly as “a response to 
the succession of highly publicized show trials of intellectuals that took 
place from the middle of the 1960s onwards” (Boobbyer 2005: 77). Thus, 
the important milestones in the dissident activity were the trial of the poet 
and later the winner of the Nobel Prize (1987) Iosif Brodskij, who was 
arrested and tried in 1964; the trial of Andrej Sinjavskij and Julija Daniel in 
1966, and the famous ‘trial of the four’ in 1967, in the course of which 
Aleksej Dobrovol’skij, Jurij Galanskov, Vera Lashkova, and Alexander 
Ginzburg were arrested for their involvement in the samizdat literature146 
and consequently, being diagnosed as ‘psychologically insane,’ were 
sentenced to specialized mental hospitals. The history of this trial gained 
publicity through the publication of the book The Trial of the Four, edited by 
Pavel Litvinov (Litvinov 1968). In April 1968, the movement started the 
samizdat publication of the first in the USSR bulletin devoted to the 
advocacy of human rights, A Chronicle of Current Events. Evaluating the 
effectiveness of the human rights movement, Boobbyer acknowledges that, 
on the one hand, the movement “clearly failed” because “by the end of the 
1970s most of the activists were in prison or abroad” (Boobbyer 2005: 93). 
On the other hand, the dissidents have succeeded, according to the 
                                               
146 The term ‘samizdat’ is an abbreviation of Russian ‘publishing house on its own’; it indicates 
the uncensored publishing of the literature forbidden by the Soviet authorities. 
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dissident Alexander Daniel, to “play the game of civil society,” and thereby 
to awake and continuously stimulate the critical awareness of Soviet citizens 
with regard to the state regime. Indeed, if the aim of the human rights 
movement consisted in shaping public opinion and witnessing the 
possibility of free thought, then we can agree with Boobbyer’s assessment 
of the dissident project as “relatively successful.” This is because “human 
rights activists contributed greatly to the Soviet regime’s loss of moral 
legitimacy, and the formation of an alternative moral and civic tradition” 
(Boobbyer 2005: 93).  
Having sketched the general portrait of the Soviet dissident movement, I 
intend now to clarify the difference between the conservative theological 
conception of society, elaborated within the tradition of the official ROC, 
and the conception of civil society developed by the Soviet dissidents who 
aimed to reach beyond both Soviet ideology and the tradition of the ROC. 
Both Orthodox conservative theologians and the Soviet dissidents conceive 
of society in moral-religious terms, juxtaposing it either to the secular 
democratic model or to the Soviet model of society. The major difference 
pertains, however, to the anthropological angle. If the Orthodox theological 
tradition conceives society in terms of the Ekklesia and grounds this 
conception in the idea of sobornost’, or unity of all Orthodox Christians in 
the divine-human organism of the Church, the dissidents found their moral 
conception of society on the idea of individual conscience. Thus, although 
the dissident liberal discourse is genetically connected with the Orthodox 
theological tradition, it reserves certain freedom in interpreting the 
traditional religious-moral concepts.  
This freedom of interpretation was noticed by Boobbyer when he traced 
the intellectual sources of the dissident moral discourse back to the two 
distinct pre-revolutionary traditions. On the one side, the dissident 
discourse extensively uses “the language of Orthodoxy, with its profound 
awareness of ‘good’ and ‘evil,’ and its strong monastic tradition and 
emphasis of the interior life.” On the other side, it also cherishes “the 
secular values of a Russian intelligentsia which drew much of its inspiration 
from the socialist tradition and laid the foundations for the rise of Russian 
Marxism” (Boobbyer 1999: 374). Boobbyer discovers the common ground 
between these two distinct traditions, one belonging to the Russian secular 
intelligentsia and another belonging to Russian Orthodox theology, in the 
fact that “both would declare allegiance to ‘conscience,’ ‘truth,’ ‘justice’ and 
‘freedom,’ even if giving the words different meanings” (Boobbyer 1999: 
385). Despite great differences between the socialist and Christian 
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traditions, the dissident moral discourse combines elements of both 
traditions. As a result, religious and secular arguments are so much 
intertwined in the dissident discourse that it would be, in Boobbyer’s words, 
“absurd to try to separate them.” Characteristically, this amalgamation of 
religious and secular arguments confirms that “some secular moral 
viewpoints have emerged from within a Christian culture and that this 
accounts for similarities of language” (Boobbyer 1999: 385). In my view, 
Boobbyer’s assumption that the dissident ideas on morality and social order 
are deeply entrenched in the religious worldview bears a striking 
resemblance to Taylor’s thesis that the ideas of individual freedom and 
society’s independence from the state and from the Church have 
foundations in Christian ethics, ecclesiology, and anthropology (Taylor: 
1995: 208-12). Therefore, the influence of the Orthodox theological legacy 
on the dissident moral discourse is undeniable. 
What did the dissidents inherit from Orthodoxy? Above all, they took 
over the spiritual tradition of hesychasm. Hesychasm originated in the 
Byzantine monastic circles in the tenth century; it is frequently associated 
with the name of Simeon the New Theologian (949-1022). Later, Gregory 
Palamas systematized hesychasm as a theological doctrine and a mystical 
practice based on silent prayer (1296-1359). In Russia, hesychasm was 
introduced in the fourteenth century by St. Sergij Radonezhskij (1314-92) 
and was further developed by Nil Sorskij (1433-1508). The core of the 
hesychast practice consists in preserving one’s inner spiritual discipline and 
purity of conscience, which will be crowned by “the possibility of 
establishing a direct relationship with God, and a sense of overall purpose 
of life” (Boobbyer 2005: 14). To attain this goal, hesychasts preferred to live 
in solitude rather than in community and focus on “personal piety and the 
possibility of direct access to God” by means of silent continuous repeating 
of Jesus prayer (Boobbyer 2005: 5). For their part, the Soviet dissidents 
eagerly embraced hesychast spirituality but situated it in a different 
hermeneutical context – the context of persecution by the Soviet state. In 
this sense, Boobbyer describes the dissident experience in religious-
psychological terms as ‘desert spirituality.’ Referring to numerous prison 
memoirs of the Soviet dissidents, he argues that dissident desert spirituality 
entails pertinent inner conflict, as it involves permanent hostility on the part 
of the Soviet system (Boobbyer 1999: 374, 386). Desert spirituality is a result 
of constant inner struggle to preserve one’s inner freedom and integrity in 
the face of the system’s pressure to conform.  
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In this connection, Boobbyer’s remark concerning the ‘ecumenical’ 
character of dissident spirituality is especially revealing. Although the 
majority of the dissidents locked up in the Soviet prisons or labor camps 
were baptized Orthodox Christians, some of them had a Jewish, Roman-
Catholic, or secular background. The versatility of their religious 
backgrounds did not preclude the dissidents from a shared religious 
experience.147 Boobbyer comments, “In these years, spirituality was 
sometimes universalized and secularized to the extent that it was not linked 
with to particular traditions at all” (Boobbyer 2005: 106). The unifying 
element of dissident spirituality was their inner struggle against fear; 
accordingly, it was this individual inner experience that induced the 
dissidents to discover their religious faith. Indeed, the dissident struggle to 
preserve one’s individual integrity in the face of a KGB interrogator and 
follow one’s conscience required an enormous inner discipline, strength, 
and concentration, which are precisely the virtues central to the spiritual-
ascetic tradition of hesychasm.  
 
6.4.2 The Orthodox Dissidents and the ROC: The Ecclesiastical Crisis 
 
A significant group of the Soviet dissident intelligentsia went further than 
rediscovering the tradition of hesychasm. They received baptism by the 
ROC and became conscious and believing Orthodox Christians.148 
Pertaining to this specific group, we can speak about the establishment of 
the Orthodox dissident movement. In general, the Orthodox dissidents 
intended to invoke an individualistic religious understanding of secular 
politics, society, and ethics by means of self-analysis. Given this intention, it 
is interesting to investigate what kind of relations emerged between the 
Orthodox dissident intelligentsia and the institute of the ROC. As I have 
indicated in the historical overview (§ 6.1.1), Orthodox believers, as well as 
many alternatively thinking Soviet citizens, were persecuted by the Soviet 
authorities in the decades preceding World War II. The whole body of the 
ROC, embracing the clergy, monks, and parishioners, suffered great losses 
until September 1943 when Stalin’s religious policy abruptly changed. Stalin 
                                               
147 The evidence of such a shared religious experience of dessert spirituality can be found in the 
dissident memoirs, thoroughly studied by Boobbyer: such as Tat’jana Goricheva’s Talking about 
God is Dangerous (1984), the memoirs of Zoja Krakhmal’nikova and Grigorij Pomeranst. 
148 This group of consciously baptized Orthodox dissidents of the Soviet epoch is to be 
distinguished from the group of nominal self-identified Orthodox Christians that emerged during 
the period of post-Soviet religious renaissance. 
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promised to stop the persecution of religious believers but required 
institutional and ideological control over the ROC. The question of the 
Church’s loyalty to the Soviet state became then crucial for the majority of 
the Orthodox dissidents. Criticizing the conformist position of the ROC, 
the Orthodox dissidents refused to comply with the Soviet state. As 
Boobbyer clarifies, insofar as “the compromises that the Church made with 
the regime were exactly the ones which the dissidents would not approve 
of,” their “refusal to conform and the price paid as a result made it difficult 
for dissidents to come to terms with the Russian Orthodox establishment. 
The Moscow Patriarchate never accepted or defended the dissident 
movement, and it was very difficult for there to be a real dialog” (Boobbyer 
1999: 387).  
Disagreeing with the official position of the ROC, the Orthodox 
dissidents elaborated their own position with regard to the questions related 
to social ethics, individual morality, and citizenship. Until now, the official 
ecclesiastical conservatism and the dissident religious liberalism continue to 
collide, as they have obviously different cultural-intellectual orientations. 
Despite the fact that both conservative theologians and dissident 
intellectuals ground their worldviews in the concept of Godmanhood, they 
diverge as far as the application of this concept is concerned. If 
conservatives insist on the Church’s exclusive function as a “divine-human 
organism” (Fundamentals I.2) and refute modernization associating it with 
the process of unrelenting secularization, the Orthodox dissidents, on the 
contrary, emphasize the human aspect in the teaching of Godmanhood and 
confirm their beliefs with the examples from Russian literature. Even after 
the collapse of the Soviet system, the divergence between the conservative-
conformist standpoint of the official Church and the profoundly moral non-
conformist dissident discourse manifests itself, as Boobbyer argues, in that 
the ROC still remains “divided from a community which had much to offer 
at a spiritual level” (Boobbyer 1999: 387).  
During the Soviet post-war period, the parish of father Alexander Men’ 
(1935-90) became one of the centers of the Orthodox dissident 
intelligentsia.149 Men’ was a reformative priest of the ROC and an influential 
spiritual counselor. Although I cannot reckon his contributions scholarly in 
a strict sense, I consider his writings, sermons, and activity as the sprouts of 
                                               
149 Although Men’ was brought up with Orthodox faith, actively participating in a local parish, he 
nevertheless pursued a secular carrier by studying biology at a state institute. Because of his 
religious views, he was expelled from the institute and decided to be ordained as an Orthodox 
priest in 1960, exactly during the period of fierce psychological terror aimed against the ROC. 
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civil society in late Soviet Russia. Men’ attempted at revising Orthodox 
theology from a humanistic perspective. He believed that the individual’s 
calling consists in the discovering and realizing one’s individual 
uniqueness.150 Being an Orthodox priest and father confessor, Men’ was 
confronted with the unrelenting dilemma: How to combine his belief in 
freedom of individual conscience with the required obedience to church 
authorities? How to preserve such values as individual freedom and human 
dignity in the face of the imposed priority of collective rights and the 
importance of the so-called common good of the Soviet people? Copying 
with this dilemma, Men’ explicitly exalted in his essays and sermons, 
especially in the volume A Difficult Path to the Dialog,151 the values of 
democracy, mutual respect, and tolerance as the highest achievements of 
Christian civilization. At the same time, he criticized the alliance between 
political dictatorship and undifferentiated mass. 
The well-known Orthodox priest and intellectual Vsevolod Shpiller 
(1902-84) undertook a comparable attempt at rediscovering, in Orthodox 
Christianity, spiritual sources for the dissident resistance against the 
totalitarian Soviet system. During the 1950s, he managed to build up a 
strong, dedicated parish community, which comprised the contemporary 
reformative intelligentsia. Consequently, Shpiller remained the spiritual 
counselor at the parish of the Church of St. Nikolaj in Kuznetsy until his 
death in 1984. Boobbyer astutely notices, “Shpiller sowed reform from 
within, and was anxious to avoid any possibility of schism within the 
Church” (Boobbyer 2005: 110). Being a moderate reformer, Shpiller 
proclaimed the ideals of “long-suffering and patience” as the cardinal 
virtues appropriate for the difficult situation, in which Orthodox believers 
had to survive under the anti-religious Soviet regime, and considered 
compromise with the regime necessary “to ensure the survival of the 
Church.” Insofar as Shpiller embraced the ascetic ideal of “a sacramental 
withdrawal” from the world, his “approach to some extent reflected the 
prevailing survival strategy of the Orthodox Church; in the context of 
Soviet oppression otherworldliness was the only option” (Boobbyer 111-
12).  
If Men’ and Shpiller remained primarily reformative theologians and 
pastors, some Orthodox priests were determined to oppose the Soviet 
                                               
150 This belief underlies his eminent book The Son of Man where Men’ interprets Jesus’ life story 
from a humanistic-liberal perspective. 
151 Александр Мень, Трудный путь к диалогу. Сборник (1992). 
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regime more directly. Thus, the priest Gleb Jakunin (b. 1934) uttered his 
protest by writing, together with Nikolaj Eshliman, an open letter to 
Patriarch Aleksij I (Simanskij) on 13 December 1965. The authors of the 
letter criticized the ROC for allowing the Soviet state to subjugate the rights 
of religious believers and demanded the cessation of state control over 
religious life. Despite being persecuted by the Moscow Patriarchate and the 
Soviet authorities, Jakunin managed to publish, during the 1960-70s, a great 
deal of material that provided evidence of the widespread suppression of 
religious freedom in the USSR. Besides, Jakunin was one of the spiritual 
inspirers and participants of the abovementioned ‘human rights movement.’ 
Amongst others, he baptized the dissident Aleksej Dodrovol’skij, who was 
tried in 1967. Finally, after continuous arrests and banishment in the 1980s, 
Jakunin was rehabilitated; he functioned, between 1993 and 1995, as a State 
Duma deputy. In contrast to his political image, Jakunin’s ecclesiastical 
carrier was not as easy to be rehabilitated. The Moscow Patriarchate 
deprived him of priesthood in 1993 and excommunicated him from the 
ROC four years later. Since then, Jakunin joined the Independent Ukrainian 
Church, which was established after the collapse of the USSR under the 
jurisdiction of the Catholic Patriarchate of Constantinople. Nowadays, he is 
still active as a human rights advocate and a reformative theologian. Much 
of Jakunin’s revealing critique is summarized in the eloquently titled book 
The Genuine Face of the Moscow Patriarchate, published in 2000.152 The central 
point of his critique concerns the history of the ROC in the twentieth 
century. Jakunin criticizes Patriarch Sergij (Stragorodskij) for his allegedly 
non-canonical usurpation of the Patriarch’s title in 1927 and denounces the 
cooperation of the hierarchs of the ROC with the KGB structures after 
Stalin’s ‘rehabilitation’ of the Church in 1943 (Jakunin 2000).  
In addition to engaging in politics and criticizing church policy, 
Orthodox dissident intellectuals expressed their protest against Soviet 
suppression of religious freedom by publicizing critical essays. A collection 
of such critical accounts is presented in the famous volume From under the 
Rubble, edited by Alexander Solzhenitsyn. The first original exemplar 
appeared in Russian in Paris in 1974, followed by an English translation in 
1975. With this publication, Solzhenitsyn intended to reestablish the pre-
revolutionary tradition of Landmarks (Vekhi), instigated in 1909 by the 
eminent Russian religious philosophers Nikolaj Berdjaev, Sergej Bulgakov, 
                                               
152 Глеб Якунин, Подлинный лик Московской Патриархии (2000). Internet publication, last visited 
on 28 July 2010. 
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and Semën Frank.153 In the introduction to the dissidents’ volume From 
under the Rubble, Mac Hayward correctly argues, “By modeling their 
collection of essays on Landmarks, Solzhenitsyn and his associates 
demonstrate their conviction that in order to talk meaningfully about 
present-day Russia it is essential to cross back over the intellectual void of 
the last sixty years and resume a tradition in Russia though which is 
antithetical to the predominant one of the old revolutionary intelligentsia, 
particularly as it developed in the second half of the nineteenth century” 
(Solzhenitsyn 1975: vii).  
Evgenij Barabanov’s contribution ‘The Schism between the Church and 
the World’ analyzes the relationship that emerged between the Orthodox 
dissident intelligentsia and the institute of the ROC. Analyzing the 
ecclesiastical crisis of the ROC during the Soviet period, Barabanov regrets 
the actual reduction of the Church to a kind of “liturgical department” of 
the Soviet administration system and criticizes “all the participants of the 
‘rite,’ the hierarchs, the priests depending of them, and laymen” for being 
“reconciled to their dependence.” Being reduced to a “place for the 
performance of the rite of a religious community,” the Church betrays its 
universality, otherworldliness, and spirituality (Barabanov 1975: 173). 
Searching for the causes of “this “manifest and indubitable 
submissiveness of the Church to the state,” Barabanov wonders why the 
ROC considers either joining the system or going underground as the only 
possibilities to survive the totalitarian regime. By choosing between these 
alternatives, it avoids “what would seem to be fully lawful and natural path – 
a legal and open demand of the rights, which are indispensable for the 
normal existence of the Church” (Barabanov 1975: 173, 177). Amongst 
other explanations, the scholar relates the institutional malaise of the ROC 
to the pervasive influence of the symphonia doctrine on ecclesiastical life in 
Orthodox Christianity. In the context of the Byzantine Empire, the borders 
of the Empire coincided with the borders of the Byzantine Church; hence, 
the ecclesiastical community, the divine-human organism of the Church, 
was substituted by the political community embracing the citizens of the 
Empire.154 However, in contradistinction to the amiable attitude of the 
Byzantine Empire, the Soviet state assumed a hostile position with regard to 
the ROC and wanted to suppress the Church. 
                                               
153 Landmarks had only one sequel. A second volume under the title De Profundis appeared in 
1918, after having passed the strict Bolshevik censorship. The nascent tradition of critical essays 
was thus interrupted by the philosophers’ dispersion in emigration. 
154 The symphonia doctrine was addressed in § 4.2.1 and in § 6.3.2. 
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For his part, Barabanov rightly considers the historicist critique of the 
treacherous unity between the Byzantine state and the Orthodox Church 
insufficient to explain the ecclesiastical crisis of the ROC during the Soviet 
period. With that, he identifies the underlying cause of the diagnosed crisis 
in the “conformist inertia” of his contemporary ecclesiastical intelligentsia 
(Barabanov 1975: 177). Barabanov explains, “People who know 
ecclesiastical life well are usually less optimistic”: Scarred by the dilemmas of 
the state-church compromise, they are “inclined to think that the Church 
will only be able to have an impact on society if society itself grows 
sufficiently free and democratic to liberate the Church from the political 
fetters imposed by the state” (Barabanov 1975: 173-74). Employing typical 
dissident concepts, Barabanov defines the critical situation in which the 
ROC functions in the Soviet system as the crisis of “ecclesiastical 
conscience.” He argues that the conformist inertia of the Orthodox 
intelligentsia and clergy has much to do with the distinctively Orthodox 
attitude to the world in general and to the Soviet system in particular 
(Barabanov 1975: 179). Presumably, Barabanov refers to the dualism of the 
Orthodox worldview. 
It is in the Orthodox rejection of the world that Barabanov finds “the 
origins of the radical division of Christian life into two independent spheres, 
the ecclesiastical and the sociohistorical,” asserting that “the Christian world 
has lived in this duality not so much in terms of its dogma as 
psychologically.” As a result of the schism between the Church and the 
world, there emerged a great temptation of ‘simplifying’ Christianity, i.e. of 
“reducing it from being a teaching about the new life to a mere caring for 
the salvation of one’s own soul.” Insofar as Christian salvation was often 
conceived in terms of flight from the world into the sphere of mystical 
reunion with God, “this gave rise to contempt of the flesh, the belittling of 
man’s creative nature and, consequently, a special religious individualism.” 
Indeed, as we have concluded from the analysis of the social doctrine of the 
ROC, Orthodox theology tends to overemphasize individual pursuit of 
salvation, devaluating at the same time the importance of working in the 
world and transforming the world. To the extent that the Church becomes 
increasingly preoccupied with its soteriological self-identification, it tends to 
devaluate “the earthly aspect of life” and consider the whole structure of 
social relations as “empty and immune to the influence of the truth” 
(Barabanov 1975: 181-82).  
In contrast to this traditional view, Barabanov argues that the withdrawal 
of the ROC from worldly problems is not what Orthodox Christianity 
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actually propagates. Acknowledging that Christianity constantly struggles to 
reconcile two opposite tendencies, namely active participation in the world’s 
transformation and renunciation of its temptations, Barabanov undertakes 
to reinvoke the significance of Christians’ active participation. He reminds 
that Orthodoxy has found the solution to the schism separating the Church 
and the world in “its spiritual breakthrough to the eternal Divine Light, the 
contemplation of that Light and the union with it of the whole human 
being” (Barabanov 1975: 182). Obviously, Barabanov’s conception of the 
Light as a penetrating and reinvigorating force in the process of world’s 
transformation testifies to his affinity with the monastic tradition of 
hesychasm, which was for many Soviet dissidents a vital source of 
inspiration. The ascetic practice of hesychasm is rewarded by the 
Eucharistic mystery, when “God and man meet in the most intimate and 
unsunderable way.” During the Eucharist, “in the incomparable joy of 
man’s union with the absolute Reality, the God-man Jesus Christ, everything 
is filled with unutterable light and exultation” (Barabanov 1975: 183). 
At the same time, Barabanov is aware that this mystical reunion with 
God entails a danger of total withdrawal from the world. He comments, “In 
the contemplation of the Light it is very easy to forget the world and its 
eternal movement” (Barabanov 1975: 184). Consequently, “contemplating 
the divine energies, which permeate the created world, he (i.e. an Orthodox 
Christian) lives in tune with the one and indivisible all-embracing cosmic 
mystery, in which there is no room for transformations and personal 
initiative” (Barabanov 1975: 184-86). That is the reason, the scholar 
concludes, why the Orthodox attitude to the world is so much determined 
by the distinction between the cosmos and history, between the mystique of 
the Heavenly Kingdom and the profanity of the earthly political-social 
order. On this view, Barabanov asserts that the sense of a tragic schism 
between the Church and the world permeates Christian conscience in 
general and Orthodox Christianity in particular. This dualism also underlies 
the spiritual crisis of Soviet citizens. In the context of Soviet suppression of 
religious freedom, “the most surprising fact in modern spiritual life must be 
considered our indifference” toward the thirst for the true Light (Barabanov 
1975: 187). 
Criticizing “stagnant Christianity” of Soviet citizens, Barabanov insists 
that true Christianity is not about keeping everything sacralized, 
“unshakable and incontrovertible till the end of time,” but rather about 
“spiritual initiative and daring” (Barabanov 1975: 186). For that reason, he 
denounces the traditional Christian rejection of the world and encourages 
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Christians’ creative participation in the world, relying on the Evangelical 
plea “not to judge, but to save the world.” Once Barabanov has established 
the necessity of individual Christian activity, the question arises how the 
Church responds to these “creative rhythms” (Barabanov 1975: 189). It is in 
the answer to this question that the ROC and of the Orthodox dissidents 
most radically diverge. 
Barabanov provides an interesting insight that the Church’s hostile 
attitude to modernization, as well as to “all the ‘modernism,’ all the 
‘adaptation’ introduced by the Church, is in reality nothing other than 
manifestations of its profound bondage to secular culture” (Barabanov 1975: 189). 
The scholar recognizes that the Church does not adapt to Soviet militant 
secularism voluntarily; this adaptation occurs after a long siege of scientific 
rationalism, state atheism, totalitarian regimes, or the establishment of 
general material prosperity and comfort. As “the Church turns to be 
defenseless against hostile pressures,” it eventually “closes up in itself, 
hoping to wait out the siege, then suddenly revolts and hurls anathemas, but 
ends up by trying to speak in that alien language imposed from outside,” i.e. 
the secular language of secular modernity (Barabanov 1975: 190). In result, 
the Church tries to find a balance between its traditional theological 
semantics and the language of modernity. Indeed, as we have seen, an 
attempt at such a balance has been undertaken in the social doctrine of the 
ROC. 
Nonetheless, Barabanov considers the dilemma between ecclesiastical 
conservatism and secular modernism not as important as the task of all 
Christians to contribute to the world’s transformation. For that reason, the 
scholar calls upon his contemporary readers to exert the religious will within 
themselves and “begin by prophesying inside the Church about the genuine 
foundations for hope offered by Christianity, and not by restoring nor 
modernizing things that amount merely to historical or cultural 
incrustations.” In essence, Christians should speak “about what is beyond 
modernism and conservatism alike, of what is eternally living and absolute 
in this world of the relative, of what is simultaneously both eternally old and 
eternally young” (Barabanov 1975: 192). Being an assembly (sobor) of such 
openly speaking and actively engaged Christians, the ROC can become in its 
struggle with the spiritless and antihuman Soviet system “an effective force 
that is capable of opposing mendacious ideological bureaucratism with 
genuine spiritual values” (Barabanov 1975: 173). In the end, Barabanov is 
deeply convinced that Christianity is the “affirmation of an absolute truth 
about man and human society.” Insofar as Christianity warrants “the 
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exceptional value of man, the value of his life and what he creates,” it 
should be also an indispensable element in any attempt at construing an 
ideal social-political order (Barabanov 1975: 174). 
 
6.4.3 Christian Politics and the Spiritual Economy of Civil Society  
 
The liberal-reformative trend in Russian Orthodoxy is versatile. It unites a 
wide range of intellectuals over a considerable span of time. I chose to 
analyze this trend by addressing the ideas of three outstanding Orthodox 
thinkers: the priest Mikhail Chel’tsov (1870-1931), the contemporary 
theologian and father-superior Veniamin Novik (1946-2010), and the 
contemporary Orthodox historian and philosopher Evgenij Rashkovskij 
(born 1940). Despite the fact that these intellectuals belong to different 
generations, they share a common goal, namely the goal to revise, from a 
liberal humanistic perspective, the relationship between Christian politics 
and civil society. Thereby, they aim to overcome theocentric dualism of 
conservative Orthodox theology. In this regard, they also agree with the 
Soviet religious dissidents in emphasizing the significance of individual 
conscience in building up an open, human, and just society. 
Chel’tsov’s life path is noteworthy. He was persecuted by the Soviet 
regime during the 1920s and was executed in 1931. Chel’tsov described his 
memories in the impressive A Dead Man’s Memoirs about the Past. Before 
these turbulent years, he was an active liberal priest in pre-revolutionary 
Russia. In 1906, when public life was recovering from the tragic event of the 
Bloody Sunday of 9 (22) January 1905, Chel’tsov published the essay 
‘Christianity and Politics,’ where he criticized the withdrawal of the ROC 
from the sphere of politics..155 This theological essay was extremely needed 
at the time when, with the establishment of the State Duma, the sprouts of 
constitutional monarchy began to rise. At the same time, the essay coincided 
with the time when the tsar government discredited itself by suppressing the 
civil demonstration on the Bloody Sunday and by Russia’s defeat in the war 
with Japan in 1904-5. These developments invigorated public debate, and 
encouraged the ROC to articulate its view. Vladimir Fëdorov rightly 
observes in his historical study The Russian Orthodox Church and the State. The 
                                               
155 Михаил Чельцов, «Христианство и политика», переиздание // Журнал Московской 
Патриархии. Interestingly, Chel’tsov’s essay was republished in 1994, in the Journal of the 
Moscow Patriarchate. 
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Synodal Period (1700-1917)156 that, in contrast to the Soviet period, the 
theological discussion in pre-revolutionary Russia was intense. The 
Orthodox clergy, represented in the State Duma, exerted influence on legal 
and moral aspects of Russian politics, the intelligentsia assembled in famous 
religious-philosophical associations, and the ROC was preparing the Local 
Church Council of 1917-18 (Fëdorov 2003: 248-73).157  
Chel’tsov engaged in the contemporary political debate arguing that 
progressive and humane politics needs to have foundations in Christian 
principles. To substantiate his argument, Chel’tsov distinguishes between 
two conceptions of politics: a normative conception of politics as “a 
universal, progressive endeavor” and a conception of politics as “a party 
business based on self-interest” (Chel’tsov 1994: 54). In his view, only 
normative politics treats citizens according to the principles of Christian 
anthropology because it treats human individual as “a spiritual person,” 
imbued with morality and immortal soul, and thus as a free autonomous 
citizen, imbued with inalienable human rights. On the other hand, interest-
based politics regards citizens as mere instruments for achieving its party 
interests, ensuing from a de-spiritualized understanding of human 
individual. Interest-based politics sees human individual as “a temporary 
and contingent phenomenon,” fully belonging to the earthly world. Given 
this difference between the two conceptions of politics, Chel’tsov concludes 
that political endeavor is not at all alien to Christianity, and, even stronger, 
Christianity is called to christianize politics (Chel’tsov 1994: 55). Later, in 
Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, this claim would be shared by many 
Orthodox liberal intellectuals who agree with Chel’tsov that the genuine 
task of Christianity consists exactly in christianization of politics, and not in 
politicization of Christianity.158 
The claim that christianization of politics constitutes the primary task of 
the Church requires a correct understanding of the essence of Christianity. 
Similar to the dissidents, Chel’tsov refutes intrinsic dualism that underlies 
the Orthodox attitude to politics, because the “macabre, falsely ascetic 
worldview” renders Christianity not “a religion of life and men, but a 
religion of death and some human shadows,” existent “beyond life and 
                                               
156 Владимир Фёдоров, Русская Православная Церковь и Государство. Синодальный период (1700-
1917) (2003). 
157 The reinvigoration of public and ecclesiastical life in late imperial Russia was discussed in § 
4.2.3. 
158 The consequences of politicization of Russian Orthodoxy were depicted in relation to the 
phenomenon of Orthodox fundamentalism (6.2). 
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consequently beyond politics” (Chel’tsov 1994: 56). Interestingly enough, 
Chel’tsov noticed that in the pre-revolutionary theological renaissance, this 
falsely ascetic trend in Russian Orthodoxy was losing its firm ground and 
adherents. On the contrary, to the extent that this trend was diminishing, a 
fresh view on the essence of Christianity was engaging the minds of his 
contemporaries. Obviously, Chel’tsov pointed at the renaissance of religious 
philosophy in pre-revolutionary Russia and later in the circles of the émigré 
Diaspora. These pre-revolutionary intellectuals, who were also closely 
affiliated with the ROC, perceived the ascetic and world-fleeing tendency in 
Russian Orthodoxy as the upshot of the Synodal period. Pointing at the 
two-century-long subjugation of the Church by the state, Chel’tsov clarifies 
to his contemporaries that “the penetration of politics by Christianity seems 
to some of us strange because we grew unfamiliar with a truly Christian life. 
For us, Christianity and life are two separate entities: Christianity is usually 
conceived as certain comfort, as something superfluous for us, needed only 
by clergy and monks, as well as by very few lay men and only during church 
services.” The gap between ecclesiastical and political life during the 
Synodal period affected also the sphere of politics. Politics started to need 
Christianity “only in the capacity of a kind, obliging, meek, but helpful in 
difficult minutes of life maidservant. Doubtlessly, releasing Christianity 
from such obligations is, in the eyes of political rulers, both inconvenient 
and undesirable” (Chel’tsov 1994: 61). 
However, Chel’tsov maintains that the liberation of the Church from its 
ritualistic role is required by the logic of Christian faith because the essence 
of Christianity consists in the propagation and realization of the Kingdom 
of God in the earthy life. Conceived in this way, Christianity becomes 
closely involved into socio-political life, directing interhuman relations 
towards the realization of the Kingdom of God on earth (Chel’tsov 1994: 
59). Accordingly, Chel’tsov is convinced that “a Christian state needs 
Christian politics” because Christianity should enlighten politics by guiding 
politicians in fulfilling their tasks and by reminding them of the inalienable 
value of human being (Chel’tsov 1994: 61). As a genuine theologian, 
Chel’tsov describes the relationship between politics and Christianity 
employing elegant terms of apothatic theology:  
Christianity is above all things on earth, but not beyond them. It does not 
intervene with anything but does not allow anything to be non-Christian 
either; it does not politicize but presumes Christian politics; it does not 
engage in politics but guides, enlightens, and evaluates politics; it does not 
divide into parties but strives to unite all parties in view of common service 
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to the good of the people and the state. Hence, it does not become secular 
but imbues the secular with the Divine, assisting and guiding each 
individual, as well as the whole nation to grow in perfection (Chel’tsov 1994: 
62).   
The inner interconnectedness of Christianity and humane politics 
continues to inspire contemporary Russian theologians and ecclesiastical 
intellectuals today. Thus, Veniamin Novik in his seminal book Orthodoxy, 
Christianity, Democracy159 demonstrates that Christianity is compatible with 
the democratic values of brotherhood, liberty, and equality. In his view, the 
merit of Christianity consists in emphasizing not only the value of vertical 
hierarchical subordination of men to the structure of the state, but also the 
value of men’s brotherly communication. In this sense, Christianity 
“revealed for the first time in history the importance of human relations on 
a horizontal scale” (Novik 1999: 266). Extolling the triumph of inner truth 
over any external establishment, Christianity protested against the socio-
political hierarchies that had been traditionally legitimated by ancient pagan 
religions. Insofar as Christianity combined in itself the two natures of 
Christ, the divine and the human, it was able to overcome the stagnant 
monophysitism of ancient pagan religions and break through with the 
established trend of depersonalization, i.e. systematic devaluation of the 
principle of human individuality, prevalent in pre-Christian societies (Novik 
1999: 263-64). Concisely, Christianity asserted the value of human being as 
absolute and the value of social-political establishments and institutions as 
temporal and thus subordinate to the value of human being.  
As far as democratic politics in contemporary Russia is concerned, 
Novik insists on the separation between state and Church. This is because 
the state is authorized to use violence, whereas the Church is essentially a 
non-violent organization. Nonetheless, he believes that in contemporary 
Russia the democratic state and society can contribute substantially from the 
religious and spiritual experience of the Church. Specifically, Novik suggests 
to see democracy “as a secular-social projection” of the Orthodox ideal of 
sobornost’, which entails a minimalist democratic state and a free horizontally 
structured civil society (Novik 1999: 277). Novik denounces the 
sacralization and absolutization of the state because no single individual, or 
a group of individuals, should be given unrestricted authority, as nobody 
can claim one’s moral perfection after the fall. The primary function of the 
state consists in “controlling that people fulfill not the ethical maximum, 
                                               
159 Вениамин Новик, Православие, Христианство, Демократия (1999). 
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rather the ethical minimum” (Novik 1999: 299). Employing theological 
terminology, Novik speaks of “the social apothatism essential to 
democracy” when he depicts democracy as constituted by “conscious self-
restriction of powerful functions of the state for the sake of individual 
freedom given to us by God” (Novik 1999: 294). Consequently, in 
contradistinction to totalitarianism, democracy “does not aspire to merge 
with the entire fullness of life. However, it is also inseparable from society, 
which is unable to exist without a system at all” (Novik 1999: 297). Hence, 
the relationship between the state and civil society in a Christian democracy 
should resemble the relationship between the three Persons of the Holy 
Trinity: Their relationship should be guided by the theological principle of 
‘non-unification and non-separation’ (neslijannost’ i nerazdel’nost’).   
Another remarkable attempt at invoking a religious understanding of the 
idea and the reality of civil society has been undertaken by Evgenij 
Rashkovskij. In his insightful article ‘Civil Society: A Religious Assessment 
of the Problem,’ the scholar seeks to provide “an interpretation of the 
immutable and elusive presence of spiritual reality in what appears to be an 
especially earthbound problem, that of civil society” (Rashkovskij 2004: 
113). Thereby, Rashkovskij unambiguously asserts the interconnectedness 
of the “spiritual” with the “earthbound” in civil society discourse. He claims 
that the modern idea of civil society has three religious sources: the 
Catholic, Protestant, and secular liberal-emancipatory tradition. In his 
opinion, the three religious sources “reflect and also partly share three 
fundamental ideas,” which cannot be founded empirically or scientifically, 
but “are accepted primarily by intuition, or on faith” and thus are “objects 
of faith.” Among these “axiomatic presumptions,” Rashkovskij stipulates 
the presence of an immanent mind in the world, the presence of an 
immanent solidarity in society, and the presence of an immanent autonomy 
in man (Rashkovskij 2004: 114-15). If people lose faith in these axiomatic 
presumptions, their life will be distorted by a lack of communication, 
alienation from each other, and aggressive non-acceptance. On this view, 
Rashkovskij retains the thesis that “a moment of faith is inalienably present 
in the spiritual economy of civil society” (Rashkovskij 2004: 116). 
Founded on the three axiomatic presumptions – the immanent mind, 
solidarity, and individual autonomy – civil society is able to resolve “within 
itself the conflict between the social-cultural trends of individualization and 
collectivism, which are immanent to any developed society.” With that, 
Rashkovskij recognizes that a peaceful resolution of the conflict requires, 
nonetheless, “a certain schooling of soul” (Rashkovskij 2004: 126). 
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Rashkovskij’s concept of schooling of soul bears a resemblance to Weber’s 
inner-worldly asceticism, which is characterized by the superior feeling of 
responsibility and self-discipline. On Rashkovskij’s account, the 
establishment of civil society requires not only clarification, 
institutionalization, and optimization of individual-collective interests and 
antagonisms, but also, even more importantly, the unrestricted and 
conscious enhancement of one’s spiritual experience, and maturation in 
one’s religious freedom. On this view, Orthodox liberal intellectuals share 
one core assumption: They consider individual activism, inspired by 
individual conscience and spirituality, as one of the crucial preconditions for 
the establishment and further development of civil society.  
The spiritual economy of civil society, as proposed by Rashkovskij, 
warrants individual right to spiritual freedom. Applied to civil society theory, 
spiritual freedom can be interpreted as freedom from danger of spiritual 
alienation of individuals. In this sense, Rashkovskij provokingly rejects the 
traditional liberal foundation of the normative idea of civil society on the 
principle of individual rights and individual freedom. He claims, on the 
contrary, that civil society is ultimately aimed at overcoming socio-cultural 
estrangement and alienation, since the “development of society means 
absorption of the person in a multitude of inalienable or chosen socio-
cultural connections.” Thus, civil society theory should take into account 
“the human need for socio-cultural and spiritual self-determination.” 
Ideally, civil society provides “an external guarantee for the positive 
freedom of the person’s spiritual self-realization in communication with 
others” (Rashkovskij 2004: 116-17).  
 
Conclusion 
 
The present chapter revealed the significance of the factor ‘Orthodoxy’ for 
the establishment of civil society in Russia. It dealt with the question 
whether Orthodox Christianity is able to provide a substantive alternative 
conception of civil society and thereby contribute to Russia’s democratic 
project. This question was addressed from two distinct perspectives. The 
sociological, or functionalistic, perspective yielded a revised portrait of the 
ROC by discussing the context in which the ROC functions nowadays, 
namely the context of secular democracy. The theological, or essentialistic, 
perspective provided insight into internal discourse of the Russian 
Orthodox tradition by showing how Russian Orthodoxy accommodates the 
concept and the established reality of secular democracy and civil society. 
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The factor ‘Orthodoxy’ became relevant for public life in post-Soviet 
Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the retreat of the 
Communist Party from the ideological pedestal. It was during the perestrojka 
period that religion was finally granted more freedom by the Gorbachëv 
administration. At the same time, Russian society was confronted with an 
urgent quest for a new national-cultural identity, a new ideology, and a new 
set of values. Insofar as the ROC provided a powerful and coherent answer 
to this quest, it assumed a pronounced civil position in public life. As we 
can conclude from the above analysis, such a quick transition of the ROC 
was largely determined by three important factors: the traumatic experience 
of the Soviet regime, the Church’s influence on religious policy of the 
emergent democratic state, and the growing number of self-identified 
Russian Orthodox Christians.  
The experience of Soviet persecution enhanced the image of the Church 
as a martyr because believing citizens courageously defended their right to 
religious freedom. Consequently, during the religious renaissance of the 
early 1990s, the ROC reemerged, mostly in the eyes of the newly converted 
Orthodox Russians, as an institution to be trusted and obeyed. A high moral 
appeal of the national Church stimulated a new trend of mass ‘in-churching’ 
(votserkovlenije) attracting young, intelligent, and motivated Christians. It was 
the ‘in-churching’ of the nascent middle class that changed the social 
constitution of the ROC. Importantly, different social-economic, 
professional, and political-ideological backgrounds of the young Orthodox 
neophytes contributed to the internal heterogeneity within the ROC and to 
a plurality of social doctrines within the Orthodox tradition. Thus, the 
sociological portrait of the ROC of the post-Soviet period can be 
characterized by a plurality of ideological standpoints existing within the 
ROC itself. Accordingly, when analyzing the civil significance of Orthodox 
Christianity in post-Soviet Russia, we should distinguish the official position 
of the Moscow Patriarchate from the fundamentalist trend, as well as from 
the liberal stance defended by nonconformist clergy and alternatively 
thinking laity.  
At the same time, while playing a pivotal role in the cultural, moral, and 
religious renaissance of Russian society, the ROC managed to acquire a 
significant political weight and exert influence on relevant issues in the field 
of religious policy and legislation. As a result, the ROC gained a privileged 
status in the Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993) and subsequent laws 
concerning religious organizations; it became thus one of the influential 
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participants in the evolving relations between political, corporate, and civil 
interests. 
Subsequently, the moral and ideological influence of the ROC on the 
public opinion was wisely used by the Putin administration. Certain 
Orthodoxy-based ideas of political conservatism corresponded to Putin’s 
politics of stability, centralization, and national security. The Orthodoxy-
draped image of the new president also served as a bonus in the struggle for 
the electorate. Thus, in the early 2000s, one could speak of a reemerging 
symphonia between state and Church. However, such an alliance was short-
lived: After the state’s ideological support of the ROC reached its summit in 
2002, the symphonic cooperation between state and Church has been 
cooling down ever since.  
Most importantly, the alliance between political and ecclesiastical powers, 
which both proclaimed society’s consolidation and the restoration of 
conservative values as their priorities, revealed the following characteristic 
tendencies in their strategic relationship. As for the Russian state, its union 
with the ROC can be profitable because the state obtains legitimation by 
religious authority and acquires more ideological control over society and 
citizens. For the ROC, the state’s support means more possibilities for the 
Church’s intervention in election campaigns, education, public morality, and 
the matters of legislation and property. However, the Church’s active 
engagement in politics obviously contradicts the principle of ecclesiastical 
political neutrality, which requires churches to abstain from supporting 
candidates for public office or pressing laws that would restrict religious or 
other basic liberties (Audi 2000: 41-42). At the same time, the ROC has 
learnt from its experience during the Synodal and Soviet periods that the 
state’s support does not always provide a guarantee for preserving the 
Church’s autonomy. That is why the ROC assumes nowadays a rather 
cautious position with regard to the state’s interference in its internal 
ecclesiastical matters. In its relations with the state, the Church tries to 
safeguard its borders by insisting on the principle of non-interference, 
which does not prevent it, but at the same time, from requiring a privileged 
position that is appropriate for the traditional religion of Russia.  
At the background of the depicted socio-political context, a substantive 
question arose how the ROC reacts to the emergence of secular and 
independent civil society. Tentative answers to this question revealed 
different approaches whereby the ROC relates to surrounding political and 
social realities. I distinguished three major trends within Russian Orthodoxy 
today: (1) the fundamentalist trend embracing the politicized version of 
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Russian Orthodoxy, (2) the midway conservative trend based on the official 
theological teaching of the ROC, and (3) the liberal-reformative trend 
reflecting a tolerant view on liberal values and an overall openness to 
modernization.  
Orthodox fundamentalists are convinced that Christianity is radically 
incompatible with the theory and practice of democracy because the latter is 
grounded in the non-hierarchical structure and in the principles of liberalism 
and individual freedom. Instead, fundamentalism proposes a clear political 
alternative to democracy and civil society, namely theocratization instead of 
modernization. In the theocratic model, political authority of a secular 
leader is not recognized unless it is legitimized by sacral authority of a 
spiritual leader. According to Orthodox fundamentalists, the amalgamation 
of these authorities finds place in the figure of an anointed tsar. 
Fundamentalists’ clear-cut political choice is motivated by their total 
rejection of the secular world. That is why they see the side-effects of 
modernization, such as globalization, democratization, and societal 
differentiation, as threats to the pre-established divine world order and as 
obvious signs of the approaching Anti-Christ age. Logical outcomes of the 
fundamentalist political vision are xenophobia, mythologization of national 
history, and the appraisal of ancient theocracy as the ideal model for 
modern monarchy, whereby political and sacral authorities remain closely 
connected. 
In contrast to radicalizing fundamentalism, a much more qualified 
approach to the problem of modernization is elaborated by the official 
teaching of the ROC, presented in its social doctrine. I refer to this midway 
approach as the conservative trend because it endorses the conservative 
interpretation of Orthodox social ethics.  
The conceptualization of civil society is a great challenge for the ROC, as 
it requires the Church to renounce its traditional dualistic attitude to the 
secular world. To embrace secular ethics of a pluralistic civil society is to 
accept the principle of individualism, and this constitutes a serious obstacle 
for the Orthodox theological logic. Consequently, ambiguity and ambition 
are the terms that best characterize the official position of the ROC with 
regard to democracy and civil society. Although the considered ecclesiastical 
documents provide doctrinal answers to how the ROC views the problems 
of a secularizing society, they do not suggest a nuanced and creative way to 
deal with these problems. In result, the ROC does not propose a sufficient 
theological substantiation to the concept of civil society but rather offers a 
theological alternative to this concept.  
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Difficulties in accommodating the idea of civil society stem from the 
strong dualistic tendency inherent in the Orthodox theological tradition. 
The Orthodox conception of the world is continuously divided between 
two opposite realms: the realm of the divine and the realm of the secular. 
Insofar as the Orthodox theological thought is oriented towards an 
eschatological vision of the world – i.e. views the world in its transfigured 
perfect state – the secular world and the earthly existence of the human 
individual are constantly underestimated in Orthodox social ethics. By 
formulating its social doctrine, the ROC indeed took an important step in 
the direction of embracing modernization, but at the same time, it 
redefined, in the Fundamentals, its identity as a divine-human institution 
distinct from the secular world. Instead of adapting the idea of independent 
civil society, the Church is preoccupied with the search for its self-identity, 
constantly juxtaposing itself to secular society. Hence, the very process of 
conceptualization of secular civil society reinforces the traditional Orthodox 
dualism.  
The Orthodox social doctrine proposes to conceive society as an 
ecclesiastical community: the Ekklesia. Accordingly, it establishes a 
theocentric model of society and repudiates civil society as an erroneous 
model based on the secular principles of individualism, liberalism, and 
pluralism. Insofar as Orthodox theology ascribes no substantial value to the 
idea and the reality of secular civil society, it considers civil society as a 
temporal constellation of human relations that must be ultimately 
transformed through the deification and attain the unity of the divine and 
the human in the ideal of Godmanhood (Bogochelovechestvo). Consequently, 
the Orthodox conception of civil society emphasizes the discrepancy 
between the traditional theocentrism of Ekklesia and the liberal 
anthropocentrism of civil society. In essence, the Orthodox social doctrine 
remains theocentric, since it upholds a hierarchical vision of social order, 
with God at the top, the human individual on the bottom and the Church 
(Ekklesia) in between as the mediator between God and human individuals. 
This theocentric model does not leave much space for autonomous self-
reliant civil society. Society is dissolved either in the concept of the Church, 
meaning then the ecclesiastical community, or in the concept of the state, 
where it becomes identical with the political community.  
The dualistic tendency manifests itself also in the Orthodox conception 
of political power. Defining its relationship to the secular democratic state, 
the ROC advocates, on the one hand, the model of Byzantine symphonia but 
realizes, on the other hand, the impossibility of the proposed symbiosis of 
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politics and religion under the conditions of secular democracy. Although 
the Church makes certain concessions by adjusting itself to the secular state, 
it safeguards its institutional and ideological autonomy by requiring mutual 
non-interference into each other’s affairs.  
Similarly, the Orthodox conception of human rights is characterized by 
the discrepancy between a positive understanding of human dignity in the 
framework of Christian anthropology on the one side, and an antiliberal 
critique of the secular concept of human rights on the other. The Orthodox 
social doctrine unambiguously denounced the secular institute of human 
rights as grounded in “the notion of the rights of the individual outside of 
his relations with God.” Consequently, the ROC has difficulties to 
recognize the right to freedom of conscience as a morally neutral principle. 
The adoption of the principle of freedom of conscience as a legal principle 
is perceived not as an ultimate triumph of the Christian plea for free and 
unrestrained belief, but as a token of the moral malaise of modern apostate 
society. With that, the ROC clearly links the notion of human rights and 
dignity to public ethics and individual morality. The human individual 
obtains his true dignity and realizes the image of God through taking 
personal responsibility for his own morally impeccable life and social 
responsibility for other human beings. In that way, Orthodox ethics 
connects the idea of individual freedom and rights to the distinctively 
Orthodox principles of conciliar service and collective rights; thereby, it 
attempts to balance individual interests by communal values and social 
responsibility.  
Concisely, the social doctrine of the ROC did not succeed to elaborate a 
positive understanding of civil society and secular democracy. The lacking 
conception of society as an independent, self-regulatory, and self-reliant 
factor impoverishes the Church’s contribution to the emerging civil society 
in present-day Russia. Instead of participating in public debate and seeking 
for alternative sources to legitimate the existence of autonomous civil 
society, the ROC insists on viewing civil society and democracy as inevitable 
and temporal realities, against which the Church needs to defend its God-
reliant ideality as a divine-human organism. Following its dualistic vision of 
the world, the Church reinforces its autonomy. This is obvious from the 
fact that the ROC systematically avoids recognizing its place within secular 
social order and situates itself above it. However, in order to become a true 
and equal participant in the dialog with the secular world, the ROC should 
participate in secular public debate. In order to make her voice legitimate 
and heard in the public arena, the ROC should refrain from assuming an 
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exclusive normative perspective on social issues and accept the logic of a 
pluralized liberal society; this process should start from recognizing the 
principle of freedom of conscience.  
Obviously, new theological sources should be discovered for a 
conception of civil society that is consonant with Orthodox Christian 
teaching. This attempt has been undertaken by the liberally-oriented 
Orthodox intelligentsia, whose versatile writings represent the liberal-
reformative trend. This trend unites those Soviet dissidents and Orthodox 
theologians who innovatively use traditional Orthodox concepts to 
accommodate the idea of civil society.  
Juxtaposing the moral model of open and humane society to the Soviet 
model of coordinated and artificial society, the Soviet dissidents took 
inspiration from the Christian concepts of conscience, dignity, honesty, 
inner freedom, and justice. However, they aimed to reach not only beyond 
communist ideology, but also beyond the conservative standpoint of the 
ROC. Although both the ROC and the Orthodox dissidents elaborate their 
conception of society in terms of a moral-religious category, their 
anthropological views diverge significantly. If conservative theologians 
identify society with the ecclesiastical community (Ekklesia) and ground this 
conception on the idea of togetherness (sobornost’), dissidents found their 
conception of society on the idea of individual conscience. It is the human 
individual in his inner struggle against fear and injustice that is central to 
dissident spiritual discourse.  
Although the Orthodox dissidents did preserve an organic link with the 
Orthodox Christian tradition, they assumed an alternative approach to this 
tradition. This is especially obvious from the way they used the concept of 
Godmanhood (Bogochelovechestvo). If conservative theologians employ this 
concept to legitimize the Church’s exclusive identity as a “divine-human 
organism” and refute modernization associating it with the process of 
unrelenting secularization, the Orthodox dissidents try to discover a divine 
element in the fallen human nature. Therefore, they call for a revision of 
Christian theology from the humanistic perspective and consider such ‘anti-
Soviet’ values as mutual respect, tolerance, individual freedom, and dignity 
as the highest achievements of Christian civilization.  
The Orthodox dissidents advise the ROC to change two things. First, 
the Church should renounce its obsession with self-identification. The 
tension between traditional ecclesiastical conservatism and modern 
secularism is less relevant for contemporary Christians than the authentic 
Christian message about spiritual initiative and daring. Instead of flight from 
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the world, i.e. from the hostile Soviet state and atheistic ideology, the 
Orthodox Church can better emphasize the importance of working in the 
world with a view to transforming it.  
As we have seen, the Orthodox dissidents agree with liberal-reformative 
theologians that religious insights can support democracy politics and civil 
society. Similar to the dissidents, liberal theologians advocate active 
participation of Christians in the secular world because the core of 
Christianity consists, as they believe, in transforming the world toward the 
ideal of the Heavenly Kingdom. For that reason, liberal theologians also 
deny ascetic flight from public politics and civil society. Instead, like the 
Orthodox dissidents, they propose to christianize politics, i.e. to transform 
interest-based politics toward progressive and humane politics, which treats 
the individual as a spiritual person imbued with conscience, morality, 
autonomy, and inalienable rights. This plea for christianization of politics 
should be distinguished from the fundamentalist plea for politicization of 
Christianity.  
According to the liberal Orthodox view, Christianity is compatible with 
the democratic values of brotherhood, liberty, and equality. Moreover, 
Christianity places the human individual above social-political 
establishments, considering these establishments as temporal and therefore 
subordinate to the human individual. Christianity reveals the value of men’s 
brotherly communication and the value of non-hierarchical relations in a 
social community. That is why liberal theologians see democracy as a secular 
projection of the Orthodox ideal of sobornost’ and propose the model with a 
minimalist democratic state and a free horizontally structured civil society.  
The communal element is essential to the Orthodoxy-inspired 
conception of civil society. It is not only immanent autonomy of man, but 
also immanent solidarity of society that substantiates the presence of 
spiritual reality in civil society. Civil society is ultimately aimed at 
overcoming socio-cultural estrangement and alienation of autonomous 
human beings, thereby providing “an external guarantee for the positive 
freedom of the person’s spiritual self-realization in communication with 
others” (Rashkovskij 2004: 117). 
As we can conclude from the above, the Orthodox tradition is 
multivocal and diverse, as it comprises different views on how Orthodox 
Christianity should interact with secular civil society. The politicized version 
of Orthodoxy (fundamentalism) rejects modernity and secular civil society. 
Instead, it proposes theocracy and legitimizes the interference of religion in 
various spheres of public life. The official teaching of the ROC (Orthodox 
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conservatism) provides a more qualified alternative: It advocates 
eschatologization instead of modernization. Representing a midway 
position, the ROC tolerates the secular democratic state and civil society as 
inevitable but temporal realities, and limits its relationship to the secular 
world by establishing the condition of mutual non-interference. Finally, the 
liberal-reformative trend embodies the tolerant position, as it sees the 
opportunity of a spiritual and moral liberalization of society within the logic 
of modernization. 
  
  
7 
 
Conclusion  
 
 
 
 
 
The present study was concerned with the rise and subsequent development 
of civil society in post-Soviet Russia. With that, the focus was on examining 
civil society both as an idea and as a socially tangible reality. 
Methodologically, the research incorporated normative as well as descriptive 
theories on civil society. Theoretical insights were involved to explain social 
phenomena, while empirical facts were used to substantiate or criticize 
certain theories. Thus, civil society was studied as a normative concept on 
the one hand, and as an indispensable element of a democratic polity on the 
other. 
We have set out in this analysis to achieve greater clarity on the 
encompassing question as how we can evaluate the democratic 
transformations that occurred in Russian society in the span of the last 
twenty years. The answers obtained through the research provide a complex 
picture of how Russian society, liberated from the restraints of the Soviet 
system, has been struggling for civility. We have seen that although civil 
society and democracy can exist without each other, only the existence of 
both accounts for a strong and sustainable system. As civil society is an 
essential prerequisite for a flourishing democracy, reciprocally, the 
democratic system creates the necessary preconditions for an effective and 
vibrant civil society. Without democratic government, civil society might 
reinforce an opposition between society and politics, whereas democracy 
without civil society can be reckoned merely as a nominal democracy. The 
present study has yielded a revised picture of the establishment of civil 
society in post-Soviet Russia. A robust civil society does not emerge quickly, 
as a result of adopting a democratic constitution; instead, it requires a 
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complex preparatory process, which involves profound transformations at 
the level of institutions and public ethics.  
This concluding chapter systematizes the main conclusions of the 
research. It starts with summarizing the study and answering the research 
questions as they have evolved in the process of the analysis (7.1). Next 
follow the findings of the study, articulated in the form of fifteen 
propositions (7.2). As a final point, the contemporary political climate in 
Russia is depicted, and possible trajectories of the development of civil 
society are spelled out (7.3).  
 
7.1  Summary  
 
In preparation for answering the central research question, a range of 
political, philosophical, and sociological theories have been examined with a 
view to defining a set of tentative criteria for the evaluation of Russian civil 
society. In the introduction, an analytical framework has been suggested to 
conceive of a concept as versatile and contested as civil society. Concisely, 
civil society can be defined in two different ways: (a) as an empirical reality, 
which signifies the realm of voluntary association among citizens of 
democratic polities, and (b) as a normative vision of communal life, which 
involves the ideals of social cohesion, engaged citizenship, individual 
freedom, tolerance, and pluralism. In civil society literature, these two 
distinct definitions frequently overlap. The evidence of that can be found in 
chapter two, which focused on the empirical study of civil society and 
beyond.  
In that chapter, I have been concerned with the question as what civil 
society theory clarifies about contemporary social and moral problems. The 
posed question proved relevant not only with regard to the transforming 
Russian society, but also with regard to the established Western 
democracies. Empirical studies deepened our understanding of the place 
and function of civil society within the framework of a modern democratic 
polity. As we have seen, civil society denotes the area of voluntary 
associational activity of democratic citizens. In this sense, civic activity aims 
at controlling and communicating with democratic government, producing 
political alternatives, making public concerns to be heard and replied by 
politicians and policy-makers. Civil society also enables citizens to realize 
their rights to free speech, undertake commercial projects, establish various 
interest organizations, and, if necessary, appeal to the court. On this 
account, we have argued that civil society constitutes one of the 
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fundamental elements of the Rechtsstaat, i.e. the state founded on the rule of 
law.  
On the other hand, civil society discourse revealed certain problems 
relating to the democratic system. A pertinent question arose whether civil 
society is a good society, and why. I addressed this question by looking at 
the way it is approached by two leading schools in the field of civil society 
studies: the liberal theory and the theory of deliberative democracy. 
Evidently, theorists from both schools agree that civil society can be 
conceived as a self-reflexive and self-organizing community of citizens who 
are bound by highly generalized universal moral values. According to this 
normative understanding, the model of civil society provides optimal 
conditions for the realization of individual freedom. However, both theories 
still struggle to define a legitimate degree of state intervention in civil 
society. This issue remains complex because it touches upon potential risks 
that are latently present in the liberal-individualistic principles civil society is 
based on. Thus, civil society discourse copes with the moral dilemma as 
how to reconcile individual interests and public concerns in the liberal 
democratic system. This dilemma continues to invigorate the debate on 
whether civil society constitutes a playground for egoistic disintegrative 
tendencies or a common space for civic virtues.  
Consequently, chapter three addressed the problem of social and 
political pluralism from the perspective of sociological theory. The 
sociological embedding of civil society theory proved relevant, as it allowed 
us to sketch the structural profile of society that corresponds to the 
normative theory of democracy. We have concluded that the key concept in 
the sociological rendering of civil society is differentiation. Differentiation 
depicts the process of division of society into autonomous function-specific 
subsystems and thereby reflects the increasing complexity of society’s 
institutional makeup. Accordingly, the theory of differentiation provides the 
clue for understanding society as an encompassing system constituted by 
differentiated subsystems. It is this understanding that unities the classical 
sociological theories of modern society produced by Max Weber, Talcott 
Parsons, and Niklas Luhmann.  
Underpinning my choice in selecting these particular theories was an 
aspiration to reveal the main landmarks in the evolution of sociological 
conceptions of civil society. In the beginning, Weber claimed that 
rationalization instigated the process of societal differentiation in the 
modern West. He regarded the “disenchantment of the world” as an 
important consequence of rationalization that determined the development 
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of modern Western societies toward an increasingly secularized, 
bureaucratized, and instrumentally-rational model. Thereby, Weber 
connected the concept and the reality of civil society to the ineradicable 
conflict between formal and substantive rationalities (Zweckrationalität versus 
Wertrationalität), which he believed to constitute the paradox of Western 
civilization. Parsons, for his part, disagreed with Weber when asserting that 
modern differentiated society upholds collectively shared norms and attains 
cohesion through the normative concept of societal community. In 
Parsons’s theory, civil society designates the subsystem of society that 
performs this integrative function.  
Building upon these theoretical insights, Luhmann extended the original 
Parsonian paradigm to a sophisticated theory of functional differentiation. 
Luhmann’s new perspective on functional differentiation allowed relating 
democratic theory to the model of a highly differentiated civil society. 
Departing from Luhmann’s theory, I argued that it would be wrong to see 
civil society as confined to any particular subsystem of society. Instead, we 
can better choose for a value-free conception of civil society in terms of 
modern differentiated Gesellschaft and oppose it to premodern stratified 
Gemeinschaft. This conception renders the key principles of civil society, such 
as plurality, publicity, individual freedom, and autonomy, sociologically 
feasible. Accordingly, civil society conceived as a functionally differentiated 
society can be claimed to be “a society of equals” (Luhmann 1982: 236) and 
“a society without a top and without a center” (Luhmann 1990: 16). It is 
horizontally structured and therefore inclusive and egalitarian. It is equally 
accessible for all citizens, and that is why it provides the space for voluntary 
participation, association, and mobility. On this account, the model of 
differentiated society creates the adequate structural preconditions for the 
realization of political and social rights of democratic citizens. 
Thus, chapters two and three elucidated the concepts of civil society 
theory that can be employed for resolving the core tension of civil society, 
namely the tension between the public and the private. If political and social 
ethics tries to resolve this tension through the concepts of pluralism, 
egalitarianism, individual rights, and social responsibility, sociological theory 
provides a solution through the concept of societal differentiation. 
Next, chapter four addressed an intriguing question of how the tension 
between the private and the public can be addressed from a religious 
perspective. Focusing on the relationship between civil society and Christian 
religion, we have seen that these two do not have to form rival positions in 
the modern secular world. Civil society, which generally reflects a secular 
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idea and form of society, and Christianity, which upholds a religious vision 
of social order, are involved not in a relationship of continuous opposition, 
but rather in one of dynamic reciprocal influence. Such kind of relationship 
emerged in Western Europe as a result of the historical process whereby 
Christianity imbued Western society with principles that later became the 
instruments for legitimizing the co-existence of religious and secular orders, 
namely, freedom of religious choice, freedom of conscience, and separation 
of the Church from a political community of the state. These principles 
allowed the Church to find a new identity and function during the process 
of societal differentiation, whereby the secular spheres of modern society 
claimed their autonomy from the sphere of religion. Consequently, the 
previous dualist division of society into the realms of the sacred and the 
secular gradually disappeared, and religion transformed from once an all-
encompassing system to a mere subsystem of society. 
Against this historical background, the relationship between religion and 
secular society in Russia became an interesting pole of comparison. Whereas 
in the West, the idea of pluralistic and tolerant civil society challenged the 
Christian Church to adapt to the process of secularization, in Russia, the 
dominant self-positioning of the state significantly inhibited the structural 
differentiation and thus ‘protected’ the Russian Orthodox Church 
(henceforth: the ROC) from the process of secularization. Accordingly, if 
secularization occurred in the West as a natural spin-off of society’s 
emancipation from the surveillance of the Church, in the Russian Empire, 
by contrast, secularization was delayed by the Church’s traditional 
subordination to the state. As a result, the Church in Russia started to lose 
its vital bond with the secularizing society, which became especially 
noticeable during the Synodal period. Following the tradition of Orthodox 
dualism, the ROC developed its self-conception in overtly essentialistic 
terms, positioning itself as an ultimately otherworldly community, 
ontologically independent from the secular power of the state and 
disengaged from the problems of the modernizing society. This crucial 
difference remains perceptible even today: For Western Christianity, the 
problem of secularization pertains primarily to the troubled relationship 
between secularizing society and the Church, whereas for the ROC, 
secularization raises questions such as how to position itself in the political 
arena, and how to safeguard the boundaries between political and 
ecclesiastical authorities.  
It is fair to say that a new page in the history of the diverging Eastern 
and Western Christian traditions was written, about a century ago, by 
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Russian religious philosophers, who succeeded to substantiate the idea of 
secular civil society on the grounds of Orthodox Christian theology. 
Remarkably, their theological arguments in favor of freedom of conscience 
match the arguments set forth by contemporary civil society theorists, 
namely that secularity is an indispensable regulative principle for a 
multicultural and polyconfessional society. Vladimir Solov’ëv’s views are 
closest to the theory of liberal democracy. His Christian humanism 
recognizes the highest authority of individual conscience and thereby 
defends the principle most sacred for those contemporary Western scholars 
who seek to define a legitimate place for religion in the context of secular 
civil society (Keane, Taylor, Casanova, and Audi). This principle is “the 
inviolable right to privacy and the sanctity of the principle of freedom of 
conscience” (Casanova 1994: 57). Although liberal theory of civil society 
and Russian religious philosophy are grounded in different anthropological 
and philosophical traditions, they pursue a similar goal. They attempt to 
construct the ideal of an inclusive, open, tolerant, and non-violent society 
where religious citizens can uphold their divergent convictions in a 
legitimate and respectful manner. Thereby, religious citizens can express 
their faith publicly, but without infringing on freedom of conscience of their 
alternatively-believing or secular co-citizens.  
By revising the relationship between civil society and religion, I 
accomplished the theoretical part of the study; consequently, I moved on to 
examining pertinent problems that accompany Russia’s democratic project 
today. 
Chapter five addressed the urgent problem of institutional weakness of 
contemporary Russian civil society by providing an ethical assessment of the 
problem. The analysis revealed that the creation of formal preconditions 
required by a democratic system (to name the most important, democratic 
constitution, rule of law, market economy, private property, citizens’ rights, 
openness and accountability of the political bodies to the public) is not 
sufficient for successful democratization and a vibrant civil society. 
Institutional transformations need broad public support and trust; without 
citizens’ participation, these new institutions remain formalities. By contrast, 
present-day Russian society is characterized by an essential dualism: There is 
ample public support of the normative idea of democracy on the one hand, 
but also persistent public distrust of democratic institutions and procedures 
on the other. Hence, it is plausible to assume that democratic institutions do 
not function properly not because they are unreliable, but rather because 
Russians do not trust these new institutions in the first place and 
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consequently avoid participating in them in a legal, transparent, and formal 
way.  
Partially, we can explain the institutional weakness and insufficient 
efficacy of Russian civil society by Russians’ subjective experiences of 
democracy. The transition to a democratic Rechtsstaat and a market economy 
did not erase the seventy-year long legacy of communism. This legacy is still 
traceable in citizens’ wide-scale alienation from political activity, avoidance 
of participation in public organizations, and passive acceptance of a 
homogeneous political landscape. Furthermore, the liberal reforms of the 
1990s aggravated the latent socio-economic conflict. The majority of 
ordinary Russians suffered economic degradation as a consequence of the 
hasty and nontransparent transition to a market economy. The autonomy of 
the public sphere, despite new constitutionally guaranteed freedoms, 
remained restricted by the centralizing strategy of the new political elite. If 
during the El’tsyn epoch, the authoritarian structure of political power 
reestablished itself in the form of oligarchy, Putin extended presidential 
control over the sectors of mass media, security services, the Federation 
Council, and the Duma. A special forum for monitoring civil activity was 
created – the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation. Thereby, political 
power again managed to reinforce its old character as indivisible, 
irremovable, and autonomous from society. 
In newly democratized regimes, such as Russia, the tactic of ‘imitation 
democracy,’ the inadequacies of economic policies, and persistent public 
distrust of new democratic institutions are liable to provoke a crisis of 
political legitimacy and public trust. It is exactly at this moment that civil 
society can intervene by halting the loss of legitimacy of the democratic 
system. Civil society can provide both an adequate institutional model, 
which would facilitate a vital bond of society with the political center and 
with corporate life, and a reliable ethical model of society, which would be 
flexible enough to comprise divergent public orientations and integer 
enough to define the moral borders of civil activity. As far as Russian civil 
society is concerned, the Orthodox Christian tradition serves as an evident 
source of inspiration for construing such a model. For this reason, the 
discussion of the factor ‘Orthodoxy’ in relation to civil society theory 
became the subsequent focus of the study.  
In the first place, chapter six considered the relationship between 
Orthodox Christianity and civil society from a functionalistic perspective. 
Describing the current socio-political context in which the ROC functions, 
we have seen that the ROC obtained a visible civic role during the transition 
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period, as it contributed to the rise of a new national-cultural identity of 
many post-Soviet Russians. In this sense, the Orthodox tradition suggested 
a comprehensive alternative to the collapsing communist system. Obviously, 
the moral disorientation of many post-communist citizens, as well as the 
ensuing ideological vacuum significantly contributed to the religious 
renaissance.  
Next, we examined the reaction of the ROC to the emergence of an 
independent secular public space in the form of civil society. The question 
arose whether Orthodox Christianity is able and willing to discover, within 
its theological and philosophical tradition, adequate concepts with a view to 
accommodating the idea of a secular pluralistic civil society. Tangible 
answers to this question crystallized into three main positions. First, a 
radical position of powerful rejection of civil society and secular political 
power (Orthodox fundamentalism); second, a midway position that partially 
accepts the secular state and civil society as an inevitable evil under the 
condition of mutual non-interference (Orthodox conservatism); and third, a 
tolerant position that approves values of liberal democracy: freedom of 
conscience, human dignity and rights (the liberal-reformative trend).  
Nowadays, the ROC opts to remain conservative through defending its 
independence from the state, but at the same time, tries to retain a 
privileged position in the public arena. The consequences of this binary self-
positioning are controversial. On the one hand, the ROC repudiates the 
moral malaise of increasingly secularizing Russian society. On the other 
hand, it confirms its neutrality in relation to the contemporary democratic 
state, considering it as temporal, transitory, and thus lacking any binding 
values. In contradistinction to this official dualist standpoint, Orthodox 
reformative intellectuals continue to emphasize that Christian morality is 
not in conflict with human rights and democracy. Even stronger, regarding 
democracy as the ultimate social form wherein the principle of free 
conscience can be fully realized, they offer an alternative religious 
conception of civil society, which is consonant with this core Christian 
value.  
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7.2 Propositions  
 
The following fifteen propositions articulate the key results of the research.  
 
I. Civil society is both an idea and a reality, as it denotes 
simultaneously a normative concept and a social reality. 
 
The simultaneous presence of normative and descriptive methods in 
worldwide studies on civil society demonstrates that civil society can be 
analyzed as a theoretical idea founded on a normative vision of society and, 
at the same time, as a concrete social phenomenon reflecting social reality. 
The two methods are inextricably connected. When we construe the idea of 
civil society, we inevitably build on certain descriptions of the social reality; 
accordingly, when we examine the social reality, we do so by employing 
certain ideas and concepts.  
As an idea, civil society embodies the vision of an open, inclusive, 
pluralistic, and liberal society; it establishes voluntary association as its 
organizing principle. Civil society suggests regulating the relations between 
the individual, the state, and society on the basis of three core values: 
individual freedom, equality, and tolerance. For this purpose, it requires a 
vibrant and independent public sphere constituted by engaged, active, and 
conscious citizens and functions as an intermediate sector between the state, 
the market, and private initiatives.   
As a reality, civil society signifies a complex web of public organizations 
that provide a platform for voluntary association among citizens of 
democratic states. An institutional component is pivotal for such an 
understanding because civil society denotes the institutional framework 
within which public organizations communicate with governmental and 
business structures.  
 
II. The concept of civil society corresponds to the sociological 
description in terms of a functionally differentiated society.  
 
Analysis of civil society from the perspective of the theory of societal 
differentiation confirms that civil society corresponds to the model of a 
functionally differentiated society (Gesellschaft), and that this model of society 
is adequate for a liberal democratic polity. Such a sociological embedding 
provides civil society theory with a compelling empirical referent, as it 
substantiates normative principles of civil society theory: autonomy, 
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plurality, equality, voluntary association and dissociation, publicity, and 
legality. 
Insofar as functional differentiation indicates the process of subdivision 
of social systems into new interconnected autonomous subsystems, we can 
render the structure of a functionally differentiated society as complex, 
pluralized, and multi-contextual. Moreover, the model of functionally 
differentiated society rejects particularistic criteria of participation in civil 
society, exhibiting civil society, instead, as essentially inclusive. In contrast to 
a homogeneous social community, i.e. Gemeinschaft, functionally 
differentiated Gesellschaft incorporates a complex web of processes and 
connections, and thus accommodates a plurality of various identities and 
visions. 
Accordingly, the conception of civil society in terms of modern 
differentiated Gesellschaft releases civil society from the confinement to one 
particular social sphere and allows envisaging it as a society constituted by a 
complex fabric of intersystemic communications. Civil society creates a 
free-floating matrix of communication; therefore, it can be understood as a 
kind of qualification of the way citizens and institutions communicate.  
 
III. Post-Soviet Russian society is characterized by an essential 
dualism, as it is divided between ample public support of a 
normative idea of democracy and, at the same time, widespread 
public distrust of democratic institutions and procedures. 
 
After the cessation of the communist rule, contemporary Russians tend to 
endorse the general idea of democracy, but retain a much more critical 
standpoint regarding the consequences of the democratic transition. Since 
the transition, the idea and the reality of civil society have significantly 
drifted apart after their initial reunion, which was achieved during the late-
perestrojka period and the early 1990s. By contrast, the post-transition period 
came to be associated, in the eyes of many ordinary Russians, with growing 
anxieties and unmet expectations caused by the economic liberalization and 
the granted political rights. In the span of the last two decades, Russian 
citizens have become painfully aware of the discrepancy between the ideal 
of an open democratic society and the practices of democracy established in 
post-Soviet Russia. As a result, the gap between expectations of democracy 
and inadequately democratized institutions forms a serious obstacle to the 
optimal functioning of civil society organizations. In this sense, Russian 
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society today rather bears resemblance to developing democracies than to 
consolidated liberal democracies.  
The observed antagonistic attitudes typical of contemporary Russians 
confirm that the ultimate meaning of democratic transformations consists 
not only in changing political, constitutional, and economic structures of a 
post-communist society, but also in overcoming the schism between 
nominal and real law. This can be achieved through substituting hierarchical 
relations between the state, society, and the individual by the principles of 
egalitarianism and participation in civil society. 
 
IV. Creating objective conditions prescribed by constitutional 
democracy is not sufficient for a successful democratization. An 
adequately functioning institutional framework and civic ethos are 
required for the rise and development of civil society in newly 
democratized regimes. 
 
The following presumption is central to the present study: The more 
organized civil society is at the institutional level, the more receptive society 
is to democratic transformations, including the rule of law, the market 
economy, the constitutional-legislative system, private property, and a 
vibrant and independent public sphere. This presumption makes possible to 
distinguish two interrelated problems that nascent Russian civil society is 
confronted with. On the one hand, Russian civil society copes with the 
problem of institutional weakness; on the other hand, it also suffers from a 
lack of moral resources among the post-communist public, which, in turn, 
hinders implementing the intended institutional reforms. These problems 
form a serious internal obstacle for the democratic project. The present 
study shows that in Russia, despite the fact that the objective preconditions 
for a successful transition to a democratic polity and a market economy 
have been formally established, democratic consolidation remains largely 
impeded by the institutional and civic immaturity of post-communist 
society.   
The research also confirms the necessity to reconsider the causal 
relationship between the institutional weakness and the deficient 
development of civil society. If previously the focus was put on the creation 
of civil society, as well as on its subsequent positive impact on the 
democratization process in post-communist regimes, nowadays, scholars 
tend to agree that radical institutional transformations create the 
preconditions for a properly functioning civil society. However, the 
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establishment of new democratic institutions is difficult due to the deficient 
civic ethos. This remains a typical setback for the majority of post-
communist citizens.  
 
V. The problem of institutional weakness should be considered 
within the context of civic ethics because social trust provides the 
basis for a functioning democratic system. 
  
An ethical evaluation of the democratic project in post-Soviet Russia reveals 
that the institutional weakness of Russian civil society resides in the moral 
attitudes that many contemporary Russian citizens retain with regard to the 
state, the economy, and civil society. Insofar as a flourishing civil society is 
premised not only on the establishment, but also on broad public support 
of new democratic institutions, we can assert that institutional weakness is 
essentially a moral problem.  
The study sketches a number of moral resources that are necessary for 
the establishment of democratic institutions and for the implementation of 
democratizing reforms in transforming societies. Among these, the most 
important are social trust and civic maturity. If social trust is grounded in 
the principles of law-regulated society and respect for individual dignity, 
civic maturity implies a developed self-perception of members of society as 
citizens, imbued with mutual responsibility, autonomy, and political efficacy. 
Taking social trust and civic maturity as the criteria for an assessment of 
Russian civil society, I have related the pertinent problems of Russian civil 
society to the citizens’ alienation from various public activities, their 
pervasive apathy, and permanent stifled dissatisfaction with the actual 
outcomes of the transition. At the structural-institutional level, deficient 
social trust and civic immaturity lead to the atomization of civil society and 
its stagnation in the form of microstructures. Consequently, civil society 
organizations are unable to establish efficient communication with the 
sectors of public administration and business.   
 
VI. The state’s tendency towards monopolizing political power 
confines the emancipation of the public sphere in post-Soviet 
Russia. 
 
Russia’s transition to democracy raised important questions concerning a 
new role of the public and a new balance between state and society. The 
question of how society is to be integrated into the post-communist political 
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order became especially urgent during the Putin era. Then, at the turn of the 
millennium, the restoration of state authority prompted a more rigid 
regulation of public life in general and of civic activity in particular. Civil 
society in Putin’s Russia assumed a hybrid model. This model comprises, on 
the one hand, the characteristics of public openness and independent 
judgment, and, on the other hand, the characteristics of managed public 
activity resembling Soviet citizens’ involvement in the artificially created 
public sphere. With that, the decrease of independent public organizations 
was ‘compensated’ by an intensive growth of bureaucracy.  
Presumably, the current strategy of the state aimed at monopolizing 
political power ensues from the long-term tradition of derzhavnichestvo 
(autocracy). The state’s primacy over society reinforces the incompetence of 
political power to establish new institutional channels of communication 
with society beyond the traditional hierarchical channels of communication. 
In result, the characteristic features of Russian political power, such as 
indivisibility, irremovability, and autonomy from society, are reproduced in 
the democratic system of contemporary Russia. 
What is even more alarming is that democratic consolidation in (post-
)Putin’s Russia is seriously hampered by the state’s misconception of the 
normative value and function of civil society in the system of democratic 
government. The state sees civil society rather as a threat to its monopolistic 
power than as an essential element of democratic government. The restored 
paternalistic relationship between state and society reinforces 
monopolization of political power by the presidential administration and 
thereby diminishes the significance of civil society for public politics. The 
more the state tends to monopolize political power and equalize the political 
landscape, the lesser freedom civil society retains. Accordingly, mutual 
distrust between the state and civil society is growing. 
 
VII. The development of civil society in post-Soviet Russia is impeded 
by the unfair redistribution of major economic resources and by 
the consequent socio-economic polarization of society. 
 
Although radical reforms in the early 1990s instigated the development of 
the market economy through privatization of the former state property, they 
also provoked the polarization between the new financial elite and the large 
number of disappointed and disoriented citizens. This schism was 
consequently reinforced by other unintended upshots of economic 
liberalization, such as a growing crime rate, inflation, unemployment, and 
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corruption. Therefore, when Putin proclaimed public order, economic 
security, social justice, and stricter governmental control over the corporate 
sector to be his priorities, Russians eagerly supported this new political 
course. 
As noted in preposition III, Russian citizens tend to develop the dualistic 
attitude towards democracy, as they adjust their conception of democracy to 
the actual experience of the transition. The present study confirms a direct 
correlation between Russians’ general endorsement of democracy in abstract 
normative terms and their unrealized expectations concerning the actual 
profits of democratization. In all probability, the dualism between broad 
passive support of the normative idea of democracy and equally broad but 
active disapproval of the concrete socio-economic upshots of 
democratization is the main reason why Russian citizens support nowadays 
the state’s involvement with the sectors of business and civil society. This 
confirms that Russians are inclined to regard the state as the ultimate 
warrant of the economic order and the final linking point between the 
distressing practice and the normative ideal of democracy.  
As for the emergent civil society, the socio-economic polarization of 
Russian society forms a second major obstacle. Enduring poverty and 
anxiety significantly inhibit the formation of a middle class, which is the 
social basis of civil society. Insofar as economic prosperity is one of the 
prerequisites for civic engagement and public initiative, Russian civil society 
obviously suffers from the underdeveloped middle class.  
 
VIII. The communist legacies of public distrust, avoidance of public 
organizations, and adaptation to the system continue to constitute 
serious obstacles for the democratization project in post-Soviet 
Russia. 
 
A lack of public trust is a third external hindrance to democratic 
consolidation and the proper functioning of civil society organizations. This 
handicap makes political efficacy of public institutions restricted and 
damages their reputation. Consequently, the development of democracy in 
contemporary Russia is also aggravated by citizens’ political passivity and 
reluctance to participate in distrusted organizations.  
Avoidance of civic engagement is a clear example of passive, adaptive 
behavior. It became a widespread technique that post-communist citizens 
employ to compensate for their distrust of democratic institutions and cope 
with the declining state legitimacy. Adaptation means reluctance to take 
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control over the situation; in this sense, it promulgates evasion of 
autonomous action and individual responsibility. Hence, adaptive behavior 
does not lead to radical change of certain institutions and practices if they 
do not comply with the criteria of transparency, predictability, and 
accountability. Instead, adaptation is a pragmatic strategy of survival and is 
used by those citizens who still perceive themselves as dependent on the 
centralized state and the unchangeable social order. The worrying fact is 
that two thirds up to three quarters of Russians still perceive themselves as 
essentially vulnerable, unprotected by law, abandoned by social programs 
and organizations, silent, and submissive citizens. This feeling of 
vulnerability amplifies the behavior of adaptation. 
The revealed pattern of social behavior (distrust – alienation/passivity – 
adaptation) testifies to the pervasive legacy of the communist experience. 
The putative sources of current public distrust and avoidance of public 
organizations can be related to the psychological trauma of Soviet citizens, 
caused by the mandatory character of civil participation and the state’s 
invasion into the private sphere. The gap between the distrusted public 
realm and the secure private realm resulted in the dualism between public 
acquiescence to the communist system and private rejection of it. 
Nowadays, this communist legacy manifests itself in general cynicism and 
contempt with regard to public activity.  
 
IX. Pro-active trust, as opposed to passive adaptation, is a crucial 
factor for the democratic system in general and for civil society in 
particular. 
 
As it became clear from the above, successful democracy requires pro-active 
trust in contrast to passive adaptation. The model of self-organizing and 
self-regulating civil society is based on the presumption that citizens trust 
themselves, trust each other, and trust the system as a whole. According to 
such an understanding, it is confidence in yourself, as well as in your co-
citizens’ competence and integrity that necessarily complements voluntary 
association. Moreover, voluntary association is premised not only on 
citizens’ mutual trust, but also on the legality of the system within which 
citizens undertake various civic activities and in which they need to have 
sufficient confidence.  
 In Russia, however, trust has acquired a different connotation. Russian 
citizens tend to trust those institutions that are predictable and contributive 
to social order, stability, and national unity, namely the president, the 
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Russian Orthodox Church, and, to a lesser degree, the army and security 
structures. The source of wide public trust in those institutions partially 
resides in the fact that most Russians can collectively identify themselves 
with the values and goals of the mentioned institutions. In this case, the 
images and figures of collective trust release citizens from their individual 
responsibility for civic engagement. Conversely, most Russians distrust and 
depreciate institutions that presume individual participation and 
responsibility, namely democratic government, court of law, trade unions, 
local authorities, and political parties.  
Plausibly, trust in the institutions that embody superior authority and do 
not require individual responsibility or civic engagement testifies to society’s 
institutional weakness, non-differentiation, and socio-cultural poverty. This 
largely-endorsed belief in political authority as the final warrant of social 
order appears problematic, since the democratic system is premised on the 
exact opposite of exaggerated trust in political authority. It is premised on 
citizens’ independent judgment and civil activity expressed in their 
generalized trust in the democratic system on the whole and not in specific 
institutions of power (such as the state, the army, and the president) that are 
only part of this system. 
 
X. Enduring societal differentiation is one of the optimal remedies 
facilitating Russia’s democratic project. 
 
Enduring societal differentiation is inversely proportional to the insufficient 
diversity of the political landscape. The latter constitutes one of the most 
serious deficiencies of Russian democracy today. The homogeneous political 
landscape is an upshot of the lacking middle class because it is the diversity 
of political parties that reflects the diversity of socio-economic interests and 
needs of democratic citizens. The insufficient social representation of the 
middle class in present-day Russia explains the underdevelopment of the 
multi-party system, as well as the general perplexity of existing political 
parties. It is also the reason why political parties are frequently forced to 
speak on behalf of an abstract public. Consequently, Russian political parties 
may be blamed for being incompetent to appeal to the citizens, let alone to 
represent and advocate the citizens’ needs.  
Societal differentiation offers a sustainable solution for the development 
of civil society in Russia. Insofar as societal differentiation reflects the 
degree of society’s heterogeneity and self-management, it creates the 
necessary preconditions for the emergence of civil society in the form of a 
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network of self-regulating organizations. In this sense, the continuance of 
societal differentiation in the spheres of public, economic, and social life is 
an advantage for Russian society. To the extent that society becomes able to 
articulate and resolve various problems without resorting to the state, it 
becomes increasingly heterogeneous and thus incompatible with a 
monopolistic and homogeneous political landscape. In result, a 
differentiated and pluralistic society prompts the political landscape to 
diversify itself and create more channels of communication with society. 
Instead of juxtaposing society and the political system, societal 
differentiation provides the conditions for their coexistence and thereby 
guarantees the legitimacy of the democratic system. 
 
XI. Citizens’ autonomous and rational judgment offers another 
optimal solution for facilitating Russia’s democratic project. 
 
To provide effective communication between society and the political 
system, a domain of free public reasoning is required. Within this domain, 
citizens can articulate and exchange their autonomous and rational 
judgments. However, as the present study shows, Russia still forms an 
obvious pole of comparison to this normative proposition. In present-day 
Russia, the forced centralization of society around the political center and 
the directly coordinative role of political power restrain the emergence of a 
forum for citizens’ free-floating communication. By restoring its tutelage 
over the exchange of citizens’ judgments, the Russian state threatens to 
deprive civil society of its spontaneity, autonomy, and responsibility.  
 To stop this tendency, two major conceptual shifts should be realized. 
Firstly, in agreement with Luhmann’s theory, the Russian state can approach 
modern democratic regimes by accepting a functionalistic understanding of 
politics, which means that the system of politics would lose its former 
substantive foundation and regulative function (Luhmann 1982: 158). The 
public plays a decisive role in democratic politics because the political 
system cannot generate and preserve legitimacy without public opinion 
articulated in the form of public consensus or resistance. It is the public that 
provides the bureaucratic state with the necessary feedback and thereby 
maintains the main function of the political system, which consists in 
producing collectively binding decisions. On this view, Russian democracy 
would immensely contribute not only from the rising public sphere, but also 
from the new generations of citizens, who are willing and able to formulate, 
defend, and implement their judgments on crucial political decisions.  
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Secondly, with a view to facilitating democratization of post-communist 
society, the democratic state should assume a secondary status in relation to 
society. This is because the state is just one of the functions generated by 
society itself and thus has a serving role, which consists in creating and 
guaranteeing the legal conditions for a democratic polity. Such a conception 
of democratic polity builds upon citizens’ participation in vibrant civil 
society and therefore refutes the very idea of constructing civil society with 
the help of artificial methods. 
 
XII. The third optimal remedy for Russian democracy consists in 
effective institutionalization of spontaneous civic initiative.  
 
An important precondition for articulating citizens’ autonomous and 
rational judgment is effective institutionalization of spontaneous civic 
initiative. Insofar as Russian civil society currently exhibits a lack of 
institutional channels of communication with the state, this precondition 
can be considered crucial for the future of Russia’s democratic project. A 
better transference of civic initiative into institutionalized forms would 
contravene widespread distrust of public organizations. It would also 
beneficially restore the sources of democratic legitimacy by contributing to 
the efficacy of public debate, the production of binding decisions and the 
accountability of democratic government.  
Intuitional channels that transfer the information about citizens’ 
preferences and interests provide a sustainable basis for communicating 
public discontent. However, when these institutional channels are 
underrepresented or underdeveloped, as in Russian society today, public 
discontent might assume aggressive and spontaneous forms of protest. 
Accordingly, a considerable segment of contemporary Russian civil society 
threatens to degrade into a network of informal, unsanctioned, and 
unregistered actors and organizations.  
In Russia, despite the existing democratic institutions and representative 
bodies, such as the Referendum, the Parliament, and the Court, many civil 
society organizations do not succeed to transfer their information input into 
policy preferences. Consequently, the democratic deficit expands because a 
significant number of civic initiatives do not assume an institutionalized 
form and remain neither articulated nor heard. At the same time, unable to 
receive the alarming signals from civil society, political power loses its vital 
bond with society. 
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It should be noted that there is evidence of constructive civic initiative 
and solidarity in Russia, which is most vividly expressed in citizens’ 
increasing attention to various charity initiatives, quick self-organization of 
volunteers when urgently needed (such as the civic initiative of 
extinguishing fires in the summer of 2010), and rendering help to the 
victims of recurring terror attacks. However, these spontaneous civic 
initiatives are undertaken by individual citizens who prefer to trust their 
contributions to other individual participants of these initiatives (for 
instance, concrete hospitals, orphanages, parishes, victims, etc.) instead of 
the institutions that represent those in need (for instance, fund for cancer 
research, child rights organizations, etc.). An exceptional position in this 
expanding trend of private civic initiative belongs to the Russian Orthodox 
Church. In the field of charity and volunteer projects, the ROC receives 
nowadays more public credit than governmental organizations. In this 
sense, we should take into account the contribution of the ROC to the 
democratic development in Russia.  
 
XIII. The factor ‘Orthodoxy’ is significant for civil life in Russia, as the 
Orthodox Christian tradition provides an alternative conception of 
civil society. 
 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the factor ‘Orthodoxy’ gained a 
special place in the public arena of Russian society. Then, the transforming 
society lost its foundation in communist ideology and faced the challenge of 
finding a new identity. Taking inspiration from the Orthodox theological 
tradition, a palette of alternative conceptions of civil society has been 
suggested to provide a counterpoint to the conception of civil society 
engraved in the tradition of modern liberalism and individualism. Within 
this palette, my preference goes to the conception of civil society that is 
consonant with the liberal-reformative trend in Orthodox theology. This 
conception also embraces insights of the Russian religious-philosophical 
renaissance. 
In general, Orthodox theology is much more preoccupied with the 
communal ideal of social life, than with the individual and his rights. It sees 
no opposition between individual and society and treats them as correlative 
terms. The human individual needs a social environment because he can 
accomplish his social nature only through the relations with other 
individuals. It is in accordance with this teaching that Vladimir Solov’ëv 
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developed his famous concept of All-unity, which denotes an individual-
social reality, a free union of all in perfect freedom.  
In view of that, Orthodox theologians resolve the tension between the 
individual and society by employing the distinctively Orthodox concept of 
sobornost’ (conciliarity, togetherness). Sobornost’ means an ontological unity of 
all human beings that can be attained through communion with God in the 
sacrament of Eucharist. What distinguishes sobornost’ from secular civil 
society is that sobornost’ does not imply a social contract between individual 
human beings but expresses a mystical sense of individuals’ unanimity 
achieved through their radical spiritual transformation according to the ideal 
of Godmanhood. Hence, the Orthodox understanding of civil society 
advocates communion and reciprocal service, in contrast to individual 
autonomy and rights. Semën Frank revealed the spiritual foundation of 
secular society through the religious-philosophical concept of dual-unity 
between sobornost’, i.e. the primordial unity of all human beings, and 
obshchestvennost’ (the public), i.e. the empirical manifestation of this 
primordial unity in the form of civil society. By contrast, from a sociological 
perspective, the spiritual conception of society in terms of sobornost’ relates 
rather to a Gemeinschaft-concept, as it denotes one of the numerous 
worldviews that exist within all-encompassing differentiated Gesellschaft. 
Thus, Orthodox theology grounds civil society theory in Christian 
theological concepts, but preserves, at the same time, the cardinal 
distinction between the spiritual and the secular. In this sense, Orthodox 
thinkers refuse to substitute the Orthodox Ekklesia-based principle of 
sobornost’ by the democratic secular principle of sovereignty of the people, 
even despite a seeming similarity of these principles (Sergej Bulgakov). If 
the Church represents the highest ideal of communal life, democracy 
suggests ways of finding consensus among members of the natural, i.e. 
fallen, humanity. Hence, according to the Orthodox teaching, attaining unity 
and overcoming dualism between the spiritual and the secular should be 
achieved by elevating the earthly, secular society to the spiritual, eternal ideal 
of togetherness, and not the other way around.  
 
XIV. Institutional separation between political and religious spheres is 
an indispensable precondition for a peaceful integration of religion 
in the public sphere.  
 
A religious conception of civil society also entails certain limitations and 
conditions if it is to be adequately implemented in religious policy. The 
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cardinal distinction between the secular and the spiritual corresponds to the 
institutional separation between the spheres of politics and religion. This 
separation is necessary, as it would alleviate potential problems resulting 
from the fusion of these spheres.  
The present study maintains that religion can attain a legitimate role in 
the public domain of a functionally differentiated society. An open, tolerant, 
and pluralistic civil society does not contradict the principle of religious 
freedom; however, it does prescribe the conditions under which religion can 
assume a legitimate public place in the liberal democratic order. These 
conditions include the institutional separation between Church and state, 
the principle of ecclesiastical political neutrality, and the Church’s 
acceptance of the state’s secularity. At the same time, if secularity optimally 
serves as the regulative principle for a multicultural and polyconfessional 
state, it may have destructive consequences when interpreted as a coherent 
ideology, i.e. when it becomes the doctrine of secularism. In this case, 
secularism is likely to provoke a radicalized reaction on the part of religious 
believers, known as the phenomenon of religious fundamentalism. That is 
why it is advisable to distinguish between secularity and secularism. 
Moreover, religion can take a legitimate place in the public arena of a 
secular pluralistic civil society under the condition that it recognizes itself as 
one of the participants of this arena. For the Christian Church, this option 
means retaining the double dimension in its self-perception. As a secular 
institution, the Church belongs to and participates in civil society, but as a 
divine-human organism, it cannot be restricted to the secular sphere. The 
possibility of the Church becoming a locus for civic engagement depends, 
firstly, on the institutional protection of civil rights through civil society 
organizations and, secondly, on the Church’s readiness to form part of civil 
society. 
 
XV. Contemporary Russia is struggling for civility. 
 
The multi-level evaluation of the democratic project in post-Soviet Russia 
confirmed that two different dimensions are necessarily involved in the 
analysis of civil society: the empirical-descriptive dimension, wherein civil 
society is a social reality, and the philosophical-conceptual dimension, 
wherein civil society represents a normative idea.  
With regard to the problematic rise of civil society in post-communist 
regimes, the main challenge consists in the proximity of the normative 
ethical ideal to the social-political reality. In contemporary Russia, civil 
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society has become, since recently, a reality manifested in the form of an 
existing network of public organizations that operate at the border of the 
political society, the corporate sector, and the private sphere. At the same 
time, civil society remains for Russia yet a new and unfamiliar reality. As the 
experience of the speeded democratic reforms in Eastern and Central 
Europe has revealed, civil society does not emerge out of a historical 
vacuum; instead, it needs adequately entrenched traditions and conceptions.  
A particular problem of Russian civil society relates to the lack of a 
strong public sphere and, accordingly, of a developed self-conception of 
society as an independent, full-pledged body entitled to participate in the 
political process on the par with the state. For this reason, contemporary 
political power tends to acquire an authoritarian character, while the sphere 
of politics becomes increasingly bureaucratized and alienated from society. 
The same is valid for the sphere of the economy where economic relations 
became permeated by an ethic of individualism. It is between economic 
individualism and political authoritarianism that Russian civil society is 
continuously grudged, trying to struggle for a legitimate place between the 
forces of the state and of the market.  
On this view, the expression ‘struggling for civility’ vividly describes the 
thorny path that Russian society has been following since the transition to 
democracy. After a decade of El’tsyn’s oligarchic liberalization, followed by 
a decade of Putin’s consolidating bureaucratization, there is much confusion 
among contemporary Russian citizens concerning the future course of the 
country. Some oppose the principle of separation of powers, believing that 
the president should control the Duma, the government, and the Court; 
whereas a growing part of the population starts to realize that control over 
political authorities and maintenance of social order are rather the tasks of 
society. No less confusing are public assessments of the established market 
economy. A significant number of citizens depreciate the socio-economic 
consequences of the desired economic freedom; accordingly, they are 
intimidated by the commercialization of civil society. Others, on the 
contrary, see potential in the emerging corporate sector and its intersections 
with civil society, which are manifested, for instance, in supporting 
corporate citizenship and various civic initiatives.  
One of the ways to manage this perplexity consists in the correct 
understanding of the role of civil society as an intermediate sphere between 
the state and the market. Functioning as a force that restrains technocratic 
bureaucratization and marketization, civil society provides sufficient room 
for citizens who are driven by the entrepreneurial spirit, or who wish to 
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implement their knowledge in democratic government, or who are inspired 
by the ideals of charity, solidarity, and altruism. In a nutshell, civil society 
creates the virtual space where the ideas become the reality and where the 
reality facilitates the genesis of new ideas.  
 
7.3 Perspective: Where is Russian Civil Society Heading Today? 
 
To put the present study in a relevant perspective, I want to address recent 
developments in the field of Russian politics and provide a critical 
evaluation of the current state of Russian civil society. In this diagnosis, the 
findings of the study insinuate certain traps and, at the same time, suggest 
solutions to the indicated problems.  
What are the implications of Putin’s system of governance, which is 
frequently labeled as ‘imitation’ or ‘(over)managed’ democracy, for civil 
society? Putin’s rule pursued primarily such goals as stabilization, restoration 
of the political order, and consolidation of society. These achievements 
came at the cost of an immense growth of bureaucracy, of a top-down 
approach in governance, and of an overall technocratic vision of society. 
With its focus on the present moment, Putin’s system lacked both future 
vision and reflection on the past; it was thus non-reflexive and non-
visionary. Although the current president Medvedev, working in tandem 
with the premier Putin, continuously emphasizes the priority of 
modernization for the future of Russia, his conception of modernization 
implies a technological progress, stimulated by the establishment of the so-
called hyper-modern research centers. Medvedev’s conception is based on 
external factors and therefore is opposite to a conception of modernization 
as induced by the change of spiritual and cultural values. However, it is this 
change that constitutes, as I believe, the internal source of societal 
transformation.  
Obviously, neither Putin’s nor Medvedev’s system entails recognition 
and accommodation of a plurality of social interests and civic initiatives. 
Managed democratization, as well as managed modernization, resists the 
process of societal differentiation. It also precludes the emergence of new 
public institutions; thereby, it inhibits building up a horizontal 
communication network between government, civil society, and the 
corporate sector.  
At the present moment, Russian civil society continues to experience the 
consequences of Putin’s politics of stabilization and consolidation. One of 
these consequences consists in mutual distrust between the state and civil 
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society. The state reinforces its distrust of civil society by creating 
moderated forums for a dialog with civil society (such as the Public 
Chamber) and suppressing the ‘disloyal’ sector of civil society. Recent 
studies confirm that the tendency of the state to implement this double 
approach in its policy towards civil society is strengthening. Thus, political 
power patronages ‘good’ civil society organizations by distributing grants 
and privileges to various public chambers and councils, while it also 
squeezes out ‘bad’ ones by publicly discrediting them and exercising rigid 
administrative control. This gives ground to Lipman and Petrov to speak 
about an emerging phenomenon in present-day Russia, namely the 
phenomenon of pseudo non-commercial organizations, or so-called 
GONGO’s, i.e. Government Organized Non-Governmental Organizations 
(Lipman & Petrov 2010: 7). As a result, the interactions between civil 
society and the state take place in two separate areas: the secure area 
reserved for state-controlled and sanctioned civil society organizations, and 
the marginalized, discredited area comprised of diverse protest movements 
and other uncontrolled organizations that are out of favor with the 
authorities.  
Evidently, the state’s patronage of the loyal sector of civil society causes 
rather competition and opposition among civil society organizations, instead 
of their cooperation and communication. Preferring to remain a neutral and 
invisible player, the state administration frequently uses the controlled 
NGO’s to fight against the disliked non-commercial organizations “by 
means of marionette structures, from within civil society itself”; in that way, 
the administration “muffles some critical notes by creating an artificial 
polyphony” (Lipman and Petrov 2010: 24). Moreover, it is necessary to 
notice that the shift of some registered NGO’s towards unregistered illegal 
protest movements is also enhanced by the current conditions of socio-
economic inequality and the global crisis. In extreme cases, underground 
civil society initiatives express civic disobedience, which results in 
unsanctioned rallies such as, for instance, ethnic violence in December 
2010. However, these outbursts of civic resentment remain short-lived, 
unorganized, and easily suppressed. 
Accordingly, newly formed civil society organizations and social 
movements have difficulties to integrate in the established network of 
communication between the state and the third sector. Lacking competence 
and experience in formulating and transferring their messages, these new 
organizations achieve only marginal positions or even degrade into 
unsanctioned protest movements. Hence, they lose their position as active 
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participants capable of influencing policy making. This marginalized 
position in the public sphere is also amplified by the media. However, newly 
formed civil society groups need recognition not only by official civil society 
organizations, but also by the community.  
Most regretfully, the internal schism between civil society organizations 
forms a serious obstacle to democratic consolidation in Russia, as it 
weakens the public appeal and efficacy of civil society. Insofar as mutual 
distrust among civil society organizations impedes cooperation in serving 
various public concerns, the main challenge consists in promulgating the 
partnership spirit among civil society organizations. 
Given the above, we can conclude that the internal discrimination 
among NGO’s, a lack of financial resources, and increasing control by state 
authorities form the main issues on the agenda of Russian civil society 
nowadays and in the near future. Although the aim of the present study has 
not been to offer an antidote for overcoming the revealed problems, my 
hope is that the initiated discussion can contribute to the realization that 
civil society is vitally important for the future of Russia’s democratic project. 
Civil society is an indispensable condition for a thriving democracy not only 
because it creates a network of public organizations, but also because it 
provides the democratic system with legitimacy and public trust. That is why 
our understanding of civil society should not be confined exclusively to an 
empirical dimension. Civil society is more embracing than a social reality, as 
it also embodies a comprehensive ethical vision of social order. Thus, civil 
society creates both normative and real possibilities for citizens’ engagement 
with their government and with the corporate sector. It allows citizens to 
express their opinions on issues of public concern, realize their rights to 
freedom of thought and belief, and construe a society according to their 
understanding of the right balance between solidarity and individual 
autonomy. At the structural level, civil society accommodates diverse civic 
initiatives by institutionalizing the processes of pluralization and 
differentiation of social interests. Thereby, civil society is also able to 
propose a qualified and tolerant way to integrate religion in the public 
sphere. 
To cut a long story short, the establishment of civil society implies for 
new democratic regimes the society’s struggle for the ideal of an open, 
tolerant, and civil society. It involves an inevitable struggle for civility.   
 
  
Note on Technical Matters 
 
In the present study, I have used an extensive body of material that is 
available in Russian only. The exclusively Russian sources are indicated in 
the footnotes, in their original Russian transcript. To make these sources 
available to an international public, I have included numerous citations and 
paraphrases. Unless indicated otherwise, all translations from Russian are 
mine.  
When translating specific Russian concepts, I have continuously 
encountered the problem of semantic qualification. With a view to 
providing a more precise translation of some key concepts, I have included 
the original Russian words between brackets. Russian words have been 
transliterated in accordance with the popular transcription system, except 
for some elements that I have borrowed from the scientific transcription 
system. These alternative transliterations display, in my view, greater affinity 
with the sounds of the Russian language. Amongst others, the chosen 
method of transliteration allow reproducing the ending “ий” as “ij” while 
avoiding confusing and numerous combinations such as “y,” “yi” or “iy” 
(like in Dostojevskij). However, in case of some most customary names, 
traditional English spelling has been preferred over Russian transliteration: 
for instance, Tsar Nicolas instead of Tsar’ Nikolaj, Tsar Peter instead of 
Tsar’ Pëtr, Alexander instead of Aleksandr and intelligentsia instead of 
intelligentsija. I have systematized my transcription system in the following 
table. 
а –  a к – k х –  kh 
б –  b л –  l ц – ts 
в –  v м  –  m ч –  ch 
г –  g н –  n ш – sh 
д –  d о – o щ –  shch 
е –  e п – p ъ – ” 
ё –  ё р – r ы –  y 
ж – zh с –  s ь – ’ 
з –  z т –  t э – ÷ 
и –  i у –  u ю –  ju 
й –  j ф –  f я –  ja 
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Deze interdisciplinaire studie belicht de opkomst en ontwikkeling van de 
burgerlijke maatschappij in post-sovjet Rusland. De auteur behandelt 
politieke, sociologische en religieusfilosofische theorieën over de burgerlijke 
maatschappij en legt verbanden met de praktijk. Centraal in de studie staat 
de vergelijking tussen het concept en de realiteit van de burgerlijke 
maatschappij in zowel het Westen als in Rusland. Een historisch perfectief 
legt de dieperliggende oorzaken van hedendaagse ontwikkelingen in Rusland 
bloot. 
De discussie rond het begrip ‘burgerlijke maatschappij’ is de laatste jaren 
herleefd, onder andere door de democratische revoluties in Oost- en 
Centraal-Europa in de periode van 1989 tot 1991. Aangezien de burgerlijke 
maatschappij een authentiek product van de Westerse democratie is, 
twijfelde men tijdens de perestrojka in Rusland of de burgerlijke maatschappij 
wel een adequaat instrument zou zijn voor het realiseren van de 
noodzakelijke hervormingen. Hoewel de Russische burger over het 
algemeen positief is over het nieuwe democratische regime in Rusland, is de 
laatste jaren de vraag gerezen of de burgerlijke maatschappij en de liberale 
democratie überhaupt deel uitmaken van de genetische code van de 
Russische politieke cultuur. Het doel van deze studie is een evaluatie te 
geven van deze complexe vraagstukken. 
De auteur benadert het begrip ‘burgerlijke maatschappij’ als een idee en 
als een maatschappelijk fenomeen omdat dit begrip zowel het normatieve 
concept als de sociale realiteit aanduidt. Deze tweedeling loopt als een rode 
draad door het onderzoek. In de inleiding wordt een theoretisch kader 
geschetst dat onderscheid maakt tussen deze twee analytische componenten. 
In hoofdstuk twee bestudeert de auteur de burgerlijke maatschappij als een 
sociaalmoreel concept en als een onmisbaar element van het democratische 
systeem. Als idee belichaamt de burgerlijke maatschappij de visie op een 
open, pluralistische en liberale samenleving, waarbij vrijwillige en spontane 
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associatie centraal staat. Als maatschappelijk fenomeen fungeert de 
burgerlijke maatschappij als een netwerk van publieke organisaties die 
onafhankelijk zijn van de staat en die invloed kunnen uitoefenen op 
politieke beslissingen. Fundamentele waarden van de burgerlijke 
maatschappij zijn vrijwillige associatie en dissociatie tussen burgers, 
individuele autonomie en rechten, pluraliteit, legaliteit, gelijkheid, 
openbaarheid en publieke verantwoording. Daarmee vormt de burgerlijke 
maatschappij een randvoorwaarde voor de totstandkoming van een gezonde 
en goedfunctionerende liberale democratie. Omgekeerd voorziet een 
democratisch systeem in de noodzakelijke voorwaarden voor het bestaan 
van de burgerlijke maatschappij, zoals de rechtsstaat en de constitutionele 
erkenning van  politieke-, sociale- en mensenrechten.  
De democratische transformaties in Oost- en Midden-Europa hebben 
bevestigd dat een robuuste burgerlijke maatschappij niet spontaan kan 
ontstaan. Integendeel, het vereist een grondige voorbereiding op 
institutioneel niveau en in de sfeer van publieke ethiek. Dit heeft Westerse 
wetenschappers geïnspireerd om de vraag te onderzoeken of de burgerlijke 
maatschappij een ‘goede maatschappij’ is en waarom. De auteur bestudeert 
de morele dilemma’s die inherent zijn aan een normatieve fundering voor de 
burgerlijke maatschappij. Het kerndilemma van het discours is hoe men 
individuele vrijheid kan verzoenen met het gemeenschappelijke belang. De 
auteur heeft diverse oplossingen van dit dilemma in twee theoretische 
stromingen verdeeld, namelijk de liberale theorie van de burgerlijke 
maatschappij en de theorie van deliberatieve democratie. De liberale theorie 
is niet één theorie maar omvat diverse concepties die verenigd zijn in de 
onderstelling dat de hedendaagse burgerlijke maatschappij een polycentrisch 
en pluralistisch karakter heeft. De aanhangers van de theorie van 
deliberatieve democratie erkennen dat de gemeenschappelijke visie in de 
moderne gedifferentieerde maatschappij samengesteld is uit verschillende 
conflictueuze opvattingen van haar burgers. Ze wijzen naar publieke 
redenering en rationele consensus als de oplossing voor de potentiële 
conflicten tussen uiteenlopende maatschappelijke visies.  
Hoofdstuk drie werpt een sociologische blik op het probleem van 
pluralisme en suggereert daarmee een sociologische inbedding in de theorie 
van de burgerlijke maatschappij. Vanuit dit bredere sociaalwetenschappelijke 
kader analyseert de auteur de structuur en de dynamiek van de moderne 
samenleving. Het sleutelbegrip in het sociologische exposé van de moderne 
maatschappij is differentiatie, een begrip dat verschillende interpretaties kent 
binnen de sociologie. Max Weber ontwikkelde de theorie van differentiatie 
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van waardesferen. Talcott Parsons benadrukte het structurele aspect in het 
proces van maatschappelijke differentiatie. Daarbij conceptualiseerde hij de 
burgerlijke maatschappij als een subsysteem van “societal community” die een 
integratieve functie uitvoert. Niklas Luhmann weigerde om de burgerlijke 
maatschappij tot één bepaald subsystemen van de gedifferentieerde 
maatschappij te reduceren en pleitte voor een waardevrije conceptie van de 
burgerlijke maatschappij in termen van Gesellschaft.  
De theorie van functionele differentiatie beschrijft het proces van 
onttakeling van de premoderne hiërarchische sociale orde en het ontstaan 
van een complexe pluralistische en zelfsturende moderne maatschappij. Het 
concept van de burgerlijke maatschappij is gebaseerd op de visie van een 
liberale, pluralistische en tolerante maatschappij en stemt daarom overeen 
met het model van een functioneel gedifferentieerde maatschappij 
(Gesellschaft). De theorie van functionele differentiatie completeert het 
politiek-filosofisch debat over de burgerlijke maatschappij omdat deze een 
empirische referent biedt voor de normatieve principes die ten grondslag 
liggen aan de burgerlijke maatschappij, zoals autonomie, pluraliteit, 
gelijkheid, vrijwillige associatie en dissociatie, publiekelijkheid en legaliteit. 
In hoofdstuk vier wordt een religieus perspectief geïntroduceerd. 
Aangezien het concept van de burgerlijke maatschappij een liberale en 
seculiere wereldvisie veronderstelt, lijkt dit in strijd te zijn met de religieuze 
wereldvisie. Deze problematische verhouding wordt benaderd vanuit een 
historisch en intercultureel perspectief. Ten eerste bestudeert de auteur de 
verhoudingen tussen religie en secularisme binnen het Westerse 
christendom. Zij toont aan dat religie en secularisme niet elkaars 
antagonisten zijn, maar eerder verwikkeld zijn in een relatie van wederzijdse 
beïnvloeding. Vervolgens wendt de auteur zich tot de Russische 
geschiedenis en onderzoekt de verhoudingen tussen het Orthodoxe 
christendom en de seculiere maatschappij in Rusland. Dit historische 
onderzoek laat zien hoe de Russische staat door de nationalisatie van de 
Russische Orthodoxe Kerk de dualistische tendens binnen de Orthodoxie 
versterkte. Ten slotte wordt een religieuze conceptie van de burgerlijke 
maatschappij voorgesteld op basis van de theorieën van Semën Frank en 
Vladimir Solov’ëv.  
Deze filosofen funderen een liberale christelijke visie van een 
pluralistische en tolerante burgerlijke maatschappij op concepten uit de 
Orthodoxe theologische traditie. Het concept sobornost’ kan uitgelegd 
worden als de ontologische eenheid van alle individuen in een gemeenschap 
zonder dat deze hun unieke persoonlijkheid verliezen. Deze spirituele 
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eenheid van sobornost’ wordt in empirische vorm uitgedrukt als 
obshchestvennost’, oftewel de publieke sfeer. Het morele streven naar de 
spirituele eenheid wordt gemotiveerd door het ideaal van Bogochelovechestvo, of 
Godmensdom.  
Met deze discussie wordt het theoretische deel van het onderzoek 
afgesloten. Vanuit de verworven theoretische inzichten analyseert de auteur 
het specifieke karakter van de burgerlijke maatschappij in post-sovjet 
Rusland.  
Hoofdstuk vijf onderzoekt het probleem van institutionele zwakte van 
de Russische burgerlijke maatschappij in de context van de publieke moraal. 
Het accepteren van de democratische constitutie is niet voldoende voor een 
succesvolle transitie naar een democratisch model. Een adequaat 
functionerend institutioneel netwerk en burgerethos zijn noodzakelijk voor 
het ontstaan en de ontwikkeling van de burgerlijke maatschappij in een 
nieuw democratisch regime. Deze veronderstelling laat de twee verbonden 
problemen zien waarmee de jonge burgerlijke maatschappij in Rusland 
geconfronteerd wordt. Aan de ene kant worstelt de burgerlijke maatschappij 
met het probleem van institutionele zwakte, aan de andere kant lijdt zij aan 
een gebrek aan moreel bewustzijn van haar postcommunistische burgers. 
Door het probleem van institutionele zwakte in verband te brengen met 
publieke ethiek toont de auteur aan dat het institutioneel deficit een gevolg 
is van sociaal wantrouwen en vervreemding van participatie in publieke 
organisaties.  
De samenleving in post-sovjet Rusland wordt gekenmerkt door een 
diepgaand dualisme dat evident is op het niveau van de politiek, de 
economie en de publieke ethiek. Met betrekking tot de politiek stagneert de 
emancipatie van de publieke sfeer doordat de staat de politieke macht 
monopoliseert. De regeerperiode van Putin wordt gekenmerkt door een 
hybride bestuursmodel. Aan de ene kant erkent de staat burgerrechten, zoals 
een publieke opinie en verkiezingsrechten. Aan de andere kant probeert de 
staat het publieke leven meer te controleren, onder andere door diverse 
artificiële fora voor burgerparticipatie op te richten zoals de Openbare 
Kamer van de Russische Federatie. Dit hybride bestuursmodel van Putin 
wordt om deze reden ook wel een ‘imitatie democratie’ genoemd. De staat 
onderschat de normatieve waarde van de burgerlijke maatschappij en ziet 
deze eerder als een dreiging voor haar monopolistische macht dan als een 
noodzakelijk element en partner in het democratische bestuur. Hoe meer de 
staat probeert het politieke landschap te egaliseren, hoe minder vrijheid de 
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burgerlijke maatschappij geniet. Zodoende groeit het wederzijdse 
wantrouwen tussen de staat en de burgerlijke maatschappij.  
Op sociaaleconomisch niveau is de Russische samenleving duidelijk 
gepolariseerd. Hoewel de hervormingen in de vroege jaren negentig de 
markteconomie in gang hebben gezet, hebben ze ook geleid tot een 
onrechtvaardige verdeling van economische middelen. Hiermee is een kloof 
geschapen tussen de nieuwe financiële elite en een meerderheid van 
teleurgestelde en gedesoriënteerde burgers. Vermoedelijk daarom hebben 
veel Russen het politieke programma van Putin toegejuicht, waarin publieke 
orde, economische stabiliteit, sociale rechtvaardigheid en strenge 
overheidscontrole over de corporatieve sector als politieke speerpunten 
werden gepresenteerd.  
Op het niveau van de publieke ethiek is het dualisme nog duidelijker te 
onderscheiden. De gemiddelde post-sovjet burger ondersteunt het idee van 
de democratie in abstracte termen, maar weigert in democratische instituties 
te participeren. De economische liberalisatie en de gegeven politieke 
vrijheden hebben aan de gemiddelde Russische burger niet de verwachte 
voordelen gebracht. Russen zijn teleurgesteld in de democratische 
hervormingen en vertrouwen liever instituties die voorspelbaarheid en 
stabiliteit garanderen zoals de president, de Russische Orthodoxe Kerk, het 
leger en de nationale veiligheidsdienst. Aan de andere kant wantrouwen 
Russische burgers de instituties die individuele participatie en 
verantwoordelijkheid veronderstellen zoals het parlement, de rechtbank, 
vakbonden, locale autoriteiten en politieke partijen.  
De auteur stelt drie maatregelen voor om het democratische project in 
Rusland te faciliteren: (1) het bevorderen van sociale differentiatie, (2) 
ruimte geven aan de autonome en rationele opinie van de burgers en (3) het 
effectief institutionaliseren van spontane burgerlijke initiatieven. Deze 
maatregelen dienen ertoe om een effectieve dialoog tussen de maatschappij 
en het politieke systeem te bevorderen. 
Ten eerste leidt sociale differentiatie tot een gediversifieerd politiek 
landschap omdat er in een gedifferentieerde zelfsturende maatschappij meer 
kanalen bestaan voor een open communicatie tussen de politiek en de 
maatschappij. Ten tweede hebben burgers een legitieme ruimte nodig voor 
vrij publiek debat, waarin zij een autonome en rationele opinie kunnen 
uiten. De Russische staat dient zich bewust te zijn van haar dienende rol, zij 
is immers één van de functies die de maatschappij zelf in het leven heeft 
geroepen. Het is het publiek dat de democratische staat van de 
noodzakelijke feedback voorziet in de vorm van consensus en hierbij de 
SAMENVATTING 
438 
 
kernfunctie van het politieke systeem ondersteunt. Ten derde vereist het 
uiten van een autonome en rationele opinie een effectieve 
institutionalisering van spontane burgerlijke initiatieven. Omdat de 
Russische burgerlijke maatschappij een tekort heeft aan institutionele 
communicatiekanalen met de staat, kunnen de burgers hun voorkeuren en 
belangen moeilijk overbrengen aan de politieke macht. Publieke 
ontevredenheid uit zich daarom vooral in (agressieve) vormen van protest. 
Een aanzienlijk deel van de burgerlijke maatschappij in Rusland komt 
hierdoor terecht in een netwerk van informele, ongesanctioneerde en niet-
geregistreerde organisaties. 
De auteur concludeert dat de uiteindelijke betekenis van de 
democratische transformaties niet alleen bestaat uit het veranderen van de 
politieke, economische en constitutionele structuren van een 
postcommunistische maatschappij, maar ook uit het overbruggen van de 
kloof tussen de nominale democratie en de feitelijke goedfunctionerende 
democratie. Dit kan bereikt worden door de hiërarchische relaties tussen de 
staat, de maatschappij en het individu te vervangen door een cultuur van 
zelforganisatie en zelfbestuur. Deze verandering vereist echter dat burgers 
vertrouwen hebben in zichzelf, elkaar en het systeem van de democratie. 
Sociaal vertrouwen en burgerethos zijn daarom de belangrijkste 
voorwaarden voor participatie in de burgerlijke maatschappij.  
Hoewel de Russische politieke cultuur en geschiedenis beide kunnen 
worden opgevat als een struikelblok voor de zich onwikkelende burgerlijke 
maatschappij, bevatten ze ook onaangeboorde bronnen die een 
constructieve invloed kunnen hebben op de democratische hervormingen. 
Daarom ligt de focus van hoofdstuk zes op de factor ‘Orthodoxie’ binnen 
de opkomst van de burgerlijke maatschappij in hedendaags Rusland.  
In de eerste plaats onderzoekt de auteur, vanuit een sociologisch 
perspectief, de civiele rol van de Russische Orthodoxe Kerk (ROK) in de 
context van een seculiere democratie. Sinds de ineenstorting van de Sovjet 
Unie en de maatschappelijke liberalisatie tijdens de perestrojka kan men 
duidelijk het toenemende belang zien van de ROK in het maatschappelijke 
debat. Na zeventig jaar van onderdrukking heeft de ROK een prominente 
en geprivilegieerde plaats ingenomen in de publieke arena, omdat zij een 
nieuwe nationale identiteit biedt ter vervanging van de communistische 
ideologie.  
In de tweede plaats onderzoekt de auteur of de Orthodoxe denktraditie 
een alternatieve en goedbeargumenteerde conceptie van de burgerlijke 
maatschappij kan bieden. Vanuit een essentialistisch perspectief wordt 
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bekeken hoe de ROK reageert op het proces van modernisatie en zich 
aanpast aan de seculiere burgerlijke maatschappij. De auteur presenteert drie 
benaderingen om de verhouding te beschrijven van de Orthodoxe traditie 
tot de burgerlijke maatschappij: (1) een gepolitiseerde versie van de 
Russische Orthodoxie die zich voordoet in de beweging van 
fundamentalisme, (2) een conservatieve positie van de ROK die 
uitgesproken is in haar officiële sociale doctrine en (3) een liberale 
hervormende trend die probeert de conservatieve sociale leer van de ROK 
te herzien naar een humanistisch en meer democratisch perspectief.  
Orthodox fundamentalisme schrijft geen positieve waarde toe aan de 
seculiere politieke macht en de zelfstandige en zelfbesturende burgerlijke 
maatschappij. Fundamentalisme bemoeit zich met politieke zaken en stelt 
een theocratie voor in de plaats van een democratie. De officiële leer van de 
ROK (Orthodox conservatisme) kiest voor een middenweg en levert een 
genuanceerder antwoord. De ROK tolereert de seculiere democratische 
staat en de burgerlijke maatschappij als onvermijdelijke, maar tijdelijke 
realiteiten, waarin wederzijdse bemoeienis is uitgesloten. De ROK wil de 
verhoudingen tussen staat en kerk zien zoals is voorgeschreven in het 
normatieve model van de Byzantijnse symfonija. Hierbij wordt de spirituele 
gemeenschap van de christelijke Kerk (de Ekklesia) geïdentificeerd met de 
politieke gemeenschap van het Byzantijnse Rijk. Tegelijkertijd erkent de 
Kerk dat dit model onrealiseerbaar is binnen de Russische staat die zichzelf 
niet als Orthodox begrijpt. De ROK spreekt haar voorkeur uit noch voor 
het bestaande democratische systeem noch voor andere politieke systemen. 
Deze onverschilligheid is een gevolg van de dualistische tendens in de 
Orthodoxe denktraditie die een duidelijk onderscheid maakt tussen 
‘spiritueel’ en ‘seculier.’ Door het verdedigen van het ideaal van Ekklesia als 
de ultieme vorm van menselijke gemeenschap, pleiten conservatieve 
theologen voor eschatologisatie in plaats van modernisatie. In tegenstelling 
tot deze conservatieve positie van de ROK beweren liberale theologen dat 
christendom niet in tegenspraak is met het democratische principe van 
gewetensvrijheid. Ze staan positief ten opzichte van modernisatie en 
omarmen de seculiere burgerlijke maatschappij als een forum waarbinnen de 
ROK, net zo als andere religieuze organisaties, haar geloof publiek en legaal 
kan uiten en praktiseren, zonder dat de seculiere staat zich hiermee bemoeit.  
Niettemin blijft de Orthodoxe denktraditie haar opvatting van de 
burgerlijke maatschappij funderen op het ideaal van eenheid (sobornost’). 
Anders dan de seculiere burgerlijke maatschappij, impliceert sobornost’ niet 
het sociale contract tussen individuele mensen, maar belichaamt een 
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mysterieus gevoel van consensus tussen individuen, dat bereikt wordt 
middels een radicale transformatie volgens het ideaal van Bogochelovechestvo. 
Het Orthodoxe concept van de burgerlijke maatschappij verdedigt 
gemeenschap en wederzijdse dienstbaarheid, in contrast tot individuele 
autonomie en rechten. In deze zin onderscheidt de Orthodoxe sociale leer 
zich van de sociale denktraditie van de Westerse Kerken: Orthodoxie is 
meer begaan met het gemeenschappelijke ideaal van het sociale leven dan 
met het individu en zijn rechten. 
 
De belangrijkste conclusies van deze studie kunnen als volgt worden 
samengevat. De evaluatie van het democratische project in post-sovjet 
Rusland heeft aangetoond dat er twee dimensies betrokken zijn in de 
analyse van de burgerlijke maatschappij: de empirisch-descriptieve dimensie 
waarin de burgerlijke maatschappij beschreven kan worden als een 
maatschappelijk fenomeen, en de filosofisch-conceptuele dimensie waarin 
de burgerlijke maatschappij een normatief idee vertegenwoordigt.  
De problematische opkomst van de burgerlijke maatschappij in 
postcommunistische regimes maakte het tot een uitdaging om het 
normatief-ethische ideaal en de sociaal-politieke realiteit bij elkaar te 
brengen. In hedendaags Rusland is de burgerlijke maatschappij sinds ruim 
twintig jaar een realiteit: er bestaat feitelijk een netwerk van publieke 
organisaties die functioneren op de grens van de politiek, de corporatieve 
sector en de privé sfeer. Tegelijkertijd blijft de burgerlijke maatschappij voor 
Rusland een vrij nieuwe en onbekende realiteit. Zoals de versnelde 
democratische transformatie in Oost- en Centraal-Europa laat zien, ontstaat 
de burgerlijke maatschappij niet vanuit een historisch vacuüm, maar is deze 
afhankelijk van diepgewortelde tradities en concepties.  
Een bijzonder probleem van de Russische burgerlijke maatschappij is het 
ontbreken van een ontwikkelde publieke sfeer en van een ontwikkelde 
zelfconceptie van de maatschappij als een onafhankelijke, erkende entiteit 
die gerechtigd is om in het politieke proces te participeren op één lijn met 
de staat. De politieke macht in hedendaags Rusland neigt naar een autoritair 
karakter terwijl de politieke sfeer steeds meer gebureaucratiseerd raakt en 
vervreemd van de samenleving. Dezelfde tendens doet zich voor in de sfeer 
van de economie, omdat de economische verhoudingen zijn doordrongen 
van een ethiek van individualisme terwijl het gemeenschappelijke ideaal 
verdwijnt. De Russische burgerlijke maatschappij wordt continu verdrukt 
tussen het economische individualisme en het politieke autoritarisme en 
moet vechten voor een legitieme plaats tussen de staat en de markt.  
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De titel Struggling for Civility slaat op het doornachtige pad dat de 
Russische maatschappij sinds de transitie heeft bewandeld. De opkomst van 
de burgerlijke maatschappij impliceert voor democratische regimes een 
maatschappelijke strijd voor het ideaal van een open, tolerante en beschaafde 
maatschappij. 
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Настоящая диссертация «В борьбе за гражданственность. Идея и 
реальность гражданского общества» является результатом 
мультидисциплинарного исследования, освещающего возникновение 
и развитие гражданского общества в постсоветской России. Автор 
исследует политические, социологические и религиозно-
философские теории касательно гражданского общества и проводит 
связи с практикой. Ядром диссертации является сравнение идеи и 
реальности гражданского общества как на Западе, так и в России, 
между тем как историческая перспектива проясняет глубоколежащие 
причины явлений в современной России.  
За последние двадцать лет дискуссия вокруг понятия гражданского 
общества вновь ожила благодаря демократическим трансформациям в 
Восточной и Центральной Европе. Вследствие того, что гражданское 
общество часто ассоциируется с продуктом западно-европейской 
цивилизации, ученые и политики стали сомневаться, сможет ли 
«гражданское общество» действительно стать адекватным 
инструментом в проведении демократических реформ в постсоветской 
России. Несмотря на то, что россияне в целом позитивно оценивают 
новый демократический режим, в последние годы все чаще стал 
возникать вопрос, содержатся ли такие понятия как гражданское 
общество и либеральная демократия в генетическом коде русской 
политической культуры. Цель настоящего исследования – внести 
ясность в эти сложные вопросы.  
Автор воспринимает понятие «гражданское общество» 
одновременно как нормативную идею и как социальный феномен, 
поскольку данное понятие обозначает и концепт, и общественную 
реальность. Такое двухчастное понимание гражданского общества 
является основополагающим в настоящем исследовании. Во 
вступлении автор создает теоретический кадр, в котором проводится 
аналитическое разделение между дескриптивным и нормативным 
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компонентами понятия гражданского общества. Во второй главе 
«Гражданское общество как общественно-нравсвенный концепт» 
раскрывается понимание гражданского общества в рамках 
демократической системы. В качестве идеи гражданское общество 
воплощает видение отрытого, плюралистического и либерального 
общества, основанного на непринужденной и непосредственной 
ассоциации, то есть общении, между гражданами. С другой стороны, 
гражданское общество понятое как социальный феномен 
функционирует в качестве сети общественных организаций, 
независимых от государства и оказывающих влияние на решения 
политиков. Из предложенной двухчастной концепции следует, что 
волонтерское участие в объединениях граждан или уход из них, 
независимость и права индивидума, плюрализм, легальность, 
равенство, гласность и общественная ответственность составляют 
коренные ценности гражданского общества. Воплощая данные 
принципы в реальность, гражданское общество создает необходимые 
условия для здоровой и оптимально функционирующей демократии. 
В свою очередь, демократическая система как через создание 
правового государства, так и через конституционное признание 
политических, социальных и человеческих прав граждан является 
гарантом для успешного существования гражданского общества. 
Демократические трансформации в Восточной и Центральной 
Европе показали, что гражданское общество не может развиться 
внезапно, без создания необходимых условий на институциональном 
уровне и в сфере общественной этики. Эти выводы побудили 
западных ученых задуматься над вопросом, является ли гражданское 
общество «хорошим», правильным и нравственным обществом, и 
почему. Автор диссертации исследует нравственные дилеммы, 
неминуемо возникающие при попытке создать нормативное 
обоснование гражданского общества. Главная дилемма заключается в 
вопросе, как совместить свободу индивидуальных граждан с 
общественным благом. Разнообразные ответы на данный вопрос автор 
разделяет на два основных направления, а именно на либеральную 
теорию гражданского общества и теорию делиберативной 
демократии. Либеральная теория не является единой теорией, а скорее 
состоит из различных концепций, объединенных одним важным 
предположением о том, что гражданское общество имеет 
полицентричный и плюралистический характер. Последователи 
теории делиберативной демократии придерживаются мнения, что в 
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современном дифференцированном обществе общественное согласие 
состоит из множества конфликтующих между собой убеждений 
граждан. Для разрешения возможных конфликтов предлагаются 
рациональная дискуссия, рассуждение и компромисс. 
Третья глава «Социологичекое обоснование теории гражданского 
общества» подходит к проблеме плюрализма с социологической 
стороны, исследуя структуру и динамику современного общества. 
Ключевым концептом в социологической дескрипции современного 
типа общества является дифференциация. Этот концепт прошел 
значительную эволюцию в социологической науке двадцатого века. 
Макс Вебер развил теорию дифференциации ценностных сфер. 
Вспоследствии Тэлкотт Парсонс исследовал структурный аспект в 
процессе социетальной дифференциации. При этом он предложил 
понимать гражданское общество как подсистему «социетальной 
общины», выполняющей интегративную функцию. Подобная 
редукция гражданского общества в одну из подсистем 
дифференцированного обшества была в дальнейшем опровергнута 
Никласом Луманном. На основе теории Луманна автор предлагает 
свободную от ценностных суждений концепцию гражданского 
общества, понимаемого в терминах общества как всеобъемлющей 
системы (Gesellschaft), а не как коллектива или общины (Gemeinschaft). 
Теория функциональной дифференциации описывает процесс 
разветвления и распада премодерного иерархического общественного 
строя и возникновения сложной системы общества модерна, 
характеризующегося плюрализмом и культурой самоуправления. 
Поскольку концепт гражданского общества воплощает идею 
либерального, плюралистического и толерантного общества, его 
можно конкретизировать в рамках модели функционально 
дифференцированного общества (Gesellschaft). Таким образом, 
социологическая теория функциональной дифференциации 
дополняет политико-философское понимание гражданского 
общества, ибо она эмпиричеки подтверждает принципы, на которых 
основано гражданское общество. 
Четвертая глава «Гражданское общество и религия. Взгляд со 
стороны Запада и Востока» рассматривает взаимоотношения 
гражданского общества и религии. Поскольку гражданское общество 
предполагает либеральное и секулярное мировоззрение, оно часто 
противопоставляется религии. Однако данная гипотеза оспаривается 
автором и переоценивается с исторической и межкультурной 
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перспективы. Обращаясь к истории Западного Христианства, автор 
показывает, что взаимоотношения религии и секулярного общества 
развивались в условиях их взаимного динамичного влияния. Однако в 
России процесс секуляризации принял иной характер. Заметное 
вмешательство государства в сферу религиозной жизни не только 
придало стимул к национализации Русской Православной Церкви, но 
и усугубило дуалистическую тенденцию, присущую православному 
мировоззрению в целом. Последнее обстоятельство позволило 
Православной Церкви сконцентрироваться на свой внутренней 
динамике и самопонимании как Богочеловеческого института и 
отгородиться от насущных проблем секулярного общества. 
Отдельное внимание уделяется религиозной концепции 
гражданского общества, развитой на основе теорий Владимира 
Соловьева и Семена Франка. Заимствуя концепты из православной 
теологической традиции, философы убедительно обосновывают 
либерально-христианское понимание гражданского общества. 
Соборность, обозначая онтологическое единство индивидов в 
духовном общении, проявляется в эмпирическом измерении в качестве 
общественности; иным словами, соборность является духовной 
основой секулярного гражданского общества. В то время как 
нравственное стремление отдельных членов общества к достижению 
соборности мотивируется идеалом Богочеловечества. 
Данная дискуссия завершает теоретическую часть исследования. 
Приобретенные теоретические взгляды используются в последующих 
главах для анализа специфики гражданского общества в России. 
В пятой главе «Гражданское общество в постсоветской России. 
Институциональная слабость в контексте общественной 
нравственности» исследуется проблема институционального дефицита 
с позиции публичной этики. Очевидно, что принятие 
демократической конституции оказалось недостаточным условием для 
успешного преобразования российской политико-экономической 
системы по примеру западных либеральных демократий. Причиной 
подобной кризисной траснформации послужило отсутствие адекватно 
функционирующей сети демократических институтов, то есть 
отсутствие гражданского общества. Это утверждение позволяет 
выделить две взаимосвязанные проблемы: с одной стороны, 
становление российского гражданского общества затрудняется 
институциональным дефицитом, с другой стороны, оно также 
затрудняется отсутствием нравственного этоса гражданственности, 
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которое характерно для многих посткоммунистических обществ, 
являясь последствием укорененного общественного недоверия и 
отчуждения граждан от участия в общественных организациях.   
Общество постсоветской России проникнуто глубоким дуализмом, 
различимым на уровне политики, экономики и общественной этики. 
Стратегия государства, нацеленная на монополизацию политической 
власти, задерживает эмансипацию публичной сферы, чему также 
способствует гибридная система управления, созданная в эпоху 
Путина. С одной стороны, государственная власть признает 
гражданские права, такие как право на свободу общественного мнения 
и право выборов. С другой стороны, государство стремится как можно 
жестче контролировать общественную жизнь посредством создания 
искусственных форумов для гражданского участия. Неслучайно 
данную модель ученые называют «имитационной демократией». 
Государство недооценивает нормативную роль гражданского 
общества, расценивая его скорее как угрозу своей монополистической 
власти, чем как партнера в системе демократического управления. Чем 
усерднее государство пытается выровнять политический ландшафт, 
тем меньше свободы действия остается для гражданского общества. В 
результате, взаимное недоверие государства и гражданского общества 
возрастает. 
На социально-экономическом уровне дуализм проявляется в 
поляризации современного российского общества. Несмотря на то, 
что либеральные реформы были направлены на переход к рыночной 
экономике и создание условий для преуспевания всех граждан, 
фактически они привели к несправедливому и неравному 
перераспределению экономических ресурсов. Возникло расщепление 
общества на тонкую прослойку новой финансовой элиты и на 
большинство разочарованных и дезориентированных обедневших 
граждан. Вероятно, разочарование в последствиях перехода к 
рыночной экономике обусловило массовое одобрение путинской 
программы, в которой общественный порядок, экономическая 
стабильность, социальная справедливость и жесткий государственный 
контроль над корпоративным сектором заняли центральное место. 
В сфере общественной этики дуализм проявился еще с большей 
интенсивностью. Большинство постсоветских граждан поддерживают 
идею демократии в абстрактных терминах, но в то же время 
отказываются участвовать в демократических институтах. Поскольку 
либерализация рынка и политические свободы не принесли 
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ожидаемых успехов, россияне преимущественно оказывают 
предпочтение тем институтам, которые гарантируют стабильность и 
предсказуемость (как, например, фигура президента, Русская 
Православная Церковь, армия и служба безопасности). Вместе с тем, 
россияне не доверяют тем институтам, которые требуют 
индивидуального участия и ответственности, таким как парламент, суд, 
профсоюзы, местные власти и политические партии. 
В диссертационной работе автор предлагает возможные способы 
содействия демократическому развитию России: (1) предоставить 
пространство для дальнейшей  социетальной дифференциации 
общества, (2) стимулировать автономное и рациональное мнение 
граждан и (3) проводить эффективную институализацию 
добровольных гражданских инициатив.  
Во-первых, социетальная дифференциация способствует 
разнообразному и многогранному политическому ландшафту, потому 
что дифференцированное самоуправляющееся общество содержит 
большее количество каналов общения между сферой политики и 
общественностью. Во-вторых, в рамках демократии граждане 
нуждаются в законном пространстве для свободной общественной 
дискуссии, где они могли бы высказывать свое автономное и 
рациональное мнение. Для создания этого условия российское 
государство должно переоценить свою функцию как служебную по 
отношению к обществу. Ведь легитимность демократической системы 
основана на центральной роли общественности, которая обеспечивает 
связь политики с обществом посредством общественного согласия или 
протеста. Наконец, выражение автономного и рационального мнения 
граждан требует эффективной институализации добровольных 
гражданских инициатив. По причине того, что российское 
гражданское общество страдает от недостатка институционных 
каналов для общения с государственной властью, граждане не в 
состоянии донести свои интересы и предпочтения до сферы 
политики. В результате, общественное недовольство часто принимает 
агрессивные формы протеста, а все большая часть организаций 
гражданского общества оказывается за рамками легального 
существования, превращаясь в сеть неформальных, 
несанкционированных и незарегистрированных организаций. 
Из вышестоящего автор делает вывод, что значение 
демократических трансформаций заключается не только в изменении 
политических, экономических и конституциональных структур, но 
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также в преодолении разрыва между номинальной и оптимально 
функционирующей демократией. Данная цель может быть достигнута 
путем замены иерархических отношений между государством, 
обществом и гражданами культурой самоуправления и 
самоорганизации. Такое изменение требует, чтобы граждане имели 
уверенность в себе, доверяли друг другу и доверяли системе 
демократии. Общественное доверие и гражданский этос являются, 
таким образом, главными условиями для развития гражданского 
общества. 
В шестой главе «Гражданское общество и Православное 
Христианство в России» автор вновь обращается к проблеме религии 
и рассматривает фактор православия в демократизации российского 
общества. В первую очередь исследуется общественная роль Русской 
Православной Церкви (РПЦ) в контексте секулярной демократии. 
Распад Советского Союза и либерализация общества в эпоху 
перестройки позволили РПЦ активно участвовать в общественной 
дискуссии. Сформулировав новую идеологическую позицию в замену 
разрушевшегося социалистического идеала, РПЦ заняла видное и 
привилегированное место на публичной арене 
посткоммунистического общества.  
Далее с точки зрения теологического дискурса освещается вопрос, 
смогла ли традиция православной мысли предложить альтернативную, 
хорошо обоснованную концепцию гражданского общества. Данная 
дискуссия позволяет прояснить реакцию РПЦ на процесс 
модерницации и показать, в какой мере РПЦ смогла принять идею 
секулярного гражданского общества. Автор выделяет три основные 
позиции во взаимоотношениях РПЦ и гражданского общества: (1) 
политизированную позицию, выражающуюся в течении 
фундаментализма, (2) консервативную позицию РПЦ, 
сформулированную в «Основах Социальной Концепции РПЦ» и (3) 
либерально-преобразовательное течение, стремящееся пересмотреть 
консервативную позицию РПЦ с гуманистической перспективы. 
С точки зрения православного фундаментализма, ни секулярная 
политическая власть, ни автономное самоуправляющееся гражданское 
общество не имеют позитивной ценности. Активно вмешиваясь в 
сферу политики, фундаментализм предпочитает теократию всесто 
демократии. Официальная социальная доктрина РПЦ выбирает 
умеренную консервативную позицию, терпящую секулярное 
демократическое государство и гражданское общество как неминуемые, 
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но преходящие  реальности мирского существования, не требующие 
особого внимания и участия. В идеале, РПЦ желала бы строить свои 
отношения с государством по принципу византийской симфонии, где 
духовная община Церкви (Ekklesia) совпадала с политической 
общиной Византийской Империи. В то же время, РПЦ признает, что 
данная модель не осуществима в условиях современного российского 
демократического государства, которое, согласно конституции, не 
является православным. Таким образом, РПЦ не высказывает 
предпочтения ни настоящей либерально-демократической системе, ни 
другим политическим режимам. По-видимому, такое безразличие 
является последствием общей дуалистической тенденции 
православного миропонимания, проводящего четкое разделение 
между миром духовным и светским. Преследуя идеал Экклесии как 
высшей формы человечекого сообщества, консервативные богословы 
призывают к эсхатологизации взамен модернизации. В отличии от 
консервативной позиции РПЦ, либеральные богословы убеждены, что 
христианство не противоречит демократическому принципу свободы 
совести. Соответственно, они приветствуют модернизацию и 
принимают секулярное гражданское общество в качестве форума, в 
рамках которого РПЦ, наравне с другими религиозными 
организациями, может беспрепятственно и легально исповедовать 
свою веру без вмешательства секулярного государства.  
В вопросах социальной этики традиция православной 
теологической мысли остается верна идеалу соборности. Так, на 
основе идеала соборности она строит свое понимание гражданского 
общества несмотря на то, что секулярное гражданское общество 
предполагает социальный контракт, в то время как соборность 
воплощает мистичекое чувтво духовного согласия или общения. 
Соответственно, в центре православной концепции гражданского 
общества стоит идеал общины и взаимного служения, а не свободы и 
прав индивида. В этом отношении православная социальная доктрина 
отличается от социального учения Западных Церквей. Православие 
сосредоточено скорее на вопросе, как сохранить идеал соборного 
общения в условиях современного общества,  чем на вопросе об 
обосновании и защите индивидуальных человеческих прав.  
 
Главные выводы из диссертационного исследования заключаются в 
следующем. Критически оценивая демократичесий проект в России за 
два последних десятилетия, автор выделила два измерения в анализе 
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гражданского общества: эмпирико-дескриптивное измерение, в 
котором гражданское общество выступает как социальный феномен, 
отражая реальность общественной жизни, и философско-
концептуальное измерение, в котором гражданское общество 
представляет нормативную идею.  
Становление гражданского общества в посткоммунистических 
режимах продемонстрировало, насколько трудно приблизить 
общественно-политическую реальность к нормативно-этическому 
идеалу. В современной России гражданское общество уже как двадцать 
лет стало реальностью: оно состоит из сети общественных 
организаций, часто пересекающихся со сферой политики, 
корпоративным сектором и приватной сферой. В то же время, 
гражданское общество остается для России достаточно новой и 
неизведанной реальностью. Как показали ускоренные 
демократические трансформации в Восточной и Центральной 
Европе, гражданское общество не может возникнуть из исторического 
вакуума, ибо оно нуждается в глубоко укоренившихся традициях и 
концепциях. 
Специфическая проблема российского гражданкого общества 
заключается в недостатке развитой публичной сферы и развитого 
самопонимания общества как независимого, признанного и законного 
участника политического процесса наряду с государством. 
Политическая власть в современной России приобретает 
авторитарный характер, в то время как политическая сфера все более 
бюрократизируется и становится отчужденной от общества. Подобная 
тенденция прослеживается и в сфере экономики, где экономические 
отношения все более проникаются этикой индивидуализма, тогда как 
идеал солидарности и взаимопомощи исчезает. В итоге, российское 
гражданское общество оказывается замкнутым между экономическим 
индивидуализмом и политическим авторитаризмом, будучи 
вынужденным отстаивать свое легитимное место в отношениях как с 
государством, так и с рынком.  
Титул настоящей диссертационной работы «В борьбе за 
гражданственность» призван подчеркнуть тернистый путь, 
пройденный российским обществом со времен перехода к демократии. 
Становление гражданского общества подразумевает прежде всего 
общественную борьбу за идеал отрытого, толерантного и цивильного 
общества.  
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